Soviet-Anglo/American Air War in the ruins of Europe

I may be "Off topic" ;but, you can not deny that Russia was at the end of it's resources and would not have continued the fight if the US had not entered the war and opened a second front.

The US had a "draft" and Russia had Machine guns behind the front line to shoot anyone who turned from the fight. That alone is an indication of the caliber of troops that Russia was able to field.

I have seen Russian troops in action and I am not impressed.

p.s. I love fire works

 

You are inferring that there is a lot of double counting in this statistic, yet a military dead to wounded ratio of 11.5 M to 17.5 M is rather terrifying close by itself. You can't make that assumption.

In any event, that wasn't the point. The point is, there aren't many replacements left to fight a prolonged war with the US. The Soviet manpower issue is as grave as the German one in late 1944.

Interesting, I didn't know that it was so close.

But were the Germans really that effective in 1944? Most of their professional men were dead and these divisions were nearly untrained men built around a small cadre of veterans.

 

David Glantz was in charge of selling the "Military Might" of the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War. I feel that his writings and opinions promote solcialism and communist ideology in an effort to adavance his own agenda.

Long Story short if Russia had felt that they could have beaten the US and Great Brittain, and carved themselves a larger piece of the post WW2 pie, they would have.

The Soviet Union is a government of smoke and mirrors built with propaganda and fear, it is no more a threat to world peace than a "boogey man" lurking in the closet of a child.

The Soviet Union had no economic infrastructure and natural resources to continue fighting past 1945.

They did not have the logistics capabilities to sustain an Army in the field on two fronts, let alone the three fronts, possibly four, that would have been available for exploitation.

The Russian Army was spent and stretched to it's maximum and had little resources from which to draw.

 

Do you say the first thing that comes to your head, or just what you see in the movies?

Russian machine guns mowing down there own troops quickly went out of fashion in Russia, don't take the movies as fact. Yes they did it but it wasn't common practice in the later parts of the war.

Russia did lack military effectiveness at the early stages of the war, but by the wars end they were indeed a formidable fighting force, with good equipment, training and experience.

You have seen Russian troops in action? Would you care to elaborate on this?

I am assuming that you have seen modern day Russian soldiers in action, since ww2 is probably way past your age. Therefore how and why are you comparing modern day training, and combat techniques to a ww2 soldier who by all regards was under another flag and regime, the Soviet Union and not Russia. They are different governments with different agenda's, views and targets.

 

You say that Russia had no economy and infrastructure to stand on, well if they didn't how would they have afforded to lease Allied equipment?

Germany was already winding down there attacks in the Soviet Union, D-day merely speed up the process. Just look how fast these ill equipped and badly trained Russians with machine guns pointed at there backs got to Berlin.

 

Be that as it may: What did the US Army have? Most American divisions were built from scratch with men who had never fired a shot in anger, led by untested officers, and a high command that was learning its trade on the fly. For instance, I find it remarkable that US generals had never commanded an Army Group before the activation of 12th Army Group.

The first-rate German formations displayed impressive fighting spirit and admirable skill at Normandy, and you will find little in contemporary literature that deny the Allies were outfought. US-UK forces were unable to achieve a breakthrough until local superiority could be established through attrition and reinforcement. The WWI theory that the attackers must outnumber the defender three to one is vallidated in this instance. Most of the time the Allies were not remotely close to that strength; but after 1942, the Russian almost never fought a battle in which they had less than an advantage of two to one. In the great offensives, the Red Army outnumbered the Germans three or four to one.

The fact that third-rate German volksgrenadiers and static troops could maintained unit cohesion at all speaks well for the German army. Just look at how the tatters and the ghosts of German units from Normandy were able to hold the Sigfried, and the contempt with which the Germans held allied troops throughout the battle for the borders.

In the American's own assessment, the US infantry lacked training in formal assaults against bunkers, infiltration, using darkness and weather as concealment, and went to the ground too readily. The US infantry small units tactics was in someways inadequately designed or executed. When marching fire was observed as the most effective tactic by two top US generals (Bradley and Patton) it calls to question the rigour or lack thereof in basic training.

