Semi-Automatic rifles

One of the thousands of sub categories of WW2 is the development and evolution of firearms. One such evolution, was the perfecting of Semi-auto rifles that would be used by a handful of nations in the 6 year conflict. To better understand how Semi auto rifles came to be the backbone of modern military's, you have to go back to WW1. In WW1 Semi auto technology was in it's opening stages. The U.S, France, Germany, Italy, and the U.K to name a few, used in some capacity Semi-Auto rifles during the Great War. For the most part they experienced a multitude of problems, but when they worked properly, their real potential was seen. The Harsh conditions of the trenches, and the often delicate mechanics caused the rifles more than 50% of the time to not work. As intrigued as many nations were about the new technology, the weapons often times were too expensive or unreliable. At that time and well through WW2 (and in some cases even beyond) bolt-action rifles were the main battle rifles for infantry regulars. Some countries however took the initiative and worked to make, effective, reliable, and cheap semi-auto rifles. 21 years after WW1, the Second World War began, and once again the race to make semi-auto weapons began. The Americans and Russians were one step ahead of the all other warring nations creating semi-auto weapons even before WW2 broke out (U.S 1936, U.S.S.R 1938). Despite this France, Germany, Italy, and the U.K still used bolt-action rifles. The advantage of Semi-Auto weapons wouldn't be fully appreciated until 1941, when the Soviet Union was invaded and the U.S entered the war. The Axis soon realized it's forces were facing better armed opponents, and tried to create similar weapons. The Germans created the Gewehr 43 in 1943, their first semi-auto rifle, the Japanese and the Italians never managed to create a viable semi-auto (the Japanese tried to copy the M1 Garand). After the war both generals, and soldiers alike praised the Semi-autos as game changers, and huge tactical advantages, Patton called the M1, "the greatest implement of battle ever devised". From then on, all major nations created, or perfected semi-auto technology, Now all military's obtain semi-auto firearms. For me personally, I love firearms, especially mil-surp (military surplus) weapons. What are your favorite WW2 era or any era firearms?
-Wilson

 

The Germans came out with the G 41 before, naturally, the G 43. The 41 was used by the troops on a limited basis but was found to have serious faults. The G(K) 43 corrected much of these. The Tokarev SVT also had problems with fragility (at least by Soviet standards) and wasn't issued very much after the first year of the war. The big development in WW2 wasn't the semi-auto but the equipping of soldiers with full-auto weapons (SMGs) and weapons that could be used in both semi-and full-auto modes. The last being the StGs. these were the weapons of the future. The semi-auto only weapon was just an interim step.

 

Were the Soviets really better armed than the Germans in 41?

It's also worth noting that the BAR dates back to WWI. It's big drawback was probably it's weight. Not sure how the cost would compare to a Thompson. Someone here probably has that info though.

I'm not sure there were many if any post war semi auto's developed as combat rifles (the SKS?) selective fire with a full auto option was pretty much the rule post war. The exception (which are arguably not "battle" rifles) would be sniper rifles.

 

I

I think in some ways the Russians weapons were just as good (in some cases even better) as the German small arms. But the condition's and lack of ammo especially in the first months of the war severely limited the effectiveness and impact the SVT-40 and ppsh-41 had. Some Russian soldiers were equipped with less than 10 rounds during operation Barbarossa. You are absolutely right about Semi-auto rifles after WW2 and that very few were created, but they and the STG-44 as Harold mentioned really kick started modern rifles (M14, FAL, Ak-47, Galil's).

 

I would disagree with this...Semi-automatic rifles did not "kick start" the development of modern "battle" rifles such as the M-14 and FN-FAL, so much as these were the next logical step on the evolutionary design chain of longarms.

"Assault" rifles, I see as a philosophical difference in the military powers-that-be, as to what the next logical step on the developmental chain of longarms should be. They took a long look at the battles of WW2, and decided that the long-range of a full power cartridge was not really necessary, so a less powerful cartridge could be substituted. This had the double benefit of allowing a soldier to carry a lighter weapon and more ammunition. Thus, he could be an effective troop for longer than a soldier carrying a "battle" rifle.

