Sommervilles Chance

In March 1942 Japanese Adm Nagumo was ordered to take a portion of the IJN into the Indian Ocean to strike at the British fleet. The overall objective was to eliminate any residual naval threat to Japans position in SE Asia. Nagumos total force included the carriers : Akagi, Ry?j?, Hiry?, S?ry?, Sh?kaku, and Zuikaku. These were accompanied by a battleship squadron.

Adm Sommerville RN had command of the recently arrived Warspite, four older WWI era Revenge class battleships eight crusiers, fifteen destroyers, and just five submarines. The aircraft carriers were the Indomitable & Forminable.

Warned by radio intel Sommerville was able to keep his primary fleet out of danger. However the intial Japanese raids between 31 March & 4 April sank some 23 cargo ships, three crusiers, and the carrier Hermes. Sommerville determined to try for a night action against the Japanese. Using a few air recon reports and some signals intel he played cat and mouse with the Japanese for several days. Nagumo was unable to make a daylight airstrike & Somerville unable to make a midnight rendevouz.

So heres the question: Sommerville's best shot at his night action seems to have been on the night of the 5/6th april. WI Nagumo had been a little delayed in recovering his airstrikes of the 5th April and been caught after dark by Somerville ?

 

I'm not overly familiar with naval warfare but an interesting factor would be if the strike pilots decided to take on the battleships (much more presitgious target or the carriers (much more important target). Remember in the Falklands War where the Argentine pilots broke through British CAPs but attacked warships instead of supply or troop ships.

 

Sommerville was trying for a night action with surface ships. With only two effective carriers (the Hermes was smaller & had sent its air group ashore for some reason) vs the Japanese six carriers Sommerville was realistic about a daylight action.

I'd Imagine he would look for a opportunity for a daylight airstrike if this night action was sucessfull. That would most likely be against damaged stragglers.

In the Coral Sea, Midway, and Solomons battles the Jaanese carrier pilots placed priority on attacking the carriers. When given a choice the attack leaders directed most of the aircraft at the US carriers. perhaps the pilots would have done the same in March?

 

The R class were barely capable of 20 knots in 1942/43 the Warspite could do a bit more but there was no way Sommerville could have forced an action on his faster opponent unless Nagumo made a mistake.
The four Hiei class battlecruisers may not be a match for the British squadron by themselves but if we take the Nagumo and Ozawa squadrons together there is a huge number of long lance torpedoes to even up the odds, if we go by what happened to Royal Oak and Barham the torpedo defence of the R and QE classes is not that great. So maybe it's best for Sommerville he didn't make the intercept.

 

That my take, a error by the Japanese. Sommerville is credited with stalking the Japnese hoping for such. Nagumo conversely hoped to catch the Brits in daylight with his aircraft. The two caried on like a shy pair at the dance for three daybefore Nagumo retired his fleet to Singapore to refuel. Sommervilles best shot may have been on the first night of this, perhaps due to a delay in the japanese striking Colombo and recovering their aircraft. Some of those erroneous reports reconissance pilots often make could contribute.

The one big advantage the Brits had were their search and gunnery radars. They would have a chance to orient on the Japanese before they were spotted. The torpedos were certainly deadly. At the battle of Sunda Straits the Houston & Perth were taken out by them, along with five Japanese transports. Something like 87 torps launched by the Japanese ships with four connecting to a enemy ship. When they interrogated the US & Australian survors the IJN officers were embarassed to learn neither Allied ship was equipped with torpedos that night.

The several night actions in the Solomons went both ways with the torpedos sometimes winning the battle and other times doing little.

Do you have a refrence for exactly what each side brought? I've some gross numbers for the Brit Indian Ocean fleet, but nthing for the fleet that was actualy aimed at the Japanese.

 

Re: Indian Ocean Raid 1942 by Takao on 01 Jan 2009 19:39

Online A brief overview with a break down of opposing forces: http://www.combinedfleet.com/btl_rio.htm

Timeline with a break down of Japanese Forces: http://pacific.valka.cz/forces/ijn/indocean.htm

Good Overview: http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo7/no4/stuart-eng.asp

A brief overview: http://ww2db.com/battle_spec.php?battle_id=7

Books A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy by Paul S. Dull Combined Fleet Decoded by John Prados

Earlier descriptions suggested Sommerville was trying for a surface action. The third website decribes a plan to us radar equipped Albacores to make a torpedo attack at night when the Japanese air defense would be reduced. The first website shows the composition of the two fleets, tho the tactical fomations remain unknown.

susposing better information had been available and the midnight Albacore attack could be launched. How effective would it have been?

