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Should the Axis have tried harder to take Malta?

Discussion in 'Naval War in the Mediterrean, Malta & Crete' started by 3ball44, Jul 22, 2007.

  1. scipio

    scipio Member

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    BTW Rommel was awarded his Field Marshal Baton just before his argument with Kesselring.

    I just flicked through the First El Alamein battle 1st/2nd july and was struck by the lack of Luftwaffe activity.

    The Desert Airforce seems to have had the upper hand, bombing at will, with little interference from "lone" Lufftwaffe fighters.

    The sacking of Richie (who would have taken a more disastrous mega-stand at Mersah Matruh), removal of the British immobile forces behind El Alamein and Aukinlech's use of the Grant's 75mm capability (a surprise for the German's to face a tank wil a range almost as long as their Panzer IV), coupled with the Auk line of anti-tank guns in the centre spoilt Rommel's only chance of a breakthrough.

    But back to the Luftwaffe, why did not they put in a better perfomance? Were they\Kesselring sulking?
     
  2. phylo_roadking

    phylo_roadking Member

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    Ok....

    That's a remarkably simplistic view of the Crete campaign, and is significantly short of a number of pertinent facts. To whit...

    "basically 4 positions to defend, the 3 airfields and Suda itself"
    - no, Freyberg had in effect every potential amphibious landing site along the north coast of the island to defend or prepare to defend - remember, there were two simultaneous seaborne assaults he was fully aware of.

    "still 3 airfields and a port to protect" - not protect, make useless to the enemy...and doing THAT to a port is far easier in the short and medium term than you might suppose.

    "a credible threat of a seaborne landing that will force them to disperse forces to the coast," - Freyberg KEPT forces in reserve for that purpose; that's why the invasion was ultimately successful, he didn't release them BEFORE Maleme was opened up for reinforcements...for it increasingly appears noone told him the seaborne assaults had been turned back.

    "They will also get no reinforcements like layforce to bolster the defence with fresh troops, the chances of a merchantman making it to Malta are around 25% and no sane commander will risk troopships at those odds." - Layforce didn't arrive by troopship IIRC, they arrived by destroyer at night.


    Malta, with its radar and by 1942 its large complement of fighters AND bombers, will be far more effective air asset until the moment that the airborne invasion force is detected onscreen, formating over Sicily...then Park can fly off one last fighter sortie on a "sauve qui peut" basis or simply ground everything and block all runways or flightlines. UNTIL that moment, Malta will be as effective against the Luftwaffe/RA as it was historically...

    Crete was very different; without any form of early warning to protect themselves, and without any way of blocking its airfields due to lack of plant and earthmoving equipoment....all its (FEW!!!) remaining flyable aircraft were evacuated to Egypt many days BEFORE the invasion. The RAF refused long and hard to put fighters into the island...unlike Malta, where they were ALWAYS trying to get them there! All there was on the island between the fall of Greece and their withdrawal to Egypt was a squadron of (useless) Brewster Buffalos, the remains of a squadron of Blenheim IF fighters, and a very few Sea Gladiators....and half a squadron of Hurricanes that Churchill DEMANDED sent from Egypt - which was depleted to half its strength within a day and was withdrawn again after three!

    A VERY different story to Malta...


    You can't overcome geography...only attempt to ameliorate its effect upon you. Remember what I've noted already - Malta had tenfold the recognised geographical issues of Crete...concentrated in a far smaller area!


    As much because of the "efforts" :p of the defenders - their many and various tactical errors etc. - as anything the Germans managed to do to improve the situation! As I've also already said - don't rely on the British making the SAME mistakes...don't expect that the Germans would be the ONLY party to learn from the Crete debacle!!!


    Again, ALL that fits the description of the various isolated units and combats on Crete...and yet...! As for the value of scratch troops and service personnel...the Petrol Company? The Cretan Gendarmerie and military cadets?


    TWO WEEKS??? Cunningham would have been rubbing his hands with glee at the thought of the RM pinned in one place for two weeks!


    Am I right in remembering a period of protracted bad weather just before, and plummeting LW serviceability rates round about then???
     
