New Japanese Scenario

Consider the following scenario.

The Japanese do not attack Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, Wake, Guam or any other US possession.

Instead, they go straight south, attacking and occupying their main goal, the resources of the southwest Pacific: DEI and SEA. In doing so, the take great pains to avoid any and all US forces. In fact, they treat all US citizens in their captured territory with great courtesy.

Now they have the southwest Pacific, and with their fleet, and the Borneo Sweet Crude they used as naval fuel, there are able to effect a blockade on Australian and New Zealand ports, attacking them as desired.

Even though there were a lot of sympathetic supporters in the US for the UK, isolationism was still dominant, and only really went away when Pearl Harbor was attacked.

With the Combined Fleet pretty much in charge of that part of the ocean, it would be quite a problem for Aussie and Kiwi troops to get to North Africa. It could be done, but not as easily.

What do you think the US would do? Since only a direct attack threw off isolationism, and in this scenario, there was no attack on anything American.


This is intellectual curiosity on my part. I have no opinion about what might happen. Better minds than mine are providing thoughtful responses.

 

"With the Combined Fleet pretty much in charge of that part of the ocean, it would be quite a problem for Aussie and Kiwi troops to get to North Africa. It could be done, but not as easily."

Actually the Australian army was returning to Asia & the Pacific before Japan attacked. In response to the growing threat Britain had started shipping veteran Australian combat units back to the east. Unfortunalty they were arrivng to late. In Maylasia & Burma Australian brigades were tossed into combat on the fly and piecemeal.

A Japanese attack on Maylasia & Indonesia would not solve the basic problem of the trade embargo. While Japan would eventually capture the Dutch oilfields and some of the other needed resources many other items were still out of reach in US control. A second problem is that Japan lacked the cargo ships to move the resources to the home islands. In 1940 over 60% of Japans imports were carried in forigen ships. In December 1942 Japan possesed just 39 oil tankers. Japan needed to defeat both the US and Britain so the complete trade embargo would be removed.

The US air and naval base in the Phillpines lay astride the Japanese supply line to Maylasia and Indonesia. While the US forces there were small a large reinforcement was on its way. Roosevelt created a near state of war between Germany & the US by playing chicken with the German navy in the Atlantic. The same could be done with US air and naval patrols from the Phillipines along Japans sea routes to the battle zone to the south. It would take very little to trigger a Japanese reaction to the threat.

A third thing that must be understood is the Isolationist movement was falling apart. A large part of it had been oriented towards the European war and many of the folks who were against making war on Germany did not feel the same towards Japan. Second when the attack on the USSR started the political left in the US deserted the Isolationist cause. While those folks were not interested in joining Britain in a war against Germany they did want to save the USSR. A third point is that US business interests in Asia were being threatened by Japans growing empire. The businessmen were ceasing support of the Isolationists as they learned the economic reality of Japanese control of China and French Indo China.

 

Here are my $0.02 worth on "keeping away from American properties", or persons. Sec. of State Hull had publicly stated in 1940 that American bases for both ships and planes would be made available to either UK or Netherlands forces if needed.

This would/could put both British and Dutch sea and air power in the Philippines, Guam, Midway, and other American bases which would be of any aid to them in their combat with any Axis partner. Let me add this; in 1940, when Japan occupied French Indochina (Vietnam area) upon agreement with the French Vichy government, and joined the Axis powers Germany and Italy in The Three Power Pact (in Sept), these actions intensified Japan's conflict with the United States, and the other powers which were to evolve into the western allies. With Japan’s European partners over-running the Low Countries, the Dutch government in exile in London became a de facto partner with the British, and Secretary of State Hull said; "...it was certain that Japan would assume that, whether or not the United States and Great Britain had definite agreements in regard to naval and air bases in the Pacific including Singapore, the special relations between these two countries were such that they could overnight easily establish cooperative relations for the mutual use of all these bases.", this was an open secret, and well understood by the Imperial Japanese. Even then the Imperial Japanese knew that the USN Pacific fleet would need to be "neutralized" before they could fully expand into their "Co-prosperity Sphere". So trying to keep the US out of the Pacific problem and attacking the British and the Dutch only, was more than unlikely.

