Should Hitler have assisted Mussolini

Should Hitler have assisted Mussolini in N. Africa? If Mussolini had lost N. Africa, which he would have, what consequence would have come of it other than providing a training ground for the green Americans? Hitler lost valuable resources assisting his Axis partner. I say he should have left him on his own. Nothing would have come of it had the British taken over Libya. The Mediterranean coast was more easily defended than the Atlantic coast.

 

I think Hitler made a big mistake in helping Mussolini as much as he did, but i'm sure Hitler did help as much as he did because he had the usage of several Italian Divisions on the Eastern Front.

The most I could think of that Hitler should have done for them is to at best occupy Italy and make the country into a huge Festung.

 

I agree, there is nothing in the Triparte Pact that commits Hitler to assist Mussolini in his quest to rebuild the old Roman Empire. In the end, he would have had to turn Italy into a Festung as he did anyway but it would have been without the losses incurred in the N. African campaign.

 

I think that having Hitler turning Italy into a very large military base, I think that it would have been a much tougher nut to crack and also if Rommel and the DAK were employed there as well.

I wonder who would have had overall command--my guess is that Rommel would have eventually been given command and Smiling Albert could have stayed as supreme Air Commander. Had Rommel had those units under his command, well I would hate to believe that Italy never could have been taken by the Allies.

Had the Allies not been able to defeat Italy--its most likely that Italy being such a stronghold that we could not have taken much of France either. The war most likely would have go on to be a repeat of WW1 in ways--like hundreds of miles of trenches-static warfare.

I wonder what all possibilities could have happened if Italy had been turned into a huge Festung? Could it be that even if the Germans had been pushed back to their borders by the Russians, that they would have been able to withstand their massive attacks and finally wear the Russians down enough to have somekind of peace agreement.

The German occupied territories would be greatly diminished but then they most likely would have still occupied Czecholslovakia (easily defended because of the rough terreign) Austria, Kurland, and all of France-Belgium etc etc.

They had no real good reason that I can see by keeping forces in places like Greece-Crete-etc. Had all these things come into play and had Hitler not sacrificed so many commands by making them hold to the last man, and making cities into Festungs, I don't think the Allies could have even thought of beating the Axis in 1945 except for using the A-Bomb.

 

Italy would have lost Libya and it would have began the building of Festung Italia. There would not have been the problem of lost material because of Malta being a thorn in the side. The Allies would still have attempted their invasion of Sicily.

The question would be, who would be in command? Rommel mastered what he already knew fighting in N. Africa. But if he never went there, how would he defend Italy? I regard him more of an offensive strategist. If there was no Afrika Korps, he possibly would have been fighting in the East and Smiling Albert would still have been in charge. I think this would have been the outcome.

Either way, the Allies would not have been as successful as it truely turned out.

 

I agree with you but I think that had Rommel been given that command and didn't have those limitations on him i.e Hitler, I think he would have been a metaculous defensive commander.

I know he was an attacker-a go getter, but look at what he did with the Normandy defenses with the little time he did have. The OKH gave him a most difficult assignment to tackle but not much in the way of help of ideas and he still did an impressive job.

Had Rommel instead been employed in the east, im sure he would have been in Mansteins Army Group and most likely would have taken part in the relief operation attacks aimed at Stalingrad. It sure would have been one heck of a waste had Rommel been at Stalingrad but then again, had he been in charge there, I do believe that the situation would have been much different.

Its a shame that we have no way of testing this kind of optional history, I sure would have liked to see what could have happened--especially at Stalingrad.

 

I didn't think about his work on the Atlantic wall. I'm sure he designed this out of his experience in N. Africa. I wonder how he would have prepared if he did not have that experience. I agree, It would be interesting if things turned out differently and he was in the East.

 

I'm trying to think of something good along those lines for the "What If" forum. This one i'm going to give some real time in planning before I post it.

 

The Germans did not wish involvement in North Africa, preferring instead to marshal strength for their campaign on the Russian steppes at the time, "even though Major General Wilhelm Ritter von Thoma, sent on a strategic reconnisance to Cyrenaica in the fall of 1940, has reported that only four Panzer divisions would be required to overrun the keystone positions in Egypt" (Baldwin, The Crucial Years: 1939-1941).

Keep in mind that had Italy not commited hostilities against the British in Egypt, they might have held out on the defensive, at which they later proved adept, thus preserving the 'Littorio', 'Garibaldi', and 'Ariete' armored and light armored divisions for operational deployment at a later date.