 

I think you are absolutely right, my knowledge really of how small arms got to where they are now is limited at best. I know that most firefights in WW2 were fought from an average of 300 ft away or less, and yet The U.S and even the Soviets took until the late 1950's early 60's to utilize smaller rounds and more versatile weapons such as the M16 and the AK-47, I might be wrong in assuming that, but it took more than a decade for that shift to change, IMO I think both military's maybe didn't want to break away from the long range big round rifles, at least initially?

 

Military establishments are often very conservative and don't want to make sharp breaks with the past, especially when what they used in the past seemed to work. The Soviets adopted the SKS semi-auto rifle as an interim step between the Mosin-Nagant bolt action rifle and the AK. The USA went to an "improved" version of the M1 Garand (M-14, full auto capable) before making the switch to the M16. My feeling is that these establishments had to get used to the idea of a personal weapon that fired a less-powerful cartridge and had a "rock and roll switch". During and after the Civil War the USA's army brass resisted the acquisition of magazine firearms because they thought that the soldiers would waste ammo! In 1898, when all the major world powers had converted to magazine weapons firing smokeless powder, many U.S. soldiers went into the Spanish-American War with trapdoor, black powder, Springfields.

 

I think you're missing half the equation, everyone sees it when discussing armored vehicles but misses it when discussing small arms. Everyone understands the increase armor to counter a more powerful gun or improved munition, leads to mounting bigger guns and developing newer ammunition, which leads to the need for improved engines and suspensions, and more armor, and bigger guns. The military is continually looking to lighten the soldiers load and increase his individual lethality (at present we can only do so much to improve the suspension and motive power of the infantryman so weight is a critical limiting factor). Post WWII a technological advance, improved powders, allowed for the adoption of the marginally smaller, lighter .308/7.62 NATO that due to performance of the improved powder retained similar ballistic capabilities to the .30-06, still a .30 caliber round, while reducing weight and size allowing for more rounds carried for a given weight.
Many of the factors that dictate engagement ranges and optimal type of small arms are driven the enemies tactical response to countering the current generation of infantry weapons and supporting arms. Examples would be the Korean/Chinese propensity for conducting night attacks to negate US/UN air support. This placed greater demand on high rates of fire (less time to respond), short engagement ranges due to limited visibility, and dispersion of high rate of fire weapons (because the enemy could close the range under cover of darkness and be in position to eliminate the high ROF crew served weapons with small arms and grenades before they could make their weight of fire felt). BAR's despite having a limited sustained fire capability, submachine guns (Thompson/M3 "Grease gun), M2 carbines with their high ROF despite a low powered cartridge and hand grenades proved crucial in countering the enemies tactics; so a smaller caliber, high ROF weapon became preferred for the next generation of small arms. Then Vietnam, the NVA chose to engage US ground forces closely and hug them to negate the US artillery/close air firepower advantage. Their doctrine, “Grab Their Belts to Fight Them!” reinforced the earlier decision. Then Iraq where very short engagement ranges due to enemy tactics and extensive urban/mounted operations led the US Army to drop the longer A2/A4 battle rifle and swap service wide to the M4 carbine, the Marine Corps partially followed suit going with more M4's within the rifle company, but retaining the longer barreled A4 for riflemen, searching for a longer ranged 5.56 round and adopting a new automatic rifle for the fireteam, M27 IAR based upon HK416. Then in Afghanistan the enemy revised their tactics to adopt greater engagement ranges where the M4 was minimally effective. The Army was caught flat footed, and the Marine Corps firepower advantage substantially degraded (the riflemen and automatic riflemen could still engage but, all the M4 armed personnel were rendered basically ineffective; mortarmen, communicators, members of the machine gun crews except the actual gunner, squad leaders, officers, headquarters personnel, etc). Additionally, modern body armors, more widely fielded are requiring a more powerful round to defeat. A modernized version of the M14 was brought back, a more powerful 5.56 round fielded, and now the military is looking toward a larger caliber round for it's next generation of small arms, the most likely candidates being the 6.5mm Creedmore, a new polymer round or the 7.62 NATO.