With that position stated, and it must be remembered that the following month, in October, Hull re-enforced this point with; "nothing could be more dangerous for our nation than for us to assume that the avalanche of conquest could under no circumstances reach any vital portion of this hemisphere. (He also stated)…that oceans gave the nations of this hemisphere no guaranty against the possibility of economic, political, or military attack from abroad; that oceans are barriers but they are also highways; that barriers of distance are merely barriers of time. Should the would-be conquerors gain control of other continents (the Secretary said), they would next concentrate on perfecting their control of the seas, of the air over the seas, and of the world's economy. They might then be able with ships and with planes to strike at the communication lines, the commerce, and the life of this hemisphere, and ultimately we might find ourselves compelled to fight on our own soil, under our own skies, in defense of our independence and our very lives". (Source: U.S., Department of State, Publication 1983, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941 [Washington, D.C.: U.S., Government Printing Office, 1943], pp.79-86)

As mentioned by the other poster , the isolationist position had peaked in about 1937, but after the conspicuous failure of the "Munich Agreement", and silliness of appeasement appeared, it began to wane. Then at least one nation they had held up as an example of the success of their stance; "neutral non-involvement" (Belgium) was over-run by an even more aggressive Germany in spite of a promise by Hitler not to do so.

Then they pinned their hopes on the defensive stance of a strong (military) as in France, it too fell to Nazi aggression. So the ambivalence of the public mood in the late thirties clear into 1941, became more and more evident as the Nazis overran western Europe and Scandinavia; signed "non-aggression pacts" with Stalin’s Soviet, drove the BEF off the continent, and then attacked Britain by air.

In one of the last pre-war polls during the last weeks preceding Pearl Harbor, Gallup’s interviews concluded (less than a week before the Japanese attack) that while about one-quarter thought war was avoidable and could be forestalled if not eliminated, slightly more than one-half of Americans expected that "the United States will go to war against Japan sometime in the near future." Earlier a similar percentage had expressed a "willingness to risk war with Nazi Germany in favor of Great Britain." This was shortly after that lying snake Hitler had once again ignored a treaty and or pact and invaded the USSR in mid-41! In short order Hitler had made and broken "non-aggression pacts" with Poland and the USSR, promised to observe Belgian neutrality, and over-run it, invaded both Denmark and Norway, and defeated France.

In short, from a historical point of view using both hindsight and then existing public opinion, it appears probable that (even if the Japanese had not taken the initiative), the American public would soon have endorsed the U.S. entering the war anyway. Thus, in the period directly preceding Pearl Harbor, Americans were shifting gradually, but more and more rapidly away from their prior mood of introversion/isolation to the mood of extroversion/intervention.

As an amusing aside, those polled in the land-locked mid west and mountain states were the staunchest "isolationists". Likely feeling safe so far from the ocean shores. Those polled on the coast-lines had a more realistic and pragmatic approach, in that they favored building up our defensive forces (conscription and weapons purchase), but only for self-defense. The smaller group of total pacifist isolationists were against any war at any cost, while the greater share were for self-defense, and retaliation if attacked, but not declaring war unilaterally. These polls were taken of voting age male and females in the US prior to the Pearl Harbor attack.

Gallup Poll #248, Question 3 (mid-Sept 1941), 55% of Americans believed that the country was already involved in the war. As shown in Question 5K and 5T of the same poll, a little over 1/2 of all Americans believed FDR was doing the right thing with his actions (that 55%), while about another 20% believed he hadn't gone far enough. A near complete reversal of the numbers from early 1941 when only about 17% favored going to war!

Furthermore, in Question 6 of Poll #248, 60% of Americans approved of the decision to fire on German submarines. Finally, a great majority of Americans answered in Questions 11K and 11T that American democracy and German fascism could not co-exist. Now, while in that same poll the vast majority answered they did not want to declare or go to war unilateraly at the time, they approved of FDR's actions (you can also check out Gallup Poll #248, Question 13 to see that 2/3 of Americans support FDR's policies in general as well as his foreign policy specifically).

