Should the Axis have tried harder to take Malta?

Really?

TWO things come to mind...

1/ HMS Suffolk at Stavanger-Sola, and

2/ Night!

The Suffolk's race out from Stavanger after bombarding the airfield there in 1940 was one of the instances (discussed in detail on ww2f before) that demonstrated how poor the LW was at attacking shipping.

But any damaged aircraft aren't going to head for home, they're going to divert to the NEAREST friendly airfield and potentially pancake on the runway...

Here's a question - I've a maximum range for the Ju88 of 2500km...but is this bombed-up - or stripped out during initial prototype and A-series testing? A lot of "common" range figures floating round the Internet today are the results from performance testing...no guns, armour, minimum crew etc., etc...does anyone incidently have a proper range for a fully-fuelled, fully-loaded Ju88? I.E. from the manuals?

 

Not a manual but a pilot of a Ju88 A-4 said that it depended on the load and fully equipped with maximum bomb load he said that the max. range was at approx 1730Km to 1800Km. Hope this is good enough as a information.

 

Certainly very interesting...

Heraklion to Valetta is actually 960 km...which means a round trip is actually 1920 kms! Which either means a much reduced bombload...the pilots' load vs range equation ALSO has to include fuel for formating on the outgoing leg, and circling for approach on return...OR a diversion to Sicily to refuel for the homeward leg...which means the traffic control problem on Sicily is NOT necessarily helped by having the LW operate from other areas. In fact, the difficulties in coordinating all that might make it MORE difficult than attempting to operate from Sicily and Southern Italy only!

 

So you are going to come within 100 miles of a major air base in daylight (even at 30kts you still need over 3 hours to close in and another 3 to get out, and if the RN squadron includes anything larger than a cruiser 30 is not doable) , rush in after dusk through derfensive minefields at flank speed, face shore batteries (including a couple of 15" ones if you go for Gela), endure sub and eboat ambush, that close inshore even the MAS can operate safely especially in Summer, then repeat the procedure going out again and risk facing an enemy fleet, that is based less than 200 miles away with half empty magazines all to have a chance to knock out a few planes that may well take off and relocate as soon as they know you are approaching? Doesn't look like a good plan to me.

So the Crete planes are going to have to shuttle to Sicily if going in with full loads, assuming they know the Alex squadron is in port they can do that, they will be back at Crete by the time it's in range. Organizing a shuttle flight was SOP for the LW, they were doing it all the time to escort the convoys, and will not complicate things much.

IMO the LW had learned a few things on how to attack ships since the Norwegian campaign, while the RN still had a rather weak AA, as you quote HMS Suffolk you may look at two of her sisters Doshetshire and Cornwall (there were no County in the Med at the time).

 

Unfortunately just back from hospital so have not had time to read all your excellent comments - but Volga baby when did I say the RM would run away?

They were morally, doctrinally and in practice no match for the RNavy as almost every encounter proved. In a night attack the Italian Navy was practically blind and this is when you would have seen the RN turn up - BTW in Malta Summer nights are little different to winter so there are plenty of hours of darkness where the RN would be free from Luftwaffe attention and happy to give the RM another lesson in seamanship.

Someone mentioned Hamilcars and German tanks appearing to decimate the defenders - in Operation Varsity the last para action of the War the British and Americans dropped two Divisions of Para in one drop on a very depleted German Division (very poor quality including Volksturm )and a FJ which no longer justified its name. Just prior to the drop the British and Canadians had sent Commandos and DD Tanks and Buffalos to pin the Germans ie nothing could be more in the Allied favour - yet the Allied Paras despite all the lessons learn form Market Garden still took a big hit but more importantly only 2 out of 10 Hamilcars survived the landing (into nice open muddy fields). It just is not easy.

Jumping back to Maleme (had time to read Bevor - Crete again), only one Bofor managed to fire (only four there in any case at Maleme) thanks to Freyberg not giving the warning that the attack would be on the 20th and the local idiot Royal Marine Commander not passing on the fact he had detected the German airfleet on the radar. Bevor maintained that Freyberg could have easily sent 5 battalions to the scene and mopped up the Maleme attack. Dear old Gort could not have performed as badly as this.