A though experiment would be to compare the performance of a mature US Army at 1945 to 1944. In both cases, the German army was disorganized, beaten, without armor and in complete rout. The first time the US Army was stopped cold at the defenses beyond any Germans expectation of success. The second time around, the US Army punched clean through the Schnee Einfel and Sigfried Line as if they were nothing. It bares notice that many of the American green units that held the Ardennes so staunchly were from the post 80 batch of infantry divisions with improved drill--the list includes units like the 84th, 95th, 99th, 104th, etc.

My view was and still is that the US-UK and the Red Army were more decidely more powerful than the Wehrmacht. Skill is less clear-cut.

 

Don't be petty.

So you agree that there was little tolerance for lack of fortitude in the Russian Army. The threat of violence is just as effective real violence if there is the assumption it will be carried out.

That fomidability was in large part a result of the allied bombing camaign carried out by the US and Brittain which decreased Germany's ability to sustain it's troops on the Eastern Front. The bombing raids taxed the German war production.

Yes, I had the oppurtunity to observe Soviet troop movements during the Afghan situation in the late 80's and was able to observe the predesposition of the Soviets to overcome an objective through the use of numbers rather than tactics.

The Soviet Union I am familiar with had changed very little in it's tactics and doctrine since WW2.

In 1999 I had the oppurtunity to to meet a few former Russian Soldiers that had served in Afghanistan and had been in the Military during the same time as I was. Their perspective of the Russian Army during and after the Cold War was enlightening.

I have trained with Soviet equipment at Fort Irwin using the same tactics and doctrine that the Soviet Army used. Their lack of faith in the small unit tactics and their propensity to micromanage subordinate units is ineffective and counter productive. Add to that the forced political agenda and you have an unmotivated fighting force with little or no desire to accomplish battlefield tasks if for no other reason than to avoid punishment.

 

That is an ad hominem attack on a scholar's integrity. Do you have any solid evidence for invalidating Glantz's research, or his purported affinity to socialism?

The Russians were outproducing the Germans by winter 1941. I don't see a lot of damage from allied airpower during Stalingrad either.

Maybe it would be productive to put under highlight the lack of training all around in WWII conscript armies that necessitated micro-management and predilection to replace tactical finesse with operational cunning, yes?

I also know of veteran NATO officers stationed in various "hot" places in Europe who held Russian command skill in high regard.

 

It seems matey as you are doing nothing more then attempting to start an argument with no facts and only opinions. You still are and as always though your posts through various threads are stating nothing more then your own opinions or opinions of others and then for some reason continuing to argue these points which are in no way valid. Why?

Do you either not now the facts or just choose not to recognize them?
As always you have been asked for references to your posts and as usual there is nothing, so why do you continue to fill this forum with dribble.

Before you go on about me pointing out where please take a look at your posts and really read them and think about what you are saying. I for one don't care about your opinion if you are not going to post facts.

 

This seems to be way OT. I started a thread here http://www.ww2f.com/military-history/30019-vietnam-us-loss-something-else.html#post366406 if anybody cares to discuss this topic.

 

ConsimWorld.COM - David Glantz Interview (10/02/98)

David Glantz - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

I've read the available articles

David Glantz (military historian) - Biography Research Guide

and based my opinion on them. I am sorry you feel that my opinions and perspective are drivel and that I bring nothing more than conflict to the thread and the overall forum.

I do try to post well thought and substantiated opinions.

 

If one looks at the dates his books are published in the referance you list below

And compare them with the following:

There seams to be a bit of a disconnect. Now he did/does tend to make extensive use of Soviet materials which may affect some of his conclusions but ....

 

I have read your links and there is not a single shred of evidence confirming his "own agenda" or any sort of alliance toward "socialism". It seems ( based on what you have posted ) that you dislike this Ex U.S. Colonel simply because he finds the war in the east fascinating and discredits all of the myths which you would like to believe.

 

I have seen it postulated that sense he made heavy use of and was given unprecedented access to the old Soviet archives he was somewhat sensitive to the concerns and views of those who controlled access to them. The implication was that he did not go out of his way to present the Soviets in an unflattering light and was fairly quick to note things they did well. This of course presented a considerably different view from many of the cold war (especially those with mostly German sources) views.