In Gallup Poll #250, Question 3K (conducted October 7th, 1941), now 66% of Americans believed the US should continue to help the UK even if it risked war in Europe. In Question 3T of that poll, the same 66% ratio of Americans now stated that it was more important to defeat Germany than to stay out of the war.

The in mid-November (15th) 1941, Gallup Poll #253, Question 1K was: Which of these two things do you think is the more important -- that this country keep out of war, or that Germany be defeated? Keep out of war, 32%; Defeat Germany, 68%

Additionally, according to Gallup Poll #254, Question 3 (conducted in late November 1941), 73.58% of Americans now believed the United States should "take steps now to keep Japan from becoming more powerful, even if this means risking a war with Japan."

I think that response more closely reflects American public opinion than any other. Not just that we would end up in the war, or have to fight eventually, but that the Axis, with Germany at the head were going to have to be dealt with. I myself think that Japan was still regarded as a poor and minor player in the Axis Power structure, only equal to or even less important than Italy.

I would guess the majority of Americans absolutely knew we would have to deal with the Axis militarily before the middle of November 1941. And only 32% were in favor of staying out of war (at any cost) even before the Pearl Harbor attack. That sneak attack only sealed the deal.

Just my opinon of course, but trying to avoid the Americans in the area would only have increased their difficulties. They couldn't get the NEI oil home without taking the Philippines, especially if it was the open base for British and Dutch ships and planes. They had to "take out" the Pacific Fleet at Pearl as soon as they could, and they had to also occupy or subdue the Philippines for a sea route to the home islands.

 

Depending on how long the US remains out of the war in this scenerio could mean substantial reinforcements for MacArthur's troops in the Philippines. An additional 45 B-17 bombers are slated for direct transfer to the Far East Air Force using the Oahu to Midway to Wake Island to Guam to Manila route within days of 7 December. This would have given the FEAF some 80 B-17 bombers, with more to follow. The Pensacola Convoy is also on its way and would soon be docking in Manila Bay in January, 1942.

"The convoy was carrying a brigade from the U.S. Field Artillery Corps, made up of 4,600 National Guard (reserve) personnel:

2nd Battalion, 131st Field Artillery Regiment (Texas National Guard)
1st and 2nd Battalions, 147th Field Artillery Regiment (South Dakota National Guard)
1st Battalion, 148th Field Artillery Regiment (Idaho National Guard)
U. S. Army Air Forces ground crews were also on board, along with aircraft disassembled in crates: 52 Douglas A-24 dive bombers and 18 Curtiss P-40 fighter planes.

Materiel on board included: 20 75 mm field artillery pieces, AA ammunition, 2,000 500-lb bombs, 3,000 30-lb bombs, 340 motor vehicles, 9,000 barrels of aviation fuel, 500,000 rounds of .50 caliber ammunition and 9,600 rounds of 37 mm anti-aircraft shells".

Added to this:
Some additional information taken from the "Green Books."

"The schedule of shipments finally established in November provided for sending to the Philippines some 20,000 troops, about one third of them Air Force units, on eleven troopships to sail from fan Francisco between 21 November and 9 December 1941.32 The Holbrook, carrying 2,000 troops and equipment (the 147th Field Artillery Regiment and the 148th Field Artillery Regiment minus one battalion), and the Republic carrying 2,630 troops and equipment (the 2d Battalion of the 131st field Artillery Regiment, the 27th Bombardment Group, and 48 Air Corps officers), sailed from San Francisco 21-22 November. Convoyed by the USS Pensacola, they were due to arrive in the Philippines on 14 January 1942.