 

Really? I don't think the soldier's basic load has substantially gone down since the days of the Romans. Lighter ammo is followed by more ammo and other stuff.

I've said this before, but it needs repeating, asking one weapon to fit all the possible battle scenarios is like asking for one golf club to play 18 holes. Soldiers should be trained on 2-3 different rifles and then issued the one that best fits the situation.

 

Indeed, you beat me to it. The increase in the weight carried by infantry soldiers has increased ridiculously since the turn of the last century. Hoplites, Legionaries, Byzantines, Anglo-Saxon fyrds, English bill and longbow men, and musketeers through the US Civil War marched and fought with less than 40 pounds as their basic load...and sometimes with considerably less (the English bill and longbow men carried less than 25 pounds) The exception was the British infantry of the Crimean War with a 65-pound load, the same that was carried on the Somme. On D-Day, "assault" infantry carried up to 80 pounds of gear...plus the water weight after getting soaked by spray...through soft sands and clay while under fire. It stayed the same through Korea and Vietnam, then in Grenada the Rangers - 'light infantry'! - jumped with over 120 pounds...and now the USMC Infantry Officers Course requires the carrying of 152 pounds for nine miles at a twenty-minute-per-mile pace for completion!

What justifies a nearly four-fold increase in weight carried by the individual?

 

The average combat load of a US soldier or Marine is back down to 65 to 70lbs. as of 2016. This is a direct result of efforts by the military to cut weight after loads ballooned up to the 100-135lb range during the fitst several years of the Iraq War. A large part of the increased weight was due to additional protective gear due to Congressional pressure related to ongoing body armor controversies during that period. The whole body armor thing was really a made up problem pushed by certain politicians, the media and a manufacturer that was trying to secure government contracts. The military got such a black eye and the media so pressed the narrative that the military hung so much armor on the troops their effectiveness suffered. A report by a naval medical servicemember proved that the increased weight led to increased casualties and had the hard data to back it up. Funny but when the report came out Congress and the media dropped the whole issue. Look at the evolution of combat helmets, since 2001, they've gotten smaller and cover less area in order to cut weight but they've upped the ballistic protection for the areas covered. Same thing with the evolution of body armor since the start of GWOT it got more extensive and heavier and covered more area, then evolved into the plate carriers that got lighter, cover less body area, but offer better ballistic protection to the areas covered. They also offer greater protection against small arms fire to vital areas while sacrificing some fragmentation protection.

 

The 152lb load you referenced is a sustainment load and not the combat load. It is analogous to the USMC pack system of WWII. It could be configured several ways, light marching, field marching, transport and field transport. You wouldn't assault a beach with a field transport pack. Same same today.

 

That is fine and I am aware of and understand the issues of your previous post, but I still maintain the problem is out of control. The USMC Combat Development Command concluded in 2003 that the optimum combat weight carried was 33% of body weight and the average male Marine weighed 169 pounds - that is a 56-pound combat weight. A 65 to 70 pound carry is still less than optimal. FM 21-18 (1990) proscribes a combat load of 48 pounds and an approach march load of 72 pounds...and as far as I know hasn't changed since publication.

Meanwhile, the sustainment load is ridiculous. A Greek hoplite carried at most 80 pounds as a sustainment load...probably about 60% of his body weight and marched for days with it. Soldiers assaulting OMAHA carried about the same load and were probably about the same weight...and the consequences were dire when they went directly into combat without shedding the extra load. So today, what is the point of carrying 90% of your body weight for three hours in order to go nine miles...aside from passing a test?

