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Philippine Guerilla Leaders

Discussion in 'Land Warfare in the Pacific' started by Falcon Jun, Apr 15, 2008.

  1. Falcon Jun

    Falcon Jun Ace

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    I thought it's about time that I introduce you guys to Filipino guerillas who fought against the Japanese.



    Wenceslao Quinito Vinzons (September 28, 1910July 15, 1942) was a Filipino politician and a leader of the armed resistance against the Japanese occupying forces during World War II. Among the first Filipinos to organize the guerrilla resistance after the Japanese invasion of the Philippines in 1941,[1] he was executed by the Japanese Army.


    Early life and education

    Vinzons was born in the town of Indan, Camarines Norte to Gabino Vinzons and Engracia Quinito. He graduated valedictorian from his local high school, and proceeded to Manila to study at the University of the Philippines.[2]
    While at the university, Vinzons gained fame as a student leader. A member of Upsilon Sigma Phi, Vinzons would be elected president of the student council and editor-in-chief of the Philippine Collegian.[2]. He was also known for delivering an oratorical address entitled "Malaysia Irredenta", where he advocated the unification of Southeast Asian nations with a common Malay origin.[3] The piece won him the Manuel L. Quezon gold medal for excellence.[2]
    Vinzons obtained his law degree from the University of the Philippines College of Law in 1932, and placed 3rd in the bar examinations of the following year.

    Political career

    After graduation, Vinzons, along with future Vice President Arturo Tolentino founded a political party, the Young Philippines Party,[2] which advocated the grant of Philippine independence from American rule.[3] After the passage in 1934 of the Tydings-McDuffie Act which laid the groundwork for independence, Vinzons successfully sought OpenDNS that same year as a delegate representing Camarines Norte to the 1935 Constitutional Convention tasked with drafting a new constitution. As a member of the Convention, he was instrumental in prescribing Tagalog as an official language of the Philippines.[2] At 24, he was the youngest delegate, and the youngest signer of the 1935 Constitution.
    During the 1935 presidential elections, Vinzons actively campaigned for the presidential bid of former president Emilio Aguinaldo, the main challenger to then-Senate President Manuel Quezon.[2] Vinzons' efforts helped Aguinaldo carry Camarines even though Quezon won the presidency.[3] Following Aguinaldo's defeat, Vinzons put on hold his political career, opting instead to become the president of a mining corporation based in his home province.[3]
    Vinzons resumed political life in 1940, when he was elected governor of Camarines Norte. The following year, he successfully ran for election to the National Assembly, representing the lone district of Camarines Norte. His service in the legislature was interrupted by the Japanese invasion of the Philippines in December of 1941.

    Guerrilla activities and execution

    Within days following the arrival of the Japanese forces in the Philippines, Vinzons began to organize armed resistance in the Bicol region against the invasion army, which had arrived in the region on December 12, 1941. He commandeered all the rice warehouses in Camarines Norte, and ordered the confiscation of explosives used in the province's gold mines for use against the Japanese army.[4] By December 18, 1941, he would lead a raid against a troop of Japanese soldiers in Basud, Camarines Norte. His guerrilla forces soon grew to around 2,800 strong, and in May of 1942, Vinzons would lead these forces to successfully liberate the provincial capital of Daet.[4] It is said that between December 1941 and May 1942, Vinzon's troops, armed with poisoned arrows among others, were able to kill around 3,000 Japanese soldiers.[4] As a result, the capture of Vinzons became a prime objective of the Japanese army.
    With the help of a former guerrilla-turned-informant, Vinzons was seized by the Japanese military together with his father on July 8, 1942. He refused to pledge allegiance to his captors, and was brought to a garrison in Daet. It was there, on July 15, 1942, that Vinzons was bayoneted to death after refusing one final entreaty to cooperate with the Japanese forces.[1] Shortly thereafter, his father, wife, sister and two of his children were also executed by the Japanese.[5]
     