 

Sub and eboat ambush??? You seem to assume they KNOW you're coming...

An enemy fleet? As noted before, many times, the RN tried on many occasions to bring the RM to a major confrontation...INCLUDING by bombarding shore targets in Italy!

And of course - not matter how many aircraft are destroyed or not destroyed on the ground - the fact that you've done it once will force the KM/RM to keep their coastal forces to the coastal waters of Sicily to patrol rather than have them operating around Malta No matter how good they are or aren't - they can't be in two places at once...

The problem is, however, unlike convoy escorting - they'll have to do it into and back out of airfields clogged with dozens of damaged aircraft, overworked black men trying to repair/refuel combat aircraft and reload/refuel transports. If it doesn't all fall apart - at the very least it'll severely slow the turnround time on Sicily-based combat sorties AND resupply flights.

And yet...as late as May 1941 in the Med...events off Crete proved that RN ships with time to re-arm and trim properly COULD stand off LW air attack in exactly the same way as Norway; it was only when forced by circumstances to not manouvre to avoid fall of shot, or ordered back into the combat area with depleted magazines, that the RN lost vessels off Crete.

HMS' Cornwall and Dorsetshire? Engaged and sunk by carrier aircraft with years of training and months of experience...there's a distinct shortage of those on the Axis side. The Japanese success rate that day in actually hitting their targets FAR outmatched anything the LW or RA was able to perform on armed, trimmed, manouvering RN vessels. Compare the six misses but nine hits - that's 3/5s of bombs dropped - on the Cornwall with, say, the LW's performance on the Suffolk...

 

Phylo, WI’s have to be based on reality and cause & effect; otherwise those dastardly Fairies & Aliens sneak up on you and ruin everything. Your examples only prove that things can be changed a bit when EVERYONE gets on board, and general pre-approved strategy is still adhered to. That wasn’t the case with Malta, not by a long shot.


Was Malta worth it?
The people who mattered, not the arm chair generals, said yes … and no. In April/May, given Malta’s plight, Churchill and CoS considered having Auchinleck move forward with an attack on Rommel, to seize Cyrenaica, and its key airfields (in many respects, of greater value than Malta itself) in their view, such was Malta’s value. However the Middle East Defense Committee (composed of the Minister of State, and the 3 Commanders-in-Chief, whoever they happened to be at the time i.e. the guys on the scene) disagreed, moving up the assault date was a mistake, it would take 2 months or so to take Cyrenaica and get anything out of it if successful, but going too early invited the same problems that Operation CRUSADER had experienced i.e. the piecemeal destruction of British armour, supply probs. etc. The enemy was still using up Luftwaffe resources better spent in Egypt, Malta was on the defensive at the time and had no current offensive effect on Rommel’s supplies, and was thus of no value to the coming attack on Rommel anyway – if attacking too early meant Malta, then Malta was NOT worth it. The effects from Malta’s loss short term would be negligible, provided Suez and communications with India were secured (Operation IRONCLAD helped ensure this). CoS consideration was also given to further remove forces from Auchinleck to shore up defenses in India, if that was the case then Auchinleck wouldn’t go forward anyway. Churchill wasn’t happy, Auchinleck missed his punch and was forced to retreat anyway, PEDESTAL was planned and sent to supply Malta (RN shelling airfields on Sicily mid-1942 was unlikely, the Inshore Squadron was too busy shelling Rommel's forces when they could, which took precedence), enter Alexander and Montgomery who’d sit and build up, and would destroy Rommel’s Army. Ultimately it can be said that most agree that the Middle East Defense Committee got more right than wrong.



