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Myths of the Eastern Front

Discussion in 'Eastern Europe' started by Comrade General, May 19, 2015.

  1. Tamino

    Tamino Doc - The Deplorable

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    Thanks for this additional information. The issue was Italys' own safety hence knightdepaixs' statement that "Finland is probably most worthwhile to be helped" seems entirely detached from reality. Besides, Italy wanted an empire at the Mediterranean, not Baltic sea.
     
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  2. knightdepaix

    knightdepaix Member

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    Italian commitment in the Eastern front in the 3 armys divisions CSIR are quite neglegible to Italian in North Africa and the Balkans. If El Duce and his companies were determined to help the German cause, deployment in Finland gives a better chance of reaching the White Sea coast or even taking Murmansk. In essence on Finland's side, any deployment shall be most effective and influential in their favor.

    Despite poor performance of both German and possibly Italian due to weather and landscape, Italian presence is better than nothing. Finnish air forces were boosted considerably in planes after the Winter War and thus paved their pilot performance in the C.W.. On the other side of war, were the Red Army in Ukraine where the Italian faced possibly stronger than those in Karelia ? Based on the lightly armed and mobile forces like the CSIR in horse cavalry, tankettes, light tanks, mobile riflemen and some aircrafts, the Italians possibly perform better in difficult terrain of Karelia than on the flatland of Ukraine where Soviet tanks, air support and infantry are. The CSIR participated in second line duties under German Army Group South in taking towns; why can the CSIR not take towns in Karelia and more where the Red Army is probably weaker ?

    Excuse my bluntness if it is, banking on seas of ww2 information could influence analysis. As I noted before, more Russian perspectives are needed.
     
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  3. Tamino

    Tamino Doc - The Deplorable

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    Indeed knightdepaix! :)
    When you just look at the equipment ARMIR had at disposal, everything becomes clear: besides their obsolete "formidable" tanks equipped with 20mm and 47mm guns, they have received from Germans 12 (twelve) Mark IV tanks and several captured Russian tanks. Unprepared for real winters, they have been doomed at the beginning of Mussolonis' adventure at the east. Mussolini really has deserved to be hung.


    Fiat-Ansaldo L6/40
    [​IMG]
     
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  4. knightdepaix

    knightdepaix Member

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    Sorry for bluntness. If I could be told how to get my point across with dignity, please inform me. :cool:

    Did the Finnish land forces in the C.W. have excellent equipment to begin the combat with ? Bicycles were used too.

    Besides the German, non of its co-belligerents were well equiped for the war in the East but Blitzkrieg was exactly targeted for this warfare: short sharp thrust onto enemy territories for the prize Moscow and other. If German forces were formidable to one of the Allies, the war would have been different and probably like ww1 deja-vu when the weaker allies would deploy defensive depth like that in the Battle of Kursk. Thus obsolete equipment hurts dearly the performance but for FInland where its national security was grave, any help is good. As you delineated, Italian equipment is obsolete and the troops fought not much on the frontline at the beginning of the OB which really counted for Finland. Italian planes could help second line duties in transport because of its advantage in existing unified command and maintenance. Reliability counts more than performance in frontline dogfights and whatsnot.

    If Italy waited until 1942 or 1943 when its troops would have got better for winter, Finland would have already halted the advance in Karelia. Finland made the call whether to advance. Since it entangled with Germany already, Finland needs to secure the border for the inevitable Soviet attack. For Italy, the war in North Africa deteriorated so much that sending troops overseas is dropping morale which would be better used for guarding the homeland peninsula. So window exists only in 1941 or early 1942, Italian is indeed more free in regards to preoccupations of the co-belligerents. Spainish División Azul fought in the advance towards Moscow and in Leningrad. If Italian bodies are more suited than Spanish to colder climate, they shall fight at Leningrad and Karelia too.