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  2. Falcon Jun

    Falcon Jun Ace

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    CHAPTER X
    GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES
    The Philippine Resistance Movement
    In the wake of military conquest by foreign invaders there have developed great and powerful resistance movements from within subjugated peoples. These rebellions against imposed authority have usually brought swift and ruthless suppression. For their own protection, invading armies have branded the patriot franc-tireur and guerrilla as a bandit and a criminal in an effort to alienate him from his people and crush his efforts to gain liberation for his country.
    Fighters of the underground have usually received payment in the form of a one-way ticket to the gallows or the firing squad, very often by way of the torture chamber. World War II rings with the echoes of many rifle volleys directed against blindfolded rebel patriots standing stolidly against a stone wall or tied hurriedly to a convenient telegraph pole.
    The foreign conqueror, however, is usually vulnerable in his attenuated lines of communication; the franc-tireur is an elusive opponent. The spirit of free men thrives on oppression. In the European Theater, the French Maquis has become a valiant and symbolic figure, in his untiring struggle against the Nazis. Equally impressive in the Pacific is the rise of the Filipino against the Japanese invader. The Filipino guerrillas fought for the same principles as the European underground, against the same background of peril, ruthlessness, and hardship.1
    After abortive efforts to draw the people of the Philippines into the " Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere " by propaganda, quislings, bribery, and subversion, the Japanese were forced to resort to wholesale arrests, punitive expeditions, and summary executions in an attempt to stem a steadily rising tide of opposition.2 Repressive measures, however, only increased the determination of the Filipino patriot to resist.
    The 7000-odd islands of the Philippines, sprawling along 1000 miles of ocean, made it impossible for the Japanese armies to garrison more than key towns in the populated and cultivated districts. The sparsely settled farmlands and the virtually inaccessible mountains of the interior were left relatively unoccupied by enemy troops. Since the Philippine Constabulary had been demobilized with the invasion, the mass of people in the outlying areas
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    was left without adequate police protection. Such a situation soon encouraged the rise of numerous marauding parties which roamed the countryside in search of easy loot and tribute to be taken from the defenseless farmers.3
    As usual in such cases, the harassed people took matters into their own hands. The small vigilante groups that were formed to combat these raiders soon banded together for greater strength and mutual protection, and it did not take long to eradicate the lawless elements as an immediate threat to their homes. These vigilantes later combined forces with the unsurrendered soldiers of the United States and Philippine forces and provided the nucleus for the guerrilla resistance movement.4 As the occupation became harsher and more onerous, opposition and active rebellion began to spread rapidly throughout the islands.
    This spirit of resistance was vividly expressed by Tomas Confesor, pre-war governor of Iloilo Province on Panay, who headed the free civil government of that island during the Japanese occupation. In 1943, Confesor wrote a stinging letter of rebuke to a Filipino quisling who had appealed to him to surrender in return for a promise of personal safety:
    There is a total war in which the issues between the warring parties are less concerned with territorial questions but more with forms of government, ways of life, and those that affect even the very thoughts, feelings and sentiments of every man. In other words, the question at stake with respect to the Philippines is not whether Japan or the United States should possess it but more fundamentally it is:-what system of government would stand here and what ways of life, system of social organizations and code for morals should govern our existence....
    You may not agree with me but the truth is that the present war is a blessing in disguise to our people and that the burden it imposes and the hardships it has brought upon us are a test of our character to determine the sincerity of our convictions and the integrity of our souls. In other words, this war has placed us in the crucible to assay the metal in our being. For as a people, we have been living during the last forty years under a regime of justice and liberty regulated only by universally accepted principles of constitutional governments. We have come to enjoy personal privileges and civil liberties without much struggle, without undergoing any pain to attain them. They were practically a gift from a generous and magnanimous people-the people of the United States of America. Now that Japan is attempting to destroy those liberties, should we not exert any effort to defend them? Should we not be willing to suffer for their defense? If our people are undergoing hardships now, we are doing it gladly, it is because we are willing to pay the price for those constitutional liberties and privileges. You cannot become wealthy by honest means without sweating heavily. You very well know that the principles of democracy and democratic institutions were brought to life through bloodshed and fire. If we sincerely believe in those principles and institutions, as we who are resisting Japan do, we should contribute to the utmost of our capacity
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    to the cost of its maintenance to save them from destruction and annihilation and such contribution should be in terms of painful sacrifices the same currency that other peoples paid for those principles.
    You were a member of the Constitutional Convention that adopted the Constitution of the Philippine Commonwealth. You did not only subscribe to it but you became a Filipino citizen by virtue thereof. Now that the hour of test has come, how dare you advise the people, as you do now, to forsake that sacred document and accept anything for peace and tranquility? Should I harken to you, I would be conspiring with you and the Japanese military authorities to destroy the Constitution that you and I signed with all solemnity, and everything for which that Constitution stands....
    I firmly believe that it is not wise and statesmanly for our leaders, in this their darkest hour, to teach our people to avoid sufferings and hardships at the sacrifice of fundamental principles of government and the democratic way of life. On the contrary, it is their bounder duty and responsibility to inspire our people to willingly undergo any kind of difficulties and sacrifices for the sake of noble principles that they nourish deep in their hearts... .
    America is at war with Japan not because she wants to keep the Philippines but to uphold and maintain the principles of democracy therein. In the speeches of Japanese military authorities, especially that of Gen. Homma, formerly commander in chief of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines, they condemned democracy and the principles of liberty under such a system of government. It is, therefore, evidently fallacious and insincere on your part to state that you are not pro-Japanese nor a pro-American but a pro-Filipino. What do you mean by being a pro-Filipino? What are the principles for which you stand as a pro-Filipino ? What national objectives do you have in mind when you expressed the thought that you are a pro-Filipino and not a pro-Japanese nor a pro-American ? What ideals do you propose to realize as a pro-Filipino ? If you have any objectives and ideals at all, do you believe in realizing them more effectively under a totalitarian and absolute system of government than under a democracy ?.. .
    You are decidedly wrong when you told me that there is no ignominy in surrender. That may be true in the case of soldiers who were corralled by the enemy consisting of superior force with no way of escape whatsoever. For when they gave themselves up they did not repudiate any principles of good government and the philosophy of life which inspired them to fight heroically and valiantly-to use your own words. Should I surrender, however, and with me the people, by your own invitation and assurance of guarantee to my life, my family and those who follow me, I would be surrendering something more precious than life itself : " The principles of Democracy and the Justice of the Honor and Destiny of our people."
    I noted you emphasized in your letter only peace and the tranquility of our people.... You and your fellow puppets are trying to give them peace and tranquility by destroying their honor and dignity, without suffering or if there is any, the least possible. On the other hand, we endeavor to inspire them to face difficulties and undergo any sacrifice to uphold the noble principles of popular rule and constitutional government thereby holding up high and immaculate their honor and dignity at the same time. In other words, you are trying to drive our people to peace and tranquility on the road of ignominy, to borrow your own language. Peace and tranquility are easy to achieve if you choose the easy way but in that case, however, you would be living beneath the dignity of a human being. You would be reducing our people as a result thereof to the status of a dumb animal like the good carabao which lives in peace and tranquility you are talking about-that of a carabao ? Would this not be clearly ignominious ?.. .
    You may have read, I am sure, the story of Lincoln who held firmly to the conviction that the secession of the Southern States from the Northern was wrong.... If Lincoln had revised his convictions and sacrificed them for the sake of peace and tranquility as you did, a fatal catastrophe would have befallen the people of America. With this lesson of history clearly before us, I prefer to follow Lincoln's example than yours and your fellow puppets....
    I hope I have made myself clear enough to make you understand my position. I will not surrender as long as I can stand on my feet. The people may
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    suffer now and may suffer more during the next months. To use the words of St. Paul, the Apostle: "The sufferings of the present are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come that shall be revealed in us....5
    Confesor's feelings were echoed in the hearts of the majority of his countrymen.6 Their struggle was bitter and sometimes marked by internal discord and petty bickering, but the Filipino guerrillas managed to keep the torch of freedom burning during the period from the fall of Corregidor to the liberation of Luzon.7 During the course of the war every island produced its local forces to resist the enemy. (Plate No. 84)
    Although the size and geography of the Philippines made it difficult for the Japanese to interfere with the continued growth of the numerous, small guerrilla bands that had sprung up on the various islands, this very topography was a tremendous handicap to any effective unification of strength. Isolated from each other and from the outside world, the guerrillas at first dissipated their efforts in unco-ordinated raids against the enemy. These minor operations were generally fruitless and often did more harm than good since they brought swift and severe retaliatory measures by the Japanese. Even on the larger islands of Luzon, Mindanao, and Leyte, the terrain and poor communications caused a multiplicity of initially independent guerrilla commands to arise with intransigent leaders pursuing their own particular interests. A single driving force was badly needed to direct the guerrilla potential into channels which could produce maximum results. As soon as the facts concerning Filipino resistance became known in 1942, it was General MacArthur's purpose to provide this direction and to weld the scattered groups into unified and responsible forces through the designation and support of responsible local commanders.
    Activities of the Allied Intelligence Bureau
    The story of guerrilla activities in the Southwest Pacific Campaign can be divided into three phases, Phase One consisting of the initial exploration of the guerrilla movement by the Allied Intelligence Bureau under the operational control of G-2, Phase Two comprising its development under the Philippine Regional Section, and Phase Three composed of the merging of all guerrilla activities with the actual invasion of the Philippine Islands.8
    The fall of Corregidor in May 1942 cut off virtually all communication with the Philippines. A single radio station operated in the
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    [​IMG]
    PLATE NO. 84
    Major Guerrilla Forces in the Philippines, 1942-1945​
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    Luzon province of Nueva Ecija by a Philippine Army Officer, Lt. Col. Guillermo Z. Nakar, Philippine Army, and several other Filipino and American escapees continued to provide a slender thread of information for several months. Messages from this station broke off in August 1942, however, and with the subsequent capture and execution of Colonel Nakar by the Japanese, radio contact with the Philippines was temporarily lost.
    In October 1942 two unsurrendered officers, Capt. William L. Osborne and Capt. Damon J. Gause, who had made a hazardous journey from Luzon in a remarkable feat of navigation, arrived in Australia with the first reports of guerrilla activities on southern Luzon, Palawan, and Tawi Tawi. In December other escaped personnel brought in more detailed information concerning numerous guerrilla groups in operation on central Luzon, Leyte, Samar, Cebu, Negros, and Panay. During this same period, radio contact was re-established, and intercepted calls from guerrilla commanders on northern Luzon and Panay added to the picture.9 By the beginning of 1943, it was clear that organizations to combat the Japanese were forming everywhere in the islands and that with proper exploitation valuable intelligence could be obtained locally for use in planning future operations. Steps to penetrate the Philippines by clandestine methods began in earnest.
    At this early stage, General MacArthur was obviously limited in the amount of aid he could give the guerrilla organizations to help them through their embryonic stages. His own supplies were inadequate and the great distances involved made the problem of tangible assistance a formidable one.
    The initial task of contacting the guerrillas and laying the groundwork for an extensive intelligence net in the Philippines was given to the Allied Intelligence Bureau under the operational control of the Theater G-2. A long-range program was developed, based on previous experience with AIB operations behind enemy lines in the Solomons-New Guinea area. In October 1942 the AIB established a special Philippine Sub-Section for the exclusive handling of operations to assist the guerrillas. Solutions were worked out for the best methods of dispatching supplies and funds to the Philippines; areas of responsibility were defined; and plans were made for communication channels to forward information to Australia.
    The dispatch of a pioneering party to explore the prevailing situation in the islands and develop specific information on the military, political, and economic aspects of the Japanese-dominated Philippine Government, as well as on the attitudes of the guerrillas themselves, became a priority project. On 27 December 1942, a Filipino aviator, Capt. (later Maj.) Jesus A. Villamor, together with a party of five, left Australia on the submarine Gudgeon to organize an intelligence net, determine means of receiving emergency supplies, and obtain general information on Japanese activities. The party landed successfully on Negros and, on 27 January, just one month after his departure, Major Villamor established efficient radio contact with Australia.10
    Meanwhile two agents sent by Col. Wendell W. Fertig, an unsurrendered American officer
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    who had become a guerrilla leader on southern Mindanao, reached Australia by sailboat. Their reports indicated that this large and strategically placed island could be made into a major guerrilla base for further expansion to the north. Commander Charles Parsons, USNR, because of his wide and intimate knowledge of the Philippines, was selected to lead a secret fact-finding mission to Mindanao and carry in cipher materials and token sup plies. This party arrived in Zamboanga, the westernmost province of Mindanao, on 5 March. After contacting Colonel Fertig, Commander Parsons presented General MacArthur's concept of guerrilla activities and then went on to visit the other islands in the archipelago.11
    Following these two initial penetrations, additional parties were sent in as rapidly as strained transportation facilities permitted. Submarines carried supplies to Panay in April, and to Tawi Tawi and Mindanao in May. A number of concealed radio transmission stations were established in these islands and material support was given to the local guerrillas.12
    This initial exploratory period also saw an outstanding episode of clandestine operations. On 16 June 1943, Major Emigdio Cruz, P.A., arrived in Australia from Washington on the first leg of a secret mission to Manila on instruction of Manuel Quezon, President of the Philippine Government-in-Exile. After conferring with General MacArthur and members of his staff, Major Cruz sailed aboard the submarine Thresher and landed on Negros on 9 July. From there he worked his way ingeniously across the intervening islands to Luzon, posing at various stages along the way as an itinerant trader, a vendor of fowl, and a vegetable peddler. Several times he narrowly missed discovery by the Japanese but, despite frequent arrests and searching interrogations, he finally arrived safely in Manila on 22 October.
    Major Cruz' main mission in Manila was to contact General Manuel Roxas, a well known Filipino politician with an intimate knowledge of high-level Japanese activities in the Philippine Puppet Government, who was in constant communication with the various guerrilla leaders on the islands. After a series of conferences with General Roxas and personal contacts with the other government officials, Major Cruz had accumulated sufficient important data on the inner workings of the Philippine puppet regime to dictate his return to Australia.
    On 8 November he left Luzon for Negros and by the end of February 1944, he had retraced his difficult course to complete a brilliant and extremely hazardous mission.13 Besides the highly important intelligence brought back, Major Cruz' journey showed that, despite the great risks involved, the occupied islands of the Philippines could be traversed by a person with sufficient daring, judgment, and ability.
    The information collected by these few penetration parties provided a good working basis for future plans. The guerrilla units could be classed into three main categories: (a) those built around a nucleus of unsurrendered United States and Philippine Army troops; (b) those of purely local origin, under the leadership of prominent civic personages or former Constabulary, which sprang up more or
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    less spontaneously to combat the immediate threat of uncontrolled banditry; (c) those, like the Hukbalahaps, which were an outgrowth of pre-war semi-political organizations. There were also a few roving bands of the outlaw variety which were motivated more by the lucrative prospects of brigandage under cover of guerrilla warfare than by any consideration of patriotism.14
    Although the majority of the guerrillas shared a common antipathy for the Japanese, they were often divided among themselves, separated into intractable rival factions engaged in a bitter struggle for power. There was no established demarcation of authority and no defined chain of command. All reports of returning AIB agents stressed the necessity of achieving greater co-operation and more unified control among the guerrilla organizations.
    It was considered that the best way to meet this problem would be to reactivate the pre-war Philippine Military Districts. Based on population densities, these territorial entities had been used by the Philippine Army for administrative and mobilization purposes. This device had the advantage of being based on legal precedent and would probably be the most acceptable method of division to the majority of de facto guerrilla leaders.
    In accordance with this concept, the first district commanders were appointed in February 1943. Colonel Fertig was given command of the 10th Military District on Mindanao and Lt. Col. Macario Peralta, of the 6th Military District on Panay. Since these officers already exercised considerable influence over adjacent islands, Colonel Fertig was also assigned responsibility or the 9th Military District, embracing Leyte and Samar, until a permanent commander could be selected; Colonel Peralta was similarly given temporary control over the 7th and 8th Districts of Negros and Cebu. (Plate No. 85)
    Meanwhile the development of the Philippine communications net progressed steadily. Navy and Signal Corps departments co-operated closely with the Philippine Sub-Section of AIB in working out a co-ordinated program to meet immediate needs and at the same time provide for future expansion. Separate networks were mapped out for guerrillas and AIB parties, with additional provisions for a special naval coastwatching system to cover important strategic waterways.
    June 1943 marked the end of the preliminary phase of SWPA's penetration into the Philippines-the exploration of the guerrilla potential. This initial period had seen effective liaison established with guerrilla groups on Mindanao, Negros, and Panay. Agents in Manila had also been contacted. In co-operation with the U.S. Navy, supplies and trained personnel had been transported by submarine to Tawi Tawi, Mindanao, Cebu, and Panay and put in the hands of the local leaders. The groundwork for a widespread intelligence net had been begun under Major Villamor with heartening results. Steps had been initiated to expand
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    [​IMG]
    PLATE NO. 85
    Military Districts, 1943-1945​
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    the procurement of supplies, weapons, and capable personnel and to increase the number of intelligence parties sent into the islands. Radio stations had been established and developed until the operation of an efficient, comprehensive communications system was well on its way. A good and encouraging start had been made.
    Activities of the Philippine Regional Section
    The second phase of guerrilla development in the Philippines began in June 1943 with the activities of the Philippine Regional Section. This new section, formed from the original Philippine Sub-Section of AM and given semi-autonomous status, was organized in late May, under Col. Courtney Whitney, to handle the increasing problems inherent in the rapid development of events and the growing availability of supply facilities.
    The assistance and co-ordination of guerrilla operations was continued on an enlarged scale, and efforts were intensified to push on from the bases established on Mindanao and Panay into the islands to the north. Additional parties were prepared for the Visayas, and plans were laid for the penetration of Luzon via Mindoro and Samar. To aid this program, facilities for the transportation of supplies under the general direction of Commander Parsons were augmented by the acquisition of more cargo-carrying submarines from the U.S. Navy.
    To guide the various guerrilla leaders in the prosecution of their operations and to make maximum use of their services in the war against Japan, General MacArthur directed that his agents follow a policy of general encouragement and careful instruction without direct command interference which might incur resentment. Guerrilla groups were advised to assist in maintaining civil order so that they might receive reciprocal popular support. They were also cautioned to refrain from open and aggressive warfare against Japanese troops lest they bring reprisals on the people out of all proportion to the results achieved. The collection, co-ordination, and transmission of useful intelligence were stressed as the most important, immediate contributions the guerrillas could make to the Allied cause until the actual invasion of the islands was begun.15 Before that time, all military operations were to be limited to strategic harassment, sabotage, and ambush.
    On Panay, despite strong personal differences, Tomas Confesor's civil government worked with Colonel Peralta's guerrilla organization to collect voluntary contributions and taxes to support the resistance movement. On Mindanao, the civil government and the guerrilla forces under Colonel Fertig were closely affiliated. With the authorization of President Quezon, the guerrillas issued their own currency and even carried on their own postal system. A planned agricultural production and distribution program was also mapped out to insure a maximum food supply. Such measures were indicative of Japanese weakness in the Philippines and of the Filipino's potential for independence.
    During the latter half of 1943, the Philippine Regional Section sent two new parties to
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    pierce the line north of the Central Visayas. (Plate No. 86) In October, Maj. L.H. Phillips led a group of agents to the island of Mindoro, just south of Luzon. Major Phillips was able to establish a radio station and develop some contacts in Manila. Unfortunately, the encouraging start made on Mindoro was short-lived. In February 1944, just three months after Major Phillips' arrival, the Japanese managed to discover his hide-out in Mt. Calavite and, after a futile attempt to escape, Major Phillips was killed and his headquarters destroyed.16 In July 1944, Comdr. George F. Rowe, USNR, succeeded Major Phillips as GHQ representative and was able to re-weld the severed radio link between Mindoro and Australia.
    A party sent to Samar in November under Maj. Charles M. Smith, was more successful in its efforts. Major Smith set up a radio control station which was in contact with GHQ by 20 December, and established a firm base of operations for further advances. From his position on Samar, he dispatched a number of his men to Masbate, Cebu, and to south and central Luzon. The planting of agents in these various localities was to bring forth valuable intelligence information to aid in planning Philippine invasion operations.
    By the end of 1943 a communications net had been established covering most of the southern Philippines. (Plate No. 87) This net formed a framework for later development and extension into the areas to the north during 1944.
    Meanwhile, Commander Parsons had returned to Australia in the late summer of 1943 from his fruitful mission to Mindanao and its neighboring islands. After the information he carried back had been co-ordinated with the plans and activities of the Philippine Regional Section, Commander Parsons sit out a second time, in October, to expand the contacts made on his previous trip. He again remained on Mindanao for several months, helping Colonel Fertig to consolidate his control and to increase the efficiency and value of his organization. In February 1944, Commander Parsons conducted still another supply run to Mindanao, Tawi Tawi, and Mindoro. His name became well known throughout the southern islands of the Philippines and his "life line" supply service was famous among the important guerrilla leaders.
    The first half of the year 1944 saw a marked speed-up in the activities of the Philippine Regional Section. The number of submarine-borne parties was increased and the tonnage of transported materials considerably augmented. In January, supplies were landed on Panay and Negros; in February, on Tawi Tawi and Mindanao. The month of May was a particularly active one. A large party of specially trained agents was dispatched to Colonel Smith on Samar and another to Colonel Fertig on Mindanao. Additional quantities of supplies were brought into this latter island for distribution to the north. During May, too, the first agents were sent to the island of Palawan. In June, a party with complete equipment for transmission of weather information was sent to Negros.
    By the middle of 1944, as plans for the invasion of the Philippines were fast ripening, the scope of the Philippine Regional Section's expansion in the archipelago had reached the point where direct participation by the various staff sections of General MacArthur's Head quarters became desirable. The vital early steps of arranging contacts, ascertaining actual conditions and the problems facing the guerrilla movement, sending in supplies and equip-
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    [​IMG]
    PLATE NO. 86
    AIB and PRS Penetrations of the Philippines, 1943-1944 ​
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    [​IMG]
    PLATE NO. 87
    Philippine Islands Communications, 15 December 1943 ​
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    ment, establishing an intelligence net, and organizing military commands within the areas of guerrilla activity had been largely completed. (Plate No. 88) Guerrilla activities had to be thoroughly co-ordinated with operational plans of the Southwest Pacific Area for the coming assault. In June, therefore, the functions of the Philippine Regional Section were decentralized, and the further direction of the guerrilla movement was apportioned among the General Staff sections so that the optimum result in each phase of activity could best be achieved. A nucleus of the Philippine Regional Section continued as a co-ordinating and advisory agency.17
    The Guerrillas on Mindanao
    With all operations between SWPA and the Philippine guerrillas now channeled directly into the invasion planning of specific GHQ staff sections, the third phase of development was opened. During this stage, the guerrillas emerged from their hideouts to take their places in battle beside the advancing American divisions.
    Because of its large size, its rugged terrain, and its location farthest from the center of Japanese occupation in the Philippines, Mindanao was particularly adaptable to the easy formation of guerrilla groups. Japanese troops held only a few main cities along its 1,400-mile coastline and paid little attention to the interior of the island. It enjoyed comparative freedom from Japanese surveillance and pressure and was consequently the scene of early development of guerrilla organizations.
    The growth of the guerrilla movement on Mindanao was in general prototypic of the movements in the rest of the Philippine Islands. On Mindanao, however, the movement matured earlier and with less hostile interference. With the complete absence of Japanese inland patrols, small guerrilla bands quickly made their appearance all through the interior. The many mountains, limited road nets, and primitive communication facilities at first kept these groups isolated from each other, and a certain mistrust and jealousy on the part of the guerrilla leaders prevented any initial attempts at consolidation. In addition, the vast expanse of the island, with almost three weeks required to journey from east to west, increased the obstacles in the way of operational co-ordination.
    As time passed, however, the bond of common purpose and the advantages apparent in unification induced the various leaders to seek some means of co-operation. The smaller groups soon blended into larger ones and finally Colonel Fertig emerged as the generally accepted commander of the Mindanao guerrillas. Colonel Fertig was a former American mining engineer who had fought on Bataan and then, upon its surrender, escaped to Mindanao to serve with General Sharp. When Mindanao, in turn, fell to the Japanese, Colonel Fertig took a group of officers and men into the hills to form the nucleus of a responsible resistance movement. By perseverance and diplomacy Colonel Fertig gradually won the respect of the other guerrilla leaders, and by October 1942 he had built up a fairly cohesive guerrilla organization.18
    In November, Colonel Fertig decided that the time was ripe to notify General Headquarters of the potentialities of his organization and to request assistance. He dispatched his two emissaries, Capt. J. A. Hamner and Captain Smith, on their trip to Australia which resulted in the subsequent contact by Commander Parsons. With authority over the 10th Military District as conferred by GHQ at the time
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    of Commander Parsons' first trip and, with the approval of the Philippine Government-in-Exile, Colonel Fertig attempted to establish a smoothly functioning civil government to parallel his military organization. Former Philippine officials were appointed as provincial governors and to other civic posts. By early 1943, conditions on Mindanao had become so stable that President Quezon authorized the creation of the Mindanao Emergency Currency Board to issue its own monetary notes for use as a medium of exchange among guerrilla forces.
    Before the swift-moving events of the war made it advisable for General MacArthur to make his first strike in the Philippines directly at Leyte, it had been planned to retake the islands by an initial invasion of Mindanao. This fact, together with a convenient geographical position which eased the problem of transportation by submarine, constituted the main reason why the Mindanao guerrillas were the first to be supplied extensively. It was a sound strategical investment.
    With the assistance of SWPA, the Mindanao guerrilla organization eventually became the largest and best equipped in the Philippine Islands. By January 1945, Colonel Fertig's command included a force of about 38,000 men.19 (Plate No. 89) His radio and intelligence network consisted of some seventy transmitter stations and an excellent and extensive coast-watcher system. GHQ was furnished with a constant stream of information which, within its limits of accuracy, helped considerably in the planning of operations against the Japanese in the Philippines. The guerrillas had also prepared airfields at Dipolog, Labo, Lala, and Barobo.20
    When General MacArthur was ready to retake the Philippine Islands, the guerrillas on Mindanao were in a position to contribute substantially to military operations.21 With the American invasion of the southern Philippines in early 1945, they began to strike openly against the Japanese forces occupying the island. They seized the airfield at Dipolog, held it until elements of the 21st Infantry landed, and later helped them defend it against strong Japanese counterattacks while a squadron of American fighters used the field as a base for operations to the south. When the American forces chased the Japanese from Zamboanga City, guerrillas set up strong positions behind the retreating enemy troops to form a wall against any further escape into the mountains. On 12 April, five days before
    [309]​
    [​IMG]
    PLATE NO. 88
    General Philippine Intelligence Coverage, 1943-1944 ​
    [310]​
    [​IMG]
    PLATE NO. 89
    Mindanao Guerrilla Organization, 31 January 1945 ​
    [311]​
    the first Eighth Army landings along Illana Bay on Mindanao's west coast, Colonel Fertig notified General Eichelberger that the initial objective of Malabang and its airfield already had been captured by the guerrillas. Acting on this information, the American forces made their assault further down the coast at Parang, for a drive on the enemy-held town of Cotabato. On 10 May, when elements of the U.S. 40th Division landed near Bugo on northern Mindanao's Macajalar Bay, they found that the guerrillas had cleared the Japanese from the beaches and were ready to assist in the advance to the important town of Cagayan. Aiding the drive of the U.S. 24th Division, Colonel Fertig's forces guarded Highway No. 1 from Kabakan to the Tanculan River so that the Americans could race across the island without fear of an unguarded flank. Guerrilla troops also seized the Tagum River area on north Davao Gulf, as well as Talikub Island in the Gulf itself.22
    The Guerrillas on Negros, Cebu, and Bohol
    Slightly to the northwest of Mindanao lie the three-islands of Negros, Cebu, and Bohol. The growth of guerrilla organizations on these three islands followed a pattern very similar to that of Mindanao. (Plate No. 9o) After the usual birth pains of interfaction rivalries and petty jealousies, the islands gradually evolved their own de facto commands which eventually were unified under a few main leaders. Unlike Mindanao, where the guerrilla movement developed primarily under the leadership of American officers, these commands were mainly Filipino-organized and Filipino-led.
    On Negros, the chief character to arise as commander of the central and northern portions of the island was Capt. Salvador Abcede, P.A. Captain Abcede originally was sent to Negros in November 1942 by Colonel Peralta of Panay. His initial efforts to spread Peralta's control throughout the entire island met with considerable initial opposition from other guerrilla chiefs, particularly from Lt. Col. Gabriel Gador, P.A., in southern Negros.23
    Major Villamor's dramatic arrival in January 1943 as the forward representative of General Headquarters marked the first genuine progress toward real unification of the Negros guerrillas. His presence as an advisor accredited by SWPA was welcomed by the majority of the guerrilla leaders and, after his appointment as temporary commander of the 7th Military District in May, a general accord was worked out among the various dissident groups. Major Villamor organized the 7th Military District Headquarters, appointed a civil administrator, Henry Roy Bell, and secured authority for the establishment of a free civil government under Alfredo Montelibano, pre-war governor of Negros Occidental.
    Upon his return to Australia in October 1943, Major Villamor nominated Captain Abcede as the man best qualified to assume permanent command of the 7th Military District. When this nomination was finally approved and made official in March 1944, Captain Abcede worked aggressively to improve the efficiency of his command. The remainder of the guerrilla units, including Colonel Gador's group in southern Negros, was absorbed into his organization and an amicable and satisfactory relationship was achieved with the free civil government. Captain Abcede gave particular attention to the development of his intelligence network and succeeded in providing a wide coverage of enemy activities. By December 1944, the strength of Colonel
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    Abcede's organization on Negros numbered approximately 13,000 men.24
    East of Negros is the long, narrow island of Cebu, the most densely populated of all the Philippine Islands. The story of the guerrilla movement on Cebu is primarily that of two men-Harry Fenton and Lt. Col. James H. Cushing, both American-born. With the Japanese capture of Cebu City in the central part of the island, a large number of USAFFE forces escaped to the hills, taking along a sizeable quantity of arms and supplies. Numerous guerrilla units were soon formed in the enemy-unoccupied regions to the north and south and these gradually combined into larger groups. By the middle of 1942, the guerrilla organization on Cebu was split into two bodies; one under Fenton, in the north, and the other under Colonel Cushing, in the south.
    Despite marked differences in personalities and methods of operation, these two leaders quickly recognized the advisability of uniting their resources for co-ordinated action against the Japanese. A joint command was established which put administration under Fenton and combat activities under Colonel Cushing. A single staff served for both factions and areas of control were delegated to subordinate leaders.25
    This arrangement functioned satisfactorily until mid-1943 when critical food shortages and rapidly dwindling supplies, coupled with intensive countermeasures by the Japanese, seriously disrupted the Cebu guerrilla organization. To aggravate the situation, both leaders fell seriously ill and all activities were temporarily curtailed. During this period, dormant animosities between the two factions were again aroused; disagreements arose between Fenton and his associates. Instituting a reign of terror and persecution, Fenton engaged in a series of reckless and injudicious actions which alienated many of his officers. On 15 September he was tried and executed and his command was reorganized.
    Colonel Cushing meanwhile recovered his health and, in the face of persistent Japanese anti-guerrilla campaigns, began to rebuild his weakened groups for further operations. In January 1944 he was designated by GHQ as commander of the 8th Military District and shortly afterward his organization was sent supplies and radio equipment from Australia. Colonel Cushing broadened and improved intelligence coverage on Cebu and his guerrillas throughout the island worked with increased efficiency. By April, GHQ was receiving a gratifying volume of information on Japanese movements and military operations.26
    On Bohol, the oval-shaped, coral island bordering Cebu on the southeast, several guerrilla groups developed, with Maj. Ismael Ingeniero emerging as the leader of the specially created Bohol Area Command.27 Internal friction among the guerrilla groups had to a degree alienated the civil populace and when the Japanese landed in force on the island in June 1944 the guerrilla organizations collapsed. Following the Japanese partial withdrawal in
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    [​IMG]
    PLATE NO. 90
    Central Philippines Guerrilla Organization, October-November 1944 ​
    [314]​
    July, Major Ingeniero's organization was largely reestablished but little useful information was extracted from Bohol before the major invasion of the Philippines.
    Despite deficiencies in the resistance organizations on the islands of Negros, Cebu, and Bohol, the guerrilla forces played a significant part in the liberation of their territories when the Eighth Army invaded the southwest Visayas.
    Colonel Abcede's units on Negros had done valuable preliminary work to assist the invasion troops. The guerrillas held the Japanese to a line stretching from Bacolod, the capital, on the west to San Carlos on the east. Most important towns south of Bacolod were under guerrilla control. After the landing of the U. S. 40th Division, the guerrillas, familiar with the jungle terrain, served efficiently as scouts and guides in helping to rout the Japanese from hidden retreats and successfully executed numerous combat missions assigned by the division.28
    Colonel Cushing's guerrillas on Cebu played havoc with Japanese patrols and movements prior to the arrival of the Americal Division. Enemy lines were disrupted and the task of the invading troops was made considerably easier.29 The guerrillas had also developed an airstrip and had control of all but a few areas in east and northern Cebu. After the landing, Colonel Cushing's guerrillas joined the combat patrols of the Americal Division in trailing enemy remnants which had fled to the mountainous interior.30
    Most of Bohol Island was free of Japanese and under surveillance of Major Ingeniero's guerrillas before the coming of the American forces on 11 April. The landing parties were met by the news that no enemy forces were in the area.31
    The Guerrillas on Panay and Adjacent Islands
    The resistance movement on Panay was unique. It developed rapidly ; there was a minimum of discord; and a dynamic leader emerged at an early time. The guerrilla structure on Panay was built around a core of refugee troops of the Philippine 61st Division who had taken to the hills immediately after the surrender orders were published. Scarcely ten weeks after the Japanese invasion, Colonel Peralta, former G-3 of the division and a man of strong and driving character, assumed undisputed control of the main guerrilla groups. The early emergence of a generally accepted leader and the availability of a relatively large amount of salvaged supplies and equipment gave a powerful impetus to the formation of a smoothly working guerrilla command. In addition, the efforts of Panay's intrepid governor, Tomas Confesor, whose free civil government was left comparatively unmolested by the light Japanese garrison, strengthened the framework of the Panay organization and bolstered the morale of the people.32
    Colonel Peralta made rapid progress. By November 1942 he had reactivated the Philip-
    [315]​
    pine 61st Division, initiated an intensive training program, and established first radio contact with Australia. He also began to extend his influence to the adjacent islands in the Visayas and even to Mindoro and Palawan. In February 1943, GHQ appointed Colonel Peralta as de facto commander of the 6th Military District which included Panay, the Romblon Islands, and Guimaras Island. While this appointment solidified Colonel Peralta's control over his own territory, it had the effect of cancelling any official authority in other regions where he had aspired to establish his influence.
    In spite of this limitation, Colonel Peralta's activities in adjacent areas continued to flourish spontaneously. The small guerrilla bands on Masbate, Marinduque, Mindoro, and Palawan, having no outstanding leaders of their own, remained under the domination of the 6th Military District. Colonel Peralta soon developed one of the most extensive and efficient intelligence systems in the Philippines. He had radio contacts and courier service with the principal guerrilla chiefs in the Visayas and Mindanao and his agents were in operation as far as Luzon. Voluminous intelligence reports flowed in a steady stream from the north and the east via Masbate and Tablas Island into Panay Headquarters where they were collated and relayed to SWPA.33
    When the U. S. 40th Division went ashore on Panay in March 1945, Colonel Peralta's forces made a large contribution toward eliminating the Japanese. Even before the landings, his guerrillas had cleared the enemy from the outlying districts and had won possession of nine airstrips in the northern and southern parts of the island. To aid the advance of the American troops, all important bridges were repaired, roads were serviced, and key junctions were kept under control.34
    After the 40th Division forces had moved inland from the beaches, the guerrillas were used as guides and patrols. Guerrilla troops joined in the liberation of the capital city of Iloilo late in March and in the subsequent attack on the strong Japanese garrison at San Jose.
    In the neighboring islands of Mindoro, Masbate, and Palawan, guerrilla units, though not as strong or as well integrated as those on Panay, were also helpful. On Mindoro, the Japanese fugitives in the interior were hunted down in the mountains and through the jungles; on Masbate, the guerrillas conducted their own amphibious assault and occupied the capital town; on Palawan, guerrilla groups confined the Japanese to the area of Puerto Princesa and joined in the elimination of scattered enemy pockets. With the assistance of the various guerrilla units of Colonels Peralta, Fertig, and Abcede, the invasion tasks of the Eighth Army forces in Mindanao and the western Visayas were immeasurably simplified and greatly shortened.
    The Guerrillas on Leyte and Samar
    Until the Spring of 1943, a dozen different guerrilla leaders contested bitterly for authority on Leyte. Although most of these men shared a desire to work against the Japanese, any thought of unification was subordinated to their individual interests. There was apparently no leader unselfish enough to put aside his personal motives for the common good or strong enough to enforce obedience from the others.
    On a visit to Leyte in April 1943, Commander Parsons persuaded Col. Rupert K. Kangleon, former commander of the Philippine
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    81st Infantry, to attempt a consolidation of the dissident factions on the island under the guidance of SWPA. By a judicious mixture of force and diplomacy and by the strength of his own prestige, Colonel Kangleon eventually succeeded in winning the allegiance of the principal guerrilla groups to begin a reorganization of the pre-war Philippine 92nd Division.35 In October 1943 he was appointed by GHQ to head the Leyte Area Command, and by Fall of the following year, Leyte boasted a well-trained guerrilla force of some 3,200 troops.36
    On Samar, as on Leyte, numerous irreconcilable groups contended for supremacy after the removal of the Philippine Government and the dissolution of the Philippine Constabulary. Since the island was of little value strategically, there were few Japanese troops to fear, and conditions fostered the unhampered existence of a multitude of guerrilla bands. Samar, however, did not possess a man of sufficient caliber to harmonize the various prevailing differences, and as a result the island remained without any centralized authority until October 1944, the month of General MacArthur's invasion of the Philippines.
    The two largest groups on Samar were commanded by Col. Pedro V. Merritt, P.A., who was established in the north, and by Manuel Valley, an escapee from Bataan, who led an organization in the south. An attempt in September 1943 by Colonel Kangleon's emissary, Lt. Col. Juan Causing, to unite these two leaders was unavailing, and although much good work was done independently by the guerrilla units on Samar, very little was contributed to aid the plans of General MacArthur's Headquarters until after the assault on Leyte.37
    Samar's main value lay in its use as a base of operations by GHQ's representative, Colonel Smith, whose agents working on Luzon and in the Bicols relayed accumulated information on the Japanese to Australia. Although Colonel Smith did not take an active part in guerrilla affairs, his advice was often sought and his suggestions generally heeded; he gradually won the confidence of both Colonel Merritt and Manuel Valley, and in September 1944 the two principal guerrilla groups agreed to accept him as their co-ordinator. In early October, GHQ appointed Colonel Smith as commander of the Samar Area. Colonel Smith was in the process of reorganizing the Samar units when the American forces landed on the island.38
    General MacArthur's invasion of Leyte on 20 October 1944 sounded the signal for the Philippine guerrillas to throw off the cloak of concealment and come forth in open warfare against the Japanese. Shortly before the assault forces were due to sail for their objective, General MacArthur issued the following alert to the Visayan guerrilla commanders:
    The campaign of reoccupation has commenced. Although your zone is not at present within the immediate zone of operations, it is desired that your forces be committed to limited offensive action with the specific mission of harassing the movement of the enemy within your area and as far as possible contain him in his present positions. Intelligence coverage must be intensified in order that I be fully and promptly advised of all major changes in enemy disposition
    [317]​
    or movement.39
    It was on Leyte that the Filipino guerrilla and the American soldier first joined forces in battle. With the initial Sixth Army landings on the beaches at Tacloban and Dulag, Colonel Kangleon's units went into action. They dynamited key bridges to block Japanese displacement toward the target area; they harassed enemy patrols; and they sabotaged supply and ammunition depots. Information on enemy troop movements and dispositions sent from guerrilla outposts to Colonel Kangleon's Headquarters was dispatched immediately to Sixth Army.
    The guerrillas also performed valuable service in maintaining public order and in keeping the roads and highways free of congestion. After the American beachheads were established, the Leyte guerrilla groups were attached directly to the Sixth Army corps and divisions to assist in scouting, intelligence, and combat operations.
    On neighboring Samar, a regiment of the 1st Cavalry Division, which landed on 23 October, was aided extensively in its mission by the guerrilla units on the island. The main objective of seizing and controlling the strategic Taft-Wright Highway was achieved by a dual drive of cavalry and guerrilla forces. While the 8th Cavalry battled to capture Wright at the western terminus of the Highway, the guerrillas fought the Japanese from Taft on the east. A junction of the two forces in December cleared the enemy from the heart of Samar and prevented his reinforcement of Leyte from the northeast.40
    The Guerrillas on Luzon
    In contrast to the rest of the Philippine Islands, which in general were lightly garrisoned, the main island of Luzon was heavily occupied by Japanese military forces. Thorough policing and frequent, intensive clean-up campaigns prevented any effective unification of the numerous guerrilla groups which sprang into existence after the surrender of the USAFFE units.
    One of the earliest organizations developed on Luzon was headed by Col. Claude Thorp who, in January 1942, worked his way from Bataan through the Japanese lines to establish a headquarters in the Zambales Mountains. From this retreat, Colonel Thorp attempted to centralize operations in the various regions of the island including northern Luzon and the Bicol Peninsula. Though he made substantial progress in this direction, his efforts were brought to an untimely end. In October 1942 Colonel Thorp and several of his staff were trapped in a Japanese raid and subsequently executed. After Colonel Thorp's death, a multiplicity of independent guerrilla commands began to develop throughout the provinces of Luzon.41
    In the southern half of the island, three units were particularly outstanding in their growth and operations. (Plate No. 91) These were the forces of Maj. Bernard L. Anderson
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    [​IMG]
    PLATE NO. 91
    Guerrilla Forces on Luzon, October-November 1944 ​
    [319]​
    in the eastern region, of Maj. Robert Lapham in the central region, and the " Marking Guerrillas " in the sector east of Manila.42
    Major Anderson was contacted by SWPA agents in mid-1944 and in September began to receive supplies and radio equipment brought in by the ever-busy submarines. Major Anderson's efforts to achieve co-ordination, for intelligence purposes, were enormously complicated by the concurrent existence of so many independently active organizations in the area to be covered. In addition to the Marking Guerrillas and the forces of Major Lapham, there were the Hukbalahaps in Pampanga, the East-Central Luzon Guerrilla Area (ECLGA) units of Colonel Edwin P. Ramsey in east-central Luzon, the Hunters in Cavite, the Fil-American Irregular Troops in Rizal, and President Quezon's Own Guerrillas in Batangas. These units were of varying quality and effectiveness.
    Making the best of a difficult situation, Major Anderson succeeded in forwarding much valuable information from Luzon directly to SWPA Headquarters in Australia. In addition, he distributed some of the supplies he received, especially radio equipment, to other units in southern Luzon in an endeavor to increase the efficiency of the intelligence and propaganda network.43
    The guerrilla situation in the northern half of Luzon remained generally obscure until well into 1944. Distance, difficulty of communications, and the extensive countermeasures of the Japanese hampered any effective SWPA penetration of the upper provinces either for liaison or supply.
    After Colonel Nakar's execution by the Japanese and the subsequent loss of contact between his headquarters and Australia, a series of successors attempted to carry on his work in the northern mountains and in the Cagayan Valley. The Japanese in these areas were particularly watchful, however, and, as each new leader arose, he was tracked down and eliminated. In a heroic and desperate effort to continue the movement, Colonel Nakar's intrepid lieutenants, Lt. Col. Arthur Noble, Lt. Col. Martin Moses, Maj. Ralph B. Praeger, and Lt. Col. Manuel P. Enriquez, were killed or captured by the enemy before the close of 1943.44
    In early 1944 the command of the main guerrilla forces in northern Luzon ultimately fell to Maj. Russell W. Volckmann, an unsurrendered American officer. Major Volckmann designated his organization as the United States Army Forces in the Philippines, North Luzon (USAFIP, NL) and set about the task of revising the whole guerrilla movement in his area in order to weld all groups into a single force responsible to a central authority. He divided his command into sectors, giving each sector commander full power to consolidate and control the fragmentary outfits in his particular area. At the same time, Major Volckmann built up a strong intelligence system to funnel all information on Japanese movements in northern Luzon to his headquarters.
    Major Volckmann's forces grew rapidly and by the end of 1944 numbered some 10,000 men.45 The greatest drawback to the full re-
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    alization of his efforts, however, was the lack of radio contact with General Headquarters, SWPA. Finally, in September 1944, he succeeded in putting a makeshift radio into operation and, through this lone channel of communication, messages began to be sent and received. It was then that the guerrillas in northern Luzon first learned of General MacArthur's imminent return to the Philippines. Agents and equipment sent from Australia in November and December helped to co-ordinate Colonel Volckmann's operations with the American invasion plans.
    When General MacArthur landed at Lingayen Gulf, the Japanese were caught in the midst of a general redeployment of their forces throughout Luzon. Seizing the advantages of the moment, the guerrillas broke out in full force. Roads were torn up, bridges destroyed, mountain passes blocked, and rail and motor facilities sabotaged at every turn to interfere seriously with Japanese troop and supply movements.
    Shortly after the American landings, Colonel Anderson was requested to form a Filipino battalion to be attached to General Krueger's Sixth Army forces. Colonel Anderson responded by taking the best personnel at his disposal to form the first "Anderson Battalion." This unit performed efficiently and valiantly throughout central and eastern Luzon and built a battle record of 3,000 Japanese killed and 1,000 captured.
    Major Lapham's guerrillas in central Luzon played a prominent part in effecting the dramatic rescue of over 500 Allied internees from the ill-famed Cabanatuan prison camp. (Plate No. 92) The first in a series of bold liberations of Allied prisoners from enemy hands, this daring raid was carried out 25 miles behind Japanese lines by a mixed force of 286 guerrillas, 121 troops of the 6th Ranger Infantry, and 13 Alamo Scouts. The guerrillas acted as the eyes of the raiding force to guide it through the brush and as its ears to be on the alert for any surprise flanking movement by the enemy. They constructed roadblocks at the northeast and southwest approaches to the stockade to hold up hostile reinforcements and also arranged for food caches so that the liberated prisoners could be fed at convenient points along the return route.
    The attack was launched on the night of 30 January 1945. Within thirty minutes the entire Japanese garrison had been wiped out and the last prisoner removed from the prison area. The Rangers' return was covered by a guerrilla delaying action which successfully fought off approximately Boo enemy reinforcements sent to assault the strategically placed roadblocks. Meanwhile the litter patients from the camp were transported by guerrilla-organized carabao cart train to Sibul Springs, whence they were evacuated to a hospital at Guimba.46
    On 23 February, in another equally brilliant and even more extensive liberation of Allied internees, Luzon guerrillas helped troops of the 11th Airborne Division to release more than 2,100 prisoners from the Los Banos prison camp in Laguna Province on the shores of Laguna de Bay.
    For several nights prior to the attack, guerrilla units infiltrated through the Japanese lines to gather in the area of Los Banos. On the morning of the 23rd, one element of the 11th Airborne crossed Laguna de Bay in amphibious craft while another element took off by plane for a spectacular parachute drop. All forces converged in a swift and co-ordinated attack which caught the Japanese guarding the camp in the middle of their morning calisthenics. The entire garrison was annihilated with prac-
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    [​IMG]
    PLATE NO. 92
    Cabanatuan Prison Raid, 30-31 January 1945 ​
    [322]​
    tically no loss to the Allies, and the Los Banos prisoners were evacuated across the Bay.47
    The Marking Guerrillas, led by Col. Marcos V. Agustin, carried out extensive combat operations in the mountains northeast of Manila. After a month's hard training and fighting with the troops of the U. S. 43rd Division, Colonel Agustin's force, numbering some 3,000 men, was assigned a part in the powerful assault on Ipo Dam, the largest of the three dams supplying Manila. While two prongs of the 43rd Division converged on the dam from the south and west, the guerrilla force formed a third prong that came down from the northwest. The Japanese were routed from their defense positions, and the dam was captured intact. After successfully completing their assignment in the Ipo sector, the Marking Guerrillas pursued the fleeing remnants of the enemy into the hills and later aided considerably in other missions which, in the words of the 43rd Division Commander, Maj. Gen. Leonard F. Wing," otherwise would have required costly and protracted action by American forces.48
    In the northern half of Luzon, Colonel Volckmann's units fought effectively with I Corps against General Yamashita's beleaguered forces in the high mountains around Kiangan and in the plains of the Cagayan Valley. Supported by planes of the Fifth Air Force, these guerrillas were able to clear the enemy entirely from Ilocos Norte Province.49 They captured San Fernando on the eastern shore of Lingayen Gulf and took part in the drives on Baguio and the succeeding operational bases used by the Japanese in their retreat into the northern hills.50 Guerrilla destruction of the bridges on the Bagabag-Bontoc road reduced the Japanese to a single carabao trail for transport of supplies. Cervantes, on the way to Bassang Pass, was taken by guerrillas and, in a hard-fought battle, they captured the Pass itself to break into a part of the Japanese defense perimeter.
    In the bitter fight for Balete Pass in the Caraballo Mountains, guerrilla infiltration of enemy lines paved the way for the final assaults on this key approach to the Cagayan Valley.51 In the Valley itself, Colonel Volckmann's forces seized the important town of Tuguegarao and occupied its adjoining airfield.
    So widespread and effective had been the assistance rendered by the Filipino guerrillas in the liberation of their country that General Krueger, upon withdrawing the Sixth Army from combat on Luzon, said in acknowledgment:
    The gallant Filipino forces, despite tremendous difficulty and with very limited means at their disposal, rendered invaluable support to our operations. Their accomplishments are worthy of high praise.
    By the first half of July 1945, when the Eighth Army assumed combat responsibility for Luzon, the Japanese had been driven deep into the mountains, their main power broken and their destruction or surrender inevitable. A
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    large part of the painstaking task of mopping up these dismembered but dangerous forces was performed by the various guerrilla groups whose elusive fighting tactics were particularly well suited for jungle and mountain warfare against isolated enemy troops.
    General MacArthur's Tribute to the Philippine Guerrillas
    The enormous volume of valuable military information sent by the various guerrilla units in the Philippines to General Headquarters constituted a contribution fully as important as their direct combat participation. The extent and degree of intelligence coverage are evident in the complex radio communication system developed under the noses of the Japanese during the days of their occupation. The entire archipelago from north to south and from east to west was literally dotted with guerrilla transmitting and receiving stations. (Plate No. 93)
    Perhaps the best recapitulation of the rise of the guerrilla movement in the Philippines and its gradually growing part in the liberation of the Filipino people from the domination of the Japanese was given by General MacArthur shortly after his memorable return to Leyte when he said:
    As our forces of liberation roll forward the splendid aid we are receiving from guerrilla units throughout the immediate objective area and adjacent islands causes me at this time to pay public tribute to those great patriots both Filipino and American who had led and supported the resistance movement in the Philippines since the dark days of 1942. These inadequately armed patriots have fought the enemy for more than two years. Most are Filipinos but among these are a number of Americans who never surrendered, who escaped from prison camps, or who were sent in to carry out specific missions.
    Following the disaster which, in the face of overwhelming superior enemy power, overtook our gallant forces, a deep and impenetrable silence engulfed the Philippines. Through that silence no news concerning the fate of the Filipino people reached the outside world until broken by a weak signal from a radio set on the Island of Panay which was picked up, in the late fall of that same fateful year, by listening posts of the War Department and flashed to my Headquarters. That signal, weak and short as it was, lifted the curtain of silence and uncertainty and disclosed the start of a human drama with few parallels in military history.
    In it I recognized the spontaneous movement of the Filipino people to resist the shackles with which the enemy sought to bind them both physically and spiritually. I saw a people in one of the most tragic hours of human history, bereft of all reason for hope and without material support, endeavoring, despite the stern realities confronting them, to hold aloft the flaming torch of liberty. I gave this movement all spiritual and material support that my limited resources would permit.
    Through the understanding assistance of our Navy I was able to send in by submarine, in driblets at first, arms, ammunition and medical supplies. News of the first such shipment spread rapidly throughout the Philippines to electrify the people into full returning consciousness that Americans had neither abandoned them nor forgotten them.
    Since then, as resources increased, I was enabled, after formalizing the guerrilla forces by their recognition and incorporation as units of our Army, to send vitally needed supplies in ever increasing quantities through Philippine coastal contacts by four submarines finally committed exclusively to that purpose.
    I would that at this time I might name the gallant heroes of this epic in Philippine-American history, but considerations of security for the individuals, their families and the cause require that I limit myself to a generalization of their work and a statement of their brilliant achievements.
    Of the latter I need but point out that for the purposes of this campaign we are materially aided by strong, battle tested forces in nearly every Philippine community, alerted to strike violent blows against the enemy's rear as our lines of battle move forward and that now are providing countless large areas adjacent to military objectives into which our airmen may drop
    [324]​
    with assurance of immediate rescue and protection. We are aided by the militant loyalty of a whole people-a people who have rallied as one behind the standards
    of those stalwart patriots who, reduced to wretched material conditions yet sustained by an unconquerable spirit, have formed an invincible center to a resolute over-all resistance.
    We are aided by the fact that for many months our plans of campaign have benefited from the hazardous labor of a vast network of agents numbering into the hundreds of thousands providing precise, accurate and detailed information on major enemy moves and installations throughout the Philippine Archipelago. We are aided by the fact that through a vast network of radio positions extending into every center of enemy activity and concentration throughout the islands, I have been kept in immediate and constant communication with such widespread sources of information. We are aided by the fact that on every major island of the Philippines there are one or more completely equipped and staffed weather observatories which flash to my Headquarters full weather data morning, afternoon and night of every day and which in turn provides the basis for reliable weather forecasts to facilitate and secure the implementation of our operational plans. Widely disseminated to our forces throughout the Pacific and in China the information from this weather system has materially aided our military operations over a large section of the world's surface.
    We are aided by an air warning system affording visual observation of the air over nearly every square foot of Philippine soil established for the purpose of flashing immediate warning of enemy aircraft movement through that same vast network of radio communications. We are aided by provision of all inland waterways and coastal areas of complete observation over enemy naval movement to give immediate target information to our submarines on patrol in or near Philippine waters. This information has contributed to the sinking of enemy shipping of enormous tonnage, and through such same facilities was flashed the warning to our naval forces of the enemy naval concentration off the western Philippines during the Marianas operation.
    Finally we are aided by the dose interior vigilance that has secured for our military use countless enemy documents of great value, among which were the secret defensive plans and instructions of the Commander-in-Chief of the combined Japanese areas and complete information on the strength and dispositions of enemy fleet and naval air units. That same Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Japanese Fleets was a prisoner of one of our guerrilla units prior to his death from injuries sustained in an air crash.
    All of these vital aids to our military operations, and there are many more still unmentioned, are responsive to the indomitable courage of the military and civil leaders whom I shall in future name and their loyal followers both Filipino and American; to gallant Filipinos, residents of the United States, who have volunteered to infiltrate into the islands in succor of their countrymen and Americans who have infiltrated with them; and finally to the militant loyalty and unconquerable spirit of the masses of the Filipino people.
    As Commander-in-Chief of the forces of liberation I publicly acknowledge and pay tribute to the great spiritual power that has made possible these notable and glorious achievements-achievements which find few counterparts in military history. Those great patriots, Filipino and American, both living and dead, upon whose valiant shoulders has rested the leadership and responsibility for the indomitable movement in the past critical period, shall, when their identities can be known, find a lasting place on the scroll of heroes of both nations-heroes who have selflessly and defiantly subordinated all to the cause of human liberty. Their names and their deeds shall ever be enshrined in the hearts of our two peoples in whose darkest hours they have waged relentless war against the forces of evil that sought, through ruthless brutality, the enslavement of the Filipino people.
    To those great patriots to whom I now pay public tribute I say stand to your battle stations and relax not your vigilance until our forces shall have swept forward to relieve you.52
    325​
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    PLATE NO. 93
    The Philippine General Radio Net Developed during the Japanese Occupation, 9 October 1944 ​
     