 

I would suspect that the Japanese would have trashed Sommerville's fleet with no big effort. The Japanese were the masters of the night naval engagement at that time. Sommerville would have known nothing about Japan's trump card in such an engagement: The Long Lance torpedo. His battleships would have been sitting ducks for these weapons.
Given the Japanese performances off Guadalcanal I doubt that the British would stand much chance. I would think that Sommerville would have quickly retired after the first wave of torpedoes reached his ships with telling effect. From what we know of the R and QE classes in terms of taking damage as few as two hits on one of them would have been crippling. Three would have been disasterous.

In 1942 radar would not be an overwhelming advantage for the British. Their search sets are still long wave metric ones and of dubious quality in many cases. While they would give a decent warning they would do nothing to prevent or warn the British of a torpedo assault.
Their gunnery sets are likewise only really good for ranging and not generally tied into the fire control. Again, it doesn't give them a huge advantage any more than radar initially did for the US at Guadalcanal or elsewhere in the Solomons in 1942.

 

The combinedfleet site seems to list only Nagumo, and the 6 then 5 CVs look like the Kaga had some problem.

Roskill, who had access to the classiffied RN reports when writing, does not report a "night surface action" as Sommerville's plan but a night aircraft carrier strike and stresses that the R battleships were "more a liability than an asset".

For Sommerville (source Roskill) I have:
CVs Indomitable, Formidable and Hermes,
BBs Warspite, Resolution, Revenge, Ramilles and Royal Sovereign
Two heavy and five light cruisers including the dutch Heemskerk. The heavies are obviously Dorsetshire and Cornwall and the lights most likely old C, D or E class ships.
Sixteen destroyers and seven submarines.

This is what I have for Nagumo:
1st, 2nd and 3rd CV division Akagi, Hiryu, Soryu, Shokaku, Zuikaku
Battleships (VA Mikawa) Kongo, Hiei, Haruna, Kirishima
Cruisers: Tone, Chikuma, Abukuma (CL)
9 Destroyers
So we have 32 14' guns 16 8' and two 120+ 610mm torpedo broadsides (the japanese destroyers had reloads ant the heavy cruisers 12 or 16 tubes).
Ozawa had:
4th carrier division Ryujo
Cruisers: Chokai, Mikuma, Mogami, Kumano, Suzuya, Yura (CL)
4 Destroyers (Roskil quotes 8 DDs)
Which add another 50 8' guns and another 60+ torpedoes to the broadside.

I believe British radar sets of 1942 were not fully capable of long range gunnery control, the only scenario where I see a british advantage is a medium to long range engagement (10.000+) that would most likely be inconclusive as neither side is very likely to hit anything at night at that range. If Sommerville hoped for a Matapan (so below 5000m range) he probably would have gotten a Savo as contrary to the Italians the Japanese night training was excellent. It would have taken incredible luck for the sort of torpedo salvo they were capable of to miss and so we go back to the old BBs vulnerability to torpedoes shown with Barham and Royal Oak. His best chance was a night Albacore attack and I think that's what he tried to do.

As to why Nagumo retreated japanese sources are not very specific but he had accomplished his mission, Ozawa's rampage sank 23 merchant ships for ships for over 110.000t and he was probably low of fuel after days of intensive air operations and high speed steaming, in the meantime the British pulled back the battle fleet to East Africa.

 

Weren't some of the British planes at this point equipped with radar primarily for night strikes? That could have added another element.

 

I've had a couple people tell me of a plan for a night air torpedo attack. One of them seems to have been citing the book by Dull mentioned by Tako in my previous post. In reading Costello 'The Pacific War 1941-45' I had taken his remark to mean a night surface action. But, now folks are telling me the Albacore torpedo bombers had a search radar with a 20-30km range, and those squadrons had been practising night torpedo attacks.

A second indicator is that Sommerville had the Warspite with his two good carriers and the other four older batleships manuvering in a seperate B team. If he was seriously looking for a surface action one could think of possibly better groupiings for the battleships and crusiers.

The question of Japanese skill at night combat occured to me long ago when I first read of this action. It also occured to me the British had a reputation for night actions as well. At this point I'm nt going to try to guess what he may or may not have been thinking for any surface action.

Nagumos retirement seems to have been dictated formost by his fuel. I have not found anyone who quotes him otherwise. Perhaps not locating the main British fleet made the expidition seem at a end.

 

I have always been under the impression that Summerville was hoping for a night carrier engagement using his 45 radar-equipped Albacores. The Japanese had nothing to effectively counter this form of attack and, with some luck, it could have gutted Nagumo's force. I would be most surprised to learn Summerville thought he had much chance in a night surface battle, if only because his heavy ships were so slow compared to the Japanese units. Summerville did have five BB's to Nagumo's four old, but fast, BB's. From what I have read, Nagumo spent several days dancing around, Nagumo trying to get in a daylight air attack, while Summerville was angling for a night air attack.

