Soviet attack in 1941

A year or two ago I read "Icebreaker" by Viktor Suvorov. It struck me as quite credible and based on solid facts. I don't know if the version published in the West is the same as the one in Poland, but it amazes me, however, why it is so neglected in the discussion about the WWII.

What do you think about the idea that Stalin planned to attack Germany in 1941? I particularly remember one point in the book where Suvorov claimed Soviet divisions were close to the Soviet-German border in June 1941, even barbed wire on their side was already cut. They wouldn't have been placed there if they hadn't been to attack, would they?

Moreover, the number of paratroopers (app. 1 million, if memory serves) suggested Soviets didn't think much about defence.

There are really many more arguments, but I don't want to change my post into an essay.

Have you any ideas why other historians neglect Suvorov theories or is it maybe my own ignorance that I don't know about other publications? And do you believe Russians wanted to strike Germany first? The date Suvorov gives is the beginning of July (I don't remember the exact day, but it was around 7th).

 

Patryk0820, Welcome to the forum.

If it is your desire to learn about this period, then this is the place for you!

I would respectfully suggest you expand your reading sources, again this forum offers much. Occasionally a author comes out with a book the offers a 'startling new interpretation' of history as we know it. All too often this assertion does not bear scrutiny and fails to prove its point, despite its hyperbole.

Most on this forum look at authors like Surorvov and Kessler with a somewhat jaundiced eye. They use raw numbers and ascribe theories that are not supported by a deeper look into the subject. I have not read the book in question, and assuming the million man paratrooper comment was not a typo, any cursory exhamination of Airborne operations would quickly show such a force as being a fantasy.

I hope you will stay around and take the time to expand your understanding rather than accept whole the claims of any one author.

 

I don't want to be perceived as someone who accepts Suvorov's theories unconditionally - the idea about the to-be Soviet attack could have been an attempt to justify Soviet inertia during the first day of Barbarossa. I've read books and watched documentaries about WWII, so it's not the only perspective I looked at.
His theory just appears interesting, as an ex GRU agent he had the access to important documents - I don't think we can scrap it at once only because it stands in opposition to the previous theories on the subject.

 

Whatever Stalin's ultimate intentions, I doubt he was planning to attack in 1941. In spring 1941 the Red Army was in the midst of a major reorganization of its mechanized forces, which of course would be critical for an offensive. Most of the thirty mechanized corps in existence in June 1941 had only been formed earlier that year. They were also just starting to introduce the new T-34 and KV tanks.

Similarly, most of the air force's fighters were obsolete, but were in the process of being replaced. About half of them were I-16s and about 1/4 were I-15 and -153 biplanes. A new generation of inline-engined fighters comparable to western types were entering service - MiG-3, LaGG-3, Yak-1. The Il-2 ground attack aircraft was also just being introduced.

The Soviets would have been far better prepared for war in 1942 or later than they were in 1941.

 

Thanks for the comment, very concrete one. Thought the equipment itself was not so bad, only the commanders' qualifications and skills were devastated after the big purge that started in the late 30s.
Anyway, do you think Stalin would have attacked Hitler sooner or later?

 

Hitler had a distinct program of expansion to the east, to seize living space and resources for the German people, and he was by no means the first to conceive of the Drang nach Osten. There was nothing so specific on Stalin's side, although both Russia and Communism certainly had expansionist tendencies. The USSR was also self-sufficient in virtually every category. Communist theory held that other nations would succumb to revolution or internal decay; the Soviet state should stand ready to support them but did not necessarily have to take the initiative. So while Stalin was capable of anything, we shouldn't assume that he or his policies were mirror images of Hitler.

 

It certainly would have changed things up a bit. If Stalin did take up on his "lost chance" and would be successful in his efforts, the thought of a large and un-opposed Soviet army in Central Europe in the midst's of a massive power vacuum would be unimaginable.

 

Did Stalin have any aspirations for expansion?

 

Not in the classic sense. Russia, whomever is in charge, wants buffer states on her border who jump when Moscow calls. They have been more than willing to use force to create these states, but generally do not absorb them the way Hitler did. Nor would they strike at anyone prepared to stop them, though they have been known to miscalculate that on occasion.

This marks in my opinion the essential difference between the two.

 

I disagree about the absorption part. Look at the Baltic states for instance. I think it more a matter of Stalin wasn't nearly as much of a gambler as Hitler. Indeed he may well have believed that Communism was the stronger system in which case the world would eventually fall to him or his succesors anyway. At least if he didn't make any drastic mistakes.

 

I tend to agree with Belasar. Only reason Stalin with for the Baltic States was because of Hitler's interest in Poland. One country closer to the USSR. Finland's lean toward Hitler also a reason to add some distance. On his own, did not think Stalin wanted to expand territory. This changed after Hitler's invasion and the cost that came with it.

