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Rommel's views on Italy defense

Discussion in 'Italy, Sicily & Greece' started by bronk7, Dec 19, 2014.

  1. bronk7

    bronk7 Well-Known Member

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    Sheldrake stated in another post of Rommel's pessimistic defense strategy of Italy....ty Shel...what were his specific views on this....? pros and cons of Rommel and Kesselring's defense?? it would've taken less supplies and men to use Rommel's strategy? more units could've been put on the Ostfront--which was more important??
     
  2. Carronade

    Carronade Ace

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    Italy being a peninsula would probably take about the same number of troops to hold a line at any point. Rommel and most Germans who gave it much thought were concerned about the Allies' ability to conduct amphibious landings behind their lines and cut off the troops at the front, as was attempted at Anzio. Long supply lines would be vulnerable to air interdiction, and they anticipated, correctly, that they could not count on the Italian support. Most of Italy's industry was in the north.

    Even Kesselring's strategy left the Allies most of what they could gain from invading Italy. Italy was out of the war, the Mediterranean sea route was open, they could launch air attacks across southern Europe and support the partisans in Yugoslavia. Sardinia and Corsica fell into their hands with minimal fighting, providing bases for the invasion of southern France - which might have been a more useful occupation than slogging their way up the peninsula.
     
  3. bronk7

    bronk7 Well-Known Member

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    yes, they got the airfields....all good points, again..ty.......the amphibious point very logical.....I never thought of that
     
  4. TiredOldSoldier

    TiredOldSoldier Ace

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    Sardinia and Corsica were abandoned by the Germans, though there was some fighting in both against the Italian garrison forces and, later, some French units that were dispatched to Corsica. The single division the Germans had in Sardinia (29 Panzergrenadier) and the RF SS Brigade in Corsica were not strong enough to force the large Italian force there to lay down arms, the Italians in turn where not strong enough to prevent the German's withdrawal to the mainland that was completed in early October.

    The most critical moment was in September 1943, Allied caution an the collapse of the Italian command structure shortly followed by that of the army allowed the Germans to stabilize the front below Rome, but despite the presence of pretty strong German reserves, in Northern Italy the Germans had, amongst other forces, the 1st SS Panzer Korps that was stationed there to recover after Kursk, it was a huge risk, there were a lot of communication chokepoints and failing to gain control of them would have left the frontline forces in a very bad position.

    I do not believe retreating above Rome would reduce the German effort by much, shortening the lines may help but would also bring the allied air force closer to the more vulnerable plain, air interdiction in central Italy was never fully effective parly due to the terrain.
     
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  5. harolds

    harolds Member

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    Rommel and other German generals over-estimated our willingness to take risks. They merely asked themselves, "What would I do if I were the Allied commander?" The obvious was amphibious end-runs. Which brings us to the question, why didn't we attack farther up the Italian boot instead of at Anzio?
     
  6. bronk7

    bronk7 Well-Known Member

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    much thanks all replies..........but the Allies weren't capable of landing a large enough force, by amphibious means, to make a quick enough breakthrough?? my main points are ''large enough'' and ''quick''....
     
  7. TiredOldSoldier

    TiredOldSoldier Ace

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    Anzio was not a bad idea "per se", and could be supported by aircraft based behind the main line, doing it further North would run into issues with the shorter ranged fighters and would allow the Germans to reinforce faster, at the time there sill was a Luftwaffe presence in Italy. The problem was it was an attempt that played allied weaknesses (sluggishness of command) against German strengths (ability to improvise and interior lines). Deciding to land was a bold move, but it was basically wasted by lacklustre leadership that gave the Germans enough time to build a defensive perimeter and came close to ending in disaster.

    The force that was landed was not weaker that the force the Germans eventually collected to try to crush the beachhead, but the Allies were at a disadvantage as they didn't have the strength to both create a strong defensive perimeter and a powerful exploitation force, with 20/20 hindsight had they expanded the beachhead in the early phase the Germans may have found it impossible to contain it. The infiltration attempt by the Rangers was just an example of waste of good troops, the commanders basically sent unsupported light infantry against an armoured force, even if there were quite a number of tanks available in the beachhead, that might have worked against an "off balance" opponent but the Germans reacted efficiently, the allies didn't manage to bring up support fast enough, and the result was the rangers were wiped out.
     