Sailings for 15,000 troops were scheduled for 5-9 December. The President Johnson with 2,500 troops the 2d Battalion of the 138th Field Artillery Regiment and three squadrons of the 35th Pursuit Group), the Etolin with 1,400 troops " including the 218th Field Artillery Regiment minus the 2d Battalion) and the Bliss sailed from San Francisco on 5 December 1941. The following day the President Garfield sailed from the same port with the remainder of the 35th Pursuit Group.33

In addition to the 30,000 U.S. Army troops present, and those due to arrive in the Philippines, there were 80,000 troops in the Philippine Army, including the ten divisions to be activated by 15 December. The total strength of General MacArthur's command--present, en route, and under orders--amounted to about 137,000, considerably less than the 200,000 he had estimated as sufficient for defensive operations.34

The Far Eastern Air Force had 35 four engine bombers and 107 P-40E's on hand, and 38 more P-40E's and 52 A-24's (dive bombers) were en route in the Pensacola convoy. In addition, 37 pursuits and 48 four-engine bombers were due to leave the United States by 6 and 10 December, respectively. As for ground force matériel, equipment for one antiaircraft regiment had recently arrived, as well as 108 tanks and 50 self-propelled 75-mm. guns (tank destroyers). Forty-eight 75-mm. guns were en route (with the Pensacola convoy), and more guns and a considerable amount of ammunition were scheduled to be shipped.35 "

Lastly, there was also the 34th and 161st Infantry Regiments awaiting shipment from San Francisco on or around 8 December, that would have been used to "triangularize" the Philippine Division and bring its infantry regiments up to full wartime strength.



"Another Cablegram (below) talks of 125 P-40 Tomahawks and 5 DC-3's being sent from California in December 1941 to Australia. From another source, I believe that the 4th Air Depot Group left San Francisco on 15 December 1941 on board the U.S. Army transport, President Coolidge, and arrived in Melbourne on 1 February 1942

Casey to Evatt Washington, 17 December 1941

Cablegram 1163

Most Secret

United States is sending "in the next few days" two fast ships (President Polk and President Cooleridge) [sc. Coolidge] from the Californian coast to Australia, containing 125 P 40 fighter aircraft, 5 transport aircraft D.C. 3 type, together with United States Army Air Corps fourth mobile depot group of about 550 officers and men. Each aircraft will be accompanied by pilot, crew, observer and armourer. Above ships will also carry some ammunition and bombs. The mobile depot group will have hand tools and such other necessary maintenance equipment and machinery as the ships can carry. This depot group is to establish itself at the most appropriate place in Australia (they presume either Brisbane or Townsville) for the assembly of the above-mentioned and subsequent arriving aircraft. Subsequently about 35 or 40 P 40 fighter aircraft with pilots, bombers and ammunition may be expected monthly as reinforcements by subsequent ships.

All of the above fighter aircraft are destined on the present plans to fly to the Philippines via Darwin and appropriate stopping places. ......

[AA: A 5954, Box 535]" Taken from Australia at War Site.

 

The whole post was great. I have a possible alternative idea why the midwest might have been more isolationist. This was the "dust bowl" of the Great Depression, and the hardest hit agriculturally. The mindset might have been they still had way too much of their own lives to take care of and rebuild without worrying about anyone else.

 

There was ans is a perception the Isolationists were still strong due to the substantial PR campaigns, and funding there were recieving. The many middle class and wealthy supporters that underwrote the America First and like organizations kept the large public meetings, advertising, and lobbist teams active until the end. There was a large public meeting in progress in Philldelphia the afternoon of 7 December held at exactly the same hours as PH was bombed.

 

Oh, What ifs.... I love them. In any case, I think America might have managed to crawl out from under the rock of isolationism and manage to get its ducks in a row and start supporting the Allies. Then, well, you know what happens.

 

Taking this a little further, how would NOT attacking with the carrier forces have limited our Pacific strategies? We were still a predominate Battleship Navy viewing the carrier as a secondary weapon. Without the thrashing we took at the hands of the Japanese carriers, our Navy may have looked a lot different had we entered the war later under these different tactical circumstances. Armed with a large contingent of battleships.
Just a thought

 

Would this have worked better?

If the Japanese were feeling rather cocky, they might threaten war against the United Kingdom if the US did not lift on its embargo. The United Kingdom, quite busy back home, might pressure Roosevelt into accepting some of the Japanese terms, and ease up on them, for fear of drawing fire back home on him facilitating another war in the Pacific.

Of course, this could backfire. Roosevelt might promise the British help, and alertness levels across the substantial U.S. bases would be increased. And Roosevelt could just flat out say no.