  3. Volga Boatman

    Volga Boatman Dishonorably Discharged

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    So, Phylo, am I right in assuming your view is that Malta was too tough to crack?

    We all acknowledge it would have been a tough fight, but which side could reinforce?

    Only the Axis, once the balloon goes up. Those 1300 Axis aircraft would have more than guaranteed Allied reinforcement would be zero. They were under seige, after all. And 'Herkules' was to be the denoumont, the final act that drew the curtain on this particular drama.

    Don't forget, Vance von Borries also describes the British garrison as "Having lost their infantry traing edge...". Furthermore, he also describes the psychological state of many on the island as "...wanting to get on with the invasion to end the agony." Both of these factors are not conducive to the conduct of a diehard defense. Those expecting a Mediterranian Stalingrad were to be dissappointed. Two weeks is the absolute maximum time I would place for pockets of resistence to realise the hopelessness of their situation and surrender. IF the garrison was composed of diehards, that is.

    The mainforce action could be swift in declaring the isalnd 'secure' while they mop up. Iwo Jima was declared 'secure' long before the last pockets of resistence came to the same conclusion. We are, after all, not speaking of Japanese fanatacism or of Russian tenacity. We are speaking of a garrison that was on it's last legs. The nature of the attack would have split their defense into many isolated islands of resistence that would have had little or no scope for co-operative action. Islands in the Pacific that found themselves in this state, (Tarawa for example), fell quickly, even with fanatics manning the positions.

    The Malta garrison were not fanatics.

    Lord Gort was not going to stand by and watch the Maltese people be destroyed either. Malta was a prestige location, and sparing the Maltese would have been high on his list, simply to maintain good postwar relations with this outpost.

    Nobody thought that France could fall in six weeks. World War two was full of surprises. I sincerely beleive that those that think Malta's defenses would have lasted any length of time would have been in for another one of those surprises.
     
  4. TiredOldSoldier

    TiredOldSoldier Ace

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    The two sea borne "invasions" were by reinforced batallions transported on caiques, not really comparable to divisional sized assaults with armour support. BTW the third (Italian) convoy at Crete landed unopposed so there were no troops on those beaches.
    Remember Von Clausevitz "in war everythying is simple but even simple things are very difficult to achieve". Waiting for the last minute to knock ou the airfields is over complex planning and as such very vulnerable to foul ups, flight time from Sicily to Malta is around one hour make it two for the need to form up, distinguishing the invasion from a "normal" raid just on radar signatures is not easy, IIRC both sides knew how to use "window" by then. The axis plan called for massive air defence suppression strikes to preceed the drops, fooling around with earth moving equipmend while that is going on is suicide, pre positioning explosive charges under a runway that is being actively bombed is likely to help the enemy more than it helps you. The Italians had prepared thousands of dummy paratroopers, what if they only drop those and the self destruct orders go off?.
    IIRC they made a first attempt on a troopship and were turned back, anything with heavy equipment cannot come by destroyer and a fully night voyage to Malta is impossible, to make the end run at night they must be well within Crete or Sardinia based air range by dusk. The Italians will likely lay additional mines as part of the op, so even if they make it past the planes there is a considerable risk they will meet the fate of Force K.


    It's not "pinned in one place" the main force is at it's main base, Taranto, Cunnigham can sail whatever he has, get bombed on the way (that will somewhat reduce the sopport for the ground troops but the axis has plenty of planes) and either:
    - Attempt a night action with light forces
    - Attempt a day action in axis airspace with the Gibraltar squadron (the Alex one has no capital ships).
    The first is more likely but what the Italians are likely to do is pull back in Augusta when the cruisers go past Crete/Sardinia and wait for the airforce to deal with them the following morning, IMO the operational situation is hopeless for the RN the Italians are less than 100 miles out from their bases while they have two days steaming to get there.
    The main threat to the old BBs doing the fire support is subs, but with that many axis planes overhead subs will have a very hard time even getting at periscope depth.