  3. Falcon Jun

    Falcon Jun Ace

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    CHAPTER X
    GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES
    The Philippine Resistance Movement
    In the wake of military conquest by foreign invaders there have developed great and powerful resistance movements from within subjugated peoples. These rebellions against imposed authority have usually brought swift and ruthless suppression. For their own protection, invading armies have branded the patriot franc-tireur and guerrilla as a bandit and a criminal in an effort to alienate him from his people and crush his efforts to gain liberation for his country.
    Fighters of the underground have usually received payment in the form of a one-way ticket to the gallows or the firing squad, very often by way of the torture chamber. World War II rings with the echoes of many rifle volleys directed against blindfolded rebel patriots standing stolidly against a stone wall or tied hurriedly to a convenient telegraph pole.
    The foreign conqueror, however, is usually vulnerable in his attenuated lines of communication; the franc-tireur is an elusive opponent. The spirit of free men thrives on oppression. In the European Theater, the French Maquis has become a valiant and symbolic figure, in his untiring struggle against the Nazis. Equally impressive in the Pacific is the rise of the Filipino against the Japanese invader. The Filipino guerrillas fought for the same principles as the European underground, against the same background of peril, ruthlessness, and hardship.1
    After abortive efforts to draw the people of the Philippines into the " Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere " by propaganda, quislings, bribery, and subversion, the Japanese were forced to resort to wholesale arrests, punitive expeditions, and summary executions in an attempt to stem a steadily rising tide of opposition.2 Repressive measures, however, only increased the determination of the Filipino patriot to resist.
    The 7000-odd islands of the Philippines, sprawling along 1000 miles of ocean, made it impossible for the Japanese armies to garrison more than key towns in the populated and cultivated districts. The sparsely settled farmlands and the virtually inaccessible mountains of the interior were left relatively unoccupied by enemy troops. Since the Philippine Constabulary had been demobilized with the invasion, the mass of people in the outlying areas
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    was left without adequate police protection. Such a situation soon encouraged the rise of numerous marauding parties which roamed the countryside in search of easy loot and tribute to be taken from the defenseless farmers.3
    As usual in such cases, the harassed people took matters into their own hands. The small vigilante groups that were formed to combat these raiders soon banded together for greater strength and mutual protection, and it did not take long to eradicate the lawless elements as an immediate threat to their homes. These vigilantes later combined forces with the unsurrendered soldiers of the United States and Philippine forces and provided the nucleus for the guerrilla resistance movement.4 As the occupation became harsher and more onerous, opposition and active rebellion began to spread rapidly throughout the islands.
    This spirit of resistance was vividly expressed by Tomas Confesor, pre-war governor of Iloilo Province on Panay, who headed the free civil government of that island during the Japanese occupation. In 1943, Confesor wrote a stinging letter of rebuke to a Filipino quisling who had appealed to him to surrender in return for a promise of personal safety:
    There is a total war in which the issues between the warring parties are less concerned with territorial questions but more with forms of government, ways of life, and those that affect even the very thoughts, feelings and sentiments of every man. In other words, the question at stake with respect to the Philippines is not whether Japan or the United States should possess it but more fundamentally it is:-what system of government would stand here and what ways of life, system of social organizations and code for morals should govern our existence....
    You may not agree with me but the truth is that the present war is a blessing in disguise to our people and that the burden it imposes and the hardships it has brought upon us are a test of our character to determine the sincerity of our convictions and the integrity of our souls. In other words, this war has placed us in the crucible to assay the metal in our being. For as a people, we have been living during the last forty years under a regime of justice and liberty regulated only by universally accepted principles of constitutional governments. We have come to enjoy personal privileges and civil liberties without much struggle, without undergoing any pain to attain them. They were practically a gift from a generous and magnanimous people-the people of the United States of America. Now that Japan is attempting to destroy those liberties, should we not exert any effort to defend them? Should we not be willing to suffer for their defense? If our people are undergoing hardships now, we are doing it gladly, it is because we are willing to pay the price for those constitutional liberties and privileges. You cannot become wealthy by honest means without sweating heavily. You very well know that the principles of democracy and democratic institutions were brought to life through bloodshed and fire. If we sincerely believe in those principles and institutions, as we who are resisting Japan do, we should contribute to the utmost of our capacity
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    to the cost of its maintenance to save them from destruction and annihilation and such contribution should be in terms of painful sacrifices the same currency that other peoples paid for those principles.
    You were a member of the Constitutional Convention that adopted the Constitution of the Philippine Commonwealth. You did not only subscribe to it but you became a Filipino citizen by virtue thereof. Now that the hour of test has come, how dare you advise the people, as you do now, to forsake that sacred document and accept anything for peace and tranquility? Should I harken to you, I would be conspiring with you and the Japanese military authorities to destroy the Constitution that you and I signed with all solemnity, and everything for which that Constitution stands....
    I firmly believe that it is not wise and statesmanly for our leaders, in this their darkest hour, to teach our people to avoid sufferings and hardships at the sacrifice of fundamental principles of government and the democratic way of life. On the contrary, it is their bounder duty and responsibility to inspire our people to willingly undergo any kind of difficulties and sacrifices for the sake of noble principles that they nourish deep in their hearts... .
    America is at war with Japan not because she wants to keep the Philippines but to uphold and maintain the principles of democracy therein. In the speeches of Japanese military authorities, especially that of Gen. Homma, formerly commander in chief of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines, they condemned democracy and the principles of liberty under such a system of government. It is, therefore, evidently fallacious and insincere on your part to state that you are not pro-Japanese nor a pro-American but a pro-Filipino. What do you mean by being a pro-Filipino? What are the principles for which you stand as a pro-Filipino ? What national objectives do you have in mind when you expressed the thought that you are a pro-Filipino and not a pro-Japanese nor a pro-American ? What ideals do you propose to realize as a pro-Filipino ? If you have any objectives and ideals at all, do you believe in realizing them more effectively under a totalitarian and absolute system of government than under a democracy ?.. .
    You are decidedly wrong when you told me that there is no ignominy in surrender. That may be true in the case of soldiers who were corralled by the enemy consisting of superior force with no way of escape whatsoever. For when they gave themselves up they did not repudiate any principles of good government and the philosophy of life which inspired them to fight heroically and valiantly-to use your own words. Should I surrender, however, and with me the people, by your own invitation and assurance of guarantee to my life, my family and those who follow me, I would be surrendering something more precious than life itself : " The principles of Democracy and the Justice of the Honor and Destiny of our people."
    I noted you emphasized in your letter only peace and the tranquility of our people.... You and your fellow puppets are trying to give them peace and tranquility by destroying their honor and dignity, without suffering or if there is any, the least possible. On the other hand, we endeavor to inspire them to face difficulties and undergo any sacrifice to uphold the noble principles of popular rule and constitutional government thereby holding up high and immaculate their honor and dignity at the same time. In other words, you are trying to drive our people to peace and tranquility on the road of ignominy, to borrow your own language. Peace and tranquility are easy to achieve if you choose the easy way but in that case, however, you would be living beneath the dignity of a human being. You would be reducing our people as a result thereof to the status of a dumb animal like the good carabao which lives in peace and tranquility you are talking about-that of a carabao ? Would this not be clearly ignominious ?.. .
    You may have read, I am sure, the story of Lincoln who held firmly to the conviction that the secession of the Southern States from the Northern was wrong.... If Lincoln had revised his convictions and sacrificed them for the sake of peace and tranquility as you did, a fatal catastrophe would have befallen the people of America. With this lesson of history clearly before us, I prefer to follow Lincoln's example than yours and your fellow puppets....
    I hope I have made myself clear enough to make you understand my position. I will not surrender as long as I can stand on my feet. The people may
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    suffer now and may suffer more during the next months. To use the words of St. Paul, the Apostle: "The sufferings of the present are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come that shall be revealed in us....5
    Confesor's feelings were echoed in the hearts of the majority of his countrymen.6 Their struggle was bitter and sometimes marked by internal discord and petty bickering, but the Filipino guerrillas managed to keep the torch of freedom burning during the period from the fall of Corregidor to the liberation of Luzon.7 During the course of the war every island produced its local forces to resist the enemy. (Plate No. 84)
    Although the size and geography of the Philippines made it difficult for the Japanese to interfere with the continued growth of the numerous, small guerrilla bands that had sprung up on the various islands, this very topography was a tremendous handicap to any effective unification of strength. Isolated from each other and from the outside world, the guerrillas at first dissipated their efforts in unco-ordinated raids against the enemy. These minor operations were generally fruitless and often did more harm than good since they brought swift and severe retaliatory measures by the Japanese. Even on the larger islands of Luzon, Mindanao, and Leyte, the terrain and poor communications caused a multiplicity of initially independent guerrilla commands to arise with intransigent leaders pursuing their own particular interests. A single driving force was badly needed to direct the guerrilla potential into channels which could produce maximum results. As soon as the facts concerning Filipino resistance became known in 1942, it was General MacArthur's purpose to provide this direction and to weld the scattered groups into unified and responsible forces through the designation and support of responsible local commanders.
    Activities of the Allied Intelligence Bureau
    The story of guerrilla activities in the Southwest Pacific Campaign can be divided into three phases, Phase One consisting of the initial exploration of the guerrilla movement by the Allied Intelligence Bureau under the operational control of G-2, Phase Two comprising its development under the Philippine Regional Section, and Phase Three composed of the merging of all guerrilla activities with the actual invasion of the Philippine Islands.8
    The fall of Corregidor in May 1942 cut off virtually all communication with the Philippines. A single radio station operated in the
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    [​IMG]
    PLATE NO. 84
    Major Guerrilla Forces in the Philippines, 1942-1945​
    [299]​
    Luzon province of Nueva Ecija by a Philippine Army Officer, Lt. Col. Guillermo Z. Nakar, Philippine Army, and several other Filipino and American escapees continued to provide a slender thread of information for several months. Messages from this station broke off in August 1942, however, and with the subsequent capture and execution of Colonel Nakar by the Japanese, radio contact with the Philippines was temporarily lost.
    In October 1942 two unsurrendered officers, Capt. William L. Osborne and Capt. Damon J. Gause, who had made a hazardous journey from Luzon in a remarkable feat of navigation, arrived in Australia with the first reports of guerrilla activities on southern Luzon, Palawan, and Tawi Tawi. In December other escaped personnel brought in more detailed information concerning numerous guerrilla groups in operation on central Luzon, Leyte, Samar, Cebu, Negros, and Panay. During this same period, radio contact was re-established, and intercepted calls from guerrilla commanders on northern Luzon and Panay added to the picture.9 By the beginning of 1943, it was clear that organizations to combat the Japanese were forming everywhere in the islands and that with proper exploitation valuable intelligence could be obtained locally for use in planning future operations. Steps to penetrate the Philippines by clandestine methods began in earnest.
    At this early stage, General MacArthur was obviously limited in the amount of aid he could give the guerrilla organizations to help them through their embryonic stages. His own supplies were inadequate and the great distances involved made the problem of tangible assistance a formidable one.
    The initial task of contacting the guerrillas and laying the groundwork for an extensive intelligence net in the Philippines was given to the Allied Intelligence Bureau under the operational control of the Theater G-2. A long-range program was developed, based on previous experience with AIB operations behind enemy lines in the Solomons-New Guinea area. In October 1942 the AIB established a special Philippine Sub-Section for the exclusive handling of operations to assist the guerrillas. Solutions were worked out for the best methods of dispatching supplies and funds to the Philippines; areas of responsibility were defined; and plans were made for communication channels to forward information to Australia.
    The dispatch of a pioneering party to explore the prevailing situation in the islands and develop specific information on the military, political, and economic aspects of the Japanese-dominated Philippine Government, as well as on the attitudes of the guerrillas themselves, became a priority project. On 27 December 1942, a Filipino aviator, Capt. (later Maj.) Jesus A. Villamor, together with a party of five, left Australia on the submarine Gudgeon to organize an intelligence net, determine means of receiving emergency supplies, and obtain general information on Japanese activities. The party landed successfully on Negros and, on 27 January, just one month after his departure, Major Villamor established efficient radio contact with Australia.10
    Meanwhile two agents sent by Col. Wendell W. Fertig, an unsurrendered American officer
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    who had become a guerrilla leader on southern Mindanao, reached Australia by sailboat. Their reports indicated that this large and strategically placed island could be made into a major guerrilla base for further expansion to the north. Commander Charles Parsons, USNR, because of his wide and intimate knowledge of the Philippines, was selected to lead a secret fact-finding mission to Mindanao and carry in cipher materials and token sup plies. This party arrived in Zamboanga, the westernmost province of Mindanao, on 5 March. After contacting Colonel Fertig, Commander Parsons presented General MacArthur's concept of guerrilla activities and then went on to visit the other islands in the archipelago.11
    Following these two initial penetrations, additional parties were sent in as rapidly as strained transportation facilities permitted. Submarines carried supplies to Panay in April, and to Tawi Tawi and Mindanao in May. A number of concealed radio transmission stations were established in these islands and material support was given to the local guerrillas.12
    This initial exploratory period also saw an outstanding episode of clandestine operations. On 16 June 1943, Major Emigdio Cruz, P.A., arrived in Australia from Washington on the first leg of a secret mission to Manila on instruction of Manuel Quezon, President of the Philippine Government-in-Exile. After conferring with General MacArthur and members of his staff, Major Cruz sailed aboard the submarine Thresher and landed on Negros on 9 July. From there he worked his way ingeniously across the intervening islands to Luzon, posing at various stages along the way as an itinerant trader, a vendor of fowl, and a vegetable peddler. Several times he narrowly missed discovery by the Japanese but, despite frequent arrests and searching interrogations, he finally arrived safely in Manila on 22 October.
    Major Cruz' main mission in Manila was to contact General Manuel Roxas, a well known Filipino politician with an intimate knowledge of high-level Japanese activities in the Philippine Puppet Government, who was in constant communication with the various guerrilla leaders on the islands. After a series of conferences with General Roxas and personal contacts with the other government officials, Major Cruz had accumulated sufficient important data on the inner workings of the Philippine puppet regime to dictate his return to Australia.
    On 8 November he left Luzon for Negros and by the end of February 1944, he had retraced his difficult course to complete a brilliant and extremely hazardous mission.13 Besides the highly important intelligence brought back, Major Cruz' journey showed that, despite the great risks involved, the occupied islands of the Philippines could be traversed by a person with sufficient daring, judgment, and ability.
    The information collected by these few penetration parties provided a good working basis for future plans. The guerrilla units could be classed into three main categories: (a) those built around a nucleus of unsurrendered United States and Philippine Army troops; (b) those of purely local origin, under the leadership of prominent civic personages or former Constabulary, which sprang up more or
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    less spontaneously to combat the immediate threat of uncontrolled banditry; (c) those, like the Hukbalahaps, which were an outgrowth of pre-war semi-political organizations. There were also a few roving bands of the outlaw variety which were motivated more by the lucrative prospects of brigandage under cover of guerrilla warfare than by any consideration of patriotism.14
    Although the majority of the guerrillas shared a common antipathy for the Japanese, they were often divided among themselves, separated into intractable rival factions engaged in a bitter struggle for power. There was no established demarcation of authority and no defined chain of command. All reports of returning AIB agents stressed the necessity of achieving greater co-operation and more unified control among the guerrilla organizations.
    It was considered that the best way to meet this problem would be to reactivate the pre-war Philippine Military Districts. Based on population densities, these territorial entities had been used by the Philippine Army for administrative and mobilization purposes. This device had the advantage of being based on legal precedent and would probably be the most acceptable method of division to the majority of de facto guerrilla leaders.
    In accordance with this concept, the first district commanders were appointed in February 1943. Colonel Fertig was given command of the 10th Military District on Mindanao and Lt. Col. Macario Peralta, of the 6th Military District on Panay. Since these officers already exercised considerable influence over adjacent islands, Colonel Fertig was also assigned responsibility or the 9th Military District, embracing Leyte and Samar, until a permanent commander could be selected; Colonel Peralta was similarly given temporary control over the 7th and 8th Districts of Negros and Cebu. (Plate No. 85)
    Meanwhile the development of the Philippine communications net progressed steadily. Navy and Signal Corps departments co-operated closely with the Philippine Sub-Section of AIB in working out a co-ordinated program to meet immediate needs and at the same time provide for future expansion. Separate networks were mapped out for guerrillas and AIB parties, with additional provisions for a special naval coastwatching system to cover important strategic waterways.
    June 1943 marked the end of the preliminary phase of SWPA's penetration into the Philippines-the exploration of the guerrilla potential. This initial period had seen effective liaison established with guerrilla groups on Mindanao, Negros, and Panay. Agents in Manila had also been contacted. In co-operation with the U.S. Navy, supplies and trained personnel had been transported by submarine to Tawi Tawi, Mindanao, Cebu, and Panay and put in the hands of the local leaders. The groundwork for a widespread intelligence net had been begun under Major Villamor with heartening results. Steps had been initiated to expand
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    PLATE NO. 85
    Military Districts, 1943-1945​
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    the procurement of supplies, weapons, and capable personnel and to increase the number of intelligence parties sent into the islands. Radio stations had been established and developed until the operation of an efficient, comprehensive communications system was well on its way. A good and encouraging start had been made.
    Activities of the Philippine Regional Section
    The second phase of guerrilla development in the Philippines began in June 1943 with the activities of the Philippine Regional Section. This new section, formed from the original Philippine Sub-Section of AM and given semi-autonomous status, was organized in late May, under Col. Courtney Whitney, to handle the increasing problems inherent in the rapid development of events and the growing availability of supply facilities.
    The assistance and co-ordination of guerrilla operations was continued on an enlarged scale, and efforts were intensified to push on from the bases established on Mindanao and Panay into the islands to the north. Additional parties were prepared for the Visayas, and plans were laid for the penetration of Luzon via Mindoro and Samar. To aid this program, facilities for the transportation of supplies under the general direction of Commander Parsons were augmented by the acquisition of more cargo-carrying submarines from the U.S. Navy.
    To guide the various guerrilla leaders in the prosecution of their operations and to make maximum use of their services in the war against Japan, General MacArthur directed that his agents follow a policy of general encouragement and careful instruction without direct command interference which might incur resentment. Guerrilla groups were advised to assist in maintaining civil order so that they might receive reciprocal popular support. They were also cautioned to refrain from open and aggressive warfare against Japanese troops lest they bring reprisals on the people out of all proportion to the results achieved. The collection, co-ordination, and transmission of useful intelligence were stressed as the most important, immediate contributions the guerrillas could make to the Allied cause until the actual invasion of the islands was begun.15 Before that time, all military operations were to be limited to strategic harassment, sabotage, and ambush.
    On Panay, despite strong personal differences, Tomas Confesor's civil government worked with Colonel Peralta's guerrilla organization to collect voluntary contributions and taxes to support the resistance movement. On Mindanao, the civil government and the guerrilla forces under Colonel Fertig were closely affiliated. With the authorization of President Quezon, the guerrillas issued their own currency and even carried on their own postal system. A planned agricultural production and distribution program was also mapped out to insure a maximum food supply. Such measures were indicative of Japanese weakness in the Philippines and of the Filipino's potential for independence.
    During the latter half of 1943, the Philippine Regional Section sent two new parties to
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    pierce the line north of the Central Visayas. (Plate No. 86) In October, Maj. L.H. Phillips led a group of agents to the island of Mindoro, just south of Luzon. Major Phillips was able to establish a radio station and develop some contacts in Manila. Unfortunately, the encouraging start made on Mindoro was short-lived. In February 1944, just three months after Major Phillips' arrival, the Japanese managed to discover his hide-out in Mt. Calavite and, after a futile attempt to escape, Major Phillips was killed and his headquarters destroyed.16 In July 1944, Comdr. George F. Rowe, USNR, succeeded Major Phillips as GHQ representative and was able to re-weld the severed radio link between Mindoro and Australia.
    A party sent to Samar in November under Maj. Charles M. Smith, was more successful in its efforts. Major Smith set up a radio control station which was in contact with GHQ by 20 December, and established a firm base of operations for further advances. From his position on Samar, he dispatched a number of his men to Masbate, Cebu, and to south and central Luzon. The planting of agents in these various localities was to bring forth valuable intelligence information to aid in planning Philippine invasion operations.
    By the end of 1943 a communications net had been established covering most of the southern Philippines. (Plate No. 87) This net formed a framework for later development and extension into the areas to the north during 1944.
    Meanwhile, Commander Parsons had returned to Australia in the late summer of 1943 from his fruitful mission to Mindanao and its neighboring islands. After the information he carried back had been co-ordinated with the plans and activities of the Philippine Regional Section, Commander Parsons sit out a second time, in October, to expand the contacts made on his previous trip. He again remained on Mindanao for several months, helping Colonel Fertig to consolidate his control and to increase the efficiency and value of his organization. In February 1944, Commander Parsons conducted still another supply run to Mindanao, Tawi Tawi, and Mindoro. His name became well known throughout the southern islands of the Philippines and his "life line" supply service was famous among the important guerrilla leaders.
    The first half of the year 1944 saw a marked speed-up in the activities of the Philippine Regional Section. The number of submarine-borne parties was increased and the tonnage of transported materials considerably augmented. In January, supplies were landed on Panay and Negros; in February, on Tawi Tawi and Mindanao. The month of May was a particularly active one. A large party of specially trained agents was dispatched to Colonel Smith on Samar and another to Colonel Fertig on Mindanao. Additional quantities of supplies were brought into this latter island for distribution to the north. During May, too, the first agents were sent to the island of Palawan. In June, a party with complete equipment for transmission of weather information was sent to Negros.
    By the middle of 1944, as plans for the invasion of the Philippines were fast ripening, the scope of the Philippine Regional Section's expansion in the archipelago had reached the point where direct participation by the various staff sections of General MacArthur's Head quarters became desirable. The vital early steps of arranging contacts, ascertaining actual conditions and the problems facing the guerrilla movement, sending in supplies and equip-
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    [​IMG]
    PLATE NO. 86
    AIB and PRS Penetrations of the Philippines, 1943-1944 ​
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    [​IMG]
    PLATE NO. 87
    Philippine Islands Communications, 15 December 1943 ​
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    ment, establishing an intelligence net, and organizing military commands within the areas of guerrilla activity had been largely completed. (Plate No. 88) Guerrilla activities had to be thoroughly co-ordinated with operational plans of the Southwest Pacific Area for the coming assault. In June, therefore, the functions of the Philippine Regional Section were decentralized, and the further direction of the guerrilla movement was apportioned among the General Staff sections so that the optimum result in each phase of activity could best be achieved. A nucleus of the Philippine Regional Section continued as a co-ordinating and advisory agency.17
    The Guerrillas on Mindanao
    With all operations between SWPA and the Philippine guerrillas now channeled directly into the invasion planning of specific GHQ staff sections, the third phase of development was opened. During this stage, the guerrillas emerged from their hideouts to take their places in battle beside the advancing American divisions.
    Because of its large size, its rugged terrain, and its location farthest from the center of Japanese occupation in the Philippines, Mindanao was particularly adaptable to the easy formation of guerrilla groups. Japanese troops held only a few main cities along its 1,400-mile coastline and paid little attention to the interior of the island. It enjoyed comparative freedom from Japanese surveillance and pressure and was consequently the scene of early development of guerrilla organizations.
    The growth of the guerrilla movement on Mindanao was in general prototypic of the movements in the rest of the Philippine Islands. On Mindanao, however, the movement matured earlier and with less hostile interference. With the complete absence of Japanese inland patrols, small guerrilla bands quickly made their appearance all through the interior. The many mountains, limited road nets, and primitive communication facilities at first kept these groups isolated from each other, and a certain mistrust and jealousy on the part of the guerrilla leaders prevented any initial attempts at consolidation. In addition, the vast expanse of the island, with almost three weeks required to journey from east to west, increased the obstacles in the way of operational co-ordination.
    As time passed, however, the bond of common purpose and the advantages apparent in unification induced the various leaders to seek some means of co-operation. The smaller groups soon blended into larger ones and finally Colonel Fertig emerged as the generally accepted commander of the Mindanao guerrillas. Colonel Fertig was a former American mining engineer who had fought on Bataan and then, upon its surrender, escaped to Mindanao to serve with General Sharp. When Mindanao, in turn, fell to the Japanese, Colonel Fertig took a group of officers and men into the hills to form the nucleus of a responsible resistance movement. By perseverance and diplomacy Colonel Fertig gradually won the respect of the other guerrilla leaders, and by October 1942 he had built up a fairly cohesive guerrilla organization.18
    In November, Colonel Fertig decided that the time was ripe to notify General Headquarters of the potentialities of his organization and to request assistance. He dispatched his two emissaries, Capt. J. A. Hamner and Captain Smith, on their trip to Australia which resulted in the subsequent contact by Commander Parsons. With authority over the 10th Military District as conferred by GHQ at the time
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    of Commander Parsons' first trip and, with the approval of the Philippine Government-in-Exile, Colonel Fertig attempted to establish a smoothly functioning civil government to parallel his military organization. Former Philippine officials were appointed as provincial governors and to other civic posts. By early 1943, conditions on Mindanao had become so stable that President Quezon authorized the creation of the Mindanao Emergency Currency Board to issue its own monetary notes for use as a medium of exchange among guerrilla forces.
    Before the swift-moving events of the war made it advisable for General MacArthur to make his first strike in the Philippines directly at Leyte, it had been planned to retake the islands by an initial invasion of Mindanao. This fact, together with a convenient geographical position which eased the problem of transportation by submarine, constituted the main reason why the Mindanao guerrillas were the first to be supplied extensively. It was a sound strategical investment.
    With the assistance of SWPA, the Mindanao guerrilla organization eventually became the largest and best equipped in the Philippine Islands. By January 1945, Colonel Fertig's command included a force of about 38,000 men.19 (Plate No. 89) His radio and intelligence network consisted of some seventy transmitter stations and an excellent and extensive coast-watcher system. GHQ was furnished with a constant stream of information which, within its limits of accuracy, helped considerably in the planning of operations against the Japanese in the Philippines. The guerrillas had also prepared airfields at Dipolog, Labo, Lala, and Barobo.20
    When General MacArthur was ready to retake the Philippine Islands, the guerrillas on Mindanao were in a position to contribute substantially to military operations.21 With the American invasion of the southern Philippines in early 1945, they began to strike openly against the Japanese forces occupying the island. They seized the airfield at Dipolog, held it until elements of the 21st Infantry landed, and later helped them defend it against strong Japanese counterattacks while a squadron of American fighters used the field as a base for operations to the south. When the American forces chased the Japanese from Zamboanga City, guerrillas set up strong positions behind the retreating enemy troops to form a wall against any further escape into the mountains. On 12 April, five days before
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    [​IMG]
    PLATE NO. 88
    General Philippine Intelligence Coverage, 1943-1944 ​
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    [​IMG]
    PLATE NO. 89
    Mindanao Guerrilla Organization, 31 January 1945 ​
    [311]​
    the first Eighth Army landings along Illana Bay on Mindanao's west coast, Colonel Fertig notified General Eichelberger that the initial objective of Malabang and its airfield already had been captured by the guerrillas. Acting on this information, the American forces made their assault further down the coast at Parang, for a drive on the enemy-held town of Cotabato. On 10 May, when elements of the U.S. 40th Division landed near Bugo on northern Mindanao's Macajalar Bay, they found that the guerrillas had cleared the Japanese from the beaches and were ready to assist in the advance to the important town of Cagayan. Aiding the drive of the U.S. 24th Division, Colonel Fertig's forces guarded Highway No. 1 from Kabakan to the Tanculan River so that the Americans could race across the island without fear of an unguarded flank. Guerrilla troops also seized the Tagum River area on north Davao Gulf, as well as Talikub Island in the Gulf itself.22
    The Guerrillas on Negros, Cebu, and Bohol