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  8. bronk7

    bronk7 Well-Known Member

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    most of you sound like you [ should ]write the books....I've read much on Anzio and my Uncle was there [ I think I've posted his souviners here, including TWO Knight's crosses , Spange, etc ] you people never cease to amaze me with your replies....I've read about the size of the force at Anzio, but did not know of it's comparison to the German force...very good point!....I guess I've read all this before, but the books have so much detail, it's hard to remember critical points.......so, you are saying they did have the forces to make a ''quicker'' breakthrough? but as time went on, shipping was taken away, correct?? so, even with a breakthrough, anywhere, would they have had enough shipping/supplies/men to continue the progress???
     
  9. TiredOldSoldier

    TiredOldSoldier Ace

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    Once the beachhead was "sealed" there was probably no space to deploy additional troops. The beachhead to succeed needed to expand far enough to cut off the German further south, or at least to threaten to do so sot that the Germans decide to pull out rather than risk encirclement. This could be achieved by expanding East so as to cut all roads west of the mountains. But doing so exposed the advancing forces to getting cut off from the beachhead, or even the beachhead itself though it's unlikely the Germans may have captured it in the face massive naval artillery support. Attacking late allowed the Germans to prevent cutting the critical roads south, even after breaking out going directly towards Rome left the most easterly road free for the German falling back from main line to retreat.
     
  10. bronk7

    bronk7 Well-Known Member

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    I wonder if Kesselring really got to 'know'' his enemy... but did they have the troops and supplies to deploy if BHead was expanded??
     
  11. harolds

    harolds Member

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    Italy was Kesselring's "finest hour". Even though he was tactically surprised several times he was able to cope and eventually foil the Allies. He was probably the ONLY German commander who could get Hitler to approve of retirements ahead of time. He was able to extract the maximum amount of Allied casualties from a position, then when his adversaries were about to breach the line he would jump back to previously prepared positions in his rear and do the whole thing over again. Several times it looked like the Allies had him, but he was able to extricate his forces-one time with the help of Gen. Mark Clark. "Smiling Albert" was from the artillery branch and probably used artillery to greater effect than any German commander in any other theater of war. Yes, he knew his enemy.
     
  12. TiredOldSoldier

    TiredOldSoldier Ace

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    I also suspect Kesselring was in a far less tenuous supply position than any other German commander in 1943, he could count on the Italian stocks (when the SS didn't get there first) that were the last instance where the Germans acquired large quantities of captured equipment, for example the 81mm mortars and ammo were interchangeable with German equipment and provided a welcome boost.
     
  13. bronk7

    bronk7 Well-Known Member

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    this seems like common sense, defend till un-defendable, then go to next position...and the re-supply situation<>seems like the mountainous area would be tough on resupply as we see the Allies used lots of mules...so, a double hit for the Allies where they had more trouble than usual resupplying and the Germans did not have the usual problems?? TOS, another interesting point there, one which I've either never read, or, had forgot ......
     
  14. Sheldrake

    Sheldrake Member

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    Most observers think that Rommel was wrong and that Kesselring was right. Hitler certainly did. Kesselring's skilful defence is arguably one of the better pieces of German generalship in WW2.

    However, Alanbrooke thought that the Germans were playing into the allied hands by defending Italy South of Rome. Alanbrooke saw the European Theatre as one connected campaign with the western, italina and Eastern fronts all connected.,

    The value of the Italian campaign to the allies was that it drew the Germans into a theatre of operations where the allies could tie down significant Germans forces,away from the Op Overlrod front , but without exposing the limited allied forces to overwhelming numbers. Italy suited this purpose. He commented in his diary that the further south the Germans defended the harder they made it to transfer troops to where they would need them, and the greater logistic strain on the Germans. Op Overlord was better served with the Germans withdrawing through Rome in June 1944 than defending the alps.

    Suppose the Germans had followed Rommel's advice. They could have a) defended the Gothic line Pisa-Rimini or b ) abandoned Italy and defended the alps.

