North African campaign

I see.
Thank You

 

10-4
Thanks

 

You are only looking at one side of the problem. Germany had insufficient oil before the war and the demand increased with the war. Simply comparing the amount of oil pre war to the amount in 41/42 is meaningless.

 

Insufficient ? To do what ?

Did the demand increase with the war ?

In 1938,Germany had some 6.5 million ton of oil .Was this insufficient ?

Wel,let's compare the war production:

1939:some 8.3 : German victory

1940nly 6.9: German victory

1941:8.5:German victory
1942: 9.4:defeats of Alamein and Stalingrad
1943:10.4 only defeats .

1944: 6.6 : only defeats .


There is no causal relation between the available amount of oil and victory/defeat: the difference between 1940 and 1944 was only 300.000 tons

Besides :in 1941,the SU had big roblems while it had 31 million ton of oil,while 1944 was very good for the SU,with only 19 million ton .

 

How many more pilots could the Germans have trained if they had more gas. How much more could they have produced if they had more oil.

 

My experience with Numbers/Statistics is that it can be used by anybody to prove or disprove whatever they want to discuss
.
At any rate.....oil and fuel are not necessarily the same thing.
As the war went on...I have heard/read umpteen times about trucks, planes, tanks that were abandoned for lack of fuel.
Missions that were not flown to conserve fuel...stuff like that x100.
So while that was going on...did Germany have just as much "oil" as ever.?
Thank You

 

While Germany produced more fuel compared to pre war you have to take other factors into account.

From 1939 to 1943 Germany had an oil production increase of 25.3% however did the amount of vehicles, planes and ships/submarines only increase by 25.3% or did it increase by more?

In 1939 they had 3,478 tanks with the vast bulk being Panzer I and II's that used very little fuel compared to the later tank models. On January 1st 1944 they had 9,148 tanks with just 399 Panzer II's remaining. The number's speak for them selves, The increase in vehicle and tank number's far out stripped the increase in fuel that was only further hampered by Italy having little to no ability to support there own needs.

 

This is questionable because,before the war, IN ALL COUNTRIES,the military used only a small part of the available oil.See the exemple of the SU.And even during the war a non negligible part of the oil production was reserved to non military use.

 

Other point : more oil does not mean that the front troops would get more oil : in the summer of 1944,the Allied forces in Europe had enough oil,but still,their advance was slowing,because there were problems to transport the oil to the front .

After the summer of 1944,the Germans had 2 big problems:

1) they had less oil :Romania was lost and the plants for synthetic oil were attacked

2)It became more and more difficult to transport the available oil to the front .


Other point : IF the Germans had in 1942 ,let's say ,1 million ton of Iraqi oil,what would be the result ?Could they transport this oil to the front ?Meanwhile,this oil had to be stocked in depots,and these would be attacked by the allied air force.

 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_armored_fighting_vehicle_production_during_World_War_II#Total_production

Based on those numbers tank production in 1940 was about 50% of prewar total, 1941 about 100% of prewar total, 1942 was about 150% of prewar, 1943 was about 200% of prewar total, With those increasing number's did oil production match to keep up? was there more oil supplied to training to train more replacement crew's? From what I can find oil allocation to training actually diminished.

1. True Romania was lost in 1944 but not until the later half of the year, That being said I'm not sure exactly on the point you are making.

2. While transporting all of the oil to the front could be a problem you make the assumption that all would go to the front. From what I figure there was just as much use for it closer to home.
a. More oil for training of tank crew's and pilot's.
b. More oil for fighter's to intercept allied bomber's.
c. More oil for the Italian navy that lacked it historically through out the war.
d. More oil for Italian domestic need's reducing the strain that they caused for Germany.

There also is the possibility of the oil being transported through Turkey into the Black Sea though this would depend on how well politic's are played although the allied ability to counter this would be weakened as they at this time would have no border connection with them eliminating there ability to hurt them either militarily or economically while Germany would have full ability to do either.

 

The biggest advantage of additional oil would be economic. Historically Germany could not face an attrition war and had to gamble on a quick military victory, with a secure oil source the biggest shortage disappears and they could possibly trade for the rest. Foodstuffs would still be a problem but possibly not, the "southern option" requires a lot less manpower than Barbarossa and would allow for more field workers, and more oil could allow for more industrialized agriculture. The big problem with that option is political, Hitler promised arable land and that could only be obtained East, but he possibly could content himself with digesting Poland.
With the Germans in Iraq in 1941 the British Empire is in big trouble, there is no trigger for US entry and they don't have the manpower to face the German army without the French,the RN and RAF protect Britain but any colonies that can be reached by land are vulnerable, having oil gets a lot of time pressure from the Germans.

