Operation Barbarossa - the UK is neutral and Japan attacks Siberia

You do realise that's exactly what the Soviet Union did don't you?

 

Last galup poll on the subject asking the direct question should America go to war was against.
What activities do you have in mind as FDR's excuse to declare war on all the Axis powers at once?

They could hold the Japanese but what effect would this have on Soviet forces deployed in the West not to mention lend lease.

Any Siberian republic needs the Transiberian railway.
Its vital to the whole region.
The wells could start being up and running once again within 6 months of the Soviet collapse.
The rolling stock is obviously some thing that was produced in large numbers anyway.

 

Proof ?

 

You seriously do not know this is happening?

 

But that was in what July or June of 41, looking at later questions we see:

It's pretty clear isn't it? Going a bit further though searching the polls for "should" one finds

And if they have it the Japanese don't. If it looks like the Japanese are going to take it then it will be fought over at the very least and probably destroyed at least in part to prevent it falling into Japanese hands.

It took the Soviets a bit longer to get the ones they sabotaged up and running again. In the Dutch East Indies it was the refineries that were the big problem as I understand it. Of course getting a decent supply line runnig is going to take a while especially as it will be in range of allied bombers.
[quoteThe rolling stock is obviously some thing that was produced in large numbers anyway.[/QUOTE]
Reallly? By who? Do you have numbers? Especially to fit Soviet rails?

It's been stated and sourced on previous discussion of this topic on this forum that the Soviet forces in Siberia never declined to the point where the Japanese had a good chance of winning. Obviously more LL will have to go through the Persian route or Murmansk or not get there but that's not likely to have a huge impact in 41 or 42 and after that it's too late for the Axis.

 

Last galup poll on the subject asking the direct question should America go to war was against!
Go on post it.
Its on the same site.

 

It's not easy to discuss competently what the Red Army had in the Far
East during the first two years of the war. Most of the old soviet
sources provide data that is obviously wrong, post-soviet era authors
give more realistic view but they often contradict each other. So do
not expect from me any complete, hard figures on early Soviet OOB.
It's amazing that this is still a very poorly researched subject.

Official OOB indicates that on 22 june 1941 Far East Front and
Zabaikalsky Military District (actually another front) had 719228 men
in total. According to official sources the following troops had been
transferred from two soviet Far East fronts to the west armies during
july 1941 - july 1942 period: 28 rifle and cavalry divisions, 5 tank
divisions, 1 mechanized division, 5 rifle brigades, 14 artillery
brigades and 8 independent regiments (344676 men in total), during
almost the same period (august 1941 - october 1942) from the remaining
units in the Far East 235518 men more had been sent to the west as
"marching reinforcements".

So overall, from the outbreak of the war till october '42 Far East
Command transferred 580194 men to the west. These troops took almost
2/3 of Far East arsenal with them - 247382 rifles, 38921
submachine-guns, 2824 heavy machine-guns, 1210 AA guns, 4928 artillery
pieces, 4425 mortars, 2822 tanks, 13101 motor vehicles, 2563 artillery
tractors and 77929 horses, 65% of ammunition and supplies was taken
from the Far East Command warehouses and send in the same direction.
Most of the Far East competent commanders were also transferred to the
west armies, and very average men came to replace them.

It's easy to figure out what has been left in the Far East by summer
'42 - 139034 men with 2420 artillery (only 88 152mm howitzers left,
almost all others were 76mm field guns and 45mm AT guns), with just
428 light tanks (exclusively t-26) , very limited transport abilities
, ridiculously low on supplies and ammunition.

Officially, on 1 september 1942 soviet ground forces in the Far East
contained 1446800 personnel. However, it is well-known fact that not a
single man drafted in the european regions in 41-42 has been sent to
the Far East during that period. Thus one should suppose that Far East
Command under Josef Apanasenko had managed to locally recruit 1308966
men in just 13 months (and send almost 45 divisions to the west in the
same time), this just cannot be true. Wartime mobilization in the Far
East gave only 682515 recruits by late 1944 (Russian Far East is still
barely inhabited compared to european areas), there was also another
manpower source - prison camps, but again, out of 320000 or so gulag
inhabitants in the Far East in january '42 only ~80000 could have been
drafted theoretically.