    Slightly to the northwest of Mindanao lie the three-islands of Negros, Cebu, and Bohol. The growth of guerrilla organizations on these three islands followed a pattern very similar to that of Mindanao. (Plate No. 9o) After the usual birth pains of interfaction rivalries and petty jealousies, the islands gradually evolved their own de facto commands which eventually were unified under a few main leaders. Unlike Mindanao, where the guerrilla movement developed primarily under the leadership of American officers, these commands were mainly Filipino-organized and Filipino-led.
    On Negros, the chief character to arise as commander of the central and northern portions of the island was Capt. Salvador Abcede, P.A. Captain Abcede originally was sent to Negros in November 1942 by Colonel Peralta of Panay. His initial efforts to spread Peralta's control throughout the entire island met with considerable initial opposition from other guerrilla chiefs, particularly from Lt. Col. Gabriel Gador, P.A., in southern Negros.23
    Major Villamor's dramatic arrival in January 1943 as the forward representative of General Headquarters marked the first genuine progress toward real unification of the Negros guerrillas. His presence as an advisor accredited by SWPA was welcomed by the majority of the guerrilla leaders and, after his appointment as temporary commander of the 7th Military District in May, a general accord was worked out among the various dissident groups. Major Villamor organized the 7th Military District Headquarters, appointed a civil administrator, Henry Roy Bell, and secured authority for the establishment of a free civil government under Alfredo Montelibano, pre-war governor of Negros Occidental.
    Upon his return to Australia in October 1943, Major Villamor nominated Captain Abcede as the man best qualified to assume permanent command of the 7th Military District. When this nomination was finally approved and made official in March 1944, Captain Abcede worked aggressively to improve the efficiency of his command. The remainder of the guerrilla units, including Colonel Gador's group in southern Negros, was absorbed into his organization and an amicable and satisfactory relationship was achieved with the free civil government. Captain Abcede gave particular attention to the development of his intelligence network and succeeded in providing a wide coverage of enemy activities. By December 1944, the strength of Colonel
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    Abcede's organization on Negros numbered approximately 13,000 men.24
    East of Negros is the long, narrow island of Cebu, the most densely populated of all the Philippine Islands. The story of the guerrilla movement on Cebu is primarily that of two men-Harry Fenton and Lt. Col. James H. Cushing, both American-born. With the Japanese capture of Cebu City in the central part of the island, a large number of USAFFE forces escaped to the hills, taking along a sizeable quantity of arms and supplies. Numerous guerrilla units were soon formed in the enemy-unoccupied regions to the north and south and these gradually combined into larger groups. By the middle of 1942, the guerrilla organization on Cebu was split into two bodies; one under Fenton, in the north, and the other under Colonel Cushing, in the south.
    Despite marked differences in personalities and methods of operation, these two leaders quickly recognized the advisability of uniting their resources for co-ordinated action against the Japanese. A joint command was established which put administration under Fenton and combat activities under Colonel Cushing. A single staff served for both factions and areas of control were delegated to subordinate leaders.25
    This arrangement functioned satisfactorily until mid-1943 when critical food shortages and rapidly dwindling supplies, coupled with intensive countermeasures by the Japanese, seriously disrupted the Cebu guerrilla organization. To aggravate the situation, both leaders fell seriously ill and all activities were temporarily curtailed. During this period, dormant animosities between the two factions were again aroused; disagreements arose between Fenton and his associates. Instituting a reign of terror and persecution, Fenton engaged in a series of reckless and injudicious actions which alienated many of his officers. On 15 September he was tried and executed and his command was reorganized.
    Colonel Cushing meanwhile recovered his health and, in the face of persistent Japanese anti-guerrilla campaigns, began to rebuild his weakened groups for further operations. In January 1944 he was designated by GHQ as commander of the 8th Military District and shortly afterward his organization was sent supplies and radio equipment from Australia. Colonel Cushing broadened and improved intelligence coverage on Cebu and his guerrillas throughout the island worked with increased efficiency. By April, GHQ was receiving a gratifying volume of information on Japanese movements and military operations.26
    On Bohol, the oval-shaped, coral island bordering Cebu on the southeast, several guerrilla groups developed, with Maj. Ismael Ingeniero emerging as the leader of the specially created Bohol Area Command.27 Internal friction among the guerrilla groups had to a degree alienated the civil populace and when the Japanese landed in force on the island in June 1944 the guerrilla organizations collapsed. Following the Japanese partial withdrawal in
    [313]​
    [​IMG]
    PLATE NO. 90
    Central Philippines Guerrilla Organization, October-November 1944 ​
    [314]​
    July, Major Ingeniero's organization was largely reestablished but little useful information was extracted from Bohol before the major invasion of the Philippines.
    Despite deficiencies in the resistance organizations on the islands of Negros, Cebu, and Bohol, the guerrilla forces played a significant part in the liberation of their territories when the Eighth Army invaded the southwest Visayas.
    Colonel Abcede's units on Negros had done valuable preliminary work to assist the invasion troops. The guerrillas held the Japanese to a line stretching from Bacolod, the capital, on the west to San Carlos on the east. Most important towns south of Bacolod were under guerrilla control. After the landing of the U. S. 40th Division, the guerrillas, familiar with the jungle terrain, served efficiently as scouts and guides in helping to rout the Japanese from hidden retreats and successfully executed numerous combat missions assigned by the division.28
    Colonel Cushing's guerrillas on Cebu played havoc with Japanese patrols and movements prior to the arrival of the Americal Division. Enemy lines were disrupted and the task of the invading troops was made considerably easier.29 The guerrillas had also developed an airstrip and had control of all but a few areas in east and northern Cebu. After the landing, Colonel Cushing's guerrillas joined the combat patrols of the Americal Division in trailing enemy remnants which had fled to the mountainous interior.30
    Most of Bohol Island was free of Japanese and under surveillance of Major Ingeniero's guerrillas before the coming of the American forces on 11 April. The landing parties were met by the news that no enemy forces were in the area.31
    The Guerrillas on Panay and Adjacent Islands
    The resistance movement on Panay was unique. It developed rapidly ; there was a minimum of discord; and a dynamic leader emerged at an early time. The guerrilla structure on Panay was built around a core of refugee troops of the Philippine 61st Division who had taken to the hills immediately after the surrender orders were published. Scarcely ten weeks after the Japanese invasion, Colonel Peralta, former G-3 of the division and a man of strong and driving character, assumed undisputed control of the main guerrilla groups. The early emergence of a generally accepted leader and the availability of a relatively large amount of salvaged supplies and equipment gave a powerful impetus to the formation of a smoothly working guerrilla command. In addition, the efforts of Panay's intrepid governor, Tomas Confesor, whose free civil government was left comparatively unmolested by the light Japanese garrison, strengthened the framework of the Panay organization and bolstered the morale of the people.32
    Colonel Peralta made rapid progress. By November 1942 he had reactivated the Philip-
    [315]​
    pine 61st Division, initiated an intensive training program, and established first radio contact with Australia. He also began to extend his influence to the adjacent islands in the Visayas and even to Mindoro and Palawan. In February 1943, GHQ appointed Colonel Peralta as de facto commander of the 6th Military District which included Panay, the Romblon Islands, and Guimaras Island. While this appointment solidified Colonel Peralta's control over his own territory, it had the effect of cancelling any official authority in other regions where he had aspired to establish his influence.
    In spite of this limitation, Colonel Peralta's activities in adjacent areas continued to flourish spontaneously. The small guerrilla bands on Masbate, Marinduque, Mindoro, and Palawan, having no outstanding leaders of their own, remained under the domination of the 6th Military District. Colonel Peralta soon developed one of the most extensive and efficient intelligence systems in the Philippines. He had radio contacts and courier service with the principal guerrilla chiefs in the Visayas and Mindanao and his agents were in operation as far as Luzon. Voluminous intelligence reports flowed in a steady stream from the north and the east via Masbate and Tablas Island into Panay Headquarters where they were collated and relayed to SWPA.33
    When the U. S. 40th Division went ashore on Panay in March 1945, Colonel Peralta's forces made a large contribution toward eliminating the Japanese. Even before the landings, his guerrillas had cleared the enemy from the outlying districts and had won possession of nine airstrips in the northern and southern parts of the island. To aid the advance of the American troops, all important bridges were repaired, roads were serviced, and key junctions were kept under control.34
    After the 40th Division forces had moved inland from the beaches, the guerrillas were used as guides and patrols. Guerrilla troops joined in the liberation of the capital city of Iloilo late in March and in the subsequent attack on the strong Japanese garrison at San Jose.
    In the neighboring islands of Mindoro, Masbate, and Palawan, guerrilla units, though not as strong or as well integrated as those on Panay, were also helpful. On Mindoro, the Japanese fugitives in the interior were hunted down in the mountains and through the jungles; on Masbate, the guerrillas conducted their own amphibious assault and occupied the capital town; on Palawan, guerrilla groups confined the Japanese to the area of Puerto Princesa and joined in the elimination of scattered enemy pockets. With the assistance of the various guerrilla units of Colonels Peralta, Fertig, and Abcede, the invasion tasks of the Eighth Army forces in Mindanao and the western Visayas were immeasurably simplified and greatly shortened.
    The Guerrillas on Leyte and Samar
    Until the Spring of 1943, a dozen different guerrilla leaders contested bitterly for authority on Leyte. Although most of these men shared a desire to work against the Japanese, any thought of unification was subordinated to their individual interests. There was apparently no leader unselfish enough to put aside his personal motives for the common good or strong enough to enforce obedience from the others.
    On a visit to Leyte in April 1943, Commander Parsons persuaded Col. Rupert K. Kangleon, former commander of the Philippine
    [316]​
    81st Infantry, to attempt a consolidation of the dissident factions on the island under the guidance of SWPA. By a judicious mixture of force and diplomacy and by the strength of his own prestige, Colonel Kangleon eventually succeeded in winning the allegiance of the principal guerrilla groups to begin a reorganization of the pre-war Philippine 92nd Division.35 In October 1943 he was appointed by GHQ to head the Leyte Area Command, and by Fall of the following year, Leyte boasted a well-trained guerrilla force of some 3,200 troops.36
    On Samar, as on Leyte, numerous irreconcilable groups contended for supremacy after the removal of the Philippine Government and the dissolution of the Philippine Constabulary. Since the island was of little value strategically, there were few Japanese troops to fear, and conditions fostered the unhampered existence of a multitude of guerrilla bands. Samar, however, did not possess a man of sufficient caliber to harmonize the various prevailing differences, and as a result the island remained without any centralized authority until October 1944, the month of General MacArthur's invasion of the Philippines.
    The two largest groups on Samar were commanded by Col. Pedro V. Merritt, P.A., who was established in the north, and by Manuel Valley, an escapee from Bataan, who led an organization in the south. An attempt in September 1943 by Colonel Kangleon's emissary, Lt. Col. Juan Causing, to unite these two leaders was unavailing, and although much good work was done independently by the guerrilla units on Samar, very little was contributed to aid the plans of General MacArthur's Headquarters until after the assault on Leyte.37
    Samar's main value lay in its use as a base of operations by GHQ's representative, Colonel Smith, whose agents working on Luzon and in the Bicols relayed accumulated information on the Japanese to Australia. Although Colonel Smith did not take an active part in guerrilla affairs, his advice was often sought and his suggestions generally heeded; he gradually won the confidence of both Colonel Merritt and Manuel Valley, and in September 1944 the two principal guerrilla groups agreed to accept him as their co-ordinator. In early October, GHQ appointed Colonel Smith as commander of the Samar Area. Colonel Smith was in the process of reorganizing the Samar units when the American forces landed on the island.38
    General MacArthur's invasion of Leyte on 20 October 1944 sounded the signal for the Philippine guerrillas to throw off the cloak of concealment and come forth in open warfare against the Japanese. Shortly before the assault forces were due to sail for their objective, General MacArthur issued the following alert to the Visayan guerrilla commanders:
    The campaign of reoccupation has commenced. Although your zone is not at present within the immediate zone of operations, it is desired that your forces be committed to limited offensive action with the specific mission of harassing the movement of the enemy within your area and as far as possible contain him in his present positions. Intelligence coverage must be intensified in order that I be fully and promptly advised of all major changes in enemy disposition
    [317]​
    or movement.39
    It was on Leyte that the Filipino guerrilla and the American soldier first joined forces in battle. With the initial Sixth Army landings on the beaches at Tacloban and Dulag, Colonel Kangleon's units went into action. They dynamited key bridges to block Japanese displacement toward the target area; they harassed enemy patrols; and they sabotaged supply and ammunition depots. Information on enemy troop movements and dispositions sent from guerrilla outposts to Colonel Kangleon's Headquarters was dispatched immediately to Sixth Army.
    The guerrillas also performed valuable service in maintaining public order and in keeping the roads and highways free of congestion. After the American beachheads were established, the Leyte guerrilla groups were attached directly to the Sixth Army corps and divisions to assist in scouting, intelligence, and combat operations.
    On neighboring Samar, a regiment of the 1st Cavalry Division, which landed on 23 October, was aided extensively in its mission by the guerrilla units on the island. The main objective of seizing and controlling the strategic Taft-Wright Highway was achieved by a dual drive of cavalry and guerrilla forces. While the 8th Cavalry battled to capture Wright at the western terminus of the Highway, the guerrillas fought the Japanese from Taft on the east. A junction of the two forces in December cleared the enemy from the heart of Samar and prevented his reinforcement of Leyte from the northeast.40
    The Guerrillas on Luzon
    In contrast to the rest of the Philippine Islands, which in general were lightly garrisoned, the main island of Luzon was heavily occupied by Japanese military forces. Thorough policing and frequent, intensive clean-up campaigns prevented any effective unification of the numerous guerrilla groups which sprang into existence after the surrender of the USAFFE units.
    One of the earliest organizations developed on Luzon was headed by Col. Claude Thorp who, in January 1942, worked his way from Bataan through the Japanese lines to establish a headquarters in the Zambales Mountains. From this retreat, Colonel Thorp attempted to centralize operations in the various regions of the island including northern Luzon and the Bicol Peninsula. Though he made substantial progress in this direction, his efforts were brought to an untimely end. In October 1942 Colonel Thorp and several of his staff were trapped in a Japanese raid and subsequently executed. After Colonel Thorp's death, a multiplicity of independent guerrilla commands began to develop throughout the provinces of Luzon.41
    In the southern half of the island, three units were particularly outstanding in their growth and operations. (Plate No. 91) These were the forces of Maj. Bernard L. Anderson
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    [​IMG]
    PLATE NO. 91
    Guerrilla Forces on Luzon, October-November 1944 ​
    [319]​
    in the eastern region, of Maj. Robert Lapham in the central region, and the " Marking Guerrillas " in the sector east of Manila.42
    Major Anderson was contacted by SWPA agents in mid-1944 and in September began to receive supplies and radio equipment brought in by the ever-busy submarines. Major Anderson's efforts to achieve co-ordination, for intelligence purposes, were enormously complicated by the concurrent existence of so many independently active organizations in the area to be covered. In addition to the Marking Guerrillas and the forces of Major Lapham, there were the Hukbalahaps in Pampanga, the East-Central Luzon Guerrilla Area (ECLGA) units of Colonel Edwin P. Ramsey in east-central Luzon, the Hunters in Cavite, the Fil-American Irregular Troops in Rizal, and President Quezon's Own Guerrillas in Batangas. These units were of varying quality and effectiveness.
    Making the best of a difficult situation, Major Anderson succeeded in forwarding much valuable information from Luzon directly to SWPA Headquarters in Australia. In addition, he distributed some of the supplies he received, especially radio equipment, to other units in southern Luzon in an endeavor to increase the efficiency of the intelligence and propaganda network.43
    The guerrilla situation in the northern half of Luzon remained generally obscure until well into 1944. Distance, difficulty of communications, and the extensive countermeasures of the Japanese hampered any effective SWPA penetration of the upper provinces either for liaison or supply.
    After Colonel Nakar's execution by the Japanese and the subsequent loss of contact between his headquarters and Australia, a series of successors attempted to carry on his work in the northern mountains and in the Cagayan Valley. The Japanese in these areas were particularly watchful, however, and, as each new leader arose, he was tracked down and eliminated. In a heroic and desperate effort to continue the movement, Colonel Nakar's intrepid lieutenants, Lt. Col. Arthur Noble, Lt. Col. Martin Moses, Maj. Ralph B. Praeger, and Lt. Col. Manuel P. Enriquez, were killed or captured by the enemy before the close of 1943.44
    In early 1944 the command of the main guerrilla forces in northern Luzon ultimately fell to Maj. Russell W. Volckmann, an unsurrendered American officer. Major Volckmann designated his organization as the United States Army Forces in the Philippines, North Luzon (USAFIP, NL) and set about the task of revising the whole guerrilla movement in his area in order to weld all groups into a single force responsible to a central authority. He divided his command into sectors, giving each sector commander full power to consolidate and control the fragmentary outfits in his particular area. At the same time, Major Volckmann built up a strong intelligence system to funnel all information on Japanese movements in northern Luzon to his headquarters.
    Major Volckmann's forces grew rapidly and by the end of 1944 numbered some 10,000 men.45 The greatest drawback to the full re-
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    alization of his efforts, however, was the lack of radio contact with General Headquarters, SWPA. Finally, in September 1944, he succeeded in putting a makeshift radio into operation and, through this lone channel of communication, messages began to be sent and received. It was then that the guerrillas in northern Luzon first learned of General MacArthur's imminent return to the Philippines. Agents and equipment sent from Australia in November and December helped to co-ordinate Colonel Volckmann's operations with the American invasion plans.
    When General MacArthur landed at Lingayen Gulf, the Japanese were caught in the midst of a general redeployment of their forces throughout Luzon. Seizing the advantages of the moment, the guerrillas broke out in full force. Roads were torn up, bridges destroyed, mountain passes blocked, and rail and motor facilities sabotaged at every turn to interfere seriously with Japanese troop and supply movements.
    Shortly after the American landings, Colonel Anderson was requested to form a Filipino battalion to be attached to General Krueger's Sixth Army forces. Colonel Anderson responded by taking the best personnel at his disposal to form the first "Anderson Battalion." This unit performed efficiently and valiantly throughout central and eastern Luzon and built a battle record of 3,000 Japanese killed and 1,000 captured.
    Major Lapham's guerrillas in central Luzon played a prominent part in effecting the dramatic rescue of over 500 Allied internees from the ill-famed Cabanatuan prison camp. (Plate No. 92) The first in a series of bold liberations of Allied prisoners from enemy hands, this daring raid was carried out 25 miles behind Japanese lines by a mixed force of 286 guerrillas, 121 troops of the 6th Ranger Infantry, and 13 Alamo Scouts. The guerrillas acted as the eyes of the raiding force to guide it through the brush and as its ears to be on the alert for any surprise flanking movement by the enemy. They constructed roadblocks at the northeast and southwest approaches to the stockade to hold up hostile reinforcements and also arranged for food caches so that the liberated prisoners could be fed at convenient points along the return route.
    The attack was launched on the night of 30 January 1945. Within thirty minutes the entire Japanese garrison had been wiped out and the last prisoner removed from the prison area. The Rangers' return was covered by a guerrilla delaying action which successfully fought off approximately Boo enemy reinforcements sent to assault the strategically placed roadblocks. Meanwhile the litter patients from the camp were transported by guerrilla-organized carabao cart train to Sibul Springs, whence they were evacuated to a hospital at Guimba.46
    On 23 February, in another equally brilliant and even more extensive liberation of Allied internees, Luzon guerrillas helped troops of the 11th Airborne Division to release more than 2,100 prisoners from the Los Banos prison camp in Laguna Province on the shores of Laguna de Bay.
    For several nights prior to the attack, guerrilla units infiltrated through the Japanese lines to gather in the area of Los Banos. On the morning of the 23rd, one element of the 11th Airborne crossed Laguna de Bay in amphibious craft while another element took off by plane for a spectacular parachute drop. All forces converged in a swift and co-ordinated attack which caught the Japanese guarding the camp in the middle of their morning calisthenics. The entire garrison was annihilated with prac-
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    [​IMG]
    PLATE NO. 92
    Cabanatuan Prison Raid, 30-31 January 1945 ​
    [322]​
    tically no loss to the Allies, and the Los Banos prisoners were evacuated across the Bay.47
    The Marking Guerrillas, led by Col. Marcos V. Agustin, carried out extensive combat operations in the mountains northeast of Manila. After a month's hard training and fighting with the troops of the U. S. 43rd Division, Colonel Agustin's force, numbering some 3,000 men, was assigned a part in the powerful assault on Ipo Dam, the largest of the three dams supplying Manila. While two prongs of the 43rd Division converged on the dam from the south and west, the guerrilla force formed a third prong that came down from the northwest. The Japanese were routed from their defense positions, and the dam was captured intact. After successfully completing their assignment in the Ipo sector, the Marking Guerrillas pursued the fleeing remnants of the enemy into the hills and later aided considerably in other missions which, in the words of the 43rd Division Commander, Maj. Gen. Leonard F. Wing," otherwise would have required costly and protracted action by American forces.48
    In the northern half of Luzon, Colonel Volckmann's units fought effectively with I Corps against General Yamashita's beleaguered forces in the high mountains around Kiangan and in the plains of the Cagayan Valley. Supported by planes of the Fifth Air Force, these guerrillas were able to clear the enemy entirely from Ilocos Norte Province.49 They captured San Fernando on the eastern shore of Lingayen Gulf and took part in the drives on Baguio and the succeeding operational bases used by the Japanese in their retreat into the northern hills.50 Guerrilla destruction of the bridges on the Bagabag-Bontoc road reduced the Japanese to a single carabao trail for transport of supplies. Cervantes, on the way to Bassang Pass, was taken by guerrillas and, in a hard-fought battle, they captured the Pass itself to break into a part of the Japanese defense perimeter.
    In the bitter fight for Balete Pass in the Caraballo Mountains, guerrilla infiltration of enemy lines paved the way for the final assaults on this key approach to the Cagayan Valley.51 In the Valley itself, Colonel Volckmann's forces seized the important town of Tuguegarao and occupied its adjoining airfield.
    So widespread and effective had been the assistance rendered by the Filipino guerrillas in the liberation of their country that General Krueger, upon withdrawing the Sixth Army from combat on Luzon, said in acknowledgment:
    The gallant Filipino forces, despite tremendous difficulty and with very limited means at their disposal, rendered invaluable support to our operations. Their accomplishments are worthy of high praise.
    By the first half of July 1945, when the Eighth Army assumed combat responsibility for Luzon, the Japanese had been driven deep into the mountains, their main power broken and their destruction or surrender inevitable. A
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    large part of the painstaking task of mopping up these dismembered but dangerous forces was performed by the various guerrilla groups whose elusive fighting tactics were particularly well suited for jungle and mountain warfare against isolated enemy troops.
    General MacArthur's Tribute to the Philippine Guerrillas
    The enormous volume of valuable military information sent by the various guerrilla units in the Philippines to General Headquarters constituted a contribution fully as important as their direct combat participation. The extent and degree of intelligence coverage are evident in the complex radio communication system developed under the noses of the Japanese during the days of their occupation. The entire archipelago from north to south and from east to west was literally dotted with guerrilla transmitting and receiving stations. (Plate No. 93)
    Perhaps the best recapitulation of the rise of the guerrilla movement in the Philippines and its gradually growing part in the liberation of the Filipino people from the domination of the Japanese was given by General MacArthur shortly after his memorable return to Leyte when he said:
    As our forces of liberation roll forward the splendid aid we are receiving from guerrilla units throughout the immediate objective area and adjacent islands causes me at this time to pay public tribute to those great patriots both Filipino and American who had led and supported the resistance movement in the Philippines since the dark days of 1942. These inadequately armed patriots have fought the enemy for more than two years. Most are Filipinos but among these are a number of Americans who never surrendered, who escaped from prison camps, or who were sent in to carry out specific missions.
    Following the disaster which, in the face of overwhelming superior enemy power, overtook our gallant forces, a deep and impenetrable silence engulfed the Philippines. Through that silence no news concerning the fate of the Filipino people reached the outside world until broken by a weak signal from a radio set on the Island of Panay which was picked up, in the late fall of that same fateful year, by listening posts of the War Department and flashed to my Headquarters. That signal, weak and short as it was, lifted the curtain of silence and uncertainty and disclosed the start of a human drama with few parallels in military history.
    In it I recognized the spontaneous movement of the Filipino people to resist the shackles with which the enemy sought to bind them both physically and spiritually. I saw a people in one of the most tragic hours of human history, bereft of all reason for hope and without material support, endeavoring, despite the stern realities confronting them, to hold aloft the flaming torch of liberty. I gave this movement all spiritual and material support that my limited resources would permit.
    Through the understanding assistance of our Navy I was able to send in by submarine, in driblets at first, arms, ammunition and medical supplies. News of the first such shipment spread rapidly throughout the Philippines to electrify the people into full returning consciousness that Americans had neither abandoned them nor forgotten them.
    Since then, as resources increased, I was enabled, after formalizing the guerrilla forces by their recognition and incorporation as units of our Army, to send vitally needed supplies in ever increasing quantities through Philippine coastal contacts by four submarines finally committed exclusively to that purpose.
    I would that at this time I might name the gallant heroes of this epic in Philippine-American history, but considerations of security for the individuals, their families and the cause require that I limit myself to a generalization of their work and a statement of their brilliant achievements.
    Of the latter I need but point out that for the purposes of this campaign we are materially aided by strong, battle tested forces in nearly every Philippine community, alerted to strike violent blows against the enemy's rear as our lines of battle move forward and that now are providing countless large areas adjacent to military objectives into which our airmen may drop
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    with assurance of immediate rescue and protection. We are aided by the militant loyalty of a whole people-a people who have rallied as one behind the standards
    of those stalwart patriots who, reduced to wretched material conditions yet sustained by an unconquerable spirit, have formed an invincible center to a resolute over-all resistance.
    We are aided by the fact that for many months our plans of campaign have benefited from the hazardous labor of a vast network of agents numbering into the hundreds of thousands providing precise, accurate and detailed information on major enemy moves and installations throughout the Philippine Archipelago. We are aided by the fact that through a vast network of radio positions extending into every center of enemy activity and concentration throughout the islands, I have been kept in immediate and constant communication with such widespread sources of information. We are aided by the fact that on every major island of the Philippines there are one or more completely equipped and staffed weather observatories which flash to my Headquarters full weather data morning, afternoon and night of every day and which in turn provides the basis for reliable weather forecasts to facilitate and secure the implementation of our operational plans. Widely disseminated to our forces throughout the Pacific and in China the information from this weather system has materially aided our military operations over a large section of the world's surface.
    We are aided by an air warning system affording visual observation of the air over nearly every square foot of Philippine soil established for the purpose of flashing immediate warning of enemy aircraft movement through that same vast network of radio communications. We are aided by provision of all inland waterways and coastal areas of complete observation over enemy naval movement to give immediate target information to our submarines on patrol in or near Philippine waters. This information has contributed to the sinking of enemy shipping of enormous tonnage, and through such same facilities was flashed the warning to our naval forces of the enemy naval concentration off the western Philippines during the Marianas operation.
    Finally we are aided by the dose interior vigilance that has secured for our military use countless enemy documents of great value, among which were the secret defensive plans and instructions of the Commander-in-Chief of the combined Japanese areas and complete information on the strength and dispositions of enemy fleet and naval air units. That same Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Japanese Fleets was a prisoner of one of our guerrilla units prior to his death from injuries sustained in an air crash.
    All of these vital aids to our military operations, and there are many more still unmentioned, are responsive to the indomitable courage of the military and civil leaders whom I shall in future name and their loyal followers both Filipino and American; to gallant Filipinos, residents of the United States, who have volunteered to infiltrate into the islands in succor of their countrymen and Americans who have infiltrated with them; and finally to the militant loyalty and unconquerable spirit of the masses of the Filipino people.
    As Commander-in-Chief of the forces of liberation I publicly acknowledge and pay tribute to the great spiritual power that has made possible these notable and glorious achievements-achievements which find few counterparts in military history. Those great patriots, Filipino and American, both living and dead, upon whose valiant shoulders has rested the leadership and responsibility for the indomitable movement in the past critical period, shall, when their identities can be known, find a lasting place on the scroll of heroes of both nations-heroes who have selflessly and defiantly subordinated all to the cause of human liberty. Their names and their deeds shall ever be enshrined in the hearts of our two peoples in whose darkest hours they have waged relentless war against the forces of evil that sought, through ruthless brutality, the enslavement of the Filipino people.
    To those great patriots to whom I now pay public tribute I say stand to your battle stations and relax not your vigilance until our forces shall have swept forward to relieve you.52
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    [​IMG]
    PLATE NO. 93
    The Philippine General Radio Net Developed during the Japanese Occupation, 9 October 1944 ​
     
  4. Falcon Jun

    Falcon Jun Ace

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    From the Department of National Defense Website


    RUPERTO K. KANGLEON
    6th Secretary of National Defense
    May 28, 1946 to August 31, 1950

    A military strategist whose name is legendary in the pre-war Philippine Constabulary and during the guerilla campaigns against the Japanese occupation armies, Senator Ruperto K. Kangleon served his government and people since early youth.