Maltese sentiments?
In summary, the Maltese people were pro-British by a large majority. British officers had retired there over the years, and there was a mixed British/Maltese nobility, most prominent being the Strickland family, in control of the Gov’t i.e. the Constitutionalists. But the people themselves had been “Italianized” to a fair extent, simply due to life within the Italian orbit, nationalist groups which wanted closer political ties to the Italians had sprung up. In the early 30’s a Nationalist gov’t had been elected for the 1[SUP]st[/SUP]time; the British knee-jerk response was to withdraw the Maltese Constitution, Malta reverted to colony status. While the Maltese were upset with the British, Italian actions nullified any true discontent; the Maltese cared little for Mussolini, and when he attacked Abyssinia they were appalled, and repelled. In that light, the British provided the Maltese with a new, weakened Constitution, an election held just prior to the war was a Constitutionalist landslide victory. Later, when Gov. Dobbie considered surrendering the Island, members of the Maltese gov’t appealed to London to fight on. Dobbie, a religious intolerant considered as expendable as Malta was when he was appointed, was replaced. Was all this unanimous? Not likely, there may have been some dissent, no doubt, but one was much more likely to find RAF pilots carried upon Maltese shoulders, Luftwaffe aircrew killed in the fields by the locals if caught, than organized demonstrated anti-British action.


Lord Gort?
Gort was sent to replace Dobbie because he was considered “a fighter”, the Maltese were leery at first because by reputation they thought they’d gotten “an evacuator”, they soon realised that he was indeed a fighter. But Gort was initially only nominally in charge of the Army, he had no direct command, and no authority over the RN & RAF. Maj. Gen. D.M.W. Beak, VC i.e. “Terrible Beak” was in command of the Army on Malta, answerable directly to Gen. Auchinleck. A no-nonsense spit & polish type he’d been sent in early 42 to stiffen up Dobbie, place the Island more directly under Egypt’s control, and stiffen up the troops. He was universally reviled, but left only after the invasion threat had passed. Gort pointed out to the CoS that he’d been sent to defend the Island, but command arrangements such as they were, had been set up for offense, London agreed and beyond Governor, he was made Commander in Chief of all armed forces on the Island.



Air-Sea Rescue?
Yes, motor launches under the command of an RAF Flt. Lt., were known to go out over 90 miles to retrieve downed aircrew if they had to, numbers recovered July 1941 – July 1942 were 112 British & Commonwealth, 26 German, and 19 Italian. Malta and Rome actually had a good relationship in this regard, they routinely radioed each other with info. on downed aircrew & retrievals, ship’s crew in boats etc., but fighter protection was required after the Germans strafed a launch, killing several aircrew.



Littorios?
Lottorio had received either 2 aerial torpedo hits or 1 torpedo and 1 bomb hit in June, the British say the former, the Italians the latter. The strike aircraft had been sent from Malta, Beaufort torpedo bombers had attacked in daylight, torpedo armed Wellingtons at night, I lean towards the British here. In any case, she was out of action for 3 months and would be for Herkules. Roma wasn’t going to be used either, brand spanking new and never fully worked up she would only steam some 2 thousand odd miles in her entire service before being sunk. That left just Veneto, and the Dorias with their main battery 12.6” guns, guns with a shell dispersion problem - even worse than the Littorios - caused by the increased bore decreasing the strength of the barrel; in short, the barrels “drooped". Problems were further compounded by excessive wear; move in close to hit anything specific, but risk being hit by more accurate artillery. Malta’s coastal artillery had been modernized before WWII, the old stuff was removed; 9.2” and 6” guns for counter-bombardment vs warships at distance, the “twin 6’s” i.e. 6 pdr.’s for smaller vessels. British Army land based Mk 10 9.2’s on Mk 7 mounts could rotate 360 degrees, elevate -5 to +35 degrees, good for 36,700 yards, they were much more accurate than the 12.6's. The standard Mk 15B APC shell could penetrate 6” of armour at 14,000 yards (Hogg), and there are serious claims that it was the best British APC shell ever produced (DiGiulian). Apparently, a pair of 9.2’s near Dover engaged CERBERUS at 17 miles heading away at speed, and was credited with 3 hits before finally being outranged.



Armour?
Malta had 10-14 tanks, depending on the source; a mixed bag of Matilda IIs and Vickers Mk VICs if it’s 10, throw in some Crusaders if it’s 14.



Glider Landing?
Malta was scored with small fields separated by short rock walls, all on an undulating surface of small hills and ridges, with a limited amount of soil. When the RAF attempted to set up ground control interception radar for night interception that required a 360 degree area level and free of obstruction for just a few hundred yards, they couldn’t find it. Even after 400 men toiled for 3 weeks to build a suitable site, the radar didn’t like it, and another area had to be sought. The only places to land an aircraft on the island without mishap, was on the runways, and even then there were problems. Because of the nature of the island surface, it had been difficult enough to find anywhere to build runways. Takali for example was built on what had been a small lake, when it rained for an extensive period of time, the aerodrome filled up with water and was unusable.