There are some sources that describe in detail what General Apanasenko
did to maintain his forces during first two years of the war and how
difficult it was. For example "Sickle and Hammer Against Samurai
Sword" by К.Е. Cherevko and "Final in the Far East" by A.B.Shirokorad,
those are in russian obviously. Both authors are skeptical about
official figures for 1941-42 period they try to analyze how Apanasenko
had managed to double his forces during such a short period of time
with almost no manpower in the area while his armies had been used as
reinforcement source and what NKGB and GRU with their numerous agents
in Manchuria, China and even in Japan (Richard Sorge for instance) did
to convince Japanese of the presence of a large fully-equipped force
guarding soviet Far East during entire 1941-1942 period.

http://www.infanata.org/2007/04/29/serp ... mecha.html
http://v3883.vps.masterhost.ru/catalog/ ... 89/313107/

Far East Command ordered total mobilization in September '41, but it
brought too few recruits to replace those who had already left ,
during the second mobilization round in late november Apanasenko
called up even 40-55 aged men, so actually all who were able to carry
a weapon. In january '42 personnel bureau officers were inspecting the
camps of Kolyma and the whole Far East in order to seek out military
officers and soldiers who had fallen victim to the purges and tried to
put them back in service. How many men had they managed to draft that
way is unknown, since all these activities were barely legal and thus
undocumented, Stalin was unwilling to interfere and was determined to
protect Apanasenko from NKVD bosses. It just shows how dramatic
situation was.
Apanasenko really did an excellent job by keeping strong cover forces
at manchurian borders, but their numbers never exceeded 365000 men
during 1942. He really tried to replace leaving divisions with the new
formations, but none of these had full complement before late 1943.
Circumstantial evidences of this can be found in the open sources.

Monthly allowance directives of the Far East and Zabaikalsky Fronts
HQs in august-october 1942 are referring to "regular allowance order
#4/120", this means that all but one Far East rifle divisions were
"reduced formations" and did not contain more than 5800 men, 9 rifle
companies instead of 21 in full division (regular allowance directive
#4/100 - full rifle division with 14483 men).

Almost 38000 soviet soldiers, captured by germans in august 1942 in
Stalingrad area, were supposed be in the Far East according to their
papers, but instead were "temporary assigned" to the 62nd army units.
Take it as an educated guess - there were up to 200000 such "temporary
assigned" men, if 38000 such soldiers became POW.

In many personal accounts of the war written by far-easterners
interesting stories can be found, during 1942-early 1943 Far East
command practiced "false reinforcement" tactics, several temporary
formations of 1000-5000 men each were constantly moving from one
fortified region to another, imitating serious military activity in
those sectors. They were usually moving into positions visible by
japanese during the daylight with their "flags high" only to leave
them secretly by night.

In november '42 Apanasenko did a little sabre-rattling when he staged
in Kharbarovsk on the anniversary of the revolution "the largest
military parade that has been held in Russia since the outbreak of the
war". The Far East Command quietly allowed the Japanese to hear of
this force demonstration by publishing a short story of the mechanized
equipment that took part in the parade. In reality only one regiment
took part in this parade with heaviest armament in form of manually
towed Maxim MG.

Stavka directives #170149 and #170150 issued 16 march 1942 for the Far
East fronts clearly show what kind of war Soviet Command expected in
the case of Japanese attack. Far East troops should do their best to
wear down Japanese in fortified regions during first 7-10 days of war,
"defend at all costs" several key positions deep in the soviet
territory until reinforcements arrive.

All such facts do not correspond well with proclaimed soviet military
superiority over japanese. 1,5m battle-ready force simply did not
exist in the Far East in 1942. Officially recorded OOBs and some Far
East Front documents are just residual artifacts of brilliantly
executed by GRU disinformation campaign, which was never officially
announced. With japanese absolutely sure that there is numerically
superior force in front of them in 1941-1942, Soviet General Command
was able to freely move larger part of Far East forces to the West and
had a luxury to do nothing to rebuild that force until mid-1943. After
the war, Soviet historiography used false numbers to claim that USSR
was never on the verge of collapse during the war, since it was
capable to maintain such a big force in the Far East during crucial
period of war and kept "larger part" of Japanese army at bay. Abwher
advised IJA that there were no battle-worthy soviet troops in spring
'42 trying to persuade Japan to join the war, but they strongly
believed in soviet myth, they could not see beyond the soviet
trenches, had no abilities to collect data on Soviet territory
themselves and were unwilling to risk.

Even if there were only 365000 soviet troops maximum, they still could
be, theoretically, a force to be reckoned with. But in reality only
40th Rifle Division was adequately trained unit (almost untouched by
autumn '41 troops requisition), others being understrength, poorly
equipped, barely trained formations capable of only stationary defense
against equally weak opponent. As I've already mentioned, Far East
Front lost most of its heavy artillery, almost all tanks and transport
to the west armies, and received very little to replace that loss
before 1943. Apanasenko organized small arms production in major
cities, but that was never enough. In fact the need for armament was
so sheer that Apanasenko ordered to put back into full working order
thousands of training rifles in late 1941. Supplies situation was also
critical during first two years of war. There is one well-known
wartime letter written by certain Nikolay Soloviev, sergeant 1148 AT
battalion, he said that in 1942-43 soldiers at the front were
virtually starving, and some of them were so weak that they could not
hold rifle for more than 10 minutes, those in critical conditions were
usually sent to the regional collective farms or the "military state
farms" to recuperate.