 

While the USN was dominated by the old "battleship" admirals, those who were in the wings were a combination of submarine and aviation proponents. And while we (USN) were in that position, we weren’t carrier poor, nor carrier stupid. We had launched two Fleet excercises on Pearl in the thirties which the Japanese copied, and one on the Panama Canal, also successful.

That said, we had a number of functional carriers. Such as on December 7th, 1941 Lexington (CV-2) was and had been at sea with TF-12 carrying marine aircraft from Pearl Harbor to reinforce Midway. Consequently when word of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was received, she immediately launched search planes to hunt for the Japanese fleet, and at mid-morning headed south to rendezvous with Indianapolis and Enterprise (CV-6) task forces returning to Pearl from Wake in order to conduct a search southwest of Oahu before returning to Pearl Harbor December 18th. The Saratoga (CV-3) had participated in a landing force exercise in May and made two trips to Hawaii between June and October as the diplomatic crisis with Japan came to a head.

When the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor on December 7th 1941, the Saratoga (CV-3) was just entering San Diego after an interim dry docking at Bremerton WA.. The Ranger (CV-4) was at the time serving in the Atlantic.

In order to aid and assist our own Atlantic fleet, Yorktown (CV-5) departed Pearl Harbor on April 20th 1941 in company with Warrington (DD-383), Somers (DD-381), and Jouett (DD-396); headed southeast, transited the Panama Canal on the night of 6th and 7th of May, and arrived at Bermuda on May 12th. From that time frame on, until the entry of the United States into the war, Yorktown conducted four patrols in the Atlantic to protect shipping. One simply must remember that there were, (Dec. 7,'41), only three carriers in the Pacific. Enterprise (CV-6), Lexington (CV-2), and Saratoga (CV-3). While Ranger (CV-4), Wasp (CV-7), and the recently commissioned Hornet (CV-8) were already in the Atlantic. Yorktown departed Norfolk on December 16th, 1941 and sailed for the Pacific, her secondary gun galleries studded with new 20-millimeter Oerlikon machine cannons. She reached San Diego, CA. on December 30th 1941 and soon became flagship for Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher's new TF-17.

The next class of carrier had been planned and the keel for the first had been laid way before Pearl Harbor. The Essex (CV-9) was begun at the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, Newport News, Virginia. Her keel was laid in April 1941; she was launched for sea trials in July 1942; commissioned in December 1942.

The (second) Yorktown (CV-10) (name changed from Bon Homme Richard in September 1942 to honor the first Yorktown [CV-5]), was also built by the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, Newport News, Virginia. This keel was laid in December 1941; launched in January 1943 for sea trials; commissioned in April 1943.

The last of the first group was also started in 1941, this was the Intrepid (CV-11). She too was built by the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, Newport News, Virginia. And her keel was laid in December 1941; launched in April 1943 for sea trials; commissioned in August 1943.

There were seven more Essex class carriers built before the end of the war. Beginning in March 1943, one visually very significant change was authorized for ships then in the early stages of construction. This involved reshaping the bow into a rather elegant "clipper" form to provide deck space for two 40mm quadruple gun mountings, thus greatly improving forward air defences.

Thirteen ships were completed in this "long-hull", or Ticonderoga, class. Four of these were finished in 1944, in time to join their Essex class near-sisters in Pacific combat operations.

As to the battleships, only three of the eight present in Pearl were "out for the duration", the Arizona (BB-39) was of course lost, the Oklahoma (BB-37) was re-floated but deemed too extensively damaged for repair and decommissioned later. The USS Utah (AG-16) had already been removed from the ranks of "Battleship" and become a "target ship". And the Arizona's sister-ship, the Pennsylvania (BB-38) was in dry-dock during the attack, and never really damaged.

The Pennsylvania went on to earn eight battle stars and a Navy unit citation in WW2. The Pennsylvania was scuttled off Kwajalein Island on February 10th, 1948.

The Maryland (BB-46) would serve with distinction and she would receive seven battle stars before being decommissioned in 1947.