    Kangleon was born in Macrohon, Leyte on March 27, 1890, as one of the six children – five sons and a daughter – of Braulio Kangleon and Flora Kadaba.

    He studied up to sixth grade in Leyte and had transfer and complete his elementary education in Surigao, because he refused to submit to what he considered was the over-bearing and oppressive conduct of some school authorities. Having graduated from the elementary grades, he went to Cebu, where he completed his high school course. Here he distinguished himself as all around star athlete, which won for him a berth in the First Philippines Olympic Team sent abroad in 1912-1913.

    After graduation from the Cebu High School, he went to Manila and enrolled in the College of Liberal Arts, University of the Philippines. But the military profession attracted him so he went to the Philippine Constabulary Academy in Baguio where he graduated in 1916.

    His first assignment after securing his commission as a young lieutenant fresh from military school was to fight “Oto”, the notorious Panay bandit whom he subdued in no time. This and other campaigns in the Visayas (Panay) and Mindanao Islands won him military citations and renown. He served with the Philippine Constabulary up to 1936 and later transferred to the Philippine Army. He was inducted into the United States Armed Forces in the Far East on September 1941.

    It was once told that Gen. Douglas MacArthur planned to land somewhere in Luzon, not in Leyte. Perhaps, MacArthur thought it would be a better strategy to recapture Bataan and Corregidor, the object of his vaunted promise: “I shall return.”

    But there was one man who opposed this move. He was Gen. Ruperto K. Kangleon, the leader of the guerrilla forces in Leyte. His indignation would forever be seen as a turning point in Philippine history.

    A MILITARY LIFE

    Kangleon was born on March 27,1890, in barrio San Roque, Macrohon in Southern Leyte, a 45-minute pumpboat ride to Limasawa Island. He was the second in Braulio Kangleon and Flora Kadava’s brood of six. Kangleon started his elementary education in his hometown and continued it in the neighboring town of Maasin, now a city and the provincial capital of Southern Leyte. He attended high school in Cebu City where he excelled in athletics and became a member of the Philippine Olympic Team.

    As a young man, Kangleon was admitted to the Philippine Constabulary School, the precursor of the Philippine Military Academy in Baguio City. Among his contemporaries were Ramon D. Gaviola Jr., former presiding justice of the Court of Appeals, and the late Rev. Mario G. Gaviola, former archbishop of Lipa City. Soon after finishing his degree in the military academy, Kangleon launched his military career, a much-coveted, luxurious and highly respectable line of work in those days.

    As a new officer-graduate, Kangleon’s baptism of fire involved combating outlaws and bandits in the provinces. Clad in shiny leather boots, wide-side khaki breeches, and a khaki shirt/coat — the prescribed military uniform of commissioned officers then — Kangleon led constabulary units in successful pacification campaigns against lawless elements.

    As a young lieutenant, he was also assigned to Imus, Cavite, a town noted for beautiful women. There he met Valentina Tagle, married her and together raised 10 children, the inspirations of his military career.

    WORLD WAR II

    After becoming provincial commander of Bohol and Cebu, World War II found Kangleon as the commanding officer of the 81st Infantry Division in Samar. As a Lieutenant Colonel then, Kangleon was ordered to proceed to Davao where he and his men valiantly fought the Japanese Imperial army. By virtue of his rank in the guerrilla movement, Kangleon was tasked to make advisories to Allied troops of the goings on in the province. And no less than General MacArthur trusted his opinion.

    That was why, when Kangleon suggested that the General land in Leyte instead of another place in the country, MacArthur listened. Kangleon gave him his guarantee that the united and well-organized guerrilla force in the province would be competent enough to secure the arrival of the American forces. Convinced, Gen. MacArthur landed in Leyte on Oct. 20, 1944, just like he promised several years before. From then on, Leyteños believed that Philippine liberation from Japanese domination would not have been complete without Gen. Kangleon. Kangleon’s image was, however, smeared when he surrendered to the Japanese. He was following the orders of his American superior, a certain Colonel Christaine. This made the once united Leyte guerrilla forces to become ragtag and disgruntled units that constantly and violently fought against each other for supremacy.

    Nevertheless, some people still kept their belief in Kangleon. Amid the anarchy, one man stood to protect Kangleon and said that he was the rallying figure that can unite the various guerrilla units because Kangleon was the highest-ranking military officer in Leyte. That man of faith was Graciano Kapili. Kapili, or Grasing to those close to him, was from Himatagon (now the town of St. Bernard). He took it upon himself to undergo the dangerous task of rescuing Kangleon who was then locked up in a Japanese military prison in Butuan. Filled with this dream of a united guerrilla movement, Grasing boarded a sailboat (kaba-kaba) and plowed to Butuan. Armed only with his antics, Grasing caught the amusement of the Japanese prison guards and was able to talk to Kangleon. Grasing convinced Kangleon that escape was the only way out of the Japanese-guarded prison.

    Kangleon and Grasing, therefore, made their dash to freedom and boarded the kaba-kaba and sailed to freedom without detection by the Japanese. They sailed to Leyte and arrived safely at barrio San Roque, Macrohon, the hometown of Gen. Kangleon, on Dec. 26, 1942.

    ON THE ROAD TO FREEDOM

    Adopting Tigulang (Visayan for old man) as his nom de guerre, Kangleon proceeded to re-unite the guerrilla forces in Leyte. Guerrilla leaders, including Captains Atilano Cinco (who later became Congressman) and Alejandro Balderan in the waray-waray areas, and even Americans — Capt. Gordon Lang who was a US Navy officer and Orville Babcock, former Leyte Division superintendent of schools — submitted themselves to his leadership. But one leader didn’t. Lt. Blas Miranda, a mere second lieutenant of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) before World War II that dubiously carried the rank of Brigadier General in a certain Camp Heaven in the mountains near Ormoc City, refused to recognize Kangleon’s leadership. Miranda took Kangleon’s surrender to the Japanese as an issue.

    The antagonism between Kangleon and Miranda reached a bloody climax when they met in armed combat in Baybay, Leyte. None of the two strong-willed guerrillas died, however. But later on, Miranda vanished for good after he narrowly escaped an unexpected Japanese raid on his camp. His men, leaderless, later found their way to the Kangleon camp.

    Since then, the guerrillas of the whole province of Leyte were united behind Kangleon. His hold and control over the Leyte guerrillas became easier because everybody knew Kangleon had the recognition and support of Gen. MacArthur. It was said that MacArthur had been in touch with Kangleon since January 1943 while MacArthur was still in his headquarters in Australia. In effect, MacArthur designated Kangleon as the military and civil governor of Free Leyte. From his headquarters in Australia, MacArthur gave instructions to Kangleon on the conduct of his military operations against the enemy and relations with the civilians. One such instruction was to avoid open armed engagements with the enemy to prevent Japanese reinforcements from going to Leyte and bloody confrontation that could harm civilians.

    Meanwhile, Gen. Kangleon maintained military liaison with Col. Wendel Fertig, the American guerrilla leader of Mindanao. Both guerrilla leaders were Gen. MacArthur’s contact persons in the Philippines. Fretig’s platoon of American guerrilla men bristling with their garand rifles, carbines and tommy guns from Australia, landed in Leyte. Wearing varied costumes from dark short pants to the traditional khaki uniforms, they marched in snappy military formation heading to the guerrilla headquarters situated in the central elementary school buildings in Bato, Leyte, to confer or exchange notes with their local comrades in arms, on the enemy movement in the area. Knowing that Allied forces neared Philippine shores, Japanese forces came and placed garrisons in every town of southwestern Leyte. The Japanese staged military forays that brought them to the mountains to flush out any armed resistance from the guerrillas. They even hunted down Gen. Kangleon, but to no avail since the civilians refused to cooperate.

    A FATHER'S SACRIFICE

    Provoked by the Japanese offensive, Kangleon and his men engaged in a hit-and-run attack against the Japanese in February 1944. The Japanese, in turn, launched search-and-destroy operations against Kangleon in the mountains. Failing to capture the man himself, the Japanese went after Kangleon’s four children and brought them to the mountains of Southern Leyte. They were held hostage there, in order to force the surrender of their father on the threat that they would be killed if Kangleon would not capitulate.

    Gen. Kangleon was locked in the horns of a painful dilemma: to surrender or not, knowing that his children’s lives were at stake. However, after some serious soul-searching, he decided not to surrender and offered his children as a sacrifice on the altar of his country’s cause, despite the pain in his heart. For his noble feat of patriotism, the late first bishop of Maasin, Most Rev. Vicente T. Ataviado, compared Kangleon to the Spanish General Moscardo whose soldier-son was captured by the enemy during the Spanish Civil War. Given the same choice, General Moscardo opted to sacrifice his son rather than surrender. While in captivity, Kangleon’s children kept praying the rosary. Their prayers were answered, since a Japanese officer named Captain Itzumi, befriended them and shared his Buddhist beads with them. The beads were given as a gift from Itzumi’s stepmother for his safety. He became their guardian angel and made their ordeal bearable.

    Meanwhile, Kangleon continued his service to the country despite the danger that has befallen his own flesh and blood. In the hope of instilling some inspiration and hope in the hearts of his men, and probably his own, he composed a song in Cebuano titled “Bantay Boluntaryo” (Watch Out, Volunteer Guards), setting it to the music of an old Philippine martial tune. Shortly before the Allied liberation forces landed in Leyte on Oct. 20,1944, the Japanese pulled out their garrisons. As one faintly recalled, the Japanese left Macrohon in July 1944, less than a year from their arrival in Nov. 1943. It was, however, speculated that the Japanese were merely re-grouping with other Japanese forces in preparation for the expected American invasion. Meanwhile, in recognition of his spectacular achievements in the guerrilla movement, Kangleon was promoted to full colonel by Gen. MacArthur on Oct. 1,1944. True to his promise, MacArthur, accompanied by the Allied liberation forces, landed in Leyte on Oct. 20,1944. Beginning the long road to the liberation of the Philippines, MacArthur’s forces rescued Gen. Kangleon’s children in Tacloban City.

    Three days following the Allied landing, on Oct. 23,1944, Kangleon was appointed military governor of Leyte. Gen. MacArthur personally pinned on Kangleon the Distinguished Service Cross of the United States of America, a decoration awarded for extraordinary heroism in combat witnessed by Philippine Commonwealth president Sergio Osmeña as well as commanders of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and even US Armed Forces at the Leyte provincial capitol building.

    IN POLITICS

    Kangleon became Leyte’s civil governor upon the re-establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth under President Osmeña. On May 28,1946, he was appointed Secretary of National Defense by Pres. Manuel Roxas, the first of the Commonwealth and the Republic of the Philippines, in the same way that Kangleon was the Defense Secretary during the closing American colonial rule in our country and held the position upon the declaration of independence on July 4,1946. But due to policy differences with the next president, Pres. Elpidio Quirino on the leadership of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Kangleon resigned as Defense Secretary on Aug. 31, 1950. Kangleon was trying to ask President Quirino to remove the generals whom he considered deadwood to which the President disagreed.

    Kangleon’s resignation from the Cabinet paved the way for his entry into the political arena, an all too familiar field for his siblings. His brother, Ciriaco, was an Assemblyman (diputado) in the old Philippine Assembly, while the other brother, Tereso, was mayor of Macrohon, his native town. Kangleon ran for Senate even without the endorsement of the incumbent President Quirino. He became senator and was appointed chairman of the Senate Committee on Veterans and Military Pensions and vice chairman of the Committee on National Defense and Security. He championed the cause of the Filipino veterans by filing bills and resolutions for their welfare and advancement. However, even before he could finish his six-year term in the Senate, Sen. Kangleon succumbed to myocardial infraction on Feb. 27,1958, exactly a month away from his 68th birthday. The Filipino nation led by Pres. Carlos P. Garcia mourned his untimely death.

    THE NUMBER ONE LEYTEÑO

    At Kangleon’s funeral, former senator Lorenzo Sumulong extolled Kangleon’s virtues of patriotism and honesty. He described Kangleon as a “tried and tested patriot who braved a thousand deaths in the defense of his country” and a man of “honesty who was always beyond suspicion.” The solon also recalled that as over-all guerrilla chief of Leyte, Kangleon was authorized by Gen. MacArthur to issue war notes for the total amount of P2 million, a fortune during that time. If Gen. Kangleon had no moral qualms, he could have made it appear that the whole amount was spent and lined his pockets with wads of money, which he never did.

    Soon after the landing of the American liberation forces, Kangleon submitted an accounting showing that only one-fourth of the authorized P2 million was spent. In another instance, Kangleon returned an unexpected intelligence fund in the sum of P49,350 to the United States government with a corresponding receipt issued by the US Armed Forces, Pacific on June 26,1945. For his highly meritorious and distinguished services in the military, Sen. Kangleon was awarded 17 medals and campaign ribbons. Topping them was the Distinguished Services Cross of the United States of America, the one pinned on him by Gen. MacArthur.

    In memory of Southern Leyte’s outstanding son, a life-sized statue of Kangleon now stands on the campus of Saint Joseph College in Maasin City. Paradoxically, it took a non-Leyteño by birth, in the person of the late bishop Ataviado, to place in concrete the honor and recognition due the number one Leyteño. On the 50th anniversary celebration of the Leyte landing by the Allied liberation forces at Palo Leyte on Oct. 20, 1994, Gen. Kangleon was posthumously promoted to brigadier general after half a century and 36 years after his death.

    Probably, in deference to his wish which he must have expressed during his lifetime, Gen. Kangleon’s remains were transferred to his place of birth on Feb. 27,1994 from the Manila South Cemetery where he was buried with fitting honors on March 4,1958.

    In a world that is presently wanting for heroes, stories such as these are rare. But simply remembering or leafing through the pages of our past — such as the memories and legacies left behind by heroes and noble men such as the number one Leyteño, General Kangleon — is enough for us to have hope even in the darkest of times.
     
  5. mac_bolan00

    mac_bolan00 Member

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    i never met gen. marking but i slept in his rest house in daraitan, rizal a number of times as a kid when our father brought me on his hunting trips.
     
  6. Falcon Jun

    Falcon Jun Ace

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    I hope they told you some stories. If you recall any stories about Marking, then do share them.
     
  7. Falcon Jun

    Falcon Jun Ace

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    Personal note: The Ifugaos and Igorots are tribes based in the mountains of Northern Luzon.
    This is excerpted from the website THE PEOPLE



    The period 1941-1945 was called Guerilla Time. Several Ifugaos joined the guerilla force under American officers - the 11th Infantry organized by Volkman and the 14th Infantry organized by Col. Manriquez. Volkman became the Commanding Officer of the 11th Infantry with the headquarters in the Antipolo Valley. The 1st Battalion was organized by Capt. Alfredo Bunnol with the headquarters at Paniqui, Hapao in Banaue. The 3rd Battalion was organized by Major Joaquin Dunuan. Though based in Isabela, he and his men always joined the US forces fighting in the Mayaoyao region.
    Co. "B" under the 1st Batallion was also organized by Francisco Balamban. This Co. "B" joined the US forces in Besang Pass; this company later on moved to the Banaue area, the headquarters of the 1st Batallion.
    Co. "C" under the 1st Battalion was also organized by Santiago Balajo and had its headquarters at Balangbang in Mayaoyao. The 14th Infantry, although organized in Nueva Vizcaya by Col. Manriquez, had its headquarters in Panopdopan. The 11th and 14th Infantries supported the American forces (6th US Army) wherever they fought, as in the Battle of Besang Pass where several Ifugao guerillas took part in the action.
    In February 1945, there was general evacuation to the mountains, especially in the Kiangan area where the Japanese soldiers were concentrated in their last-ditch attempt to guard Gen. Yamashita. The general had come to hide in Mt. Napulawan in the Hungduan region.
    The Japanese soldiers went into indiscriminate shooting when they heard of the successful landing of the American forces. The American-led guerilla forces, which occupied the Antipolo valley and Mayaoyao region, responded with ferocity by demonstrating their warrior traditions. In fact, the final surrender forces in the Philippines came after savage fighting in the vicinity of Kiangan and Hungduan. The war was a chapter in the Philippine history in which Ifugaos could take great pride.
    The civilian counterparts of the guerillas were the Bolomen and the Women's Auxillary Services (WAS). These groups were very helpful to the guerillas in terms of gathering information and catering to their needs such as a laundry work, cooking and running errands.
    On September 1, 1945, Gen. Yamashita came down from the Mt. Napulawan area to Kiangan for his informal surrender. From Kiangan he was escorted to Baguio, where he formally surrendered on September 2, 1945.
    The following in an excerpt on the Igorot warrior's role in the World War II:
    After the Japanese invasion, a military unit from the Cordillera played a crucial role in the defense of Bataan, and in the desperate fighting there, won high praise and commendation from Gen. MacArthur for valor in battle. After stopping an attack by the Japanese 20th Infantry in hand-to-hand combat, the Igorot soldiers counterattacked, riding atop tanks in jungle so thick the soldiers guided the drivers by banging on the turrets. MacArthur recounted the Exploit, saying, "Many desperate acts of heroism have fallen under my observation of many fields of battle in many parts of the worlds... But for sheer, breathtaking and heart-stopping desperation, I have never known the equal of those Igorots riding the tanks... Gentlemen, when you tell the story stand in tribute to those galiant Igorots."
    'Igorot warriors' in the above excerpt meant all Cordillera soldiers. One of those who rode 'atop tanks' was one Ramon Ab-alon,a trainee from Mayaoyao, Ifugao. He was able to escape from the Japanese during the 'death march' from Bataan to Pampanga. For his bravery he was given a presidential citation.
     
  8. Falcon Jun

    Falcon Jun Ace

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    Here's more information on the little known Ifugao and Igorot tribesmen who fought in World War II and how they fare today. This comes from the website The Northern Dispatch Weekly » Benguet pays tribute to its war heroes

    Benguet pays tribute to its war heroes

    Posted by editors under general , Cordillera , people

    LA TRINIDAD, Benguet (Aug. 15) – After 61 years from the outbreak of the World War II, Benguet honored its veterans today during the first celebration of the province’s liberation day, which, the veterans claim, falls on August 15, 1945.
    [​IMG]
    WORLD WAR II GUERRILLA. A scar from a sniper’s bullet is as worthy as the war medals a guerrilla earned for his travails. Benguet rembers its Liberation Day by honoring every veteran and boloman of World War II, be-medalled or not, who fought the imperialist invaders with all his bravery. Photo by Lyn V. Ramo
    All belonging to the 66th Infantry of the United States Armed Forces in the Philippines North Luzon (USAFIP NL) veterans, their wives or widows, sons and daughters, and perhaps grandchildren, reminisced the gallantry and heroism of the veterans, whose ages now are at least 80. Boys then should be 18 to qualify as a guerrilla.
    More than just the reminiscence, to most of the living veterans, it was a day of renewing acquaintances. Although most of them have passed away, and the living are more often than not almost ill, the veterans still managed to climb two flights of stairs to the Ben Palispis Hall of the provincial capitol here, where a documentary film was also shown as part of the tribute to the valiant war heroes.
    Aside from Ben Palispis, a former Benguet governor, among the WWII veterans are familiar names as Alejo Pacalso, Dennis Molintas, Bado Dangwa, Francisco Paraan, Ernesto Bueno, who all became politicians after the war, also belonged to the 66th Infantry. Their own scions turned out to be present-day politicians in Benguet and nearby Baguio City.
    Igorot fighters’ memoir
    It is surprising that at their age, the vets still vividly remember the events that led to the total liberation of Benguet on August 15, 62 years ago.
    USAFIP NL Baguio-Benguet Chapter Commander Robert T. Bellasi recounted that on November 21, 1944 a submarine surfaced off Lingayen Gulf, bringing superior weapons against the Japanese Imperial Army. That was some three years after the Japanese inflicted on the people an unforgivable tyranny.
    “The arrival of artillery and ammunition signaled that we could defeat the enemy and regain freedom from the tyrants,” Bellasi said as he recalled how the guerillas suffered fighting the bayonet-wielding Japanese with crude arms.
    Bellasi said Benguet’s liberation started with the liberation of Sablan in early April, 1945. It was followed by the liberation of Tuba, April 20; Baguio City, April 27; and La Trinidad, May 3. Itogon and Kabayan were liberated next.
    Besang Pass was defended from the Japanese on June 14, when the 66th Infantry merged with the 121st Infantry.
    The on-line magazine Bulatlat.com wrote about Besang Pass: “Bessang Pass was the last stronghold of the Japanese imperial forces under Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashita, known as the “Tiger of Malaya” and conqueror of Singapore. It was part of the triangular defense of General Yamashita in the north, namely the Balete Pass, Villaverde Trail and Bessang Pass, guarding the Ifugao-Benguet-Vizcaya borders.”
    After Besang Pass, Lepanto (Mankayan) followed suit on July 20 with the same group of Benguet fighters, Bellasi continued. By July 27, Abatan was secured from the Japanese. While the guerillas were fighting at Loo Valley and in Bad-ayan, in Buguias, Emperor Hirohito of Japan went on radio to order all Japanese to lay down their arms to which a cease fire was ordered by the USAFIP NL Cmdr Col. Russel W. Volkmann. The war was over.
    A small but fierce battle
    “We fought the worst battle in Lepanto,” he said.
    Another veteran, Felix Lauyan, 81, an Ibaloy from Kapangan town, confirmed Bellasi’s account. “We had no food for at least three days and three nights in Lepanto, coupled with fierce fighting, we could have died from fatigue and hunger,” he said. All that the native fighters ate was the core of the banana trunk during those days, just to fill the stomach”. At one time they had a feast of avocadoes, Paraan recalled fondly.
    The veterans even recalled they even resorted to hand to hand combat, grenade-throwing, and bayonet draws. They witnessed how civilians were herded in Japanese garrisons, subjected to water cure and other forms of torture until they died in pain and hardship.
    “Komporme ti bado mi idi. Diay dinait dagiti babbae a sako, isu ti inusar ko. Nakasaka-saka ti kaaduan,” (We wore anything then. I had clothessewn from jute sack by the women) Lauyan told Nordis.
    The guerillas had no salary, nor proper uniform, and bereft of arms, but still they fought and yet fought with all their valor, Assistant Secretary Terry D. Adevoso of the Office of the Veterans Affairs, said in his inspirational talk.
    Inspired to fight
    Then 19, the young Lauyan witnessed how Japanese soldiers took his father and mother and made to take gallons upon gallons of water, were laid on their backs and stomped on the stomach until water oozed from their mouths, ears and noses. “Isu ti inkatay da Mama kenni Tatang ko,” (That’s how Mama and Father died) he said.
    This tyranny from the foreign invaders pushed the young Lauyan to join the USAFIP NL. He confided doing everything to qualify when he reported at Camp Eureka in Kapangan. “Idi damo, kayat ko laeng ti ag-revenge” iti inkatay ti dadakkel ko. (At first I only wanted to revenge the death of my parents) Lauyan confided. Later, as the fighting went on, he realized the value of fighting for freedom and democracy.
    Lauyan then served as “scout out” or that first one who went ahead of the first squad to see if the road was clear. He also signaled if the first squad could advance.
    “Isunga siak ti natiruan ti sniper iti KM 21 ket nasugatan ti muging ko” (That’s why I was the first to be hit by a sniper at KM21 that cut my forehead) he said proudly pointing to a scar as if it were a medal of valor. KM 21 is along the Halsema Highway that leads to Lepmanto in Mankayan town.
    Later, Lauyan was with the team who fetched 30 American soldiers who brought more ammunitions. He remembered leading the soldiers from Naguilian town in La Union, passing through Longlong towards Tuel, in Acop, Tublay town, where they joined the 32nd Division which just came.
    Fighting for freedom and democracy
    As idealistic as they had been, the members of the 66th infantry are still very proud now as they were 66 years ago.
    “We never broke down despite hardships during the war. We never thought about backing out,” Bellasi proudly said. He said many lives were sacrificed during the war, but they endured the evils of war to regain freedom from the invading Japanese troops.
    Retired Col. Francisco Paraan still know the exact number of casualties of the 66th Infantry. “Of the 124,000 guerillas, there were only 854 casualties in all; 280 died. 568 wounded and six missing in action,” he said.
    “Enjoy the freedom that your grandparents have fought and died for,” Bellasi told the youth among the audience, most of whom are grandsons and grand-daughters of veterans.
    Heroes and heroines
    “We should not forget the thousands upon thousands of bolomen, women and children who fed, clothed, carried ammunitions and provided shelter to the guerillas,” Paraan reminded the audience. He said they all fought with the guerillas and they should be an integral part of the dedicated heroes and heroines of the Filipino-Japanese War.
    Lauyan’s big brother Oleko was a boloman. He said Oleko and other bolomen gathered camote in the wilderness and brought them to where the guerrillas were camped.
    The same 2005 Bulatlat.com story said of the bolomen:
    “Now, on the 60th anniversary of the Battle, we honor the real heroes of Bessang Pass – the nameless farmers, soldiers, bolomen, haulers who supplied the fighters with ammunition, food and other war materials, and the brave volunteer Igorots ho fought tooth and nail the fascist Japanese forces who entrenched themselves in the northern highlands.”
    Exactly 66 years after the first Benguet guerilla took to war, Benguet folk remember his or her heroism with the first celebration of the Liberation Day of Benguet on August 15, 2007. # Lyn V. Ramo for NORDIS
     
  9. Falcon Jun

    Falcon Jun Ace

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    Here's some more details of how the fighting in Northern Luzon went from the website HyperWar: US Army in WWII: Triumph in the Philippines [Chapter 28]





    Chapter XXVIII
    Action at the Northern Apex


    Northwestern Luzon

    The motives that prompted General Krueger to direct USAFIP(NL) to attack inland from Luzon's west coast toward Bontoc were similar to those that had led to I Corps' drives toward Baguio and Bambang, for Bontoc was equally important in the Japanese scheme of defense in northern Luzon.[SIZE=-1]1[/SIZE] The principal road junctions of northwestern Luzon--that portion of the island lying north of San Fernando, La Union, and west of the Cagayan Valley--lie within relatively easy distance of Bontoc. Krueger knew that if Volckmann's USAFIP(NL) could seize and hold these road junctions, simultaneously securing control of Route 4 inland from Libtong (on the coast) to Bontoc, the guerrilla division would effectively isolate Japanese forces in northwestern Luzon. The USAFIP(NL) would also be able to block Japanese secondary routes of access from the Cagayan Valley to Yamashita's defensive triangle, making it nearly impossible for the Shobu Group to move troops and supplies from the central and northern sections of the valley into the redoubt. The success of USAFIP(NL)'s impending attack, together with the success of I Corps operations at Baguio and Balete Pass, would seriously curtail the Shobu Group's freedom of maneuver around the periphery of the defensive triangle--and only the peripheral roads could bear military traffic. Finally, if it succeeded in opening Route 4 inland from Libtong, the USAFIP(NL) would provide Sixth Army with a back door entrance to Yamashita's triangular redoubt. (See Map 19.)
    The Roads and the Terrain