I'm not sure Summerville was even aware of the Type 93 torpedoes performance as this was quite early in the war and certainly before the Americans learned of the Type 93. But the Type 93 wasn't always so devastatingly effective as most people seem to think. I need only mention the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal.

A good source for the OOB of both sides is Order of Battle - Indian Ocean Raids - 31 March through 10 April 1942 Note that the "Malay" force on the Japanese side was not with Nagumo, but off raiding merchant shipping in the Bay of Bengal

 

I don't think Nagumo was any more aware of the radar equipped Albacores than Sommerville was of the Type 93 torpedo, his manouvers do not show an attempt to avoid a night action, his targets were the ports where he also expected to find the British ships as he didn't know about the atol secret base Sommerville actually used. Sommerville guessed wrong twice so the "big battle" did not happen. I have abook by Dull "The Imperal Japanese Navy" but he says "Sommerville wanted to be in a position for an attack at daybreak", still when dealing with RN things I believe Roskill's books (which are as close to an official RN history as you can get), are a more reliable source and he writes a night attack by the carrier's planes was the plan.
BTW Dull says Kaga returned to base with engine trouble on March 2 so that's one mistery solved. Does anybody have an idea of how effective the Albacores, especially the radars, were?

 

I've also read that the British trained to use the radar equipped planes go guide others to the target. Not sure if all the Albacores had radar at that time.

As for effectiveness I'll check around to see what I can find.

 

'Gutting' Nagumos fleet would have been nice, tho for a favorable result placing large holes in several battleship or carriers would have been usefull. Post attack Nagumo would have been faced with two facts: 1. Then enmy fleets location unknown. 2. They could make torpedo attacks at night.

Place yourself in a fleet comanders position with that knowledge. Nagumo was also aware British reconissance aircraft had spoted his fleet, possiblly more than once, and there had been a submarine report. If this sucessfull air strike occurs on the 5th/6th then it is possible that Nagumo will retire before the second strike on Trincomolee or sinking the Hermes.

The problems of having one or more ships with major hull damage is in the short run worse than if they sink imeadiately. They have to be seperated so as not to hinder manvuer of the remaining battle force. any escourts draw off additional strength from the battle force, and escourted or not they are vulnerable to follow on strikes.

The problem for the torpedos is not that they were not effective. They certainly were, but that in a night action the Japanse were still not good enough to solve the problem of target identification and a accurate aim. In the battle of the Sunda Straits a few weeks earlier the Japanese launched 87 torpedos, hit the Houston and Perth not more than six times, and sank four of their invasion fleets cargo ships and a Japanese seaplane tender. After the night battles in the Solomons the Japanese commanders who survived frequently remarked on the difficulty in obtaining good target data at night and on the small portion of torpedos that hit anything. James Hornfischer 'Ship of Ghosts' and richard Franks 'Guadacannal' both describe from Japanese sources the problems of night actions and torpedo hits.

 

A web search revealed the usuall 25,000 hits to search thru, good luck...

 

I have both books also. Dull relied almost exclusively on Japanese and American records, therefore, I think Roskill's book would be far more authoritative when it comes to Summerville's intentions.

As for Kaga, she never went on the Indian Ocean raid because she was in drydock at Sasebo from March 27, 1942 until May 4, 1942, receiving repairs to her hull for damage incurred in a grounding at Staring Bay.

See Kaga's TROM at;Imperial Flattops

 

You are, of course, correct. Any damaged ships which could not proceed under their own power would have to be scuttled. Those which could steam under their own power would still have to spend significant time in a yard somewhere. That would have been extremely inconvenient for the Japanese since they had two major operations planned in the next two months; Coral Sea and Midway.

Even as Nagumo was dancing with Summerville, an American carrier task force was making it's way across the Pacific to launch bombers against the Japanese Home Islands. So it was not a good time for having major fleet units under repair.

At the Second naval Battle of Guadalcanal, despite the huge numbers of Type 93's which the Japanese launched under favorable circumstances, not a single one hit either the South Dakota or the Washington. Whether these torpedoes were ineffective because they weren't aimed properly or because of some other reason is irrelevant. The fact remains the Type 93 Torpedo wasn't always, or even often, effective against capital ships. Unless I'm badly mistaken, I don't think any Type 93 ever scored against an enemy capital ship. The only exception that I can think of is the four Type 93's fired against the Hornet as she was already sinking. So, in a hypothetical night surface action between capital ships, any notion of Japanese Type 93's being effective is just so much speculation.