So here is the picture - 360000+ poorly trained men, some 50+ aged
some former prisoners already exhausted by gulag, with refitted
training riffles with very limited supplies, guarded soviet Far East
for almost two years. That was a blueprint for disaster. Of course
situation has changed dramatically in 1943, and even before the
"autumn storm" armies arrived in summer 1945, Apanesenko already had
far more capable forces. But the fact is, in 1942 Japanese had a clear
cut chance to grab soviet Far East, Kwantung army was more than
adequate force to do the job.

Subchaser [HR][/HR]

​

 

Thus : NO PROOF

 

Ill provide the proof as soon as you answer that you seriously did not know that oil was and is run along the transiberian railway?

 

The Japanese forces were not ready for an invasion, it would have taken time to build up the forces. Japan did not have the means to support a second full scale ground war, apx 60% of the Japanese army was involved in trying to pacify China. Also dont forget the Soviets had already demonstrated their technology endge in weapons, especially tanks twice and finally. Except for beating the Soviets there was nothing to be gained from fighting the Soviets again. Japan needed resources and those were in the south.

 

If the UK is neutral the UK may sell the Japanese oil as may the Dutch in that situation.

 

Four options presented here in this scenario by Kurgan are with my evaluation underneath -


1) Still go through (eventually) with an invasion of the Asian territories (French Indochina, DEA, etc.) as in OTL, even though this means war with a UK (and probably US) that can put more focus on its Pacific holdings than in OTL. Resources gained: oil and rubber.

If they attack British and French territory they will face a combined British and French Fleet with an abundance of military resources.
Even if the USA stays neutral the Japanese will lose.


2) Defeat Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalists and exploit China. Resources gained: coal and iron.

They could carry on with this but even after conquest holding China down will be a problem.
This will be only possible too if the Dutch and British are selling the Japanese Oil.


3) Watch north towards the Russian border (even though their last two endeavours in that region weren’t quite successful). Resources gained: coal and iron.

The option I would favour out of the four.
The mass of empty land in Siberia is tempting for a crowded Japan.
The Japanese would have to go on the defensive in China and build up to 30 plus Divisions in Manchuria.
They will also need to import some decent tanks.
They had planned to buy the Semua 38 off France in large numbers if I remember rightly. If Hitler allows the French to produce in large numbers again of course.
If not the British may well be willing to sell them tanks or even the Germans now the oceans are clear for transport to Japan.


4) Do nothing and keep the status quo. Resources gained: none.

No spirit of adventure.

 

Some very interesting plans found here - Japanese strategic planning for mainland Asia (1905

Under these circumstances, Japanese operational planning was revised in 1934: the opening round of a hypothetical war with the USSR was contemplated in the neighborhood of the Manchurian frontiers. In 1934 the Soviet Tupolev TB-3 (ANT-6) four-engined "Super Heavy Bomber", reportedly capable of striking the Japanese home islands, was deployed in the Maritime province of Siberia (the first direct threat to the Japanese islands). In view of this situation the Japanese Army Staff effected radical changes in its operational planning for eventual hostilities with the Soviet Union:

1. a. From a mobilizable force of 30 fully equipped ground divisions, some 24 were earmarked for commitment to operations against the USSR.
2. a. Great importance was to be attached to air operations from the very outset of war.
3. a. Japan should seek to wage battle on Soviet soil from the beginning of hostilities.
4. a. The primary axis of offensive operations should be eastward, from Manchuria.
5. a. Submarine bases and bomber aircraft sites aimed at Japan must be wiped out at the beginning.
6. a. After the success of eastward operations, forces should be deployed for an offensive northward, the objective being the Lake Baikal district.

The idea of launching an eastern offensive was first conceived at the time of the new plan of 1934. Three years later Japanese operational planning was again revised:


In 1934 Japanese Kantogun forces had four complete armored divisions, 18 air squadrons and 164,100 in infantry divisions. At a secret military conference they fixed July 2 as X-day for the fight against the Soviets. They concluded the following points: (a) initially not to intervene in a Russo-German War; (b) to proceed with prudent diplomatic negotiations, while consolidating secret preparations against USSR; (c) if a Russo-German War turns out favorably for Japan, to settle the Northern problem by force and maintain stability in recent northern conquests. Accordingly, from the outbreak of a Russo-German War the Chungking operation (Chinese war) should be suspended. Army High Command was traditionally watchful towards the Soviet Union. They considered the settlement of the 'China incident' incomplete, because Japan was tied down by the USSR. At the root of the High Command attitude towards the USSR lay the following consideration: conflict between Japan and Russia was just a matter of time. It was taboo for Japan to demonstrate weakness towards the Soviet Union. Armaments were therefore the only means of stabilizing matters with Russia.
The main objective of the Imperial Army would be to build up to the strength necessary to occupy all the Maritime Province and Sakhalin Island, while at same time securing Manchuria and occupying exterior Mongolia and the Lake Baikal. Other probable objectives added to the basic war plan were a possible invasion of Irkutsk-Krasnoyarsk (East-Central Siberia), and/or an incursion to occupy Central Asia mainland.
After this secret conference, Imperial Headquarters ordered the implementation of the revised policy toward the Soviet Union by commencing large scale reinforcements of the Kantogun. To keep the true reasons secret, the build-up was called the "Special Manoeuvers of Kantogun" or "Kantokuen" for short. The 400,600 troops of the Kantogun suddenly rose to over 700,000 and some billion Yen in military funds were allocated. These manoeuvres prepared the use of force against Soviet Union, based upon the prospect that the Russo-German war might rapidly take a favorable turn for Germany. In the event that force was used against the USSR, the new operational plan of 1939 was scheduled to go into effect, whereby simultaneous offensives were to be mounted north and east from Manchuria. Additionally the new plan included landings in Soviet Far East islands and coastal areas, and land operations in Outer Mongolia. Japan also had in Manchuria 150,000 to 200,000 troops.
The Imperial Army anticipated the German offensive to commence in 1941-42. The Russians had to transfer several divisions from the Far East to European sectors, but the USSR would never leave Siberia defenseless, even if the war with Germany turned badly for her. It was thought to be almost beyond the realm of possibility for the Soviet Union to participate in a war between Japan and United States, of her own accord, thereby having to wage two-front operations. Certain reports mentioned the sending of 20 or 30 divisions to the European battlefront.
Although the Kantogun had been reinforced, the Russo-German War for which the Japanese Army had held such great expectations might not turn out favorably for Germany, despite Hitler's boasts. A serious problem consequently demanded response: how could the expanded Kantogun pull through the rigorous cold of a Manchurian or Siberian winter? Military materiel was geared to hypothetical mobile operations against the Soviet Union, characterized by light weapons, large scale logistical systems, light armored groups and many horses. If after the southern operations are underway, the Soviet Army appeared to be mounting an invasion of Manchuria, requisite forces could be diverted there in ample time.
As defensive measures against any Soviet counteroffensive, Japan had the primary goal of knocking out the Soviet Far Eastern Air Forces, as necessary to protect Manchuria and Japan. The Kantogun laid plans for a border defense system in 1934, but construction work did not begin until 1935. To begin with, to 1938 only four zones were fortified in East Manchuria, plus three in the north and one in the west.



Japanese strategic planning for mainland Asia (1905

 

View attachment 18355

Japanese plan of attack.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/91/Hokushin-ron-Map.png

 

Note that the IJA had considerably different commitments in 1937 than it did even a couple of years later. How many uncomitted divisions did it have in 1941?

 

The Kwantung Army was heavily augmented over the next few years, up to a strength of 700,000 troops by 1941 and I believe it reached over 1 million in 1942.
Yamamuro, Manchuria Under Japanese Domination.

It ended the war with 1.3 million men in 32 Divisions.

 

Well looking at this thread which quotes some official Soviet numbers (which to be fair some have disputed)
Axis History Forum • Soviet Far East
The Soviet Far East forces never dropped under 700,000 and were usually kept at over 1 million. So the Japanese likely never had a numerical edge.

It ended the war completely trashed. However even before the Soviets attacked this site:
Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation | World War II Database
states:

About half what your source suggests. For what it's worth Wiki agrees with your numbers. Note that many of the Japanese divisions were no longer combat ready by that point. Aslo look at how reluctant the IJA was to send units to the Pacfic Islands.


Even if the Soviet numbers are somewhat exagerated and the higher Japanese numbers are accurate it's far from clear that the IJA had enough strength to prevail over the Soviet forces left in the Far East. Given the quality of the Soviet espionage network a suprise Japanese attack is also unlikly. Indeed if the Axis coordinate too much more than historical the German attack may not come as a surprise either and that's going to make it a lot harder.

 

What an interesting thread! Not only does Japan attack but the UK is neutral as well... why stop there? Lets also get rid of winter and shrink Russia to the size of France... U.K. remaining neutral through out this ordeal is just as realistic.

 

Strange then that Britain remained neutral when Japan and the Soviet Union clashed in 1939 isn't it.