    Bontoc, capital of Mountain Province, lies in the valley of the Caycayan River about 2,750 feet up in the Cordillera Central, the backbone range of northwestern Luzon. The town is the site of one of two junctions of Routes 4 and 11. Coming northeast from Baguio, Route 11 travels more or less along the top of the Cordillera Central and, reaching spots over 8,500 feet above sea level, alternately traverses grassy slopes and forested ridges. Along its ninety miles of road distance to Bontoc, the highway provides some of the most spectacular scenery in the world.
    Unpaved in 1945 between Baguio and Bontoc, Route 11 was scarcely two lanes wide along most of its length. The road, only one narrow lane wide and poorly surfaced, continues northeast from Bontoc along the canyon of the Chico River,
    --541--
    emerging into the central portion of the Cagayan Valley nearly 35 miles--in a straight line--beyond Bontoc. At Sabangan, 16 miles southwest of Bontoc, Route 11 makes its first junction with Route 4, the two traveling together to Bontoc. Route 4, a narrow, unpaved road, strikes southeast from Bontoc and after traversing high, very rough country, joins Route 5 at Bagabag, about twenty-five miles north of Bambang. Over one-lane Route 4, the distance between Bontoc and Bagabag is approximately seventy miles.
    The junction barrio of Sabangan, 3,500 feet above sea level, is 60 miles inland from Libtong via Route 4--as opposed to 32 miles straight-line distance. About 24 road miles west of Sabangan is the town of Cervantes, lying 1,000 feet above sea level in the valley of the Abra River. Going west from Cervantes Route 4 traverses first a mile or so of open, rice-paddy country, but then starts abruptly up the grassy eastern slopes of the Ilocos, or Malaya, Range. In the next two miles of straight distance westward, the one-lane unpaved road climbs to 4,600 feet at Bessang Pass,[SIZE=-1]2[/SIZE] where it goes through a cut in a sheer rock ridge nose. In another straight-line distance of some five miles, the road twists violently down the western slopes of the Ilocos Range to a 500-foot elevation in the Amburayan River valley.
    Like Sabangan, Cervantes is an important road junction town. South from Cervantes Route 393, a one-lane, dirt road, ascends a spur of the Cordillera Central, rising from less than 1,000 feet at Cervantes to about 5,800 feet at its junction with Route 11, fourteen miles in a straight line southeast of Cervantes.[SIZE=-1]3[/SIZE] Passing the Lepanto Copper Mine and through the municipality of Mankayan, Route 393 joins Route 11 at KP 90, fifty-six miles northeast of Baguio and twenty miles southwest of Sabangan. Route 393 descends the east side of the ridge along which Route 11 runs at KP 90, dropping into the tiny but beautiful Loo Valley. Situated about 5,100 feet above sea level, the Loo Valley is on the upper reaches of the Agno River, the headwaters of which rise on the east side of Route 11 less than four miles northeast of KP 90.
    Mankayan was of great importance to the Japanese who, in referring to the northern apex of their defensive triangle, spoke of Mankayan and Bontoc in the same breath. One reason, of course, was that Mankayan provided the Shobu Group with an ideal assembly area whence troops could move rapidly either to Route 11 or to Route 4. Of more importance was the nearby Lepanto Copper Mine, six twisting miles northwest along Route 393 from KP 90. The Japanese had spent an extraordinary amount of effort developing this mine--coming close to ruining it in the process--and had trucked the rich ore northwest along Route 393 to Cervantes and thence west along Route 4, over Bessang Pass, to the coast for shipment to Japan.[SIZE=-1]4[/SIZE]
    --542--
    Just as the headwaters of the Agno rise on the east side of Route 11 near KP 90, so the headwaters of the Abra River rise on the west side of the highway about a mile and a half south of KP 90. The Abra system is rivaled in size on Luzon only by the Agno and Pampanga, draining through the Central Plains, and the Cagayan-Magat complex of the Cagayan Valley. From its headwaters the Abra, passing by Cervantes, flows almost due north for seventy miles. Then, gathering to itself an increasingly large number of tributaries, the river turns westward for some sixteen miles and empties into the South China Sea near Vigan, on Route 3 about forty miles up Luzon's west coast from Libtong. Route 3, the coastal highway, continues north from Vigan some fifty miles to the large town of Laoag, and then stretches on northward to round Luzon's northwestern tip and continue east along the north coast to Aparri, at the mouth of the Cagayan Valley.
    From Laoag, Route 2 extends inland about fifteen miles along various river valleys. The route then degenerates into a foot trail that crosses the Cordillera Central, swings southeast, and emerges as a narrow road running eastward through the north-central part of the Cagayan Valley to the Cagayan River. Originating at Sulvec, ten miles south of Vigan, is Route 6, which runs inland along the valleys of the Abra and other rivers for about thirty miles. The road then turns into an exhausting foot trail that crosses the Cordillera Central and joins Route 11 about twenty-five miles northeast of Bontoc. Neither Route 2 nor Route 6 through the Cordillera Central is a road over which significant military operations can be conducted; Route 11 from Bontoc to the Cagayan Valley fits into the same category.
    Except along the coastal river valleys, there is scant population in the vast mountainous area of northwestern Luzon, which extends over 70 miles from the west coast to the Cagayan Valley and 140 miles north from San Fernando, La Union, to Cape Bojeador at Luzon's northwestern tip. Barren is the word to best describe much of the country. Imposing in their grandeur, most of the steep-sided mountains are grassy sloped. Thick forest is the exception in this region, and in clear weather it is easy to pinpoint movements of men and vehicles at unbelievable distances. Some ravines among the mountains have fairly thick woods and dense undergrowth, but lush tropical growth is not to be encountered except along the coast. Along Route 4 inland from Libtong, for example, there is rather scrubby jungle growth up to a height of 3,000 feet above sea level along the western slopes of the Ilocos Range. From this point to Bessang Pass scattered pines, patches of which are interspersed with open grassland, account for most of the vegetation. The east side of the Ilocos Range, where Route 4 descends to Cervantes, is completely open and grassy.
    The jumbled, rough, and steep mountainous terrain of northwestern Luzon makes a major military effort a problem even in dry weather. Route 4, the USAFIP(NL)'s axis of approach toward Bontoc, traverses much rougher terrain than Route 5 between San Jose and Santa Fe, and I Corps observers declared during the war that the terrain along Route 4 was more difficult than that the Villa Verde Trail crosses. The foot trail portions of Routes 2 and 6
    --543--
    make the Villa Verde Trail look like a superhighway, while Route 11 between Bontoc and the Cagayan Valley is one of the roughest thoroughfares on Luzon to be dignified by the name road.
    The roads of northwestern Luzon are bad enough in dry weather. In wet weather, even in peacetime, the task of road maintenance is herculean. Summer rainfalls of over ten inches a day are not uncommon in the mountains. For Route 4 from Libtong to Bontoc--and for other roads as well--such rains mean landslides and washouts, coupled with flash floods that tear out bridges and render sections of the road impassable quagmires. The USAFIP(NL) would have to strive to secure Route 4 from Libtong to Bontoc before the heavy rains began toward the end of May, or it might be unable to accomplish its mission.
    The Protagonists

    While it was not until late March that General Krueger directed the USAFIP(NL) to open a third front in northern Luzon with a concerted offensive toward Bontoc, strong elements of Colonel Volckmann's guerrilla force had been in action throughout northwestern Luzon ever since the Sixth Army had come ashore at Lingayen Gulf.[SIZE=-1]5[/SIZE] The region north of an east-west line through Vigan was the responsibility of the USAFIP(NL)'s 15th Infantry, Lt. Col. Robert H. Arnold commanding.[SIZE=-1]6[/SIZE] With an ostensible muster of about 2,900 officers and men, the 15th Infantry was understrength, ill trained, and poorly equipped. In early January the regiment's three battalions were scattered along the western slopes of the Ilocos Mountains from Vigan to a hideout northeast of Laoag. The country south of the line through Vigan was the responsibility of the 121st Infantry, under Col. George M. Barnett.[SIZE=-1]7[/SIZE] Most of the 121st was operating in the vicinity of San Fernando, but the 3d Battalion was in the hills near Route 3 from Libtong north toward Vigan. The 3d Battalion, 66th Infantry, was harassing Japanese convoys along Route 11 from Baguio to KP 90; troops of the 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry, were manning ambushes in the Sabangan-Bontoc area and along Route 11 between Bontoc and the Cagayan Valley. The bulk of the 66th Infantry later moved south to support the 43d and 33d Divisions on the Baguio front; the rest of the 11th Infantry operated in the Cagayan Valley. The Cagayan Valley and its surrounding hills were also "home" for USAFIP(NL)'s 14th Infantry, which does not figure in the story in northwestern Luzon.
    In early January the principal mission of USAFIP(NL) units in northwestern Luzon was to gather intelligence and institute a program of sabotage and demolitions designed to cut Japanese lines of communication throughout the region. But as was the case everywhere under Volckmann's sphere of influence, Sixth Army's landing precipitated more direct action among the guerrilla units in northwestern Luzon, leading ultimately to such operations as the 121st Infantry's investiture of San Fernando.[SIZE=-1]8[/SIZE] Thus, while most of the 121st Infantry
    --544--
    concentrated in the San Fernando area, the regiment's 3d Battalion moved to clear Route 3 from Libtong north to Vigan. Meanwhile, the 15th Infantry started operations to drive the Japanese from the rest of northwestern Luzon.
    The Japanese against whom the USAFIP(NL)'s units began moving in early January were little better prepared than the USAFIP(NL) to conduct major engagements. In the early weeks of the Luzon Campaign (before the 19th Division started north from Baguio), there were some 8,000 Japanese in northwestern Luzon, most of them near Vigan and Laoag.[SIZE=-1]9[/SIZE] The two towns had been of considerable importance to the enemy ever since the opening days of the Pacific war, the Japanese having seized Vigan on 10 December 1941 and Laoag the next day.[SIZE=-1]10[/SIZE] Throughout the war the Japanese had maintained an airfield at Gabu, near Laoag, and another near Vigan. Both towns were secondary base areas, although most shipping that put into Luzon north of San Fernando used Salomague Harbor, fifteen miles north of Vigan. The last Japanese convoy to reach Luzon arrived in the Vigan area on or about 30 December 1944, where it suffered heavily at the hands of Fifth Air Force planes.[SIZE=-1]11[/SIZE]
    In early January the major Japanese combat unit in northwestern Luzon was the RCT-sized Araki Force, which was built around two independent infantry battalions of the 79th Infantry Brigade, 103d Division.[SIZE=-1]12[/SIZE] Maj Gen. Shoji Araki, the force commander, stationed about 2,500 of his 3,000 men along Route 6 from Sulvec northeast fifteen miles to Bangued. His other 500 troops he scattered in small detachments along the coast from Vigan north. Araki had no control over the 500-man 357th Independent Infantry Battalion, 103d Division, which held Route 4. The 357th operated under the direct control of Shobu Group headquarters in Baguio, while General Araki reported to 103d Division headquarters, near Aparri.
    The remaining 4,500 Japanese in northwestern Luzon included a few antiaircraft units, Japanese Army Air Force ground organizations, and some Army port and service troops. Of this group about 2,000 were stationed in the Laoag area, 2,000 more at or near Salomague Harbor, and 500 at Vigan, where the Araki Force had 250 men. There were minor garrisons, varying from 20 to 100 men in strength, at a number of coastal barrios and inland at such points as Cervantes, Mankayan, Sabangan, and Bontoc.
    Most of General Araki's men were garrison troops rendered soft and inefficient by long service on occupation duties. The service units contained a large percentage of Formosans and
    --545--
    Koreans who were ill armed, poorly trained, and easily disaffected. For artillery, Araki Force had only a few 70-mm. battalion guns; it lacked ammunition of all types except for small arms. The force did not have enough weapons to arm all the service units that were passing to General Araki's control; medical supplies were short from the start; food would be at a premium within a month or two after 9 January.
    Laoag, Vigan, and the Araki Force

    Only a few days after the Sixth Army landed on Luzon the Araki Force began having serious clashes with the 15th Infantry, USAFIP(NL).[SIZE=-1]13[/SIZE] The 15th's initial efforts centered on a campaign of raids and skirmishes designed to clear Route 3 north of Vigan, force minor Japanese garrisons out of the regimental sector, and capture Japanese supplies and equipment for use in later operations. By mid-February the regiment had secured most of Route 3 north of a point twenty-five miles north of Vigan, and on the 15th the 1st Battalion entered Laoag. The Japanese who had been holding at Laoag retreated to the Salomague Harbor area, but under pressure from the USAFIP(NL) withdrew on south to Vigan during the first week of April. Almost immediately the Araki Force began a general retreat from Vigan, and by mid-April nearly all the Japanese originally stationed at or north of Vigan had withdrawn south and inland to join the main body of the Araki Force, now deployed along Route 6 about midway between Sulvec and Bangued. The 121st Infantry, USAFIP(NL), had meanwhile cleared Route 3 south of Vigan, thus opening the highway all the way up the west coast from Lingayen Gulf.
    Assembling along Route 6, the Araki Force hoped to deny the USAFIP(NL) access to the northern reaches of the Abra River valley, a rich farming area centering about twenty miles inland from Vigan. Araki's men were in poor condition to accomplish this mission. Almost all supplies except small arms ammunition had long since vanished, and the ill-equipped service troops withdrawing from the coastal barrios quickly consumed the few supplies left at mid-April. Communications equipment was nonexistent, and General Araki had lost contact with 103d Division headquarters. In mid-March Yamashita had transferred the Araki Force to Shobu Group control, which did not help. Indeed, it appears that General Araki was completely out of touch with any higher headquarters from late March until mid-May.
    The 15th Infantry planned to strike northeast astride Route 6 from Sulvec with two battalions while another battalion, employing back country roads and trails to get into position, would drive toward Bangued from the east, taking the Araki Force in the rear. Volckmann reinforced the 15th Infantry for this attack with two companies from other USAFIP(NL) regiments. Fifth Air Force planes from Lingayen area fields provided limited support, and the 15th Infantry operated the few Japanese artillery weapons it had captured.
    The 15th Infantry began its attack on 10 April and it took only five days to convince Araki that he might as well
    --546--
    retreat again. A general Japanese withdrawal started on the 15th of April, and by the 25th the bulk of the Araki Force had departed southward for the Abra River valley. Pursued by the 15th Infantry, the Araki Force headed for Gayaman, twenty-five miles upstream (south) from Bangued. The 15th Infantry also sent a small enveloping force inland from Route 3 to Angaki, on the Abra about twelve miles north of Cervantes. Elements of the 121st Infantry, USAFIP(NL), were already blocking the Abra Valley at Angaki in order to prevent the Araki Force from moving on south to reinforce Japanese units on Route 4 west of Cervantes.
    Finding his way south closed, General Araki struck east and southeast from Gayaman over trackless, virtually unexplored sections of the Cordillera Central, passing through virgin pine forests and over uncharted streams and ridges. Losing far more troops from starvation and disease than in combat, and becoming increasingly more disorganized, the Araki Force in mid-May began straggling into Besao, a mountain barrio at the end of a third-class road seven miles west of Bontoc. Few more than 1,500 men of the Araki Force had survived the coastal skirmishes, the battles in the Bangued region, and the tortuous overland trek to Besao, to reassemble late in May at Bontoc. Of the nearly 8,000 Japanese stationed in northwestern Luzon at the beginning of the year some 4,000 had been killed or had died of starvation and disease by the end of May. Another 1,500 had escaped to Bontoc, and the remaining 2,500 had scattered into the mountains in small groups that Filipino guerrillas ultimately hunted down or that also died of malnutrition and sicknesses. The losses of the 15th Infantry, USAFIP(NL), in northwestern Luzon were approximately 125 men killed and 335 wounded.[SIZE=-1]14[/SIZE]
    Relatively unimportant in the larger picture of the whole Luzon Campaign, the 15th Infantry's operations against the Araki Force were to stand the regiment in good stead. At the end of May the regiment was in far better shape than it had been on 9 January; it was up to strength; it had seized arms and supplies from the Japanese; it had received much equipment from the Sixth Army. The four months' fight against the Araki Force, however minor in nature much of the fighting had been, had given all components of the 15th Infantry the experience, training, and confidence that only combat can provide. Now the 15th Infantry was to move to Route 4, where it was urgently needed to reinforce the 121st Infantry.
    The Fight for Bessang Pass

    Early Operations Along Route 4

    When in early January the 15th Infantry, USAFIP(NL), had started to clear Route 3 from Vigan north, the 3d Battalion of the 121st Infantry began to secure the highway from Vigan south to Libtong, the junction of Routes 3 and
    --547--
    4.[SIZE=-1]15[/SIZE] Before the end of January the battalion had substantially completed this task. Colonel Volckmann was not, however, satisfied. He decided that the continued security of Route 3 demanded that his troops clear Route 4 inland from Libtong to Cervantes so that the 357th IIB, known to be holding the road, could mount no raids and counterattacks toward the coast. He accordingly directed the 121st Infantry to strike inland for Cervantes and establish roadblocks in the Cervantes area along Route 393, to the south, and Route 4, to the east. The only force that could be assigned to this rather substantial mission was the 3d Battalion, 121st Infantry.
    While the main body of the battalion was assembling for the drive toward Cervantes, Company L destroyed a small Japanese garrison at barrio Bitalag, a mile and half inland from Libtong. On 2 February the entire battalion moved east out of Bitalag and four days later was at the municipality of Suyo, three miles farther inland. Volckmann there called a halt. For the time being San Fernando was a more important objective than Cervantes, and he needed all the troops he could get for the attack on that port city. Accordingly, on 6 February the bulk of the 3d Battalion, 121st Infantry, departed, leaving only Company L at Suyo.
    By this time outpost troops of the 357th IIB, along with a few stragglers from coastal garrisons, had withdrawn to Bessang Pass, where the Japanese battalion had started digging in. Bypassing the pass via back-country trails, Company L, 121st Infantry, entered Cervantes on 24 February after a brisk fight with a small Japanese garrison. But at this juncture elements of the 19th Division began pulling into the Cervantes area from Baguio and early in March drove the guerrilla company out of town. Company L recaptured Cervantes on 13 March, but soon found itself under the sights of Japanese artillery emplaced on rising ground to the south.
    Volckmann saw that Company L could not hold for long by itself and reinforced the troops at Cervantes as best he could, forming a provisional battalion under Capt. Serafin V. Elizondo of the 11th Infantry. The components were Company A of the 11th Infantry, which had previously operated in the vicinity of Sabangan; Company L of the 121st Infantry; an 81-mm. mortar section from the 121st Infantry; Company D of the 66th Infantry, which came up from the Baguio area; and two platoons from the Replacement and Casualty Battalion, USAFIP(NL). The Provisional Battalion held out at Cervantes until 3 April, on which date Japanese pressure from the east and south forced the unit into hills northwest of the town.
    On 23 March, about a week after the Provisional Battalion was organized and on the same day that USAFIP(NL) cleared the last Japanese from the San
    --548--
    Fernando area, General Krueger directed Volckmann to open the third front in northern Luzon with a drive inland along Route 4 to Bontoc. Krueger set Cervantes as USAFIP(NL)'s intermediate objective.[SIZE=-1]16[/SIZE] These orders were to project USAFIP(NL) into a fight of three months' duration.
    The First Month

    The only units that Volckmann could muster for the attack toward Cervantes were the Provisional Battalion, already on the ground, and the 121st Infantry, which had just finished the reduction of San Fernando. The 11th and 14th Infantry Regiments were scattered through the Cagayan Valley and could not be brought out; the 66th Infantry was attached to the U.S. 33d Division on the Baguio front; and the 15th Infantry was thoroughly engaged against the Araki Force.
    The 121st Infantry, with a strength of less than 3,000 troops, was the best equipped, best trained, and most experienced regiment of the USAFIP(NL). Its supporting artillery initially included only captured Japanese weapons--two 70-mm. infantry guns and two 47-mm. antitank weapons. The two larger weapons lacked fire control equipment, and ammunition was short for both types. Lingayen-based planes of the Fifth Air Force would provide air support insofar as weather and other commitments permitted. The 121st had two ill-equipped engineer companies attached to it; its transportation consisted of seventeen captured Japanese trucks. The regiment had enough food and possessed plenty of ammunition for small arms and machine guns. Medical support was adequate, although hardly up to the standard a regular U.S. Army regiment would expect. The Provisional Battalion was attached to the 121st Infantry on 3 April, and the regiment brought north with it from San Fernando one company of USAFIP(NL)'s Military Police Battalion.
    On 29 March the 121st Infantry assembled at barrio Butac, seven miles inland along Route 4 from Libtong at the point where the road begins its steep ascent to Bessang Pass. The regiment planned to push two battalions east astride Route 4, holding the third battalion in reserve. The Provisional Battalion was to hold Cervantes, block the movement of Japanese reinforcements to Bessang Pass, and revert to a reserve role when the 121st Infantry reached Cervantes. (Map 23)
    About 2,000 yards east of Butac Route 4 swings northward, uphill, in the beginning of an irregularly shaped horseshoe bend, open on the south. The distance across the open end of this horseshoe is approximately two miles. Dominating the center of the horseshoe is Lamagan Ridge, rising from a height of about 1,000 feet at the southwestern corner of the horseshoe to more than 5,000 feet at the center--a rise of almost 4,500 feet in less than one mile. Along the west side of Route 4 at the eastern arm of the horseshoe is Yubo Ridge, the northern nose of which, crossed by Route 4, was known to the USAFIP(NL) as Baracbac Point. Ascending southward, Yubo Ridge gives way to Lower Cadsu Ridge, which in turn leads to an east-west ridge line, rising to over 6,000 feet, known as Upper Cadsu Ridge.
    --549--
    [​IMG]
    Map 23
    The Fight for Bessang Pass
    U.S. Army Forces in the Philippines
    North Luzon
    29 March-22 May 1945 East across Route 4 from Yubo and Lower Cadsu Ridges is Langiatan Hill, an extremely steep-sided terrain feature that reaches a height of over 4,000 feet. Langiatan Hill gives way on the east to Magun Hill, some 4,500 feet high. Bessang Pass, proper, the rock cut, lies at a southeastern nose of Langiatan Hill. South of the pass the terrain rises within two miles to a peak of 6,830 feet known as Mt. Namogoian.
    In a week of seesaw battling after 29 March the 121st Infantry gained footholds along the northern sections of Lamagan and Yubo Ridges. Meanwhile the Provisional Battalion, now reinforced by Company G of the 121st, attempted with little success to strike from the northeast against the rear of Japanese positions at Bessang Pass. Unable to hold Cervantes or Route 4 west of the town, the Provisional Battalion failed to prevent Japanese reinforcements from reaching the pass. By the end of the first week in April, the Provisional Battalion had taken up new positions northeast of Magun Hill and temporarily was out of the fighting.
    The 121st Infantry, on the west side of Bessang Pass, continued to make slow and painful progress and by mid-April controlled Route 4 almost to the southeastern corner of the horseshoe. The regiment had cleared Yubo and Lower Cadsu Ridges and had gained footholds on the western slopes of Upper Cadsu and the southern portion of Langiatan Hill. The Japanese (the 73d Infantry, 19th Division, and remnants of the 357th IIB) still held some of Lamagan Ridge, in the center of the horseshoe, as well as most of Upper Cadsu Ridge and Langiatan Hill. On 21 April the 121st Infantry overran the last Japanese positions on Lamagan Ridge and about a week later completed the occupation of Lower Cadsu.
    --550--
    [​IMG]
    UPPER AND LOWER CADSU RIDGES At the end of April the newly formed 1st Field Artillery Battalion, USAFIP(NL), arrived along Route 4 to reinforce the 121st Infantry, bringing up 2 Japanese 105-mm. howitzers, 2 Japanese 75-mm. guns, and 4 American 75-mm. pack howitzers. The new support was doubly welcome. The 2 Japanese 70-mm. guns the 121st Infantry had started out with had been lost during a Japanese counterattack, and adverse weather conditions were beginning to curtail air support operations drastically. With the new artillery support, the 121st Infantry anticipated more rapid progress.
    The 19th Division Counterattacks

    Contrary to expectations, during the first part of May the 121st Infantry literally inched forward over precipitous terrain against Japanese defenses that daily became stronger as the 19th Division brought more reinforcements forward, expending lives to gain time. By mid-May the lines of the 3d Battalion, 121st Infantry, facing north and northeast, extended from Route 4 at Yubo Ridge east and southeast across much of Langiatan Hill, The 2d Battalion, reduced to two companies by the attachment of Company F to the Provisional Battalion, held along Route 4 from Baracbac Point on Yubo Ridge southeast almost a mile and a quarter to the southeastern corner of the horseshoe. The 1st Battalion held a line stretching southeast from this corner of the horseshoe for three-quarters of a mile, ending along the eastern section of Upper Cadsu Ridge. Considering their limited fire power and strength, all three battalions were badly overextended. The Provisional Battalion, out of contact with the 121st Infantry, still occupied positions north of Route 4 and Magun Hill.
    At this juncture the USAFIP(NL) lost almost every significant piece of ground it had secured since 29 March. On 17 May the 73d Infantry, 19th Division, behind new artillery support, instituted a series of strong counterattacks all across the Bessang Pass front, the main weight of the effort hitting the 1st and 2d Battalions, 121st Infantry. The 73d pushed both battalions back across Lamagan Ridge and completely dispersed the 1st Battalion, which, for a few days at least, just disappeared. Some troops of the 3d Battalion also retreated from Langiatan Hill, but elements of that unit, cut off, succeeded in holding on to rough terrain along the eastern slopes. The Japanese also struck the Provisional Battalion, forcing it farther north.
    Meanwhile, a 600-man battalion of the 76th Infantry, 19th Division, bypassing Bessang Pass far to the south, had begun moving toward Route 4 at barrio Butac, almost two miles behind the 121st Infantry's front. When the 76th Infantry battalion neared its objective, just before the 73d began its counterattack
    --551--
    [​IMG]
    105-MM. HOWITZER FIRING AT EXTREME ELEVATION in Bessang Pass area. at Bessang Pass, there were few troops of the USAFIP(NL) at Butac,[SIZE=-1]17[/SIZE] but for reasons unknown the Japanese battalion milled around in the rough terrain south of Butac for two or three days before attempting to mount an attack on the barrio. By that time the USAFIP(NL) had a strong garrison at Butac, Volckmann having brought the 2d Battalion of the 15th Infantry south to Route 4. This USAFIP(NL) battalion immediately moved against the Japanese unit, which thereupon withdrew, having accomplished nothing.
    Volckmann now sent the entire 15th Infantry into a new offensive eastward, the 121st Infantry reverting to a reserve role and reorganizing. By the end of May the 15th Infantry had resecured the south flank from Butac to Lamagan Ridge. Bypassing pockets of Japanese on Lamagan Ridge, the regiment next started a drive against Japanese forces holding Upper and Lower Cadsu Ridges. Before the month ended the 1st and 2d Battalions, 121st Infantry, had also reentered the fight and had begun to clean off Lamagan Ridge. The 3d Battalion, meanwhile, had regained some of the positions it had lost on Langiatan Hill and, this time attacking from the east, had retaken a foothold on Yubo Ridge.
    --552--
    Order had begun to emerge out of near chaos, and Colonel Volckmann had begun planning for a new, stronger attack against 19th Division forces at Bessang Pass.
    Preparations for a New Attack

    On 1 June, with operations on the Bambang and Baguio fronts entering the pursuit stage, General Krueger turned operational control of the USAFIP(NL) over to I Corps so that General Swift could more effectively co-ordinate the efforts of all forces in northern Luzon. Simultaneously, Krueger directed Swift to provide USAFIP(NL) with the assistance necessary to assure the early capture of Cervantes, and ordered Swift to return the 66th Infantry, USAFIP(NL), to Volckmann's control from attachment to the 33d Division. I Corps, in turn, directed the 33d Division to send north to Route 4 and Bessang Pass the 122d Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm. howitzers) and the 1st Battalion, 123d Infantry. Swift then instructed Volckmann to mount an immediate all-out offensive toward Cervantes.[SIZE=-1]18[/SIZE]
    Volckmann set up an attack with three regiments abreast. The 121st Infantry would clear Route 4 around the horseshoe and secure the northern half of Lamagan Ridge. The 15th Infantry, striking east over the southern half of Lamagan Ridge, would drive on to seize Upper Cadsu Ridge and then advance generally northeast along the south side of Route 4. The 66th Infantry would first deal with the remnants of the 76th Infantry's battalion south and southeast of Butac and then swing eastward on the 15th Infantry's right. The Provisional Battalion--now commanded by Capt. Herbert Swick[SIZE=-1]19[/SIZE] and consisting of three companies of the 11th Infantry as well as one each from the 66th and 121st Regiments--was to clear Magun Hill and adjacent dominating terrain. The 1st Battalion, 123d Infantry, would remain at Butac as USAFIP(NL) reserve, would protect the 122d Field Artillery, and would furnish an 81-mm. mortar platoon to support the guerrilla attack. The 122d Field Artillery, with the 1st Field Artillery, USAFIP(NL), attached, would provide direct and general support.[SIZE=-1]20[/SIZE]
    As of 1 June the 121st Infantry, USAFIP(NL), was still not in good shape. Since 15 May the regiment had lost about 150 men killed and 315 wounded, losses quite harrowing to a guerrilla unit. It had not yet completed its reorganization after the Japanese counterattack; part of its 3d Battalion was still out of contact between Langiatan and Magun Hills; one of its rifle companies was attached to the Provisional Battalion. To bring the regiment up to strength, Volckmann attached to it two companies from the 14th Infantry and three from the Military Police Battalion, USAFIP(NL). The 15th and
    --553--
    [​IMG]
    BESSANG PASS. Langiatan Hill is at left. 66th Regiments, although both suffered from the "disease" of attachments and detachments, were about up to strength. The 1st Field Artillery had lost the two Japanese 105-mm. howitzers and the two 75-mm. guns during the Japanese counterattack, but had saved the four American 75-mm. pack howitzers. Since the USAFIP(NL) lacked the heavy weapons organic to American units, it sorely needed the artillery and mortar support the 33d Division provided.
    The Japanese at Bessang Pass on 1 June were in worse shape than the USAFIP(NL).[SIZE=-1]21[/SIZE] By that date only 2,250 Japanese were left in the region--1,100 of the 73d Infantry, 450 of the 76th Infantry, and the rest artillery and service troops. Japanese supplies were virtually exhausted and troops were rapidly dying from malaria, beriberi, and other diseases. Small arms ammunition was almost gone, and the artillery, although still possessing numerous weapons, was reduced to firing a few rounds each evening. The counterattack that had begun on 17 May had represented the last major effort--either defensive or offensive--of which the Japanese at Bessang Pass were capable. No reinforcements were available, for the rest of the 19th Division had orders to hold Mankayan, the Lepanto Mine, and the road junctions at KP 90, Sabangan, and Bontoc.
    Breakthrough to Cervantes