 

I doubt that a night torpedo attack would have actually accomplished much against a fleet at sea. First, the Albacores that were fitted with ASV would have had the Mk II set at best. This is more of a general search set and completely unsuitable for actually directing an attack.
Therefore, the FAA aircraft would have had to either visually sight and make a run on their target much as in daytime or, they would have had to resort to trying to lay a flare line behind the Japanese to backlight the ships and allow the other aircraft to attack visually.
Either way, it would have been very hit and miss at best. The other problem facing the British is recovering the strike. By 1942 few if any FAA pilots had much experiance with nighttime carrier landings. Lighting up a carrier to allow for any sort of approach would have been virtually like sending up flares.

The other problem is that come daylight the British carriers will almost certainly still be in range of the much longer legged Japanese aircraft. That will be a one sided battle. The British have nowhere near enough fighters to deal with a large Japanese strike. The escort is far weaker in AA firepower than a similar sized US formation would be. For instance, most of the destroyers are older ones including several T, S and V class from the early 20's that basically have zero useful AA ability.

I really think whether the British try a strike or try a night action they would come out the losers. Even if they did fairly well in a night action, again, come daybreak everything still afloat is going to the bottom when the Japanese strike aircraft show up. There would be nowhere to run at 18 or so knots for most of the battleships. Those slow R class would just ensure the whole formation got caught.

Basically, the British are just out gunned completely in the air. Outside of pure luck they are going to come off far worse engaging the Kido Butai with what they have. In 1942 they simply are not prepared in any way, shape or, form for fighting the sort of war the one in the Pacific had become.

 

Was the 1942 ASV radar unsuitable for directing an aerial torpedo attack? I don't know, just asking. I would think that under certain conditions a night torpedo attack could be conducted without radar, just so long as the ship's location could be pinpointed. The Japanese had pilots (although I don't think carrier pilots) who could do it, and so did the US. At Midway, one-third of the combined torpedo hits on both sides were scored by night-flying PBY's (equipped with ASV radar). I think if the British had trained their pilots to deliver torpedo attacks at night, they had a better than even chance of scoring significant damage.

Recovering a night time strike is more problematic, but again, I wouldn't rule it out. You say "few, if any" British FAA pilots had experience in night time carrier landings, do you know for sure that Summerville's pilots had no night landing experience? In a situation where Summerville has managed to catch Nagumo within range for a night strike, my guess would be that he would launch the strike and hope for the best. Two years later, at The Philippine Sea, that's what Spruance did with the late afternoon strike, even though he knew many of his pilots weren't night landing qualified.

Probably true, but the Japanese have to find Summerville's carriers first. Summerville had only 9 Sea Hurricanes, 16 Martlets, and 12 Fulmars, so yes, his air defense is pretty thin, but the Japanese still have to provide an escort for their strikes in order to be effective. Summerville's best course is to haul a** just as soon as his strike is recovered and hope the Japanese air patrols aren't able to find him.

I think the British have a better chance than that, but they have to put some fish into two or three of the Japanese carriers. If they fail to do that, and I admit it will take some luck and audacity on their part, they are in a world of hurt once the Japanese find them

 

Heres some sources recomended by others. I've not more than skimmed any of this.

by Takao on 01 Jan 2009 19:39
Online
A brief overview with a break down of opposing forces: http://www.combinedfleet.com/btl_rio.htm
Timeline with a break down of Japanese Forces: http://pacific.valka.cz/forces/ijn/indocean.htm
Good Overview: http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo7/no4/stuart-eng.asp
A brief overview: http://ww2db.com/battle_spec.php?battle_id=7

Books
A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy by Paul S. Dull
Combined Fleet Decoded by John Prados

by Mostlyharmless on 02 Jan 2009 14:41
You might also like http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo7/no4/stuart-eng.asp for an account of Canadian involvement. Also "A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945)" by Paul S. Dull has something from page 104. I expect vol 2 of Marder's Old Friends has something but I do not have a copy.

cstunts on 02 Jan 2009 15:42
Hello,

From the perspective of the Japanese, try reading--rather than acquiring via the web--FIST FROM THE SKY, about dive-bomber pilot Egusa Takeshige of SORYU, and THE EMPEROR'S SEA EAGLE which tells the story of Abe Zenji, who flew Vals from AKAGI. Both have brief but useful firsthand accounts of these operations, and Abe Zenji, who survived the war, writes as a participant.

Marder has a good section as well. So does Roskill & Gill. But a very underrated and little-referenced work is by David Thomas, called JAPAN'S WAR AT SEA (Andre Deutsch, 1978.) It is excellent, and his researcher, as I understand it, was Paul Dull.