Stalingrad and Red Army´s hesitation?

In several sources the Soviets have mentioned that they were surprised by the number of German troops in the Stalingrad pocket. If that is the case, why is it that the Red Army decided to make such a strong force around the Stalingrad pocket if they did not consider it a major threat? Instead they could have left smaller elements to guard the pocket and attack westwards and thus trapping the huge German Army in the Caucasus area as they later on planned but just failed to do so. Operation Winter Storm was not going to open the road to Stalingrad ever. The key to win the war in the southern sector in a flash was in their hands and it seems they lost it by wasting time? What do you think?

 

Just my version. Red Army, after a string of defeats in srring and summer of 1942, needed guaranteed victory. That's why the Soviets massed forces opposing the Stalingrad pocket to eliminate the German forces there for sure.
Besides, after defeat of Kharkov strategic offensives and loss of 2nd Shock Army trying to deblockade Leningrad, the Soviet leadership could have decided that "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush", i.e. certain destruction of German 6th Army is better than possible encirclement of German forces at the Southern flank of teh Eastern front.
Once again - this is just my point of view.

Regards,

 

There also is the point that i the winter of 1941-1942,the Soviets were overambitious resulting in few or no successes,while a more limited strategy could have resulted in real successes

 

I hold the same opinion as chi-r, the Soviet high command needed a guaranteed victory and the 6th army was the best prize.


Also, perhaps STAVKA overestimated the strength of the besieged army?

 

Could the differing phylosophy reguarding logistical assets have something to do with the mis-guess? I know there were more non-combat formations attached to German Divisions as oppossed to Soviet one's and was probably true at corps and army level.

 

Stalingrad....again