Soviet attack in 1941

6 points :

1) A Soviet attack in 1941 was out of the question:the situation of the Red Army was that horrible that it could not lance even a limited attack


2)That Stalin had a nervous breakdown,is a post war invention :from the first day on,Stalin was controlling everything and was giving orders

3) The eastern threat had vanished : there was a non agression pact with Japan in april 1941

4) Stalin did not keep an army of 1 million men in the Far East

5) Already on 21 june 1941,the Far Eastern units received the order to go west

6)The role of the spy organizations is a myth

 

Correct! An author of this myth is Stalin's political commissar Nikita Khrushchev.

PS: the other five points are correct too.

 

While most of the items below have an element of truth I think they are a bit exagerated.

The Soviets had launched attacks vs Finland and Poland not many years prior to 1941. This suggest that they could indeed have launched an attack vs Germany. Now how well it would have went is another question. I don't think Stalin planned on such an operation in 41 in any case. He probably wanted to step in and pick up what pieces he could but only do so when victory was almost asured. That simply wasn't the case in 1941.

I've seen this debated both ways. IMO the evidence is not overwhelming either way.

Using the same logic one could say that the western threat had vanished in april of 1941 as the Soviets had a non aggression pack with Germany. Now Soviet intel had picked up indicators that the Japanese were serious about theirs but ....

How big was it then? What sources do you have? How are you defining "Far East"?

Some of them perhaps, all of them? Since not all ever went west that seems a rather proplematic proclomation. Then there's the question of when they arrived.

What role? Spy organizations certainly played a significant part in Soviet actions during the war for that matter they played a role in allied actions in general. So what exactly was a myth?

 

On point 1 : in june 1941,the Red Army was incapable to launch an offensive against the WM: most of the Soviet forces were far away from the border,when they received the order to go west,most fell apart before ever seeing a German .


On point 2 (the nervous breakdown of Stalin) : in "did Stalin fall in prostration?" the appointment diaries of Stalin for 21-28 june are available,and they prove that he was working and receiving visitors every day . Thus,the breakdown is a postwar invention from Nikita(1957) in his struggle against the "Stalinists" (Molotow,etc,....)


On point 3:the fact is that the Soviet-Japanese pact was signed in april 1941;why should Japan ask the SU for a non agression pact.....and attack the same SU 2 months later ?



On point 4 :"Armchair Historian" claimed that Stalin was holding 1 million men in the Far East,against a hypothetical Japanese attack :this is wrong: it was less,much less.This has been debated on the AHF (role of the Siberian divisions)


On point 5 :Afaics,most units had already left the Far East at the end of the summer:the claim from Armchair Historian that,when the Germans advanced from Charkow to Moscow,there still were a million men in the Far East, is wrong

On point 6 :Armchair Historian claimed that Stalin was setting free his Siberian units,only after re-assurances from his spyrings : his is alluding to the general believed story that Sorge told Stalin that Japan would attack Pearl Harbour,and,that at that moment,Stalin ordered the Siberian divisions to go west .

This is totally wrong : already before the Japanese decision to attack PH,Sorge was arrested,and,besides,when this decision was taken,it was to late to move units from Wladivostok to Moscow,to arrive at time .

The whole Sorge story is a myth : 99 % of his informations was gossip (as it was with most spy organizations,from most countries):the GRU was not capable to give reliable informations about the srart of Barbarossa,FHO was incapable to give reliable informations about Uranus and Bagration,and the western spies were incapable to give reliable informations about Fall Gelb .

 

Checking the latest comments here, I happened to notice in the original post the reference to app. 1 million paratroopers, i.e. about 100 airborne divisions. If that's an accurate recollection of Suvorov, it's good cause for skepticism.

 

Yes,it's an accurate recollection;I can't understand that people stil believe these fables .

 

??? That doesn't mean that the Red Army couldn't have attacked Germany some time June. Especially if it had been decide prior to that point. Now I agree of Stalin said I to his generals on say 1 June: "I want you to launch an offensive starting at 1200 hours today" they likely couldn't have done much. That's different from him saying be prepaired to launch an invasion a month or two or three fron now. As I said it's not clear how successful such an invasion would have been but I have not seen anything that would stop the Red Army from doing so.

As I said I've seen it argued out and while the evidence presented (I think there are even a couple of threads here that are relevant) is far from conclusive but IMO the arguement that Stalin was "having issues" in the time under discussion is stronger than the counter.

Why did Hitler want a non aggression pact and then attack a few months later? Why were the Japanese still having peace talks with the US in December of 41?

I've seen numbers all over the map on this. It's far from clear which are accurate. Simply stating that your opinion is correct isn't adequate for a forum like this.

Again I'd like to see some sources on this. There was a thread here on this forum that listed forces left in the Far East and they were on a par to those that started there. Now perhaps most of the troops had left or perhas they hadn't. I've seen nothing other than your assertions to that effect in this thread.

Well your facts seem a bit off too. First of all I don't see any mention of PH in Armchair Historian's post. Then there's the fact that:
http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_04.htm
states:

And Sorge was arrested in October of 41 wasn't he?

Irrelevant. The fact that a lot of the information gathered is gossip may be true but that doesn't mean that it isn't useful. That reliable information of some events was not produced doesn't mean that intell was useless and indeed there is evidence that the Soviets did indeed recieve good intel on the start of Barbarossa but refused to believe it.

 

About the Siberian divisions :

in june 11 were transferred(9 belonged to the Stavka reserves,and had received the order to go west BEFORE 22 june .

in july,3 divisions were going west .

After juky, 14 divisions were transferred,of which 3 Siberian ones, 7 (only 7!) were assigned to the Far Eastern Front .

Source peration Barbarossa :Siberian division myth.