    As Italian is fighting in Finland or adjacent territories, not deep in Soviet territories like where the ARMIR or División Azul perform, Italian can be withdrawn more easily in comparison to facing the Red Army. No matter where the depolyments are, Spanish and Italian forces were eventually withdrawn. The exit strategy shall be accounted too although no participation at the beginning is the easier way out the two fronts war between the S.U. and the Allies in Western Europe and North America.
     
  5. steverodgers801

    steverodgers801 Member

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    The Finns were unimpressed with the German ability to fight in the far north, so how would the Italians be any better? The issue is that the Italian soldiers could be okay if they had adequate leadership, but the majority of officers had no concern for their troops.
     
  6. Karjala

    Karjala Don Quijote

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    Perhaps the Italian troops indeed could have been moved to the Karelian Isthmus in 1941 and likely the conditions there in the summer wouldn't have been as difficult as in elsewhere in Karelia/Kola. However there was not supposed to be any need for any additional troops then. The Germans were supposed to win the soviets in a couple of months anyway and the Finnish army was only supposed to follow the retreating russkies.

    When it became obvious, that the new war was not going to be a short one, it was already winter and the Italians far away in Ukraine. Moving them to Finland would have been too late for the summer 1941. By the next summer the Finnish offensive have already been stopped and some of the troops discharged. The Italians naturally would have helped even then, but they would have had to be replaced in Ukraine.

    For the overall outcome of the war just moving the Italians from one place to another wouldn't have changed much.

    Naturally in the case of peace with Russia and Germany it would have most likely included the peace between Finland and Russia too.

    I wouldn't stress too much that White Sea port idea. We preferred to keep our own ports - Liinahamari included - instead of getting new ones.

    BTW - it's Liinahamari (no "k") in Finnish, unless you specifically want to use the English writing of the Russian writing of that Finnish name...


    AFAIK the soviets indeed would have preferred a separate ceasefire with the Finns in 1941. But why should the Finns have done that then? For the Finns the greatest interest was to get rid of the continuous soviet invasion threat for good. Helping the soviets by getting out of the war in 1941 would have meant helping the mortal enemy of Finland. The situation might have gone back to the days before the Winter War - with the soviets again trying the occupy Finland.

    Besides, jumping of the wagon then would have made the Germans angry. Doing that was impossible, because without the German help there wouldn't have been enough food, arms nor ammunition left while the war was still going on everywhere.


    The soviets were in 1941 ready at max to perhaps return the territories it stole from Finland in the Winter War - no more. For Finland it was not enough then, since that would have only returned the previous status quo, where the soviets were bombing Finland from the East Karelian airports and preparing for new attacks.

    Unfortunately Finland was already locked in that mortal German-soviet combat already from the Winter War on - although it was not realized then.
     
  7. green slime

    green slime Member

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    The various peace overtures the Soviets attempted to send via the Bulgarians were never very serious, and were never treated seriously either. It was an obvious ruse at a time when it was critical to try and gain more time.
     
  8. green slime

    green slime Member

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    This is all far into the realm of fantasy.

    None of Germany's associates were capable, either immediately, or in the long term, of providing Germany with effective military support in the persecution of the war, and were indeed liabilities that had to be supported even if the majority of them, in 1942, increased or at least maintained their manpower commitments on the Eastern Front.

    Finland had in 1941 conscripted one-sixth of its population in expectation that the campaign in the East would be a short one. FInland had to return manpower to the economy when it was clear that wasn't happening. Not doing so would've had serious consequences for Finland.

    The other associates' commitment in 1942 were Hungary (12 divisions) Italy (10) Romania (22) Slovakia (1), and Spain (1). All of these divisions were hopelessly equipped in terms of armour, anti-tank weaponry, signals and transport. In short, in all fundamental aspects of (then) modern warfare.