Malta itself?
From what I’ve seen here, I question whether anyone truly understands Malta’s role and fit in Med. strategy??? To be brief, Malta had figured prominently as an RN base since the end of the Napoleonic Wars, but that changed with the development of the bomber, and its proximity to Fascist Italy. With war on the horizon Malta seemed untenable, the Admiralty made arrangements 1) to base the Med. Fleet in Alexandria and 2) use French African bases in the Central Med. as required. That all changed when France fell, ABC felt he needed and could still use Malta, and called upon the Army, and the RAF to defend it. The stretched-to-the-limit RAF wasn’t in favour, but reluctantly agreed. Facilities were built up and improved upon, fighters sent as they became available. Soon, the RAF was using Malta as its staging base for reinforcement and communications with the Middle East and India, then again with ABC’s urging, offensive strike forces were sent to interdict Axis re-supply.

In June 1941, Air Vice Marshal Hugh Llloyd, a “Bomber Man” was put in command of RAF Malta to improve the strike capability; he soon began to improve the place, aircraft protection was key. By May 1942, with the aid of civilian contractors, his airmen and the Army, Lloyd had constructed cavernous aircraft maintenance and repair facilities underground at Takali and Luqa, some 43 miles of roads connecting over 800 dispersal points, and 358 bomb proof aircraft pens. So extensive were the works that Luqa, the field at Safi and Hal Far were linked as one, Takali was hugely enlarged. The pens were ingeniously constructed when sandbags gave way to jerry cans; some 60,000 cans filled with 3,500 tons of earth and rock went into making a 90’X90’ pen for a Wellington, there were 27 of them, ¼ of that effort produced a pen fit for a fighter, there were 205 of them, another 34 for Swordfish/Albacores, ½ the effort and you had a pen for a Blenheim, Maryland/Baltimore, or Beaufort/Beaufighter, there were 67 of them, another 25 pens housed fuel bowsers, runway rollers etc# It was this infrastructure that historically saved Malta, the fact that 400 soldiers were permanently assigned to each aerodrome, trucks filled with earth and rock to repair damaged runways (or block them) were constantly on standby, and each pen was its own fort ringing the runways does not bode well for ANY unauthorised landing, much less an attacker.

Aircraft from the UK routinely staged through Gibraltar and Malta to Cairo and beyond, that includes reinforcement aircraft, fuelled, maintained and sent on, and this continued throughout the Blitz. Reinforcement aircraft means aircraft sent to squadrons in Egypt, usually bombers, some 45% of the total sent (most of the rest through Takoradi). Luqa remained open throughout the Blitz, 339 reinforcement aircraft staged through Malta during the worst of the bombing of late Feb, and March & April (Churchill attempted to goad Middle East Defense Committee, these numbers would be lost if Malta was allowed to fall). There was also a routine Lodestar shuttle, bringing in aircraft spares, mainly light stuff. Taken into account, this is why I stated “the available aircraft numbers are skewed, not just bombers” earlier. If required, aircraft, crews and airmen could be retained (historically, Lloyd had a reputation as a thief in this regard). Although they didn’t appear in strength or service numbers, damaged but otherwise easily repaired aircraft were retained until the arrival of bulk spares like engines, wing spars, and fuselage sections, numbers of available aircraft fluctuated radically in this regard. Attack aircraft could be staged in also. Historically, in order to support the June convoys, Malta’s returned Wellington bombers were sent to Egypt, 36 Wellington and Beaufort torpedo aircraft were sent in, armed and fuelled on Malta to attack the Italian Fleet. It was aircraft from these forces that damaged Littorio referred to above, and the Heavy Cruiser Trento, which was then sunk by an RN sub. The torpedo forces then staged out again.


After a year, Lloyd was sent to Tedder’s staff in Egypt, he would end the war in command of the RAF bomber forces being prepared to move East to bomb Japan, and would retire in command of Bomber Command. In came Keith Park, a “Fighter Man”, who would build on Lloyd’s work, and improve fighter intercept.