Also from the same source :whichever way data is analysed,the whole Siberian transfer story is a myth in all respects:including timing,numbers,source of personnel and overall combat performance .

 

1)From peration Barbarossa : soviet fast facts :strength of the Far Eastern Front on 22 june 1941: 23 divisions,500000 men


2)About Stalin on 22 june : the FACT is that the appointment diaries are proving that he was working and taking decisions ,thus: he had no breakdown


3) Japan : what happened on 2 july is IRRELEVANT : the decision to start the war with the US was taken at the end of november,AFTER Sorge was arrested,thus,after his role was finished

4) I like to see the evidence that the Soviets received reliable intelligence about the start of Barbarossa,but refused to believe it (not that it would make any difference): the 22 and 24 army received already BEFORE 22 june the order to go west,because,the situation became critical,although there were no reliable informations about a German attack .The whole Sorge story is something for under the proverbial bus .

5)About the pact between Japan and the SU : the comparison with the Molotow-Ribbentrop pact is the usual apples-oranges comparison :the M/R pact was in august 1939,while Barbarossa started in june 1941,almost 2 years later .

 

One million paratroopers ..... and not even one decent transport plane squadron to carry them !
I believe there were only four parachute corps withh 3 to 4 brigades each at the time of Barbarossa, a far cry from 1.000.000 men but still larger than the LW's single 7th divisionj.
Soviet pre-war military planning is sometimes surprising, a good example is the little known large naval expansion going on at the time of Barbarossa that resulted in dozens of "naval infantry" brigades raised with the manpower allocated to it (as opposed to the handful of true marines brigades that were meant to be ground troops from the beginning.

The only book from Suvorov I've read is "inside the Soviet army" and, while an tnteresting read, I got the impression it was tainted with post-war NATO propaganda, I have little doubts the USSR made contingency plans to fight Germany but that no more evidence they actually wanted to attack, than the "color coded" USN plans is evidece the US wanted to attack the French or British.

 

About Sorge : he always was crying wolf,with as result that nobody believed him . BTW: why should Sorge ,living in Tokyo,have any information about Barbarossa ? In his Weisung 21 (Barbarossa) ,Hitler stated explicitly that it was forbidden to give Japan any information about Barbarossa . Unless Soviet spies in Berlin were giving Sorge (in Tokyo) informations about Barbarossa,it is obvious that Sorge was the last man on earth to have informations about Barbarossa .

 

Not saying that you are wrong but care to give a source?

What is the providence of these? If it's well accepted why were they not presented as evidence in the previous discussions? Or perhaps they were and there were questions of their validity.

It is most certainly not irrelevant. The decision was made in July to go South rather than attack the Soviet Union. The whole PH op was thoroughly planned and practiced prior to the end of November. Now if the US had backed off on the oil embargo that op might have been suspended but not the drive south and certainly the Japanese were not going to quickly reorient vs the Soviets. So it very rellevant.

I've seen a number of mentions of Soviet intel reporting to Staliln that the Germans were going to attack before the attack came. A quick google turned up this:
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol50no1/9_BK_What_Stalin_Knew.htm
http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/RUSbarbarossa.htm
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E06E4D71638F931A25755C0A9639C8B63
and that's only a quick search.

But the Japanese were still talking peace with the US less than a week before they attacked at PH. It's pretty clear that neither the Japanese nor the Germans considered their international agreements binding and this not just from 20:20 hindsight.

 

Well a real quick google yields:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Sorge
it gives some details. It is wiki so you might want to do additional research.

 

About PH : no:there was NO decision in july :the fleet left Japan on 26 november,and the order to start a war with the US,Britain and Holland was given on 1 december .

 

Yes there was a decision in July. The decision was to expand to the South with the aim of gaining control of oil producing territories. That clearly was going to bring them into conflict with the US, Britain, and the Dutch. The final order may not have been given until 1 December but it was a mere formality at that point. Indeed it was recognized in the US that once the bill freezing Japanese assets was interpreted as an oil embargo that war with Japan was inevitable. Indeed this page notes that the PH plan was created in early 41 and practice for it started prior to the July decision.
http://archive.iwm.org.uk/upload/package/25/pearl_harbour/pearl_harbor.htm

 

That's awfully thin. Especially as you have yet to give a decent reference for said diaries.

I'm not surprised there are critical reviews although I'd like to see them. Be worth knowing what the credentials of the reviewrs were. But of course you just undermined your whole position here in any case as you stated that Soviet intel was warning of a German attack in the spring of 41. Getting the exact date right is hard especially as the Germans changed it a number of times.

No they weren't useless they. They provided a warning that could have been acted on. Much like the US was bulding up the defences of in the Philipines although Mac was slow to put in place any plans for an attack that occured before he was ready. there was enough intel coming from enough sources that if Stalin had believed it the Soviets could have been much better prepared for the German attack. How much difference it would have made I don't know but surely some.

 

The same Sorge told after 22 june that Japan would attack the SU in august . (AHF : Russian knowledge of Barbarossa)

In march,Timochenko and Zjoukow told Stalin that Germany and her allies had gathered 268 divisions with 12000 tanks and 11000 aircraft

On 19 may,Sorge told that the Germans would attack at the end of may with 150 divisions and 9 army corps (!)

On 1 march,Sorge told that the Germans had concentrated 100 divisions on the Soviet border (while the truth was that on 23 april there were only 56 divisions and on 5 june 93 divisions,the PzD and Mot.Divisons went only to the east after 14 june)

I could continue the daily rubbish that was overwhelming the Kremlin ::as long as the PzD /MotD were not detected on the border,there was no proof for a German possible attack .
Thus,there was no reason to believe what Sorge and his colleagues were telling .

 

But when combined with the decision to move south and all that that entails Japan's intentions were pretty clear well before October which is the point.