    During the period 1-5 June the 15th and 121st Infantry Regiments had little
    --554--
    [​IMG]
    Map 24
    Through Bessang Pass to Cervantes
    U.S. Army Forces in the Philippines
    North Luzon
    1-15 June 1945 trouble clearing all Lamagan Ridge and Lower Cadsu Ridge.[SIZE=-1]22[/SIZE] The 15th then turned against Upper Cadsu while the 121st struck directly toward Bessang Pass. On 12 June, after a week of bitter fighting, the 15th Infantry overran the last organized resistance on Upper Cadsu Ridge. Meanwhile, the 66th Infantry, coming in over trackless terrain south of Route 4 and chasing Japanese remnants before it, had reached the southwestern corner of Upper Cadsu. The Provisional Battalion, after a series of minor setbacks, succeeded in clearing much of Magun Hill by 10 June. (Map 24)
    On the 10th the 121st Infantry launched a final attack toward Bessang Pass, striking from the west and southwest, and the next day the Provisional Battalion began driving in from the north and northeast. Behind exceptionally close artillery support--the 122d Field Artillery placed concentrations as close as fifty yards in front of the guerrillas--the 121st Infantry overran the last organized defenses at Bessang Pass on 14 June and made contact east of the pass with the Provisional Battalion. On the same day the last opposition melted away before the 15th and 66th Regiments, south of the pass.
    Japanese remnants fled east along Route 4 toward Cervantes, pursued by elements of the 15th and 121st Infantry Regiments. Before dark on 15 June the 15th Infantry had secured the town, and on the next day the 66th Infantry put the finishing touches on the battle by setting up a roadblock across Route 393 about two and a half miles south of Cervantes.
    The last phase of the drive through Bessang Pass to Cervantes, covering 1-15
    --555--
    June, had cost the USAFIP(NL) approximately 120 men killed and 220 wounded, divided as follows: Unit Killed Wounded Total 121st Infantry 73 139 212 15th Infantry 28 71 99 66th Infantry 3 2 5 Provisional Battalion 4 1 5 1st Battalion, 123d Infantry 1 1 2 1st Field Artillery Battalion 9 4 13 122d Field Artillery Battalion 1 2 3 Total 119 220 339
    The USAFIP(NL) estimated that it killed some 2,600 Japanese in the same period. This figure, however, seems exaggerated in light of the fact that the Japanese had no more than 2,250 men in the Bessang Pass-Cervantes area as of 1 June and that some of these, according to the USAFIP(NL)'s own report, escaped toward Mankayan and Bontoc.
    Results of USAFIP(NL) Operations

    Though by 15 June the USAFIP(NL) had not reached Bontoc--the objective Krueger had assigned it on 23 March--the "division" had accomplished the mission I Corps had given it on 1 June. The success of the final attack can be attributed almost entirely to the great strength Volckmann was at last able to bring to bear. From late March until 1 June a boy--the 121st Infantry--had been trying to do a man's job. Only that regiment's spirit and the inability of the Japanese to follow up an advantage had saved the 121st Infantry from far greater disaster than the retreat that began on 17 May.
    The USAFIP(NL) had, indeed, made a substantial contribution toward the Sixth Army's campaign in northern Luzon. Even before the Sixth Army's offensives on the Baguio and Bambang fronts had begun late in February, the activities of the USAFIP(NL) had helped prompt General Yamashita to redeploy the 19th Division deep into northern Luzon. After the 121st Infantry had begun its attack toward Cervantes late in March, the USAFIP(NL) had kept the 19th Division pinned to the triangle formed by Bontoc, KP 90, and Bessang Pass. There can be no question that Yamashita could have employed the 19th Division to better profit elsewhere, and there can be no doubt that he would have done so had not Volckmann's forces been operating in northern Luzon.
    But the story of the USAFIP(NL)'s contributions does not end here. Taking upon itself the task of seizing San Fernando and clearing Route 3 up the west coast, the USAFIP(NL) had permitted the Sixth Army to forget about plans to use a "regular" division along that coast, thereby allowing Krueger to assign a division to more decisive operations elsewhere. Finally, the USAFIP(NL) had been directly or indirectly responsible for the death of nearly 10,000 Japanese in northwestern Luzon between 9 January and 15 June.[SIZE=-1]23[/SIZE] The USAFIP(NL)'s accomplishments had cost the guerrilla unit roughly 3,375 casualties: over 900 men killed, 2,360 wounded, and no missing.[SIZE=-1]24[/SIZE]
    In the end, as in the beginning, it must be noted that the USAFIP(NL) accomplished
    --556--
    far more than GHQ SWPA, Sixth Army, or I Corps had apparently expected or hoped. The USAFIP(NL)'s battles were not over. The "division" was next to drive south and east from Cervantes, joining the rest of I Corps in pursuit of Shobu Group forces that were retreating ever farther into the mountain fastnesses of northern Luzon. USAFIP(NL) and I Corps were laying plans for further advances even as the 15th Infantry moved into Cervantes. Indeed, the bulk of I Corps had already become involved in pursuit operations.
    --557-- Table of Contents ** Previous Chapter (27) * Next Chapter (29)
    Footnotes

    1. Additional background material on the decision to send the USAFIP(NL) toward Bontoc is to be found in Chapter XXIV, above.
    2. Bessang Pass is actually a redundancy, since in the local Filipino dialect a "bessang" is itself a cut or pass.
    3. Route 393 is a wartime designation, and the road has no official numerical designation in the Philippine highway system.
    4. The mine, of extreme antiquity, was worked long before the Spanish came to the Philippines. In April 1957, when the author was at the mine, trucks no longer used Route 393 to Route 4, but instead took Route 393 to KP 90, followed Route 11 to Baguio, and then Routes 9 and 3 to San Fernando, La Union.
    5. Information on the USAFIP(NL) in this subsection is based mainly on: USAFIP(NL) Rpt, pp. 2, 12, 30-31, 38, 41-45, 62-65.
    6. A Signal Corps officer who, stationed in northern Luzon at the outbreak of war, "failed" to surrender.
    7. Another unsurrendered officer.
    8. See above, ch. XXV.
    9. Japanese information in this chapter is based on: 14th Area Army Opns on Luzon, pp. 89-94, 99-108, 114-17, 128; 14th Area Army Opns Orders Nos. A-487 and A-517, 3 and 13 Feb 45, Trans, III, item 3: 14th Area Army Tr Org List; Interrog of Col Setomu Terau (CofS 19th Div), USAFIP(NL) Rpt, pp. 148-50; USAFIP(NL) Rpt, pp. 19-21, 40-41, 61 ff.; Sixth Army G-2 Wkly Rpt 86, 2 May 45; SWPA Hist Series, II, 421, 470-71, 489; ibid., II, Maps following pp. 419, 468, and 485.
    10. See Morton, Fall of the Philippines, pp. 106-08.
    11. See above, ch. III.
    12. As originally constituted, Araki Force was composed of the 176th IIB, the 178th IIB less two infantry companies and a machine gun company, the 26th Machine Gun Battalion less one company, 79th Brigade headquarters, and brigade service troops. Later, organizing various service troops and antiaircraft units in northwestern Luzon, Araki Force added two provisional infantry battalions and two machine cannon (20-mm. or 40-mm.) companies.
    13. This section is based mainly on the USAFIP(NL) Report, pages 40-57.
    14. USAFIP(NL) G-3 Opns Rpts 21 and 22. The 15th Infantry claimed killing about 4,300 Japanese, while the USAFIP(NL) Report, page 56, provides a figure of 6,406 Japanese killed in northwestern Luzon to the end of the first week of June. Both guerrilla figures are undoubtedly exaggerated, but it seems logical to assume that certainly no more than 2,000 Japanese, including Araki's group of 1,500 that went to Bontoc, actually made their way from northwestern Luzon to rejoin other Japanese forces.
    15. The remainder of this chapter is based largely upon two MSS prepared by Maj. Billy C. Mossman, AUS, at OCMH during the summer of 1954: Volckmann's Guerrillas (20 pp.), and Volckmann's Provisional Battalion (5 pp.), both in OCMH files. The sources used by Major Mossman include: USAFIP(NL) Rpt, pp. 29-31, 58-82; USAFIP(NL) G-3 Opns Rpts, 6 Jan-15 Jun 45; USAFIP(NL) FO's 1-29, dated between 4 Jan and 14 Jun 45; USAFIP(NL) G-2 Per Rpts, 24 Apr-16 Jun 45; Terau Interrog, USAFIP(NL) Rpt, pp. 146-50. Additional sources from the Japanese side employed by the present author have been cited previously. Also checked was Col. Russell W. Volckmann, We Remained: Three Years Behind the Enemy Lines in the Philippines (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1954), pp. 208-12.
    16. Sixth Army FO 58, 23 Mar 45, Sixth Army Rpt Luzon, I, 162.
    17. As far as can be ascertained from available records, a Military Police company and a few Quartermaster troops comprised the USAFIP(NL) garrison at Butac on 17 May.
    18. Sixth Army FO's 62 and 63, 24 and 28 May 45, Sixth Army Rpt Luzon, I, 164-65; I Corps FO 18, 29 May 45. The portions of these orders relevant to the USAFIP(NL) became effective on 1 June.
    19. At the outbreak of war Swick was a civilian gold mining engineer in northern Luzon. Rather than be interned by the Japanese he had hidden out in the mountains and had joined the guerrillas in October 1942. Captured and interned as a civilian early in 1943, Swick had broken out of camp with USAFIP(NL) help in April 1943. Volckmann, We Remained, pp. 79, 112, 148.
    20. USAFIP(NL) FO 27, 30 May 45; 122d FA Bn Rpt Luzon, p. 9.
    21. Additional information on the Japanese is from: An. 1, Intel, to USAFIP(NL) FO 27; 122d FA Bn Rpt Luzon, pp. 11-12.
    22. Additional information for this subsection comes from 122d FA Bn Rpt Luzon, pp. 12-16.
    23. This figure is based upon a study of all relevant Japanese, U.S. Army, and USAFIP(NL) sources available. The USAFIP(NL) claimed 19,700 Japanese killed, including those killed by units operating under 43d and 33d Division control on the Baguio front.
    24. These figures include losses of 66th and 121st Infantry units operating under 43d and 33d Division control on the Baguio front.
     
  10. Falcon Jun

    Falcon Jun Ace

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    Though not a guerilla leader, Ms. Adelaida showed that she had more than enough courage to be a guerilla. This is from the site bambanense.com/adelaida.html




    BEYOND COURAGE: The Story of Adelaida Villareyes of Bruce Guerilla of Bamban
    [​IMG]
    by Rhonie Dela Cruz
    In Bamban, the tale of a woman named Adelaida Villareyes stood in the annals of the history of resistance. A native of the town, Daling, as she was used to know, was a an epitome of sweet but a true freedom fighter, hardened in battles but soft in compassion.
    Daling was one of the original members of Bamban guerilla outfit, the 101st Squadron under the command of Captain Alfred D. Bruce, which was under the umbrella of then Lt. Col. Claude A. Thorpe’s Luzon Guerilla Force (LGF) operating in the mountainous boundary of Pampanga, Tarlac, and Zambales. At the tender age of twenty three, she was already associated with the Bruce Guerilla. Captain Bruce’ staff in Bamban were Lt. James H. Hart, Eugene P. Zinghiem, Daling, Fortunato V. Anunciacion, Serafin N. Punsalan, and Melencio R. Wage. Daling became the supply officer of the unit, a task that was as dangerous as carrying rifles, bullets, and grenades.
    The story of resistance in Bamban started already as the Japanese reconnaissance troops in bicycle entered Bamban on the early hours of New Year in 1942, which were annihilated in a heroic encounter with the Filipino soldiers of the 21st Division, Philippine Army. By February 1942, the Japanese Kempei-tai in Bamban conducted punitive actions against the local guerillas with the killing by firing squad of four men at the back of the municipal hall in the presence of more than 150 residents of the town.
    By 1943, the hunt for the local guerillas and their American leaders became an obsession of the Japanese Kempei-tai. Daling, in a baptism of fire, encountered her most terrifying test of courage when on the early 5 o’clock morning of September 1943 she was in Sitio Tapuak, Sacobia, Bamban with Captain Bruce, Lt. James H. Hart, Eugene P. Zinghiem, and 2nd Lt. Jose Raagas. In their small nipa hut hideout in the Tapuak hills, the Japanese Kempei-tai consists of twenty Japanese soldiers, ten Constabulary men, and four local spies swept in a lighting raid against the rainy and foggy morning. Her testimony narrated, “ I was supply officer and I was nursing them (Bruce and staff). That morning, we were sleeping soundly and we had a little dog named Daisy. This dog started making noise inside the mosquito net and we all woke up. Then, we heard the noise of so many people coming and they opened fire so we finally dropped to the ground to get away because the place was surrounded by Japanese, constabulary men and spies.” In the ensuing fight, Lt. James Hart was killed while trying to shoot as many Japanese as he could.
    Eugene P. Zinghiem, an American civilian personnel who was sick with malaria, was captured. Captain Bruce and 2nd Lt. Raagas escaped and ran away to the top of the hill. “They grabbed me and took me where Zinghiem was and tied me. He was tied up when I got there like I was, hands behind back.”
    From Tapuak Hills, although wounded, she was forced to walk to the Central Luzon Milling Company in Bamban, which was the Kempei-tai headquarters. At the sugar central, Daling saw the torture and murder of other captured guerillas of Bamban. She was interrogated and as any captured guerilla, tortured so as to get information on the whereabouts of the Americans and Filipino guerillas. Femininity did not render the guerilla fighter to reveal the location of her comrades in their mountain hideout. The next day, she was taken to Camp O’Donnell in Capas for more interrogations and sent back to Bamban. The torture continues for the next six days in Bamban. “I saw guerillas being tortured everyday just to make them tell if they knew more guerillas and whatever they wanted to find out. I saw them, and the Japanese dipped them into the swimming pool there, and they sat on their stomachs.”
    She was later taken to Magalang prison camp. At the Magalang prison, she suffered breakdown, hunger, and torture but not her indomitable spirit. She endured a captivity of more than three months, starting from September 3 to December 7, 1943. After her released, she went back into Captain Bruce’ guerilla lair in the Bamban mountains, keeping a hand on the wounded guerillas, nursing them in battles and in their camp, getting supplies from the locals, and running away with them.
    Bruce Guerilla played a major part in the local intelligence of Gen. MacArthur’s South West Pacific Area command and later in the liberation and the Bamban-Stotsenburg campaign in 1945. Daling survived the war with the rank of captain, serial number 0-45323, and the number five in the official rooster of the Bamban Battalion - Bruce Guerilla, Tarlac South Military District. She was the only woman among the local freedom fighters (Bruce Guerilla) of the Second World War. About five years ago, she died, leaving an unknown legacy of her fighting spirit for freedom and resistance against foreign aggression in our local history.
    Note:
    Sources:
    - Record of the Supreme Court, Case No. G.R. L-880, December 17, 1947.
    - Report No. 139, General Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific War Crimes Branch, “The Murder and Torture of Filipino Civilians by Members of the Japanese Military Police at Bamban, Tarlac, Luzon, P.I., in February 1942 and in October and December 1944.”
    - Rooster of Bamban Battalion, Bruce Guerilla, Luzon Guerrilla Force, South Tarlac Military District as provided by the office of the Veterans Federation of the Philippines, Bamban Chapter.
    - Various interviews conducted on surviving members of the Bruce Guerilla, in Bamban, Tarlac.
    - Official documents of Macario W. Dela Cruz, 101st Squadron (Bamban Battalion), Bruce Guerilla.
     
  11. John Odom

    John Odom Member

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    Thanks for that massive post! It will take a while to read and digest!

    In scanning it I see some familliar names.
     
  12. Falcon Jun

    Falcon Jun Ace

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    Well, if you have more info, share it here. What little there is scattered all over and I think it's high time that people exchange info about what they know and learned so that more people can have the chance to find out out about this oft neglected part of the Pacific theater.
     
  13. Falcon Jun

    Falcon Jun Ace

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    INQUIRER NORTHERN LUZON
    Heroism of N. Luzon bolomen retold
    By Cristina Arzadon
    Northern Luzon Bureau
    First Posted 06:59am (Mla time) 04/25/2007
    MANILA, Philippines -- Stories of heroism by Filipino guerrillas and American forces during the Japanese invasion of the Philippines in World War II have been locked inside a monument built in honor of the men and women who fought to liberate the country from Japanese atrocities.
    Crowned with an anchor, the marble stone and pebble marker was unveiled on April 21 in a seaside ceremony in Pagudpud, Ilocos Norte. The event was attended by war veterans both from the Philippines and the United States.
    The ceremony also marked the return of the original bolo that Filipino guerrillas used and had found its way to the US after the USS Stingray submarine unloaded assorted weapons for the locals on Aug. 27, 1944. The bolo was said to have been traded by a local to a submarine crew while the war materiel were being unloaded offshore.
    Veteran Ramon Miranda and two surviving bolomen received the weapon from Stingray crewman Basil Wentworth. In return, the Filipinos handed over a Thompson submachine gun, which was part of the weapons that the Americans brought to the country.
    The monument was built on the site in Caunayan Bay in Pagudpud where the Stingray beached 63 years ago and unloaded arms and ordnance that Filipino guerrillas used in fighting the Japanese forces in Northern Luzon.
    Collaborative project
    The Stingray marker was a seven-year collaborative project among Pol Bautista, Lucky Guillermo and Peter Parsons—all scions of war veterans.
    Its crown symbolizes the anchor that the submarine dropped off the waters as it left the Pagudpud Bay so that it would not be detected by patrolling Japanese troops.
    The late Gov. Roque Ablan Sr., an Ilocano war hero, was known to have led a ragtag troop of guerrillas, locally known as bolomen, against the Japanese Imperial Army. They earned the name because they fought the invaders with bolos and sharp bamboo lances that they normally used in tending their farms.
    Ablan’s son, Rep. Roque Ablan Jr., has promised to work on declaring the marker’s site a national shrine for Filipino war veterans.
    Dr. Ricardo Jose of the University of the Philippines’ history department said the Stingray was one of 21 US submarines on special missions to the country to provide arms and war equipment to the resistance movement across the archipelago.
    “The landing of the submarine was very, very dangerous. It (Stingray) landed here very early in the morning in Japanese-controlled water,” Jose said.
    “There were Japanese ships coming by every now and then and the Stingray was caught between the open sea and the shore by Japanese ships. It was not able to lift its anchor [after dropping it] because it would cause too much noise.”
    The anchor still lies offshore in Caunayan, Jose said. “Local fishermen found it,” he said.
    The submarine, however, succeeded in unloading six tons of armaments. On board along with US forces were 15 specially trained commandos led by Lt. Jose Valera, who were sent to help local troops.
    “These [armaments] had to be brought from the submarine by raft or by boat. Once they were ashore, they had to be brought into the mountains where the other guerrillas would receive and use [these] to fight the Japanese,” Jose said.
    The bolomen were the key in transporting the materiel from the shore to the mountains undetected, he said.
    Aside from land mines, bazooka, Carbine rifles and bullets, the Americans also brought the latest Life magazine either to counter the Japanese propaganda or to indicate the date of the latest landings, Jose said.
    “Other materials included communion wafers, Mass wines, and pamphlets just to boost the morale of Filipinos,” he said.
    Most dangerous
    According to Jose, Pagudpud was considered the farthest and most dangerous landing that the 21 submarines made across the Philippines.
    Unlike the other landing sites in the Visayas and Mindanao, Northern Luzon was risky because it was next to Taiwan, a strongly guarded Japanese territory, he said. “Most of the Japanese convoys would be sailing from Taiwan to Luzon and these straits were infested by Japanese ships,” he said.
    The war exploits of Filipino guerrillas in Northern Luzon are stories that have not been fully told.
    “With the memorial, we will be recognizing the submariners, the Filipino guerrillas and the landing forces for the role they played in liberating the country,” Jose said.
     
  14. Falcon Jun

    Falcon Jun Ace

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    here's another guy I found.

    Leovigildo “Leo” Miguel Giron
    ** born 8/20/1911 Bayambang Pangasinan Phil worked for: 2nd Filipino Inf Regt, 978th Signal Group, Allied Intelligence Bureau (secret operative) Sgt. Awards: Bronze Star Medal, Philippine Liberation Ribbon, Asiatic Pacific Campaign Medal, American Campaign Medal, WWII Victory Medal; post war occupation Martial Artist founded the Bahala Na Martial Arts Association

    The one below is from the website Guro Dan Inosanto

    Jungle Warfare was Giron’s proving ground. He walked as the point man in World War II guerrilla warfare in the Philippines. As lead man in a Triangular formation of guerrilla soldiers patrolling through the brush, he encountered the enemy first, disabled him (or them) and kept walking, leaving his men in the rear to finish the job. Giron was born in Bayambang, in the Philippine province of Pangasinan. World War II took away one of his instructors, but it gave him others, men who depended on Escrima to stay alive. Guerrilla units in the Philippines were made up mainly of Filipinos, issued leaf-shaped bolo knives for their jungle fighting. When Giron was first assigned to a unit one of the men, an Escrimador, was appointed his bodyguard until he could take care of himself. Giron recalls one of his training sessions with the sergeant, following a near fatal incident in a Japanese ambush.
    "When he saw I saw nervous he said, ’Take your knife and we’ll do some training. Don’t worry about hurting me because I’ve been fighting for a long time. Cut me anytime you can. If you touch me, you’ll get a month’s pay.’ That was the way you learned in the old days." Today, Giron talks about the old days in a more guarded way than many of his contemporaries. All the stick fighting styles are good in different situations, he says, but when it comes down to saving your life - keep it simple.
    An example of simplifying the art is "Cinco Teros," or what Giron calls the five cardinal blows. Patterned around the four areas divided by an "X" with a dot in the center for the thrusts, Cinco Teros is designated for strikes to the large fleshy areas of the body, not directly protected by bones.
    He’s primarily a "Largo Mano," or long range fighter, using the reach of his 30-inch stick or blade to hold his opponent at bay. He supplements the characteristic Largo Mano movements with what some would recognize as different styles and others would call tactics.
    One such is "Abierta," or open style, where the fighter dances about and evades his opponent’s strikes without blocking. Another is "Riterada" or retreating style, designed for wary encounters where the fighter has time and room to keep backing away in order to study his opponent’s movements. "Fondo Fuerte" or the non-retreating style is the opposite tactic used when the fighter is forced to take a stand. Fondo fuerte may have been a tactic Giron used in the jungles when closed off by the terrain or rushed for time with more of the enemy closing in. Probably the most unique is "Lastico," or what Giron describes as the rubber band style. It’s characterized by a forward sway and backward snap that accompanies each strike. Lastico is a method he used often during the war since it gives the fighter the ability to strike out between intertwined branches and snap back again for protection.
    Much of the training Giron describes gives special consideration to terrain. Environmental training is an integral part of Giro’s training regiment. In simulated combat, training in the environment Giron describes can be fun, but in real life a knowledge of such common situations could easily mean the difference between life or death. That Giron is still alive is strong testimony to the effectiveness of his fighting tactics in such terrain.




     
  15. Falcon Jun

    Falcon Jun Ace

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    Here's something I found on the Bolo men of Northern Luzon.
    Bolomen

    From the Time Magazine archive

    Three Who Came Through

    Monday, Feb. 28, 1955




    BLACKBURN'S HEADHUNTERS, by Philip Harkins (326 pp.; Norton; $3.75). Except for a coast watcher or two who greeted returning U.S. forces at Leyte near war's end, Americans know practically nothing of the men who led Philippine guerrillas in World War II. Rather than surrender with U.S. forces at Bataan in 1942, these U.S. soldiers fled to the jungle and carried on as best they could. Blackburn's Headhunters is the exciting true story of Lieut. Donald Blackburn, one of the handful of Americans to fight through on Luzon to the triumphant end. He survived by dodging north from Manila to hide out among the mountain Igorots, who used to be headhunters and were still not entirely reformed when Blackburn met up with them (other tribes in the vicinity were said to drink the blood and eat the hearts and livers of their enemies). One day when his superstitious, G-strung auxiliaries thought a red bird had flown into his jungle headquarters, Blackburn stood by anxiously as witch doctors studied the spleens of sacrificed chickens to see whether a new, unhexed camp would have to be pitched. When MacArthur finally returned, Blackburn's Bolomen mopped up the Japanese diehards who had fled to the mountains ("Every single bloody body [was left] without its head").
    Blackburn put his shoes on again and prepared to fly home (he is now a major in the Regular Army), but not before the natives gave him a rousing farewell party.
    Ever since, V-J day has been Aug. 14 to the rest of the world but to his friends among the Igorots it is Sept. 14—Donald Blackburn's birthday.
     
  16. John Odom

    John Odom Member

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    I just typed, and lost, a long (for me) post.) (This is the short version) about a trek through the then Mountain Province in Dec of 1947 when I was 11. We walked from Bontoc to Tegueguerao because a typhoon washed out the roads and stranded the bus. There was no way back to Baguio. We lived among and were totally dependent on the local tribes folk who were most hospitable. They were Bontoc, Ifugao and Kalinga mostly.

    Everywhere we went we were asked: "You Know Blackburn?"

    At Tegueguerao we got a plane ride on an ex ASAAF C-47 with hand brush painted out and over markings to PAL.

    Ween we walked out of the mountains in to the river valley we were menaced by Huks who wanted to kidnap us for ransom. We got regular reports about them. I think God guided us to persons who would not give us up to them. it is no fun looking down a HUk gunbarrel!
     
  17. Falcon Jun

    Falcon Jun Ace

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    Yes, those local northern tribesmen are very very friendly and helpful.
    I have similar story about them. Back in 1997 when my crew and I were trekking through that area to cover the story of the Benguet mummies, we never worried about where we were going to sleep at night. These tribesmen and their families opened their homes for us and allowed us to spend the night. All we had to do in exchange was tell stories and share our food. At the bus terminals in those small out of the way villages, one can leave their bags and other belongings and go traipsing off to explore. When one we returned a couple of hours later, our stuff were still there. There was only one local cop and when we interviewed him about the law and order situation, he said if there were anything stolen in the community, it was usually someone from the city who did it.
    Those guys are a very tight knit clan and very very reliable. One thing about them, their elders speak very good English and they told me that they learned it from American volunteers just before the onset of World War II. That's one reason why these tribesmen were very supportive of the US during the Japanese occupation.
     