I stated earlier, “If Malta survived (and it would)”, in part because of what’s above. But there’s alot more to it, these are just corrections and additional info. to factual errors that I feel have already been made on this thread (I confess though that I haven't read it all, not even close). Taken in totality Malta COULD persevere IF there was a will to, IF something like Herkules/C3 was launched. But Herkules/C3 was a gamble best not made, Kesselring’s Luftwaffe snowbirds had largely neutralized Malta’s offensive strike aircraft and submarine forces, IF they had been allowed to remain, perhaps reinforced, instead of returning for the Soviet Campaigning season that could’ve continued. Still, air and submarine forces from Alex & Gib had taken up the challenge, sinking’s went on, ports to the east of Tripoli and Benghazi were denied and the war against the Soviets was always more important.

 

Almost forgot the map!

View attachment 16791

Note the glider fields. As I stated earlier, the RAF discovered C3/Herkules preparations without the benefit of ULTRA enigma decripts, there weren't any. Maryland/Baltimore recon. photos showed the glider fields, they'd been set up next to railway sidings, Intel photo analysis got it right. Enigma decripts only revealed troop deployments AFTER C3/Herkules had been called off, it was more a matter of redeployment. Given the time required between Enigma interception, decription, analysis and appropriate dissemination, it's debatable whether or not it could've been used, at least on Malta at a tactical level before the actual assault, during this period of the war. No matter, the forces on Malta knew what was up, and were watching.

 

I disagree on the damage on Littorio, BTW it was discussed earlier in the thread, her damage was light (and pretty well documented, see image) they could have gotten her ready if they wanted. IMO the 9.2" don't have a good chance of achieving much, visibility in the Med in spring summer is much too good for them to survive bombardment and air attack once the open up. I would be curious to know if all were still operational by 1942. AFAIK dispersal figures for the 9.2" Mk XI were bad (the issue came up at the enquiry for the the Goeben fiasco) and supercharged Mk IX and Mk X are likely to be worse as they would have similar initial velocity on a shorter barrel.
I've seen gliders land in the Aeolian islands and those vulcanic rocks are probably worse than Malta, they are terraced nearly to the top with the remainders of olive grooves and wines, you can land a glider in a very short space, landing speed is 100 km/h or less, doesn't take a lot to kill that velocity.
In the spring/summer you have lots of daylight in the Med, it' 6:00 here in Rome ad visibility is aready good, you can rely on no more than 10 hours of darkness, that means a 20 knot fleet wishing for a 2hours action needs to be 80 miles away from it's target at dusk, that's well within Me 109 range even adding the distance from Sicily to Malta, historically the RN didn't risk heavy ships close cto Malta once the LW got to the scene. Chances of a a RN squadron from Gibraltar or Alex achieving tactical surprise in 1942 are slim, axis air recon wasn't very good but the Med is packed with other axis intelligence assets (subs, trawlers and air assets on other missions). It's safe to assume the RM will accept combat only if it has superiority and with a 4-5 knots advantage and operating that close to it's bases it can do so, btw that's the reason Malta was considered indefensible at one time, with the air threat preventing basing there sustained ops 2000 miles from base were not considered possible, for one Brithish destroyes didn't have the legs to make it to Malta and back at reasonable speed without refueling there, history proved that air attacks alone could not make the base completely inoperable so it could be defended.
Operational surprise for the axis was impossible, tactical surprise is a different story, they get to choose the attack date and time and can wear down the defenders with feints as much as they want if they have the fuel.
As someone pointed out one weakness of the Italian position is that if the main fleet is at Taranto it's too far to prevent a raid against the Ligurian coast, as happed historically, with over 500 miles to go it's 5 knot advantage is not enough to catch the raid as they would only be sure of it's intentions when it sails past Corsica, and don't have the fuel reserves to reposition on a mere suspicion, but any 1942 raid is a big risk.

BTW if that map reflects allied intel it's not very good, Gela is on the coast not in the interior (and Sciacca, near Agrigento also on the coast, is missing it should be close to the Bo Rizzo marker while the true Bo Rizzo is between Trapani and Marsala).

gela - Google Maps


View attachment 16792
BTW the torpedo hit was nearly identical to the critical one on the Taranto night, but by 1942 damage control had improved a lot. The bomb damage looks little more than a paint job, there is a pic of Mussolini standing in front of it.