    German problems are so apparent, no matter were you choose to look: In May 1941, the reserve army's training capacity and holdings were the same as authorised for the campaign in Poland, 18 months earlier. In 1942, the summer campaign began with approx the same number of divisions (179), but 625,000 men under establishment, and with lower priorities than the other services (Luftwaffe, Kreigsmarine, and SS), and the priority on armour, there was no hope for the infantry. We often talk about the effects of the Soviet Purge, but Hitler purged the German officer corps in December 1941, by dismissing no fewer than 35 senior generals, including all three army group commanders. After destroying nearly 7,000 Soviet aircraft during 1941, the Luftwaffe was still not capable of exercising air superiority over most of the Eastern front, and was not in anyway, shape or form, ever hoping to achieve air supremacy against the Soviets. In Spring 1942, the Luftwaffe had ca 2870 combat aircraft, compared to 3450 in June 1941, and 3690 in March 1940. The Soviets were vastly outproducing Germany in fighter aircraft.

    Imagining that shifting a few poorly equipped Italian divisions from Southern Ukraine to Karelia is going to swing the tide against the awakening Soviet colossus is in the realm of madness. It would only add to the Command and Control quagmire; the Finns had refused to operate under a "combined" German command; introducing troops from yet a third nation would not make decision making or co-operation any easier.
     
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  9. knightdepaix

    knightdepaix Member

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    How would one suggest that Italian participation in FInland would turn the tide ? Italy committed only 3 divisions in CSIR in 1941, the only window which Finland advanced into Karelia. Finland needed transport aircrafts (from the video The Airwar Over Finland). CSIR's aircrafts could help as they can fly from Italy to Finland with stops in Germany for refuel. Since 1942, Finland would have dug in and defended for various reasons including what Green Slime typed, "FInland had to return manpower to the economy", regardless of German or Italian participation.

    I found interesting after communication that once a new idea is expressed, it is stretched beyond its limit. How could 3 Italian divisions turn the tide, let alone 100+ aircrafts from CSIR ? Take mini-steps... About the Bulgarian middleman overture to negotiation, only scant information is available. Let us not push to either limits of a ceasefire or breaking off.

    If the argument of not invading the SU is to be pushed ahead, please go ahead. I want to stay within this realm of Finland involvement in ww2. Before 1950s, both Italy and Finland comprised mostly of agrarian population so using their lacking in war machines from weak industrial base to push ahead that they are incapable to put up a good fight is self-refuting. In this case, only Germany barely fights capably the Soviet Union, let alone other co-belligerents. Operation Barbarossa is madness. Without the OB, Finnish forces will not advance into the SU.
     
  10. Karjala

    Karjala Don Quijote

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    Finland needed basically everything - although not as desperately as in the Winter War - but still the transport aircrafts were not in the top of the list.

    But what's the point with the 3 Italian divisions, if they are not going to turn any tide anyway?

    At least I was not saying, that it was the agrarian background of the Italians (or of the Finns for that matter), which made them incapable to put up a good fight. What I meant was, that the Finnish terrain and climate - and the war and survival techniques they demanded - were so different compared to what the Germans or the Italians were used to.
     
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  11. knightdepaix

    knightdepaix Member

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    I concur with Karjala's agrarian backgrounds in both countries as one of the deciding factors. A bit surprising assumptions of reaching either ends of the spectrum in which either bowing out of the contest to Soviet Union like in 1945 or utterly turning the red tide led me to suggest a happy Finnish medium since 1930s. Economical, political, military stability could have been reached for industrialization since the White victory in the Finnish Civil War. Could Italian, Eastern European after collapse of Austria-Hungary and Finnish industries better cooperate for that development ?
     
  12. Kai-Petri

    Kai-Petri Kenraali

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    Seems like I have some cathcing up to do. If Finland had attacked from North cannot see much chance for Leningrad. However, FDR and Churchill told Mannerheim by secret messages the Finnish position after war would be very much in danger if Finland even attacked the Murmansk rail road. Cannot see that not being a change in history as Mannerheim offered to conquer St Petersburg in 1918 to the western side for a suitable sum. And that is just money, not other things or forces.
     
  13. steverodgers801

    steverodgers801 Member

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    Would Finland really spend the manpower necessary to attack Leningrad?
     
  14. Karjala

    Karjala Don Quijote

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    I said that I do NOT think that the agrarian background was a deciding factor. Quite the opposite then!