 

I do not disagree that the combat loads are an issue and need to be cut. I also know that the military is spending tremendous effort and money in trying to save weight. Unfortunately, most of the weight savings are being nullified with increases in other areas. The combat helmet is an excellent example to illustrate the point. From the PASGT (K-Pot) that was in use in 2001 the military has reduced weight from 4.2 to 2.5lbs in the ECH and 1.9lbs in the FAST, while improving the ballistic protection, mobility and the protective capabilities of the suspension system (there are tradeoffs and the total area of the head and neck protected has decreased). However, night vision devices, mounted on the helmets have also been improved during the same time period to mitigate their shortcomings. This has resulted in them, and especially the batteries that power them in increasing in weight, totally negating the weight savings from the helmet itself. We communicate better, now having inter squad communications capabilities where in WWII and Korea we often did good to get radios down to the platoon level. These additional capabilities come at the cost of extra weight of the equipment and the batteries.
Sustainment loads are only intended to be carried from your insertion/drop off point, to wherever you set up your patrol/operational base, and it has to contain everything you need to allow you to operate until a given resupply time. It is only carried through areas where enemy contact is unlikely.
As for the Marine Officer Course they are training towards a final operation out at 29 Palms, when that operation commences about 20% of the weight carried will be in water weight, which decreases as it is consumed. Water is obviously a critical resource when operating in a hot desert environment. We were told at 29 Palms that we had to consume 2 gallons per day to avoid becoming a heat casualty and 3 gallons was optimal.
When I went through Special Forces school during phase I, one of the required events was a 12 mile ruck in under 3 hours (you basically had to jog) with a 75lb pack. The 75lbs did not include weapon, PPE, ammunition, water and LBE, which probably added another 40lbs (the 152lbs you mentioned is total weight, ammo, weapon, helmet, plate carrier (which now serves the dual purpose of LBE), ruck and water). It wasn't easy, but wasn't a man killer either. I normally carried a gallon and a quarter of water on me, two x 1qt. canteens on my LBE and a 2qt. and a 1 qt. on my ruck so that's 10 lbs I would cut simply through consumption on a hot day at Ft. Bragg. Funny part is I saw as many people fail the event due to underweight rucks at the finish as to not making the time. Reason being they used their water to help make up the weight at the start and didn't figure in consumption. So, the 75lb ruck at the start weighed 69lbs at the finish because they drank the water in the canteens attached to it. The student is now a No-Go and gets dropped or recycled.
I will say that many of the sustainment loads we deployed with were well in excess of those we trained with, and that was after searching for ounces we could cut without degrading our operational capabilities.
The question now becomes what capability are you willing to degrade in order to cut weight. The WWII soldier carried a Carlisle bandage in a pouch, now they carry an IFAK that gives them a much greater ability to treat individual wounds/injuries and they receive much better first aid training in order to utilize it. They have advanced combat optics on their rifles that help them be more lethal at range and during low light conditions. Should we cut those ounces and return to just iron sights? Give up the night fighting advantage by scrapping the NVGs and the batteries they need to operate? Tough questions and I don't pretend to have any answers.

 

Good points all. I suppose my answer would be to optimize the weights to what the studies show are best for keeping the soldier/Marine combat effective...if the weight carried exceeds that 33% optimum and exhausts them before they enter combat, then advanced combat optics might not be useful. It's a conundrum, but it might be safer to be guided by what happened in the past...

 

In regards to weight issues, some time ago it occurred to me that one of the most important and difficult decisions by NCOs and officers is indicating what "required" equipment must be carried into combat and what can be left behind. A rather awkward place to put people especially new officers.

But there were pre war studies, at least in the US, that indicated a smaller less powerful round was preferable in many ways. A number of WWII era countries also used smaller rounds didn't they? Some of the Arisakas (sp) were smaller caliber and didn't some of the Scandinavian countries us a round in the 7mm range?

Back in the 90's there was a publication out of Quantaco called "The Tactical Notebook" one of the articles published in it was a translation of an article by German officer written somewhere between 1900 and 1910 if I recall correctly. It recommended very minimal use of "magazine fire" to the point of suggesting the magazines be used (and if I remember correctly loaded) only upon command. Ammo expenditure was the expressed rational.