The Germans could have permitted the loss of four Panzer divisions from their Strategic Reserve and French theater for an extended period, given the likliness than Egypt would permit an Axis presence thanks to popular anti-British sentiment in Cairo and Alexandria. The Middle East was a hotbed of German sympathies, while the Turks, coerced by early Nazi victory, might have joined a drive on the Caucasus, led by Rommel's four German and three Italian armored divisions.

[ 12 May 2001: Message edited by: Desert Journeyman ]

 

Welcome aboard! Also, you hit the nail on the head with your post. I also agree with what is said.

The proble lies with Italys dictator who bit off way more than he could chew-resulting on the Germans sending help and almost 3 years of wasted efforts and lives.

 

Definitely agree

 

Hitler's committment to N.Africa never amounted to much - just a couple of armoured divisions and a small number of infantry and Luftwaffe units. Considering the prize - Egypt and the Suez Canal - the question arises as to why. The answer must be that it was a feint - intended to draw attention but not valuable resources away from Barborossa. As such it can be best understood in terms of Crete, the invasion of which pointed towards pursuing a war against Britain in the Eastern Med. Crete, in turn, helped to draw attention away from the Balkan campaign which was, in reality, a prerequisite for Barborossa.

Chris Ray

 

Good one Chris but, have you thought of this one? It could be that Hitlers REAL reason for sending a Korps to Afrika, was to gain some units more combat experiance for future usage.

 

Good one, but if Hitler had put the right amound of forces in North Africa Rommel would have quickly finished the britsh off and the North African campain would have ended in 41. and the cacus would have been ripe for the picking. Turkey would have easily joined the axis.

 

I agree, had Hitler given Rommel a proper amount of men and equipment, he would have defeated the British for sure. At that time, I dont think the British could have spared many more units to fight in North Africa.

Basically though, the desert war was just meant to strengthen Italy and to help out. So it was meant to be a side show at most, but woud up becoming much more than Hitler had counted on.

 

Hitler and the OKH became perhaps too much enthused by previous reports suggesting to Berlin that German victories were possible on the Egyptian front. Although these did call for greater concentrations of armored and motorized deployments, Germany thought that by spending a minimum, they were then capable - theoretically - of achieving the maximum.

Hitler and Rommel were both optimistic when approaching the war in North Africa. Italy had failed, but in the process left in its wake the core of a powerful army. Combined with Panzer and motorized divisions - even a small "helping" of them, a victory seemed very possible.

 

Well said. Also had Rommel recieved the promised tanks he needed and replacements, I do believe the British would have been stopped into a stalemate at least. With the arrival of US Troops, I could see that that would have been the only way to break the stalemate, because I do not think the UK, could afford to send many more men over into the desert because of all their committments elsewhere.

 

The UK had plenty of Commonwealth troops to throw into the meatgrinder, Aussie's, Kiwi's, and especially Indians.
Desert Journeyman is exactly right. And by the time the African campaign became obviously unprofitable they had managed to make the theater important to Allied goals. Churchill had the time to twist US arms by then. Allied troops then were within striking distance of Sicily, then Italy and so on. The Allies were sucked into the Italian campaign like the Germans had been before them.
Germany not contesting Africa gives the Allies the advantage of concentrating troops in the Med to attack the "soft underbelly of Europe" at many places. An Italian retreat from Africa in '41 most likely means an Allied landing in Italy or Greece in '42.

 

Hi there everyone - nice to see ya Talleyrand.

Some good points made (esp. Desert Journeyman). I believe that Germany went into North Africa to bail their aillies out. This may not have been in accordance with any specific treaty obligation, but Hitler had a sense of loyalty to Mussolini ever since Italy stood by at the time of the Anschluss. It was bad for the prestige of the Axis to have the Italians thrashed by numerically inferior Britsh forces and Hitler , no doubt with some dark mutterings about Italian incompetence, came to the rescue.

Bear in mind that it was planned as a holding operation. Rommel injected the mission creep into the scenario with his visions of lunch by the Suez canal. serious numbers of troops ere only pumped in towards the end - right in time to be captured in Tunisia.

Hitler didn't plan to tie up large forces over on a continent he knew little (and cared less?) about, but went to the rescue of an ally for power-politcal reasons. When threatened with a expulsion from the contient in 1943 he refused to face facts (that the position was strategically untenable) and turned it into the African Stalingrad. Good work, hey?

S

 

Welcoma aboard. I totally agree with you, you hit-the-nail-right-on-the-head.