 

In 1943,Germany produced 1.88 million ton of crude oil,5.75 million ton of synthetic oil and imported 2.77 million ton.

In 1944;crude:1.68,synthetic:3.96,import:0.96

The big problems in 1944 were the attacks on the synthetic oil plants and the loss of Romania AND the problems to transport the oil where it was needed .

For the Italian navy : I doubt that she would do better with more oil,and,besides,she did not do that bad with the oil she received:exemple :90 % of what was going to NA arrived in NA.


About the Iraqi oil being transported to the Black Sea through Turkey: I doubt it was possible (the Turkish railways were primitive) and,it also assumes that this oil would have been refined in Iraq before it was going through Turkey,and,this was very unlikely to happen .

 

The loss of Romania in 1944 may not have happened as it did historically. We must remember that in this scenario there is no war with the SU and as such the Romanian oil fields may be better off then historically as no allied air force would be in range to bomb them.

I'll agree the biggest problem in 1944 (that is conceivable to happen in this scenario) is the attack's on the synthetic oil plant's however the Luftwaffe is also likely with oil sources from Iraq able to train there pilot's to a higher degree and possibly (Just spit balling, Don't know it for a fact) train more at a time which could lead to higher losses amongst bomber command and less damage inflicted onto German industry.

As for the Iraqi oil, I'm afraid I didn't clarify it properly so apologies. What I meant was it travelling by ship through the Dardanelles into the Black Sea but yes you are correct that it would have to be refined first but that too would require Germany and Russia to be actively fighting one another at the time.

To help us clarify the various point's it may be prudent to work out when conflict between the Axis and the SU would erupt and on whose terms. Doing so would help us best be able to track the location of troop and equipment number's to work out the logistics of the oil.

 

Fuel constraints affected the axis military as early as 41. In particular the KM and activities in the Med. It also required considerable diversion of resources in key industries.

Of course it did. Both military and industrial demands grew.

The basic premise of the above is flawed. While Germany won some tactical victories early in the war strategic ones after mid 1940 evaded them. The consequences of their energy deficiencies were a factor. How critical a one is an open question. By late war however it is clear that it was critical.

Of course there was. It may not have been immediate but it's clearly there for Germany as it was for Japan. Again you are only looking at half of the problem and hand waving the consumption half away because it invalidates your position.

That just illustrates that energy wasn't the only problem the Soviets had.

 

No,it illustrates that less energy was not preventing the SU to win,thus,I repeat my question: why should Germany win with more energy ?

 

Ok how about this, Before the war the SU produced 31 million ton of oil but in 1944 it produced just 19 million ton. My question is this, Before they started fighting the Germans how much of t here oil was exported? and How much oil did they receive in LL?

That being said, It has already been stated several times that the extra oil would be of just as much use back home as it would be at the front removing the logistical nightmare. We know for a fact that training decreased and there ability to field fighter planes was hampered due to the fuel or lack there of. We also know for a fact that the Italian navy was hampered by a lack of fuel, You pointed out earlier that this apparently wasn't such the case as they did there job in getting supplies to Africa but what about the rest of the Med? You can not ignore it or sooner or later the allies would build up and strike.

 

"Less energy" only depends on your point of perspective.

While it is true that Soviet petroleum production decreased, the fact remains that, even at the Soviet Union's lowest year of production - 1943(also Germany's highest oil year), the USSR still out-produced the German to the tune of about 8 million tons(18.0 million metric tons to 10.5 million tons).

So, the Soviets, at their lowest ebb, still maintain a sizable advantage over Germany in petroleum supplies.

 

That advantage would only be further tipped to the Allied side if you also account for British and US petroleum, Germany had to split there petroleum amongst a half dozen axis nations fighting a multi front war, Russia had a single front.

Germany may have produced 8 - 10 million ton of oil annually but only a portion went to the Russian front (cant give you a percentage as I don't have any idea, Could be 40% through to 70%).

 

Lack of energy was everything. It means slower transportation, and more congestion on alternatives. It means less production. It means fewer training hours for crews. It means less mobility. Time consuming Manual labour must replace what should've been done by machinery. It causes excessive frugality, and hoarding, which in itself, is wasteful.

The Italian navy was a paper tiger. Given the ships it had, the RN expected a far greater showing, and a more aggressive Italian Navy could have caused major issues. But the Italians had only marginal stocks prior to the advent of war, which meant most of their fleet sat around in port most of the time.

It doesn't matter when the USSR had how much. Nazi Germany needed more than it had access to. Throughout the war it was a major concern, except perhaps immediately after the capture of France.