    IMO Crete saw major blunders on both sides, the Germans underestimated the garrison size by a factor of 3 and planned accordingly. You are assuming the underfed and worn British force will make no mistakes at all, and even then the brute force axis planning has the advantage of being simple, it relies on getting lots of parachuters on the ground, relying on their aggressiveness to get a decent foothold, they were superbly trained to do exactly that, and reinforcing success, the worst thing that can happen to that plan is an Arnhem like failure of the radio sets. On the other hand the British will have to react to multiple threats with worn out troops, a Maleme like bad decision is very likely.
     
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  5. steverodgers801

    steverodgers801 Member

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    If the Germans want to use the airfields for their gliders then are they going to attack them and risk damaging them? You say the British cant block the airfield and use them then neither can the Germans.
     
  6. Gebirgsjaeger

    Gebirgsjaeger Ace

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    I totally agree to this point with you, TOS!
     
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  7. lwd

    lwd Ace

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    Would he? If so when? How long would it take to deliver it? My impression is weeks at least. The movement of massive quantities of fuel to the Italians would also be something of a tip off wouldn't it?

    But they aren't going to have 20,000 or more on the ground initially are they? Indeed 7,000 seems to be the max possible in the first wave. 25% is also a bit of a minimum as it doesn't really acount for the losses of transports entering Malta AA zone or the additional difficulty of Malta over Crete. As for the Germans learning nothing, Phylo has pointed out a couple of areas where they obviously have. The problem is the fixes weren't place by July of 42.
     
  8. TiredOldSoldier

    TiredOldSoldier Ace

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    I think 25% losses in the first wave is very pessimistic from the axis standpoint, the paras are not comming until most of the AA has been suppressed, IIRC the plan called for two or three days of flak suppression, after that sort of treatment on top of months of "ordinary" bombing most AA positions are going to be marginally effective.

    The first wave is between 6000 and 10.000, the theoretical airlift capacity is higher but serviceability is never 100%. The Italians plan called for dropping an initial drop of four batallions of Folgore, (3.400 men) though that stretches their airlift capacity to the limit, the Germans have a lot more planes than the Italians do. That leaves some 10.000 jump capable airborne reserve to reinforce the initial foothold(s), and the garrison will have to deal with them as well, immagining a 12:00 initial drop, a reasonable assumption given that you need time for the bombers to look for any AA that recovered during the night, the second wave could be in by dusk so dawn on X+1 will see some 12.000 troops on the ground, even assuming a third are out of action that's still 8000 combat effective troops, and another 6000 are comming in thethird wave, even if they can't secure a viable airfield for the airlanding element they will be able to secure a beach for the seaborne element and that's enough to doom the defence.

    IMO you can land a glider on a much worse terrain than a narrow track fighter like the Spitfire can operate from.
     
  9. urqh

    urqh Tea drinking surrender monkey

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    So do I Tos....share the salute mate..I've run out.
     
  10. lwd

    lwd Ace

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    If it works. However I wouldn't be at all surprised to see the guns cease fire due to ammo depletion but once the transports are inbound the invasion reserve is available for use. But as I said I don't think Phylo counted the heavy AA much in the 25% losses those were losses due to light AA, personal weapons, and landing accidents. The history of airforces being able to silence well sited AA is not a particularly good one in any case.
    Is it? There's the question of gliders in the first wave. Doesn't look good from here for instance. Then there's equipment other than just the partroopers and their immediate gear or did you just plan on men and small arms?
    But the Italian planes average significantly greater carrying capacity.
    Will they? First they take heavy losses in landing. Then they take heavy losses trying to take an air field. Then they have to move on foot from the vacinity of the airfield to the beach and take that?
    Not all that relevant if we're talking about landing on airfields. There's also the fact that if a glider sees a problem just before landing there's not much they can do about it where a Spitfire can hit the gas and go around again.

    Up to this point the number of available German transports is based on wiki isn't it? Or at least German plans? If so were there really that many that could have been available in the area at the time?
     
  11. lwd

    lwd Ace

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    Which is also not quite right if the British are using vehicles to block the airfields. If so as long as they control the airfields they can move any of the operational vehicles off and use them then move them back. If it looks like the field will fall they can render the vehicles non operational.
     
