Some pictures of the spot today and some well known photo's of back then. For more information read: Ardennen Poteau '44 Museum - The Official Website => History. Notice the M1 .30 Carbine used by this German soldier. The spot today.
Very nice thread. I've got a book that was written by an American Soldier who was in that area and or a survivor of the Malmedy Massacre. I'll see if I can find what box it's in and tell you more about the book. Anyway, the reason I mention said book is because I think it had soem good info about what you just posted? If not this book, then the volume that Roland Gaul did on the Americans.
thanks for the nice pics well done the one with the soldier with the belt of ammo around his neck would he be a .SS.man ?? best krieg
Unfortunately, the 14th Cavalry Group got alot of what it deserved. Its command was not the most competent bunch on that front, especially given their more veteran status. Colonel Devine, the group commander was more concerned with spit and polish than combat readiness. He was also loath to integrate the attached tank destroyer battalion (3" towed) into his unit; instead relegating them to the Northern flank of his sector on their own. The XO went missing early in the action (obstensively he went to "get more ammunition") while Devine left his CP and was out of contact leaving no one definitely in charge. As Devine had made little effort to tie in his flanks with the green 99th and 106th divisions he left these two units vulnerable when his own front collapsed and fell back through the Losheim Gap. Not a stellar moment for the US Army.
Thanks for that. I saw their website when planning my Ardennes trip back in February. As I couldn't do everywhere in a week I'm pleased to see someone got there and did the Then & Nows I had hoped to do. Thanks.
That's OK MArtin, we all know you served with the 62nd Peoples Grenadier Division ;-)) And they actually were a hard-fighting Division-so no insult there ;-))
Yes - the legendary 'pink shirts' Division.... Seriously, I love that sequence of Poteau photos. We've all seen them a thousand times, I know they were of course posed for the PK-Berichter, etc, but what a fantastic resource they are of images of late-war front-line Waffen-SS troops.
Have you seen the runner looking back on his opponents? It looks as if they are 200 meters behind! What a fighting face we can see. Really impressing! Mats
Hi Martin, this Div had in the neighborhood of about 25 Knights Crosses as well as about the same of German Crosses in Gold. I don't think the pink thing, was a trend until after about mid to late 1943. ;-)) Anyway, you look graceful, when crossing that road ;-))
There is infinitely more detail about the 14th Cavalry group and its role in the Bulge. Many historical accounts unfairly malign the 14th. My father (86 and still alive) served in the 14th Cavalry Group, 18th Recon. Squadron, Troop C , located in Krewinkel on the morning of the 16th Dec., 1944. He has done extensive research, as have several colleagues of his. There is beyond ample evidence to show that the 14th fought bravely and was not some band of incompetent cowards. I have video footage of a 14th Cav. reunion from 2002 in which man after man recounts the wildly chaotic days following the morning of Dec. 16th. You begin to understand that much of the responsibility rests with the higher ups who deployed the 14th (approx. 800 men in the 18th Reconn.) across an 8 mile stretch of the Losheim Gap. Calvalry is not meant to be used as a static defensive force. The 32nd reconn. was back in Vielsam Troop C bloodied the hell out of the 3rd German Para. as they came through, my dad doing his share. He was 21 at the time. With no ill intent to those of the 7th Armored or who had family in the 7th...evidence shows that General Hasbrouck was back in Holland with his armor for nearly 12 hours essentially sitting on an order from Eisenhower when the German attack came through the Losheim on the morning of the 16th. That Hasbrouck recommended Presidential Unit Citations for all forces involved in the defense of St. Vith except for the 14th is not prima facie evidence that 14th Cav. was inept and cowardly as some histories read. To assert that the German assault on of St. Vith was somehow a consequence of the 14th being overrun my vastly larger numbers is misleading. St. Vith was defended by a superior American force compared to the German assault force. My dad's best friend (Bill Barton) was in the lead vehicle at the Poteau ambush. Bill is still alive. I had the honor of traveling to the Ardennes with Bill and my father in 2003. They were the first 14th Cav. troopers to visit the museum at Poteau. The Dutch couple almost fell over. Read multiple histories of the Bulge. Sure there were mistakes that the 14th made, but the fog of war surely makes all of us amateur and professional historians realize that a full understanding is complex and tedious. To try and lay some sort of blame on the 14th...absurd. These guys fought as hard as anybody else. I have a number of interviews of members and unpublished documents and letters which may be of interest. Would like to make them available if any party is interested.
As I stated earlier in this thread the 14th's problems had alot more to do with its leadership than the individual fighting ability of the men in the unit. Colonel Devine made a number of serious blunders in how the unit was disposed at the begining of the battle. One squadron had been withdrawn for heavy maintenance (the 32nd) so it was largely unavailable immediately. The 18th was spread by troop very thinly across the 14th's frontage. The typical village defense (such as troop C) would have had just 9 M 8 armored cars and 18 jeeps with a dismounted strength of about 75 men mostly manning machineguns and a few 60mm mortars. This is hardly enough strength to hold off battalions of German infantry outnumbering them as much as 10 to 1 or more. As I said, the attached tank destroyer battalion was frittered away by being forced to man a seperate section of the frontage, not allowed to tie into 14th Cavalry Group's communications net (per Colonel Devine's orders) and, they too were quickly overrun. Had the group instead had both squadrons on their frontage, had integrated the tank destroyers into their positions and made better use of supporting artillery that was available (the 275th SP Artillery battalion attached did yeoman work in this respect but was largely alone in its efforts while much of the in range corps artillery went unused by the 14th) the Cavalry might have just stopped the Germans like the 38th Cavalry Squadron did on Eisenborn Ridge. The 14th fought bravely but lacked leadership at the top to make it fight effectively.
I will be very interested if you can clarify what do you mean by the following statement: To assert that the German assault on of St. Vith was somehow a consequence of the 14th being overrun my vastly larger numbers is misleading. St. Vith was defended by a superior American force compared to the German assault force. As I recall, the 14th Cavalry was attacked by the lead elements of both Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies in division strength. And latter the defense of St. Vith involved less than two division's worth of American Combat Comands and RCTs from four parent units, spread over a frontage that should have been guarded by an army or at least a powerful corps. I would interested in what your research had uncovered.