 

I agree, hence generally do not absorb as opposed to always absorb. They would incorporate areas that had a significant Russian minority, but I will stand by my statement in that if you look at Finland, Romania, Hungary,Bulgaria, Poland, Afghanistan and North China they could have kept all they took, but chose to set up client states or at least those unwilling to cross them.

There are always exceptions and the Baltics were Russian in Czarist times.

 

The Baltic states and eastern Poland had been Russian as recently as 1919 (as had Finland). I'm not saying that justifies taking them over, but regaining former Russian lands isn't quite in the same category as Hitler's quest for Lebensraum.

 

Stalin's/the USSR's ambition was indeed to expand. At first to get back the lost territories of Imperial Russia - namingly the Baltics, Finland, Poland and so on - and eventually to the Atlantic. For Russians all areas once ruled by Russia were "Russian/soviet" for ever! IIRC it was Stalin, who reminded that Alexander I's troops were in Paris. According to him a great nation should expand "from an ocean to the other one". Whether this was done by annexations or by puppet states was irrelevant.

With the alliance of Hitler this Stalin's ambition became reality.

There was no "lean toward Hitler" in Finland prior the Soviet attack, small fractions not included. The governments of Finland were democratic ones leaning towards neutrality, Scandinavian co-operation and disarmament. Hitler was complaining for the attitudes of the Scandinavian states against the nazis.

Of course after the Winter War the the naiivity of the Finns was lost and the only source of help, Germany, was wellcomed.

 

Well Stalin did want the Allied Capitalist and the German National Socialists/Italian Fascists to line up and go at each other, and beat them themselves silly while the USSR stood on the sidelines. Afterwards he would step in and "liberate" the proletariat workers from their capitalist oppressors once and for all. Uncle Joe and the freedom loving Soviets would more than likely not absorb the liberated territories, but leave a large occupying army to insure the continuance of the Comintern agenda no doubt. I think that idea sucks too.

 

Stalin wasn't an idealist; he has consolidated his power in early thirties and was much more concerned with modernization and industrialization of the USSR to make his country less vulnerable to possible aggression:

 

The Baltics were never "Russian". They were occupied and annexed to the Russian Empire, which is not the same thing at all!

 

See my previous post!

Finland declared her independence on 6th December 1917 - not 1919. Before that Finland was an autonomous Grand Duchy (only from 1809) straight under the Grand Duke of Finland, the Russian Emperor (among others also the czar of Russia). Finland was never "part of Russia (proper)" nor "former Russian land"!

 

How many have forgotten the Molotov-Ribbentrop deal and it´s secret part? The countries were divided between the two and and the aim was to conquer them. And that´s what they did. If you think Finland got any sympathy from Germany/Hitler towards Stalin, that was not until Hitler had decided to attack the USSR. Until then Finland was under Stalin´s sphere of influence and Germans actually told the Finns to accept all the demands Stalin had.

And if the countries were only to be joined together, why were the people sent to Siberia or actually in the Baltic countries, they were sent. The aim was to send Soviet citizens instead.

Forced settlements in the Soviet Union - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

I've read quite a bit about this theory. Ultimately, nobody alive knows for sure if the Soviets did indeed intend to attack Germany in the summer of 1941. They were certainly making demands in eastern Europe that upset the German government, and they were actively taking advantage of the war with the west. There's no question about that. Whether or not they intended to invade central Europe? I find this hard to believe.

First, as mentioned, the Red Army was in a state of re-organization in 1941. Stalin was actually very desperate to maintain peace with Germany at this point. He put much emphasis on his relationship with Germany, and even formally requested admittance into the Axis alliance. This is a fact that is often not discussed in the west. Now... whether or not this was a ploy to fool Hitler... I certainly have my doubts. I think the Soviets saw an opportunity to repel any threat from the west, and to strengthen their geopolitical position.

Secondly, Stalin was also very anxious to repel any eastern threat (the Japanese). Most people forget, up until 1941, the largest tank battle in the history of warfare was at Kholkin Gol between the Soviets and the Japanese. Indeed, up until Kholkin Gol the Japanese were very interested in eastern Soviet real estate. Many speculate that Stalin's request to join the axis may have been an attempt to also curb Japanese expansion. Stalin took this threat from the east so seriously, that, even as troops were advancing from Kharkov towards Moscow, he kept close to one million troops in the east to protect the region. Only after repeated re-assurances from his spy rings, and with German troops advancing on Moscow itself, did he reluctantly divert these divisions to throw the Germans off in the west.

My third point, is the personal reaction of Stalin once the Germans declared war. By all accounts, he had a nervous breakdown. I'm not sure if this is the sign of a guy who wanted to go to war with Germany anyways, and was waiting for an excuse. Now.. whether or not he was anxious about being taken off guard? Perhaps... but if his army was poised to advance on Germany anyways, I doubt he would have stressed as much.

I think he was desperate to keep the peace to be honest. I think the Soviet offensive 1941 theory is interesting... and perhaps it was true... but from the historical evidence I've seen... I have my doubts.