  12. scipio

    scipio Member

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    All this talk about knocking out the AA. The Germans had put in maximum effort in April. According to the Luftwaffe they were no worthwhile targets left to bomb having concentrated upon bombing all three airfields and Valleta which they claimed was out of commision - it wasn't and neither were the airfields or the British AA which was still over 250 guns including Bofors strong. You have to ask how many more months they were going to have to soften up Malta before the place was neutralised enough for the paras. to go in.

    And just where are these multiple German threats? - their targets are obvious (three airfields and a landing) and the timing of the attack well known thanks to Ultra and radar.

    It could just as easy be a fiasco as a walk-over.
     
  13. phylo_roadking

    phylo_roadking Member

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    V-G...

    Those 1,300 aircraft will be ineffective at night...which was when the RN got munitions and reinforcements into Crete despite the efforts of Richthofen's aircraft by day.

    End the agony of bombardment....or the agony of waiting? ;)

    Quite true...like First Tobruk? The Admin Box? WWII was full of suprises in a good sense, too!

    P.S. the British certainly though France could fall within 4-5 weeks...they were thinking so a week and half after the morning of May 10th!
     
  14. phylo_roadking

    phylo_roadking Member

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    The point remains that Freyberg had to retain forces away from the landing zones in order to react to the amphibious landings - and did. The size and quality of what was on board the two flotillas doesn't matter.

    The reason there were no troops opposing the Italian landings...OR the German landings at Kastelli Kissamou...was that they happened some days AFTER Freyberg had already decided to withdraw to the south coast.

    Where did I say anything about destroying the airfields??? The British incapacitated Ti'qali in 1940 by simply plonking great big boulders from the Luqa quarries on the lakebed! I said that in the hours before invasion all they had to do was tractor out the island's aircraft and plonk them on the various runways and flightlines....and if its a false alarm, get the tractors out again...

    They KNEW about blocking flightlines to stop airlanded troops; Norway, Holland, Crete...

    As for only an hour's warning....I'm afraid not. First of all - the British are going to know everything about the luftwaffe's role in the operation ahead of schedule via ULTRA. They're going to to know the timetable for the operation, and the fields used...

    This latter is important; Sicily historically "enjoyed" a multiplicity of SMALL fields, not able to handle more than a dozen or so aircraft :p Remember, in 1940 the RAF could eventually tell from SIGINT which fields in Northern france and the Low Countries were being used for what units; by the end of September 1940, they could tell from where they could see aircraft formating over France whether the incoming raids were bombers or what. They're going to enjoy the SAME interpretation of radar returns on Malta - they'll "see" aircraft formating over the fields they know are being used by the Transportverband for the invasion. That's the advantage of something like Bletchley Park and the leaky LW wireless protocols...

    Remember Calabria; the RA were NOT as good at attacking naval vessels from the air as they thought they were :p Moving on...look at the effort it took to damage the Illustrious, AND remember that EXCESS moved on to be an otherwise successful round trip of the Med. To be bombed continuously they first have to be found...and Norway etc. showed that RN vessels, fully armed and well trimmed COULD stand off air attack.

    Oh, and please explain why Cunningham can't attempt a night action with Force H???

    Which means the Italians will be only 100 miles from refuge when they turn tail :p The RM can react to ONE of the two approaching RN flotillas - by 1942 they don't have the forces to split and tackle both successfully. It's more likely they pull out and head to port...

    P.S. if Cunningham's approaching forces suffer such heavy air attack...Malta will get somewhat of a respite then...

    You are assuming the underfed and worn British force will make no mistakes at all,

    No, I'm assuming that if the "underfed and worn British force" make various forced and unforced mistakes, they'll be mistakes of their very own, knowing better than to repeat the SAME mistakes that the Commonwealth commanders did on Crete; the commanders of MORE underfed and worn-out troops..."more" both in number AND degree of exhaustion and deprivation.

    No, the worst thing that can happen is of course NO or very limited reinforcement/resupply. Guaranteed resupply/reinforcement depends SOLELY on taking one or more airfields.
    Don't forget that the geography isn't going to go away!!! The second and third waves of paratroopers are going to take as many casualties from the terrain etc. as the first is.

    You're ALSO forgetting that mechanical attrition, issues at the many scratch airfields in Sicily, and of course losses to AA are going to cumulatively reduce the transport fleet each time. Those small fields in Sicily are going to clog up rapidly with damaged aircraft...