 

OOPs!

That was Steverogers posting that the RM would 'run away', many apologies for that.

But really, this HAS been a most stimulating debate, even if we agree to disagree.

I still think the Axis had all the right cards in place to secure a victory in July of 1942. Many Italians and more than a few historians agree with this assessment.

This incident is the major reason why Rommel, AS A STRATEGIST and corps level commander, was quite over-rated.

Many contemporary German officers agree with this as well. They despised Rommel for his arrogance and getting his way with Hitler far too often. One wonders what the African campaign would have achieved had Rommel paid more attention to advice, not just from his own Whermacht either...

 

I personally think that we won´t agree, but VB is correct, that this is a very stimulating but very good debate.:S!

 

I wonder if the memoirs of Johannes 'Macky' Steinhoff can shead yet more light on the axis attitude and prep for Malta. Steinhoff was operating out of Gerbini, and his book was called "The Straits of Messina". I used to have a copy of it, but alas, I cannot find it anywhere. I can only remember bits and pieces of the text, including an appalling story of a young and very promising fighter pilot in Steinhoff's squadron. He got his first kill with a masterly piece of flying to put himself on the tail of the allied fighter. This kid was very badly burnt in a crash a short time later, and I can still remember that terrible feeling, reading of Steinhoff bending over him, his hair was all 'gluggy' from the flames, and he couldn't talk.

War is such a bloody waste of talented people.

 

My Dad has seen him often during his time with the Bundeswehr as he was Günther Rall´s driver. He said that both were great guys!

 

Not likely we will agree but it's fun. And it forces me to do some research, just picked up a copy of the Ufficio Storico della Marina's accounts of naval actions from 4/41 to 9/43 (and decided not to buy the companion 6/40 tp 3/41 volume and one on Italian convoys to Greece , Sicily and Sardina becouse of price. I know I will regret that, especially the one on the "secondary" convoys for which it's nearly impossible to find sources, contrary to the ones to NA). Let's see if there are some insights in there, there are usually lots copies of originals in those books.

 

TOS, i like your postings to the RM! There is a lot to learn for me! Thanks for the efforts.

 

Marmat, thanks for your detailed post - I have a couple of further points, and a coupe,of questions arising!

In total, yes...but on a rolling basis, the picture at the time wouldn't have always looked so rosy

Any idea of the date when this occured?

Somewhere I have full details of what arrived where and when, their assignments etc. culled when I was researching the VICs on AHF and ww2talk, have to find it all again.

Have to agree wholeheartedly with this; and Luqa was only really cleared and made useable in the first place by trucking it's cut rock to Ti'Qali. See my previous comments about how narrow the flightline was there nevertheless, and having to use the road from Hal Far to Luqa as Luqa's apron!

It's worth noting that during the 1940 invasion scare period in the UK, two companies of infantry were considered enough for airfield defence!

Marmat - having discovered preparations, do you happen to know if the RAF flew a retasked/increase photo recce against those fields?

 

I would hesitate to compare modern one- or two-man sporting gliders with heavily-loaded WWII-era military gliders; looking again at the preparations for Eben Emael, one of the basic problems they had was stopping them within the required distance on the top of the fort. They tried everything from wrapping barbed wire round the skids to altering the design of the skids..at least one version proving inadequate...and a later version being incorported into the DFS...however, as I noted before, I'm not sure if such preparations for Western European clay-backed grass would have worked in a Maltese environment...left alone the hardpacked runways at Hal Far and Luqa!

 

Landing speed of a Troop Carrying British Glider WW2 was about 90 miles per hour (150 KM p hr) and mass obviously far in excess of a modern light glider. Slow enough to be a sitting duck (but with a momentum that takes some stopping) and there are tales of the troops shooting the pilots as they try to land at Maleme . Unfortunately at Maleme there was no AA left when the gliders appeared but even so many of the gliders broke up on the dried up river bed.

 

TOS, I’m only going to clarify issues in regards to what I recently posted, I’m not going forward with any “What-If” stuff involving seasonal daylight/night conditions, RN attack etc.