    If A then the allied landings in September 1943 would have been opposed only by rearguards and the Germans established a defensive line on the Appenines. More of the Italian armed forces would have been available to the allies and airfields much further North. It is quite likely that the allies would have been halted on the Gothic line in winter 1944 as they were on the Gustav line in 1943. If so , the allies could have surged into the Po valley in May 1944 for the same reasons they succeeded in breaking though in the Liri in 1944. if you want some further contra factuals,, imagine the landing at Anzio replaced by a landing North of Ravenna or near Venice. D Day might have taken place with the Germans worried about an Allied threat to Austria via Slovenia or France via Piedamont. By this time the allies had a decent mountain corps - the FEC and potentially amount the British Indian army Divisons. .

    Suppose the Germans adopted option B and withdrew to the Alps in 1943. This would ave made Op Anvil in the South of France a possible precursor to d Day rather than an afterthought. Single seat fighters based in Piedamont could have established air superiority over the South of France and escorted bombers to Austria in 1943. .

    On balance, whatever the Germans did regarding Italy it did not turn out well for them.
     
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  15. harolds

    harolds Member

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    I'm not sure that we tied any more troops down than if we had fought those same German troops somewhere else. The Allies were far more mechanized than the Germans and Italy was NOT a great place for mechanized warfare so were at a disadvantage at times. Because we were attacking and the Germans defending, we, IIRC, lost more men than the Germans, at least up until 1945. Personally, I think it was about a wash with a slight advantage to the Germans. As the previous poster points out, no matter what, Germany lost.
     
  16. bronk7

    bronk7 Well-Known Member

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    can't defend everything....especially against the Allied might...
     
  17. minden1759

    minden1759 Member

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    It is important to think of the Mediterranean as a whole rather than just Italy.

    Mussolini's stupidity in invading Yugoslavia and Greece, and then making a complete hash of it, drew the Germans into a part of Southern Europe where they had no strategic interest - other than the southern flank of Op BARBAROSSA, and yet still had to police it for years.

    In committing vast numbers of Divisions - 50 across Italy, the Balkans and Greece, Hitler stunted his offensive and then defensive campaigns in Russia for the rest of the war.

    Being in the Mediterranean was the right thing for the Allies.

    FdeP
     
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  18. Sheldrake

    Sheldrake Member

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    You are quite correct in pointing out the problems of allied forces over dependent on motor transport. In Italy "Mobility" meant the ability to manoeuvre over mountains with light infantry supported by mule transport. This was a theatre level tactical problem.

    However, the reason why Italy was important was that it helped top solve the biggest operational problem facing the allies on the Channel.

    The allies had a lot more troops and equipment than the Germans. But in any operation in France would be constrained by the rate at which they could land forces, by air or sea. After any landing the campaign would be a race between the allies , brining troops by sea and air and the Germans by road and rail. Thus the allies had C 100 divisions available, but could only land eight on D Day and 1-2 per day thereafter limited by shipping capacity. The Germans had 80 divisions to defend the Western and Southern fronts, but started any campaign with all their troops on the continent.

    Any troops freed up for the allies by not invading Italy could not have made any difference to the size of the allied army in France available on D Day, D+30 or D+60. However, two extra German armies in France might have made a big difference to Op Overlord. While the allied campaign in Italy could have been fought better, it did not matter how far up the leg of Italy the allies were on D Day.

    Extending Minden 1759's point. The best outcome for the axis in the Mediterranean would have been for Italy to have been neutral. This would have protected the southern flank of Festung Europa and acted as a porous conduit for essential war materials to reach Germany.
     
  19. bronk7

    bronk7 Well-Known Member

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    this is an excellent point and a very excellent what if thread....yes, seems like they had to keep the units in the Balkans/Greece in place after the Allies went into Itlay [ to cover flanks? ], or did they? I guess most of you actually study/critically think about the war, because I really see the logic [ from my reading ] in the answers whereas I just read about it for pastime purposes....
     
  20. harolds

    harolds Member

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    Sheldrake's last post implies that the Allied didn't realize the success that their transportation plan, or Operation Fortitude was going to be. After June 6th, 1944 major offensive action in Italy with its increased casualties was, IMHO, a mistake.

    To follow up on Bronk7's last question, the Germans, for some stupid reason, put some second-rate infantry divisions in Normandy and kept good divisions in Norway, the Channel Islands, and in Greece. These "Eastern" divisions could have been used for occupation duties freeing up better units to fight "The Invasion(s). By my thinking, Operation Fortitude and Hitler's muddled thinking was much important in tying down German divisions than the campaign in Italy.
     

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