    THAT'S a very strange statement...given the sort of scratch (literally scratched out of the desert!) forward "airfields" the Desert Air Force operated Spitfires and many other types on in 1942 and 1943! :rolleyes:

    Also...yes a glider MIGHT survive a landing on rougher European terrain...but would gilders equally survive - rough Maltese terrain??? We're not exactly talking nice springy turf/sod...
     
  15. scipio

    scipio Member

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    Who is this von Borries??? Never heard of him before??

    I looked into the 26,000 British Force. Other than the three battalions of Maltese, the remainder of the Infantry were almost exclusively professional soldiers, Devons, Hampshires, Northumberland Fusiliers, Manchesters etc. (not Territorials or Conscripts).

    Most were used later in Sicily and then DDay with some ending up in Germany - an excellent fighting record - so just why they would lie down and get rolled over in the Maltese sunshine seems absurd. And as I mentioned they were bolstered by an additional MMG Battalion fresh from defeating the Italians in NA.

    While the German Paras had combat experience, the Folgore had not (to my knowledge) - indeed had they even been under shell fire? Add the German habit of denigrating their Allies fighting prowess and obvious difficulty of two different languages, collaboration could be a problem.

    We have not mentioned that the Royal Artillery was supplied with well protected 25 Pounders (not sure how many) which were capable of hitting every inch of the Island from their dug in positions.
     
  16. steverodgers801

    steverodgers801 Member

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    Considering that the Italians had never stood up to the RN why would they now. I would bet the mere threat of an engagement would cause the Italians to run. The French drink wine, The British Rum and the Italians stick to port.
     
  17. Volga Boatman

    Volga Boatman Dishonorably Discharged

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    Steve, the Regia Marina does not deserve that criticism.

    Records show that not only were their light units responsible for delivering by far the greater majority of the troops and stores entrusted to them, but frequently, it cost Italian lives and shipping to do so.

    Don't let the lacklustre performance of the bigger units colour your opinions. British Captains and seamen were fed on a steady diet of anti-Italian Navy propaganda. They were very shocked and surprised to see the lighter units behaving in just the opposite way. The Italians emphasised the small convoy,(they despatched over 1200 of them. Most engagements found the RN attempting to sink the escorts, who would put up a marvellous fight while the cargoe vessels split up and, the gretaer majority of the time, reach their port of call.

    Look at the figures, (quoted above). Rommel despised the Italians and blamed his own supply problems on them consistently. Records show he was scapegoating them to make up for his own lack of performance. Of over 200,000 men despatched in Italian vessels to Rommel, only 17,000 of them failed to arrive on time, and many of these men were resuced and reached the front anyway. German shipping totals and their airlifted troops are not included in this total.
    If Rommel had have followed his orders from Berlin, and done what the Italians wanted him to do, (which was a limited advance in STAGES that would allow their supply train to catch up), the war in Africa would have been markedly different.

    But Rommel was never one for stopping to let his logistical 'tail' catch up. He ALWAYS went to far....and the results were plain for all to see. Rommel failed, and he blamed his Italian allies for something that was entirley the fault of Erwin Rommel's inability to manage his affairs. Just what we would expect from a 'thrusting' infantry officer, untrained in logistics at the Staff College, a political appointee who used his influence with Hitler to get what he wanted.

    Don't be fooled. The Regia Marina were not the cause of Rommel's woes. It was all down to his judgement. And he FAILED.
     
  18. Volga Boatman

    Volga Boatman Dishonorably Discharged

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    Vance Von Borries is the designer of "Air Assault on Crete/Malta", to date, the ONLY game of any kind to tackle Malta and the proposed operation , "Hercules".

    We are not basing our assumptions of British defeat on the QUALITY of the garrison, but rather, the condidtion it was in after 22 months of protracted seige.

    There were NOT 26,000 actual fighting personnel. of the island's garrison of approx. 30,000, only half of those were actual combat troops. And of the rest, service personnel, fitters, armourers, nurses...non-combatants in the strict sence of the word despite the uniform.

    Malta was considered to be "The Hell Hole of the Meditterrainian" by these personnel. Many wanted the invasion to arrive simply to 'get it over with'.