  18. Falcon Jun

    Falcon Jun Ace

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    BALITANG BETERANO: PMA-HUNTERS RESCUE 2,146 AMERICAN POWs IN LOS BANOS

    LAS VEGAS, NEVADA,
    July 1, 2004 By Col.(Ret) Frank B. Quesada, Associate PMA ‘44, Former Senate Committee Secretary, Veterans and Military Pension - In February 23, l945, during the Liberation Campaign of the Philippines from the iron heels of the Japanese occupation forces, 2,146 emaciated and tortured Americans and allied prisoners-of-war were rescued by in a joint operation by the daring members of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) also known as the West Point in the Philippines, as wartime-members of the Hunters ROTC Guerrilla. Principal Role in the Assault
    The Hunters participated as the lead ground assault force in the liberation of Americans and allied prisoners-or-war detained by the Japanese in Los Banos (Laguna) Internee Camp, at the foot if mystic Mt. Makiling, some 60 miles from Manila, behind enemy lines.
    The assault rescue operations was a joint Filipino-American force composed of the U.S. composite force of the U.S. 11th Airborne Division, and the combined units of Filipino guerrillas led by the Hunters-ROTC (PMA) Guerrilla.
    The rest of the guerrilla forces were: the Marking’s Fil-American Troops, the Andersom’s USAFFE Bonn Military Area unit, the Pres. M. Quezon’s Own Guerrilla, the Fil-Chinese 48th Squadron unit, and the Filipino Communist “Hukbalahap” unit.
    They all set-aside their internecine conflicts and jealousies to fight just one common enemy – the abusive Japanese invaders.
    This liberation operation was described by military experts as one of the almost perfect assault-rescue ever attempted during wartime (in world War II) in the Philippines. It has become a model in the War College nd Staff Schools.
    Ovation Paid by Gen. C. Powell
    To quote Gen. Colin Powell, as former U.S. Joint Chief of Staff Commander, after learning about the notable rescue operation said:
    “I doubt that any airborne and guerrilla unit in the world will ever be able to rival the Los Banos raid. It is a textbook operation for all ages and all armies.”
    PMAyer’s Graduation in Battle
    Philippine Military Academy cadet Class ’44 literally graduated in the battlefield, so to speak. They fought in World War II in an unconventional and irregular warfare against an obdurate enemy who were veterans of the infamous China Campaign noted for their barbarity.
    The PMAyers, along with ROTC cadets stuck together and did not want to take defeat from an invading enemy, they – organized one of the most formidable guerrilla resistance movement in Luzon that defied the enemy manhunt from 1942 to 1945. It was originally led by cadet Miguel Ver (PMA’43), by Eleuterio Adevoso (PMA ’44), and Gustavo Ingle (PMA ’45). The rest were crack rifle platoons of the Reserve Officer Training School (ROTC) coming from different universities in Manila.
    These PMAyers were all sent to the United States Staff Schools, after the war before formally serving the Armed Forces of the Philippines post-World War II. Class ’44 was a noted Academy class that produced many Generals and Flag Officers. It was the most cohesive since their cadetship before the war (World War II) up to peacetime 1945 and thereafter.
    PMA Hunters ROTC Guerrilla
    In summer of 1942, they readily organized the Hunter-ROTC Guerrilla and took off for the hills of the vastness of Sierra Madre Mountain [ in Rizal Province], where they trained and learned the art of “beg-borrow and steal” irregular and un-coventional warfare - and “hit-and-run” raids against the enemy. They inflicted heavy damage and casualties upon the enemy occupation troops, but with minimum losses on their part. The Hunters were the most wanted by the Japanese Imperial occupation troops.
    Armed with outmoded 1903 bolt-action rifles, foraged ammunition and a handful of rice, and a prayer - they expertly routed the enemy in various ambuscades and at death-defying raids. They earned their place in the heroes’ hall of fame through honorable and active military service – as freedom founders.
    Established Second Front
    The most cohesive, PMA Class ’44, after the enemy vanquished the USAFFE in Bataan in April 9 and Corregidor in May 9, 1942 - situated themselves in strategic towns and provinces in the Philippines. And established small pockets of intelligence nets that supported the mobile combat units. They were the object of hot pursuit by the Japanese Military Police (Kempeu Tai), but resisted the enemy hamletting (dragnet zonings) by the enemy forces. Some of then were caught inside the enemy dragnets and suffered brutal torture and beatings. A few were executed.
    The first casualty was Cavalier Mike Ver, killed-in-action - in a skirmish against an overwhelming enemy force in July 4,1942 in the training camp at the Sierra Madre mountain. They were raided by the enemy, however, but were able to put up a respectable defense which nevertheless was overran n\by overwhelming number. Mike died in action, but after inflicting several casualties upon the surging enemy. He died a traditional PMA hero’s death with mortal wounds on his chest facing the enemy squarely.
    Cavalier Eleuterio “Terry” Adevoso, took ove command, and moved the guerrilleros to the inner jungles of the Sierras. He fielded several “mobile strike units” to hound the enemy to avenge Nike’s death. From 12 original Hunters in 1942, grew to 30,000 strong in 1945, and won recognition by the U.S. Army. Its record has been deposited in the U.S.Army Personnel Center In St. Louis Missouri, U.S.A. And they enjoyed same compensation and benefits like any member of the United States armed Force, with the exception of those whose names were deleted from the original roster, as a consequence of travesty of justice and unfairness by the AFWESPAC, that was in a great haste to leave the Philippines.
    Post War Careers
    Many Hunters eventually secured U.S citizenship by virtue of their honorable and active military service to Uncle Sam. While many of them remained as Filipinos to continue to serve the Armed Forces of the Philippines after completing various Command Staff Schooling in the United States Armed Forces.
    Class ’44 have produced several Generals and Flag Officers in Command. Some of them became successful professionals, while others became successful politicians. As of this juncture, out of the total class of 72, there are about half of them still around (2002) engaged in business and civilian careers. Some of their sons followed their profession and have also entered the PMA and are serving the armed services.
    The Academy Standard
    From 1942 to 1945, the Hunters scored heavily against the Japanese, which drove the enemy to counteract the guerrillas. Enemy established (hamletting zoning dragnets) of towns and villages by rounding up all male residents, imprisoned and tortured them to elicit names and rosters of suspected guerrillas caught in the area.. There were a handful of them caught and executed by the enemy to continue fighting.
    Guerrilla Casualties
    There were many Hunters caught in this “zona” [this author was one of them.] tortured days and nights. At least, dozen other guerrillas were punished by decapitation [beheaded] in Laguna, where the hamletting took place]. One of the casualties was a white priest [Fr. Francis V. Douglas, of New Zealand, suspected of having contacts with guerrillas. [See the book, Martyrdom of Fr. Douglas by Patricia Brooks. New Zealand]
    PMAyers in Paete, Laguna; Cavalier Benitez Roque, Daniel Adea and myself (associate) were all Class ‘44, and Cav. Luis Adea, Class 41. The first three above, were savagely beaten during incarceration, after 8 days in hell, were spared and released, but with broken ribs, broken spine. and wounded - were released, after enduring the worst “beast barracks” (excruciation) of savage agony by a brutal enemy guards. Previous hazing experience at the academy paid off - because they all were able to endure the torture. Many died, however, gloriously like a man with their lips sealed they saved their comrades. .
    No Where to Go But Fight
    After recuperating from the injuries, we all voluntarily went back to guerrilla duty with a vengeance - to fight for God and Country, freedom, justice and to go for broke, so to speak.
    The Hunters had a record of the most formidable resistance movement - owing to stern discipline and tactical training learned from the Academy, whose officers were mostly PMAyers who set the standard to all its members. It was the most feared guerrilla unit by the Japanese troops in the provinces of Southern Luzon. They ambushed the enemy many times and took no Japanese for prisoners. [See Terry’ Hunters book, by E. Adevoso ]
    There was a classic record by the Hunters who was able to capture a Japanese EM, that was successfuly brainwashed, who turned around and fought alongside the hunters. ( See; story, Japanese Guerrilla in the Philippines).
    Contact with MacArthur in Australia
    Sorties were organized to make contact with Gen. D. MacArthur in Australia to secure arms and logistics. Col. Frisco San Juan, also of Class ’44 successfully made contact with sea planetary missions of US submarine landings in Negros Island, of the famed Filipino ace, then Air Force Maj. Jesus Villamor, who landed in the Visayas, and Navy Cmdr. Chick Parsons, a former Manilan sent by NacArthr to infiltrate the Philippines the Hunters therefore received arms , amo and supplies from Australia via U.S submarines.
    The planetary parties took back with them valuable intelligence reports from the PMA-Hunters to Australia, and in return they- trips carried radio sets and supplies for the Hunters via US submarines.
    War Materiel in exchange for Intelligence
    Since then, by late 1943, the Hunters received fresh shipments of radio sets, arms and ammo at Infanta, Quezon and Polilio Islands. In return for these logistics - valuable intelligence were sent to Southwest Pacific Area Command of MacArthur. Maj Gen. Charles A. Willoughby was MacArthur’s G-2 relied heavily on the Hunter’s intel reports, which he said “shortened the liberation of the Philippines.”[See Willoughby’s book,” Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines, and Return to the Philippine
    The Los Banos Daring Raid
    The 8th U.S. Army [ XI Corps] commanded by Lt Gen. Robert Eichelberger landed in Nasugbu, Batangas together with the famed US 11th Airborne Division under Maj. Gen. Joseph M. Swing, in January 31, 1945. They were met by the Hunters Guerrilla Regiment of Cavaliers: Col. Juanito Ferrer, Class ’44 and assisted by Col. Eufracio Villanueva, also Class ‘ 44 at the shore of Nasugbu, Batangas with very little resistance from the enemy. Cavalier Adevoso headed the Hunter’s welcoming party – and immediately former a central guerrilla command together with Mja. Gen.Joseph M. Swing, CO of the famed U.S. 11th Airborne Division. They set up headquarters in Nasugbu, Batangas plotted the liberation of Manila from Batangas towards the southern jaw of Manila [ in Pasay, Rizal ]. They named the drive “Pony Express,” way - in a mad rush towards Manila to get there ahead of the U.S 6th Army that landed in Lingayen, Pangasinan. There was a quiet contest between the 11th Airborne and the 1st Cavalry - to capture the capital city.
    Guerrilla forces were integrated a into the U.S.liberation troops – which formed a massive assault force against the Japanese holed up in the mountains of Laguna, Batangas and Cavite.
    Pony Express to Manila
    The Hunters was the spearhead guerrilla unit that pushed from Tagaytay City which oushed towards Paranaque, Rizal under heavy artillery fire from the 15,000 naval forces of Admiral Furuse, who defied the order of Gen. Yamashita to abandon Manila. The rest of the enemy retreated towards the mountains of the Sierras in Rizal and Bulacan provinces, to form the Shimbu defense line. To fight to the last Bushido warrior.
    Fierce Fighting
    Fierce fighting ensured from Paranaque towards Nichol’s Field pinning down the 11th Airbonre and the Hunters. As a matter of fact, the 11th Airborne lost one of its top officers, Col. Himmelfening, in the drive towards Paranaque. Japanese banzai [suicide sorties] charges took tolls on U.S troops.
    So the Hunter’s provided the 11th AB Division headquarters staff of Maj. Gen. Swing - a crack company of well-trained Hunters - called “Gen. Swing’s Own Guard” [GSOG] to protect the General’s staff., led by PMAyer Class ’44, Col. Godofredo Carreon. Maj. Gen. J. W. Swing. CG of the US 11th AB had high respects for these Hunters whom he described in his letter to me, to wit: ‘Those were the finest men of yours that safeguarded me and the general staff. Thank them for me.”
    Lt. Gen. Joseph M. Swing retired as 6th Army Commander at the Presidio of San Francisco, and, in civilian life was appointed by his West Point classmate, President Eisenhower, as Commissioner of Immigrations and Naturalization Service, who was responsible for pushing my U.S. citizenship under the 1950 Act, upon my residence in the U.S. In no time, I was re-activated as a full Colonel, General Staff officer (Deputy Chief of Staff of the State Defense Force, U.S. Army National Guard Headquarters in Sacramento, /California
    American POWs Impending Massacre As the liberation forces neared Manila, Cav. Gustavo Ingles, PMA Class ’45 was ordered to penetrate inside enemy line to provide intelligence to the General Staff about the prisoners-of-war in Los Banos. I was also tasked to coordinate the various civilian intel-units in Los Banos, Laguna.
    We discovered that the enemy had standing orders to massacre all the 2,146 when the U.S forces reache Los Banos. The local quislings (Makapilis) spies were hotly after Ingles and myself in the foothills of the mystic Mount Makiling, in Los Banos where the 2,146 American and Allied prisoners-of-war were incarcerated. We n ever slept in a place twice to evade those spies who had a price for our heads, under orders from the Kempei Tai.
    Ingles was tasked by Adevoso as the overall coordinator of the Los Banos liberation operation representing the unified guerrilla participants. It was a very sensitive assignment because the lives of the 2,146 POWs were at great risk if we were discovered by the enemy.
    Precise intelligence was the utmost priority in order for the assault-rescue force to execute a masterful plan of rescue drawn by Gen. Swing’s general staff led by the then Col. H. “Butch” Mueller, G-2 and Col. Douglas Quandt. G-3. The whole plan was a product of the careful verification by POW escapees from Los Banos brought by Col. Ingles to the headquarters. The plan was validated by Hunter Col. Middy” Castillo, USNA, Annapolis Class ’35.
    The POWs were being maltreated by the enemy guards, and were in the edge of hell, being starved and maltreated owing to the surging liberation forces towards Los Banos. Col. Ingles and I had to work double-time to clear up all the gaps in the assault plan with the guerrillas and U.S 11th AB Scouts assigned with Col. Ingles – as overall coordinator of the raid.
    Time Reconnaissance
    The liberation of the 2,146 Americans and allied prisoners-of-warm incarcerated in Los Banos, Laguna, took priority action from Gen. MacArthur owing to the reported enemy order to massacre the POWs who were hoping against hope of emancipation.
    Both the 11th AB and the Hunters –PMA General staff urgently acted on our radio request for immediate action, by radio message from the guerrilla base of the PQOG [Pres. Quezon’s Own Guerrilla] led by a certain Col. R. Price, who later turned out to be [Col.. Romeo Espino] who would later be Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 30 years later under the Marcos regime.
    Strategic Assignment
    Much earlier, Adevoso plucked me out from the 45th Hunters Regiment Combat Force, to personally penetrate the Los Banos POW camp, inside enemy lines. Ingles and I both confirmed the enemy massacre order of the POWs at will by the Garrison Commander. Ingles urgently dispatched the information by radio to Adevoso and Gen. Swing in the joint general US-Guerrilla headquarters near Manila.
    Assault and Rescue Order Finally, the order of Joint General Staff came after elaborate preparations [ by Col. D. Quandt [G-3], USMA; and Col. Henry Muller [G-2], with Hunter Marcelo “Middy” Castillo Class’ 35 of USNA, Annapolis, who validated the operational plan. In turn, Col. Adevoso ordered execution thereof by the PMA-Hunters 45th Regiment to execute the assault rescue of Los Banos POWs initially February 23, l945. It was to be an air-se-an-land joint 11thAB-Hunters assault-rescue operation.
    Joint Assault-Rescue Operation The 11th AB contingent was ordered to support the guerrilla operation, along with a couple of American war correspondents[ Frank Smith, etc.] who witnessed the whole daring raid. They saw the finest hour of the PMA-Hunters and the U.S. scouts in action during the surprise assault-rescue operation. On D-Day, [Feb. 23, 1945] the Hunters 45th Regiment under command of Hunter Col. Honorio K. Guerrero was deployed around the POW camp. They were to wait for an airborne para-troop company to jump over the camp, as the signal of the overall assault, then later followed by the intrusion of the amphibian tanks of the 672nd Tank BN, that would evacuate the POWs to Muntinlupa, Rizal in amphibian tanks -and ferried across the Laguna de Bay.
    The Surprise Attack
    The attack was to be carried out at 07:00 HRS by the 23rd. Hunters’ combat forces were deployed around the POW camp the night of the 22nd, while other guerrilla units were to arrive Los Banos early morning of the 23rd abroad sailboats to join the attack. All entries and exit to Los Banos were sealed from any possible enemy break through. Civilian populations were requested to evacuate Los Banos shortly before the assault of the POW camp.
    The Final Hour
    The Hunters lay. on the ground motionless but wide awake awaiting for the drone of the C-47 airplane Squadron of Col. Anderson at dawn to disgorge the airborne troopers at the para-drop zone outside the POW camp. The February wind was annoyingly chilly, they hugged the ground for warmth, all of them prayed. There indeed were no atheists in the foxholes. We prayed for the POWs’ safety and for myself – about to see the face of the enemy in combat. However, we believed that God was on our side.
    The heavy morning mist lazily crawled through the barbed wire fence, blurred shadows of the enemy guards moved about inside the camp preparing for their daily assembly for the morning “radyo taisho” [callisthenics over the radio from Manila) ]. This was their daily routine which Ingles and I have discovered beforehand. We noted the guards stocked arms before callisthenics every morning when we observed them earlier. This was important cue to the planners (G-2 and G-3) to use such prime information. It was part of the surprise attack which totally caught the enemy guards totally off-guard during the lightning assault
    Morning of February 23rd
    By 06:40 HRS the sound of the planes drew nearer. The men aroused fully from their catnaps - and firmly positioned themselves near the fence facing the camp. The enemy, nevertheless, nonchalantly continued their routine without any idea what was going to happen to them. This daily routine was sharply noted by Col. Ingles earlier during his observation from the fringes of the POW camp, which he emphasized in the report to GHQ. It proved to be the key to the precise hour - as a surprise attack upon an insouciant enemy. It certainly paid off during the assault.
    Unexpected Episode
    At this juncture, early in the morning -an enemy guard chased a hedge-hog towards the fence. He fired at the hog narrowly and unwittingly missing the Hunters deployed behind the buses. Hunter Capt. Marcelino Tan mistook this incident as discovery by the enemy of his men, thus - ordered a return fire.
    At this juncture, all the Hunters around the camp reacted and hell broke loose. They simultaneously opened fire at their chosen targets. This unexpected incident started a premature assault. Rifles and machineguns barked without let up at the unaware guards that were mowed down without mercy. The Hunters breached the camp and “bolo” squads carrying razor-sharp machetes hacked the enemy. Surprise was our best weapon. It paid off handsomely in routine the guards that were felled by the initial volley of fire.
    Makeshift Enemy Defense Some of the guards, however, were able to recover from the first wave of attack, managed to put up a makeshift defense to no avail. There was a hand-to-hand skirmish which resulted to the death of two young Hunters [ Tana Castillo and Momong Soler]. These two young lads were my close friends in the combat force. I have trained them in the mobile combat force, prior to my new assignment as coordinating intelligence officer at Los Banos liberation. I knew them well for they have always been behind me in previous patrols upon taking the lead at all patrols. However, during the Los Banos raid, they were under a different component during the assault
    Ingles’s Intrusion of the Camp
    At the main entrance of the camp, during the breach, Col. Ingles and the U.S Scouts were met with burst of enemy fire. Ingles returned with heavier fire and lobbed half-dozen grenades which wiped out the enemy guards instantly. They proceeded towards the main camp to join the melee.
    Para-drop of the Brown Boots
    At the para-drop zone, secured by guerrillas, the airborne troopers finally landed safely, with Hunter Bob Fletcher, and joined the action inside he camp nearby. By the time they reached the camp, the Hunters 45th Regimental banner was proudly waving on the makeshift flagstaff over the internee’s barracks. This banner was later brought by this author to be displayed at the U.S 6th Army Presidio Museum in San Francisco, California. And was returned to the Hunters on its 50th Anniversary in Manila, Philippines.
    Hunters Breached the Camp
    As sporadic gun-fires faded, there was an ominous silence. Hunters searched the perimeter for remaining enemy, mostly were badly wounded that were beyond help, and were left to die on the spot to join their ancestors. The airborne troopers had their share fire-fight against the remaining scampering Japanese from their stations.
    The whole camp was in pandemonium. Both the guerrillas and the airborne troopers had a hay day routine shooting enemy guards who wee caught with their pants down. The element of surprise certainly was on our side that contributed much to the assault.
    The POWs - sensing that it was safe to come out of their barracks, rushed out to greet their emancipators, hugging and kissing us, while tears of joy fell unashamedly. The whole camp was an amphi-theatre of ovation and thanksgiving. We cannot also help but also cry unashamedly upon seeing these starved, emaciated tortured souls, for three years and a half suffered under the iron heels of a savage enemy. It was a day of jubilation. Their prayers were finally answered while they went on their knees for three years praying for emancipation. They could not believe it that they were finally free. They were stunned, bewildered and horrendously surprised with glee. Can could not believe that they were free – at last.
    Sad Aftermath
    But, after the POWs and the raiders were all safely evacuated to Muntinlupa, Rizal, on that day, Japanese Battalion returned to Los Banos after a week - and vengefully massacred 7,000 innocent civilians who remained in - and/or returned to Los Banos who disobeyed the warning of the liberators to leave the place after the raid. A high, price - indeed was paid for by Filipino live in exchange of 2,146 Americans and allied POWs.
    But it was part of the wages of war. People of Los Banos could not understand why there were none of us that stayed behind in Los Banos to protect them after the raid. However, the truth was – we had another order to proceed north towards Manila for the liberation of the Capital City..The Los Banos local guerrilla home-guards albeit have warned the people of Los Banos to evacuate, but failed to do so.
    Day of Expounding the Truth On the 50th anniversary of the Los Banos liberation of the POWs and the town - Col. Gustavo C. Ingles, together with Cav. [BGen. E. Gidaya], PMA Class ’51, as Undersecretary of Defense, and myself with some American POWs returned for the grand reunion. The townspeople of Los Banos finally understood why no less than 7,000 of them were massacred by the vengeful Japanese who came back after our raid - and killed the civilians who did not heed the advice to leave the place. They were informed beforehand that after the raid, and that we had another assignment to proceed to liberate Pasay and Manila. The Hunters had to move on to liberate Lucena City, Quezon province.
    Liberation Campaign
    The guerrillas had another assignment to push forward to liberated the provinces of Quezon and Rizal, where the Hunters once more showed the U.S. Army how to flush out the enemy from their caves at Tanay, Rizal and Ipo Dam, in Bulacan province.
    At Ipo Dam Campaign, it was Col. Frisco F. San Juan [Cav ‘44] and his PMA-Hunter forces kept the enemy without sleep under continuous assaults. The Hunters, however, paid a heavy toll in that campaign against waves of suicidal enemy “Banzai” charges. San Juan was in the heat of the assault against the huge enemy forces of the Shimbu defense line. It had to take over two months to mop u the Sierra Madre.
    The Batangas Debacle
    The Hunters also spearheaded the campaign in Batangas [ at Mt.Makulot ] where there was fierce fighting led by Hunter Col. Emmanuel de Ocampo against the enemy holed up in the area - who fought to the last man. The Hunters and other guerrilla units had a grudge fight against a superior enemy defense force. They took months before routing the enemy holed inside caves, determined to die to the last Bushido. In sum, the liberation campaign – gloriously succeeded but not without a high price. One million Filipinos perished in this war of the United States against Japan that involved the Filipinos in a war not inherently their own. It was a war of the U.S. against Japan.
    Looking Back
    The PMA Hunters - led by Class ’44 cavaliers had written a veritable history in blood and sweat - in World War II in the Philippines witnessed by no less than their comrades [ Lt. Gen. Robert Eicheberger, CO of the US Eight Army, the U.S 11th Airborne Division of Maj. Gen. Joseph M. Swing, the First Cavalry of Gen. William Chase. The 43rd Infantry Division of Maj. Leonard Wing, 103rd Infantry Battalion under Brig. Gen. Stark, the 11th Corps, the 11th Corps led by Gen. Julian Cunningham, and later by the AFWESPAC, etc., during the liberation and pacification campaigns of Southern Luzon .
    Before the Turnover of the Commonwealth from U.S. Armed Forces Professional Careers
    The PMAyers were all sent to the U.S. after World War II to undergo advance schooling at Command and Staff Schools (Fort Benning, GA; Fort Sill, OK; San Antonio TX, etc., and other schools before assuming respective posts n the Armed Forces of the Philippines. They all reached the apex of their military careers. For my part, I served a few years with the U.S Armed Forces in the West Pacific (AFWESPAC) and later with the Philippine Ryukus Command (PHILRYCOM) - then continued higher studies in Europe [ in Switzerland, Italy and France], completing my thesis “ Structures of Governments and Comparative Economic Systems.” Earned a gold medal for merit and excellence.
    ‘ Had a brief stint with the Flying Tigers Transport Command (1949) in China that evacuated Gen. Chiang Kai Shiek and the Chinese Nationalist Army [ Koumintang ] flown to safety from Lunghua, Shanghai, China to Taiwan Island, Republic of China.
    ‘ Completed studies at the Political War College, then stint with the Trans-Ocean Transport Division collecting by air transport all the Jews [White Russians, Estonians, stateless refugees] Jews and Palestinians all over Asia for repatriation to Lydda, Israel. And then in the Korean War with the U.N. Airlift Operations.
    Then, later as psy-war and counter-intelligence observer in Laos during the Vietnam Conflict.
    After serving the Philippine Government as psy-war consultant to then Sec. Ramon Magsaysay, who later became President of the Republic of the Philippines was tasked as Senate Committee Secretary of the Veterans and Military Pensions, vice president of Veterans Federation of the Philippines, then as public relations director of the Philippine Veterans Bank.
    .It was time move on to participate as a ranking delegate to the International Conference of Human Rights and Social Welfare at Helsinki, Finland. And also as a delegate to the International Inter-Pol Security Conference, and then as member of the Cultural Delegation to the United Soviet Republic of Russia ( Moscow and Leningrad).
    No sooner, after returning to the U.S., was called to serve - the U.S Army National Guard Reserves (CSMR) at Sacramento National Guard Headquarters [ first, as G-3 of the State Defense Force], [DCS] and then, Dep. Chief of Staff, of the Defense Force of 4 Brigades - after serving as Logistic Advisor of the 2nd Infantry BDE, a Fort Funston in San Francisco, California.
    Tapped by Lt. Gen. Daniel O.Graham as a member of the ad hoc United States Defense Committee( White House) during Pres. Ronald Reagan Administration.
    Retired as a full Colonel USA. Served the U.S. Federal Court of Appeals, (Circuit Executive Office) in San Francisco, California. Resided in California with my wife, Lou – as an executive of the School of Nursing, in San Francisco State University. We then relocated to a retirement hone in Las Vegas, Nevada.
    + + +
    Those interested in the Internet version of the Los Banos Liberation of the American and allied POWs “Freedom At Dawn”. And the other book – “Ordeal In War’s Hell” – browse the internet. And contact Cavalier retired Gen. Fred Filler, at the Armed Forces of the Philippines Museum
    Tribute to Members of PMA Class‘44 in Alphabetical Order: (Surname first)
    Abendano, Fernando A. Acosta, Galileo C. Adea, Daniel B. Adevoso, Eleuterio L Aguila, Florentino B. Alcasid, Domingo A. Aquino, Joae M. .Artiaga, Jose M .Baquirin, Bienvenido V. Baumann, Eduardo A .Bermejo, Leandro C. Bernal, Felix R. Cabal, Geronimo M .Caceres, Percival R .Caluya, Laureto E. Carreon, Godofredo M. Castillo, Lauro M. Cleofe, Jimeno A .Concepcion, Teodoro J .Corpuz, Marcelno R. Dacanay, Benito R Dacamay, Patrocinio T. David, Nicanor C .Dizon, Rufino C. Domingo, Emilio A.Dumlao, Rafael F. .Erfe-Mejia, Marcelino P. Estrera, Hilarion L .Fawcett, Alfredo Federis, Waldemero E. Fenix, , Jose B.Guzman, Pablo O. Flor, Leonilo A. Ferrer, Juanito N .Flor, Leonilo. Flores, Mauricio S. Francisco, Pablo M. Genguyon, Gil G. Gutierrez Guillermo G. Indiongco, Saturnino S .Irlanda, Cristobal V. Jazmin, Cesar C .Jose, Pacifico V .Lara, Melanio P La Madrid, Bernardo L .Lim. Vicente H Jr., .Macalinao, Bartolome S .Magaro Pablo A Maristela, Vicente E. Molano, Sergio C. Moreno, Guillermo S .Nonato, Godiardo G Paat, Pedro O. Paje, Anselmo Q .Panopio, Juan B. Paredes, Pablo G. Perez, Gregorio R .Perlas, Jose Z. Punzalan, Victor M. Radam, Julio C .Regalado, Ramiro F. .Reyes, Jose L .Rodriguez, Jose Romero, Armando G .Roque, Antenor B .Roque,Benitez C .Ruaro, Severino R. Sabalones, Samson T .Sandiko, Felipito C. San Juan, Frisco F. Santiago, Hermogenes V. Segundo, Fidel V. Jr. Sevilla, Elias G. Signacion, Mario G. Tan, Lorenzo A. Torralba, Damaso Ugalde, Aurelio S. Valdez, Vivencio A .Valencia, Erusto P.Ver, Jesus L.Vera, Vicente A De, Veto William R. Villanueva, Eufracio C.Villasanta, Mariano M.
    Associate Members
    Lim, Patricio H (Rev.)Manglapuz, Raul, S., Quesada, Frank B., and Tangco, Paciano S.
    Members, Reported to Class’ 44
    On April 1, 1944
    Bernal, Felix R. (returned from 1941), Briosos (FNU) Escalona, Marcelino, Ignacio, Pablo Lim,.Vicente H.Jr. (left for USMA) Loren (FNU) Molano, Sergio C. (left for USNA) Porat, Vicente O, Rapista (FNU) Reyes, Edmundo Delos, Rordiguez, Jose, Sabalones, Samson, Santos, Dizon, Santos (FNU) Tadeo, Rafael, Veto William R.
    Source: Memoires of PMA Class ‘44
    “Wrought In Gold “ 50th Anniversary



    From BALITANG BETERANO: PMA-HUNTERS RESCUE 2,146 AMERICAN POWs IN LOS BANOS
     
  19. maraflore

    maraflore recruit

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    My name is David and I am contacting you on behalf of my wife Ella. Her father was a Philippine Guerilla in WWII when the Japanese invaded the Philippines.

    My wife is desperately searching for any records and serial number, dating back Jan 1, 1945 to July 8, 1945 of her father Julian Gordula Flores (deceased) 2nd Lt. 3rd Command of Captain Raquel Valena(deceased) a recognized guerilla. He was also attached to the American 5th Cavalry Division.

    Ella has been trying for years, on her late mothers behalf of getting her father's benefits, which he never received.

    I am looking to get in touch with anyone who could help in contacting the right people to get at least a serial number or some type of identifying information which could be sent to the US government to look into whether his family was still entitled to those benefits.

    Ella believes that she can still get her father's benefits. Unfortunately her mother has passed away and never received a peso from her husband. she (Ella)is desperately trying everything she can to get someone to re-look into her father's records. Ella even wants me to contact President Obama's office so his staff can look into it again.

    I think it's hopeless, but since she is my wife, I promised her I would do what I could to help her. This by the way has been going on since 2001, 8 years and she still hopes she can get her father's benefits.

    Is there anything that can be done? Your assistance whatever it may be can be helpful to put us in the right direction, and be most greatful.

    We live in Toronto, Ontario, Canada, not in the states F.Y.I.

    I am leaving it in your hands. Thank you in advance, good or bad.

    David Orton
     
  20. Falcon Jun

    Falcon Jun Ace

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    If he was attached to a US Army Division, then there would be some sort of record. The US Army maintains an official list of such Filipinos from World War II. Also check out the AP story I posted on the other Philippine Guerrillas thread.
     

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