Re: Littorio,
Sources vary, Bragadin largely poo-poos the damage, Bagnasco & Grossman state “Time needed for repairs, … about 3 months”, but Garzke & Dulin provide more detail:

Re: Bomb damage, “a rangefinder hood was damaged as was the barbette, and several holes were punched in the forecastle deck from bomb splinters”

Torpedo damage, “the torpedo detonated near frame 194 on the starboard bow and tore a huge hole in the shell plating (photo similar to yours provided). About 1,600 metric tons of water flooded the double bottom and lower compartments in the bow. Some 350 tons of counterflooding aft helped to improve the trim and remove the list. … Repairs were completed by 27 August 1942, but the ship was destined to carry out no more combat missions.”

Littorio would still require post-repair sea trials, I don’t see her available in July, and I don’t see her participating in Herkules.

Re: 9.2” guns
I think you have faulty info, that comes from using naval sources (Navweapons perhaps?), for Army artillery. By “similar initial velocity on a shorter barrel”, could you be confusing the British/US 9.2” Howitzer, for the 9.2” 46.7 cal. Mk 10 Gun? They’re quite different.

Using sources for Army weapons, 9.2” coastal gun installation in Empire ports continued throughout the war, a Mk 15 being introduced as late as 1940; in 1944, 9.2’s were being readied for use against the Siegfried Line, but they were never sent. Of course Malta’s were still in operation in 1942, the scrap had been removed in the 20’s, modern guns, installations, and fire control left & sent in their stead. These 9.2’s featured upgrades like “wash-out” gear; a water jet built into the chamber squirted a stream of water after firing to eliminate fllash-back, and increase rate of fire. The “Twin 6’s” had a firing rate of up to 120 rounds/min., on that night in July 1941 when the Italians chose to test the defenses, they required a mere 28 rounds/gun/target destroyed, or 15 seconds firing per turret – pretty outstanding work. Don’t mistake the hundreds of hodge-podge guns of mere “anti-invasion artillery” Hitler set up to defend Europe’s Atlantic Coast, for Coastal Artillery, they were not.

Remember, “For make no mistake about it, the Coast gun was the master of the ship, and whenever the opportunity presented itself, this was proved beyond any doubt.”
– Ian “Gunner” Hogg

Lastly, I have to wonder what makes anyone think that any of these emplacements wouldn’t “survive bombardment and air attack once they open up”, related to C3/Herkules, when they were targeted and bombed and strafed repeatedly, and over, and over, and over again during Kesselring’s Blitz, and remained???

Re: Gliders
I’ve asked myself whether the Allies would’ve considered landing gliders on small fields separated by short rock walls, on an undulating surface of small hills and ridges, with a very limited amount of soil hardened rock, much less on volcanic rocks, terraces with olive groves and vines, when preparing for Overlord. I’ve concluded, despite overcoming challenges of their own, not a chance.


Phy, the RAF routinely sent Marylands & Baltimores to recon Sicily and points beyond to search for a variety of things, such as ports staging ships attempting to resupply Rommel, escorting warships, and Luftwaffe bases; anywhere as required, or directed. Gort's status was changed from Gov. to CiC on the 15th of May, 1942.

Hope this helps.

 

I see several points of contention of the utility of the 9.2" guns vs the Dorias.
1) You continue to ignore the threat they represent to the decks of the Dorias at something over 25,000 yards.
2) The fire control advantages of the guns.
a) They have a very wide baseline as they don't have to be mounted on a ship. So much better resolution especially at long range.
b) At least some sources imply radar rangeing was available.
c) Both tie into a well equipped and hardened fire direction center.
3) The accuracy advantage of the 9.2" guns over the 12.6" guns of the Dorias.
4) Gun emplacements proved particualarly hard to take out by either naval gun fire or bombing from what I've read. Indeed Normandy was one of the few areas were I remember a ship winning such an exchange and it had edges the Italians wouldn't in this scenario.
5) The performance data we both started using was for the older 9.2" design with only 15 degrees of elevation and no supercharges. I think Maramt's data includes the performance with the newer 35 degree elevation mounts and possibly with the supercharges.

I'm also somewhat sceptical of the viability of a slow battleship steering straight line courses just outside an opposing submarine base.