    The design of Von Borries 'Air Assault on Crete' delivers consistently accurate results for just a boardwargame. I own the game and have played the Malta 'gamette many times. I know just how to win with the Axis, as I've described above. If you can win it on the cardboard feild, there is a very good chance of doing the same in reality. The German General Staff were great beleivers in the power of Kreigspeil to train their staff officers. Rommel's "Infantry Greiften" was simply a collection of wargaming 'problems' for infantry officer to 'solve', with Rommel's 'solutions' at the back of the book.

    If the German and Italian Staffs thought that Malta would not last very long, so do historians and wargamers like myself, or designers like Vance von Borries. All of these people look at these historical conundrums with the plain facts of the day in mind. If the wargame testing proves otherwise, the operation is usually cancelled. Only headstrong fools ignore the results and think they know better, like the Japanese Naval staffers who ignored the result when their wargame of their proposed invasion of Midway flunked out with their carriers caught with planes on deck. The umpires stepped in, declared the game 'won' by the IJN team, and promptly lost the battle in excatly the same way they did whilst gaming it.

    Don't be fooled by propaganda thats years old and very outmoded. The lighter units of the Regia Marina performed VERY WELL, and did their job.

    Pity Rommel couldn't....
     
  19. Volga Boatman

    Volga Boatman Dishonorably Discharged

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    I might point out also that the 1300 Italo-German aircraft slated for "Hercules" would have made short work of those 25 pounders, and anything else they set their aircraft to attack. Fleigerkorps X specialized in this style of air attack. Malta's fighter components were being blown apart almost as fast as they could arrive at Luqa and other airfeilds. The sixty one spitfires that arrived on the second and last run made by the USS Wasp would have lasted not very long at all. To be sure, they may have taken down Axis aircraft with them, but 60 odd fighters compared to 1300 attack aircraft spells DOOM for Malta, just as two divisions of paratroopers PLUS the people that would make the lasnding spells DOOM for the garrison, already short of everything that it was.

    Don't let national or service pride get in the way. I'm English by birth, and I'm darned proud of my country and it's military record in WW2. But this does not blind me to the disasters that occurred, or the ones that were possible, given a German assault. The Fallschirmjaeger proved they had what it took to be more than a match for ordinary British infantry, and their elite units as well, (as demonstrated at Primsole Bridge/Catania, in Sicily). Folgore were nothing to be sneezed at, and were simply the best trained, motivated and equipped fighting unit anywhere in Italy. Add to this Ramcke's Brigade of seasoned veterans, PLUS the Von Der Heydte unit dropping in rear areas as they did for the 'Battle of the Bulge'.

    All of these units were well trained, lavishly equipped, and supportted in the best possible way.

    As Jaeger points out so rightly, we have an English garrison that could not afford to make ANY large listakes, whilst the Italo-German forces have much scope for completeing their operational objectives in good time....not neccessarily in good order, and not without casualties.

    So, you have a tough fight, but one side has little or nothing to fight with after all the anti-aircraft weapons are gone or, even more likely, OUT OF AMMUNITION.
     
  20. Volga Boatman

    Volga Boatman Dishonorably Discharged

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    For those interested, the following is Vance von Borries assessment of Malta as published in "The General, Vol 15 no.3, page 14.".....Enjoy!, (bold typeface is mine, to emphsize the relevent points of interest that explain why many people felt that, despite the defenses, Malta WOULD fall....

    FORTRESS MALTA

    Malta is covered with fortifications. Ever since the British occupied the island during the Napoleonic Era the island was considered a naval fortress. During the mid-19th century many coastal fortifications were built and batteries installed. Remnants of these were pressed into service during WW2. One prominent system of fortifications was known as the Victoria Lines. It consisted of numerous weapons pits and small forts., and incorporated a natural defense line running from the Madalena Battery through forts Musts and Tarja to Binjemma Battery. During the 19th century an enemy could occupy the island outside this line, yet Malta could still operate effectively as a naval base. However, by 1940 the range of field howitzers was so great that, at best, these fortifications would serve as the last line of trenches. Given the dimensions of the island, the British had to move their defense seaward and into the skies. Once enemy troops had arrived on Malta, had artillery in action, and had secured supplies then Malta would cease to be a base and essentially would have been captured. The critical factor in the strategic defense of Malta was command of the air. When this was lost, the Royal Navy could not remain. So a study for the struggle for Malta is a study of the air war above.