 

In general, the "major/emerging military powers" (Britain, Germany, France, Russia, US) all coalesced around a 7.5 - 8mm cartridge relatively early on (1886 - early 1890s), while the "lesser military powers" went for cartridges in the 6.5mm range (Japan, Sweden, Holland, etc) in the mid 1890s to early 1900s

I've thought about this for a while, and although I haven't researched that far into it, I'm of the thought that the "early adopters" of smokeless powder cartridges decided upon (and stuck with) the larger bullets, while later adopters were much more receptive to smaller bullets. While there are ballistic arguments for larger bullets, I believe this pattern can be explained primarily by the attitudes of the time. For black powder, a large diameter and heavy bullet was required for several reasons. When smokeless powder started to become adopted in earnest by the large military powers of the day, the various military players - perhaps unaware due to sparse test results or perhaps just unperceptive of the significantly increased ballistic performance afforded by smokeless powder which made a smaller bullet just as/more effective as the "legacy" heavy bullets like those used in the black powder cartridges, hesitated to switch to smaller bullets. These early adopter nations were primarily major military powers. When later nations adopted smokeless powder cartridges (primarily minor powers), due the time that elapsed, there was less hesitation to break with "tradition" and maintain large diameter bullets in the face of test data showing that smaller bullets had significant advantages.

The chronology that's lead me to those observations is below. There are of course some exceptions (Italy adopted 6.5mm Carcano in 1891, at the same time its military contemporaries were adopting larger bullets), but I think if you want to draw a simple and broad explanation, I think what I said above has some validity.

"Major/Emerging Military Powers"
France: First adopter of smokeless cartridges, 8mm Lebel adopted in 1886.
Britain: Adopted .303 in 1888.
Germany:" 8mm M/88 adopted in 1888, 8mm Mauser S adopted in 1905
Austro-Hungary: 8mm Mannlicher adopted 1890
Italy: 6.5mm Carcano adopted in 1891
Russia: 7.62x54R adopted in 1891.
US: .30-40 Krag adopted in 1892, .30-30 adopted in 1903, .30-06 adopted in 1906 (note: not considering the 6mm Lee Navy cartridge which saw rather limited use and was phased out rapidly)

"Lesser Military Powers"
Sweden: 6.5x55 adopted in 1894
Norway: 6.5x55 adopted in 1895
Holland: 6.5x53 adopted in 1895
Japan: 6.5mm Arisaka adopted in 1897
Various South American nations: 7x57 Mauser adopted in late 1800s/early 1900s

I'm not saying this is correct, its more so just something to think about.

 

But to bring the discussion full circle, Japan, which had adopted the 6.5mm x 50SR Arisaka for it's service rifle(s) (Types 30,35 and 38) and then it's light machine guns, Type 11, Type 96, and Type 3 HMG had started converting to a 7.7mm x 58SR round in the late 30's based upon their combat experience in China. The IJ Army adopted the 7.7mm x 58 Arisaka for it's Type 99 service rifle, Type 99 light machine gun and Type 89 air service MG. The 7.7mm cartridge had entered service in 1932 with the Type 92 HMG and the superiority of the cartridge over the 6.5 led to it's adoption across platforms in the late 30's. It was intended to re-equip the entire force, but the outbreak of WWII meant that Japan went to war with both calibers in service. The Japanese Navy adopted the 7.7mm x 56R around the same time, it was a direct copy of the British .303.
To make matters even more interesting Russia, that had adopted the 7.62x54R, as George correctly pointed out, was impressed with the performance of the Japanese 6.5mm round during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 used the cartridge in the Federov avtomat rifle, (a select fire weapon developed in 1915 and to further muddy the discussion, it could easily be one of the earliest examples of an assault rifle) and purchased 763,000 Arisaka (mostly Type 38) rifles and 4 million rounds of ammunition.