The West Virginia (BB-48) would receive five battle stars for meritorious service before she too was decommissioned in 1947.

The Nevada (BB-36) was the only Battleship to attempt to steam out of Pearl but grounded herself to keep from blocking the channel outlet, she was re-floated in February 1942, she served valiantly through the war, was inspected and reassigned as a target ship during the Bikini atomic experiments. The toughness of this ship showed through once again as she survived the tests and returned to Pearl Harbor to be decommissioned on August 29, 1946.

The Tennessee (BB-43) was the least damaged after the attack of the Battleships, she would earn a Navy Unit Commendation and 10 battles stars for World War II service and be placed in "mothballs" on February 14, 1947.

The California (BB-44) was re-floated on March 26, 1942 and for valiant service during the war, she received seven battle stars and was decommissioned on Valentine's Day, 1947.

Those new carrier ships would have been available even without the sneak attack, since they were in the works anyway, and that isn't counting the gob of little "jeep carriers" that were pumped out like sausages. The Japanese took their best shot, they knew where the USN was headed as per aviation, our carriers weren't built in secret behind screens like the Yamato had been.

 

If the Japanese never attacked any American-held places, then America would've had no reason to go to war, so America would've never became a part in World War 2

 

The problem here is that they couldn't attack south for the raw materials they needed without dealing with the US Pacific Fleet. The American Sec. of State (Hull) had publicly announced in 1940; that if the Japanese drove the British and/or Dutch off of their colonial holdings, then US Navy and Army Air bases would be put at their disposal in the Pacific. This meant the Philippines, Wake, and Guam without doubt.

Japan couldn't take the raw materials without ousting the colonial powers, and the colonial powers they ousted would simply move their warships, submarines, and aircraft to US bases and interdict the Japanese ships trying to transport the good home.

The Japanese simply couldn't ignore the American Fleet nor its holdings. Not if they wished to impliment their "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere".

 

This simply isn't true. The US in Asia was very much intertwined with the British and Dutch in various defense measures before the war started. Admiral Hart, commanding the US Asiatic Fleet had had meetings with his Dutch and British counterparts on numerous occasions and all were in agreement to work together in the face of a Japanese attack.
The likelihood is that the US would have greatly reinforced the Philippines making it difficult or impossible for the Japanese to take within a short period after their attacks on the British and Dutch.
I could also see the US extending their patrols and even aggressively acting, just short of war, towards Japanese shipping in the South China Sea in an attempt to instigate an incident for war.

Following the previously mentioned equipment headed to the PI were to be an M3 medium tank battalion, another US infantry division from Hawaii (the reason a second was raised there) and, given no war with Germany likely another from NG division from the US as well. With additional aircraft including most likely P-39 and even possibly P-43 or 47 fighters the PI would have been alot harder to take just facing sheer numbers alone.
The US could also have decided to send reinforcements to the Asiatic Fleet as well. These could have made things more difficult for the Japanese too.

Basically, the longer Japan waits to go to war with the US the worse off they are.

 

Some additional information that I happened upon recently.:

"SUMMARY

2. PRE-WAR BRIEF. Any evaluation of the operations of this unit mast take into consideration the precis, (See Addenda "A"), of its movement to the theater on the eve of the outbreak of hostilities, its organization 17 days before that, and the consequent lack of mutual acquaintance between the armored personnel and their supported associates, in a strange land and climate, and with weapons new to them, as well as to all present for the war except the Tank Group Commander. It was for this reason that he asked to remain with the Tank Group when division command was proposed on his arrival. In approving on 21 November, General MacArthur stated that he had asked for an armored division, to the command of which the Group Commander would succeed. The nucleus of this division was never augmented; although a medium G.H.Q. Tank Battalion had been completely equipped and was on 48-hour standby for departure for the Philippines when its orders were cancelled on 10 December 1941. ((Another light tank battalion had also been alerted)) "

That would still have given MacArthur three battalions of M-3 Stuart light tanks, plus a single battalion of Grant medium tanks, somewhere in the neighborhood of 200 light and medium tanks overall. That's a pretty substantial sized armored fist.