    The economical stability was getting better towards the end of the 30's after the depression, like in everywhere else. It's would have been impossible for Finland to avoid that global depression. The political stability improved as well - unlike in most of the European countries.

    The military stability inside Finland was fine as well. Internationally the Finnish ambitions of getting military alliances with either with the Baltic countries/Poland or with Sweden did not succeed.

    Can't see how any extra industrial co-operation would have changed anything.
     
  15. Karjala

    Karjala Don Quijote

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    In 1918 it would have been possible, since the Bolsheviks were quite weak then.

    In 1941 it was unlikely, although had Germans been more successful the Finnish troops might have continued their push from Eastern Karelia southwards from the river Svir/Syväri to completely encircle Leningrad..
     
  16. Kai-Petri

    Kai-Petri Kenraali

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    If you think that without the Finnish attack to Leningrad the Germans practically encircled the city to death what would have happened if the forces directed to Northern Karelia by Finns had been directed to Leningrad in full force. I do not mean taking it, I mean the problem for the Soviets to direct 30-50% at least of their forces to north. They could not move forces from protecting the Murmansk railway. It is just like saying the USSR send the troops to attack Finland in 30th Nov 1939 all across the border in 1-2 weeks...They started at least in September 1939 which means they never had any idea to accept our island and area requests even if they themselves suggested that.
     
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  17. knightdepaix

    knightdepaix Member

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    Sorry for misunderstanding but I do not see why the agrarian backgound was NOT a deciding factor. For example, each industrial power in Eastern europe demostrated its own identity for tank development: Czech in the chasis (pz38t), Sweden in tank gun (Bofos) and armor (from steel suitable in cold climate), Romania in exterior tank design (Mareșal), Italy in comfortness for drivers/crew (their automobiles), Finland in weapon deployment (in Winter War). So a consortium for tank development could produce ONE useful tank for these nations, with input like the American Christie suspension. Nice in idealism, very hard to be accomplished, though. Obviously, one excellent tank or few machine guns and rifles would not change the big picture but some small steps can help.

    For taking Leningrad, I do not see much German advantage but mostly logistical and minor political reasons to take it if the OB was to be gone ahead, which I initially think against it. I wonder why Germany wanted to take Leningrad; ripping the symbol of Red Revolution shall not be the German main aim but political power of the SU in Moscow and symbol of Stalin in the city named after him.
     
  18. steverodgers801

    steverodgers801 Member

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    Finland already had to release soldiers to go back to work since too many had been called up, I dont see how spending more lives would help Finland
     
  19. belasar

    belasar Court Jester

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    I have never understood Hitler's decision not to insisy Leningrad be taken. For a man who lived for absolutes, this compromise solution seems out of character.
    Further as to reason's for, logistic's is more than enough as this was one of Germany's great weak spots in the contest and one of the few she could actually do something about. Then again a great strength of Allied planning was to look at the logistics first, then shape the battle plan rather than attack and try to cobble the logistics up after.
     
  20. Kai-Petri

    Kai-Petri Kenraali

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    If you go to war, stopping at the enemy gates is not trying to win the war, I think. And I am talking about the policy by Mannerheim and Ryti. That is why stop before Leningrad, and hold the same positions practically from late autumn 1941 to summer 1944. There was fierce fighting in places but otherwise the Finnish front was very much like WW1. I don´t even recall Hitler trying to push the Finns with ultimatums or the kind to keep on attacking which he would usually do, I´d think.

    Our best weapon was the soldier. He was already often a hunter, could use gun well before joining the army, could use the enviroment to advantage, and was very motivated to protect homeland. If we got guns, we got mostly from the Red Army troops that were destroyed in pockets on roads going through thick forest areas for long distances.

    For Germany leningrad was Hitler´s idea, I think many Generals wanted to go to Moscow, and von Bock complained there was no real plan after Smolensk what to do. Like Hitler said he was just waiting for the Communist empire to collapse which it didn´t.
     
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