By the way I'm of the opinion that without the West the Soviets would not necessarily have beaten the Germans. With the West but without LL the West would have almost assuredly have reached Berlin before the Soviets.

 

What I find jarring was your claim that A. Glantz is setting up the USSR as a boogie man and B. he symphathizes with communist ideology. The positions are not mutually inclusive. I grant that Glantz wasted no time in indulging the typical anti-commuinist platitudes, but it hardly has a place in the kind of military studies Glantz do. He studies the effectiveness of armies on the field and nothing else.

 

Well remeber it is "MY" opinion and I am entitled to it. I am not asking you to support it or accept it. I have read the reviews and the synopsis of a few of his books and I am not impressed. The impression that I got from some of the reviews was that Glantz took creative liberty when filling in voids and blanks in the Soviet "Historiography".

While I appreciate your views and criticism, even of me, we should put this tangent to bed as it serves no purpose in the grander scheme of this thread.

 

In lieu of being argumentative and inciting conflict I will refer you to my previous post(#8) in this thread.

I interpret those numbers as meaning that the Soviet Union either did not have the resources to exact victory over the Germans or they were unwilling to use them.

citations for my opinion:

Lend-Lease - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Social Affairs Unit - Web Review: In Memoriam: World War Two, 1939 - 1945 - Jeremy Black on World War Two - Part One

Or:
Complete List of Lend Lease to Russia including atomic materials
http://lend-lease.airforce.ru/english/documents/index.htm
Engines of the Red Army in WW2 - Routes Overview
Engines of the Red Army in WW2 - Sources

and finally:

http://www.ww2f.com/wwii-general/27658-western-aid-russia-during-war.html

Brad

 

Brad,

It is widely accepted that Lend Lease was responsible for shortening the war and saving lives. As I have posted in other threads in the past, what is most recognizable is perhaps the mechanized units, trucks, jeeps etc... Even during the height of the cold war the Soviet Union made no attempts at hiding this help and is till this day grateful. This is evident in all of Soviet World War II movies where you see Red Army soldiers riding in U.S. trucks. Of course there was more help then just the mechanized infantry but once again, these are just the easiest to spot and the ones that the infantry really appreciated and still talks about.

However, ( not trying to be argumentative or disrespectful ) I am trying to understand the reasoning behind your conviction of Lend Lease being the determining factor in the outcome of the war. Once again, not a single source which you have provided discredits the fact that while helpful, LL only amounted to about 8-10% of what the Soviet Union actually needed and the fact that most of this LL arrived in the middle of 1943 by which time the fate of the 3rd Reich had already been sealed.

How would you explain this?


BTW,
To quote one of your links, Complete List of Lend Lease to Russia including atomic materials,

The last two paragraphs state: It should be kept in mind that Russia was an ally of Japan throughout the war, that it had been the ally of Hitler during the first two years of the war, that its division of Poland with Germany started the war, that it was an agressive imperialist force that attacked Finland and subverted the Baltic states as well, that it had announced that it intended to take over the world and that most of the aid sent in 1945 was sent after Stalin's February speech in which he said he would continue the war but against the United States.

Franklin Roosevelt's alter ego and Lend-Lease administrator Harry L. Hopkins, a KGB agent, declared to Russia before a crowd at Madison Square Garden on June 22, 1942, that: "We are determined that nothing shall stop us from sharing with you all that we have." He was not joking.

If you think Glantz has a personal agenda, how would characterize this piece of work?

Personally, I can only think of one use for this dribble, I just doubt that the paper this was written on is soft enough for its true purpose.

All the best

 

Why do you consider that "dribble"? Do you consider the entire document "Fruits of the poisoned tree" because of the last 2 paragraphs?

I was asked to cite sources and I did and I presented them in the context I interpreted them. I do not consider them drivvel.

 

I don't think the Germans would have won in Russia even if the Soviets had no Lend-Lease.

But I think the Soviets would have much less success in their counteroffensive/offensive efforts after the spring of 1943. There would be no great pockets of German troops to capture and defeat for the rest of the war.

And I don't think that they would have been able to drive into Germany by 1945. There would still exist a struggle between the two for Eastern Europe while the Allies advanced towards Berlin..