Federov avtomat rifle​

 

Absolutely correct. A similar situation occurred in Italy during the 1930s. In response to complaints of poor stopping power during the Italian African campaigns in the interwar period, the new 7.35mm Carcano cartridge was adopted in 1938. The spitzer bullet afforded flatter trajectory, and the bullet used a similar aluminum core as the .303 British which caused greater instability when hitting a soft target (read: larger wounds). The intention was that 7.35mm would become the standard Italian military cartridge, but in 1940 work ceased and the Italian military reverted to the 6.5mm cartridge due to logistical concerns of having to fight a war with two different "standard" rifle/LMG cartridges.

But, the take-away from the two examples of Japan and Italy should not be that the nations which adopted "small" 6.5mm cartridges recognized their mistake later on and tried to rectify it by moving to larger cartridges. The opposite occurred in France: the French realized the obsolescence of 8mm Lebel pre-WW1, and had adopted the Meunier rifle with its new "small" 7x59mm cartridge in 1912 but was forced to abandon the adoption of the new rifle due to the outbreak of war in 1914 (with approximately 1000 rifles being produced). "The grass is always greener...." ....when looking at an alternative cartridge for military use. In the past 80 years we've gone from .30-06 to 7.62 NATO to 5.56 NATO, and now the US military feels that a cartridge between 7.62 and 5.56 is needed, and discussion focuses on something in the 6.5-7mm range. Hmmm... Maybe we just should have standardized on .280 British in the late 40s and avoided all this hassle? Go talk to the old guy at ROF Radway Green

 

Ever read the book "Blackhawk Down" or see the movie? Remember the Rangers that decided not to take their rear SPI plates and NVG's? They reasoned they wouldn't be gone long enough to need the NVG's and wouldn't be taking fire from the rear. Shit happens.
I wasn't ever really big, 6' 190lbs. at the time probably 6% body fat, I think I weighed 176 when I graduated Parris Island, (but most people resemble Bataan Death March survivors when they graduate) but daily PT thickens you up a little and by the time I had a year in the fleet I stayed fairly consistently between 189-192lbs for the next decade and a half. However, I had the load carrying ability of a pack mule.
You used the example of the Civil War soldier humping 40lbs.; well if he was average he weighed 137lbs. so that load is 29.19% of his body weight. The 170lb average Marine would have a comparable load to body weight of 49.62lbs., so simple human evolution from increased protein in our diets has upped the carrying potential by 25%. The Civil War soldier carried 40 rounds in his cartridge box and another 20 in his haversack for 60 rounds, 210 rounds is pretty much the basic load for a soldier today, so they carried roughly 30% of the personal weapon ammunition carried today. Then we carry hand grenades now, at least two frags and one or more smoke that he didn't have. Then water; the civil war soldier carried one quart and was taught water discipline, make it last. Advances in science have shown the degradation in physical performance due to dehydration. Now, they teach if you've got it drink it, and they usually carry about a gallon on them. During the GWOT many troops carry IV bags and will "stick" each other and force rehydrate after combat. It was common for Civil War soldiers to be ill fed and often subsisted by foraging, frowned upon these days. The current rations, MRE's, are more nutritious and much lighter weight, with greater variety than even the Vietnam generation had. Granted they do weigh more than hard tack and salt pork, but malnutrition doesn't lead to hundreds of thousands of soldiers dying from disease either. I was around when the military fooled around with freeze dried rations in order to cut more weight. They were tasty but required hot water to reconstitute and be edible. They didn't last long once they figured out the soldier had to carry more water and thus the weight savings was just shifted, plus they couldn't be eaten without prep (heating water and reconstitution) like other rations.
Then you have the crew served weapons. In the Civil War it was the light artillery and was hauled around by horses. Now, it's machine guns, mortars and grenade launchers. Every man in the company has a 100rd belt of ammunition he humps to keep the guns up. Every man carries one or more additional mortar rounds to keep the tubes thumping. So the problem remains, modern lethality and survivability is the result of items that add weight, where do we cut and still win?