    The air war over Malta underwent several phases.. There was the first blitz by the Italians in 1940 when the British had only three scratch built Gladiator fighters. After the Italian attack died down the German Luftwaffe arrived in January 1941. On the day of their arrival they inflicted severe damage to the British carrier ILLUSTRIOUS. British naval power then departed the central Mediterranean and the Axis commanded the skies until the invasion of Crete and the Russian Campaign called away the Luftwaffe. The Allied command always desired to maintain Malta's use as a base and during the second half of 1941 Malta became a stop-over point for aircraft flown to Egypt. Malta then had sufficient aircraft to go on the offensive by attacking Axis supply convoys to Africa. This offensive was so effective that in December the Luftwaffe began returning from Russia. As the pressure grew during the next three months the British were forced to send the first Spitfires to the Mediterranean. On 20th of March, 1942, the Axis felt strong enough to begin The Grand Assault, the air blitz to neutralize Malta. By mid-April the Spitfire reinforcements had been reduced through daily air action to six. In this grim situation, the Axis had achieved their greatest control of the air. When on 20 April forty-six Spitfires were flown to Malta from the U.S. Carrier WASP, the Axis superiority was such that they were all shot down within three days. It was this success and the continued Allied weakness that prompted the Axis command to report the complete destruction of Malta's air defense. Presumably the next major step would be the actual landing on Malta. But the very same day this report was made, (10th of May), another sixty-one Spitfires were flown from WASP, (and 17 more on the 18th of May). In one day the picture had changed. Malta was combat ready again.

    The Axis could not invade without air superiority, but even if the Axis could have gained lasting command of the air, they faced several other problems. The spearhead of any attack on Malta would consist of paratroopers. While they could be dropped anywhere on the island, they would need heavy weapons support to break the fortifications. Barring quick capture of an airfield the weapons would have to come across easily defensible beaches dominated by by hills, forts and steep cliffs. The North and East approaches to the island were covered by minefields and considerable coastal artillery. For the sake of the gameit must be assumed that Italian minesweepers would have been successful in clearing the way to St Pauls Bay Beach and Valetta Beach. Once the invader is ashore and has survived the counterattack, he is faced with the necessity of quickly seizing a supply port because the beaches were too narrow to bear heavy supply traffic. In sum, the invasion would depend upon the success of the airborne battalions in capturing the few key points necessary to enable the main invasion force to land successfully.

    Fortress Malta was tough but it faced problems too. first, in consideration of the civil population, Lord Gort, (in command from 7 May, 1942) would have to consider capitulation when food and water supplies ran low as Percival did at Singapore, (15 February, 1942). The equivalent of four reinforced brigades defended the island, but during the spring and summer of 1942 they had become weary, were hungry and malnourished, lost their infantry training edge, and were even split up to provide labor details to remove bomb damage. In some photographs even their uniforms were in tatters. Another problem was at times the AA guns fell silent as sufficient stocks of ammunition had to be available in the event of invasion. Malta was also besieged psychologically; every soldier and civilian watched the convoys and after 22 months of this behaviour a debilitating seige mentality had taken hold. Many were anxious for the Axis to invade just to get the agony over with. On the other hand, the seige united the Maltese people as never before with the result that there were no sabotuers or collaborators.

    An interesting aside to the fortification problem is that the island is honeycombed with caves. Some of the cave systems were so extensive that one writer called the tunnel from Valetta to Rabat "...a highway." Although most cave systems were umknown even to the Maltese, and military use would have been limited to partisan action, the island headquarters at Valetta, most granaries and water reserves, and by 1942, workshops and some aircraft hangars were all underground.




    So there you have it, a very balanced assessment from a game designer whose only interest is historical accuracy so that his design is not only playable, (gives a roughly equal chance of both sides winning,), but simulates the historical situation so that the results are meaningful for anyone studying this question...

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