The ABDA (1942) a failure or a lesson for the allies?

The American-British-Dutch-Australian (ABDA) Command, or ABDACOM, was a short-lived, supreme command for all Allied forces in South East Asia, in early 1942, during thePacific War in World War II. The main objective of the command, led by General SirArchibald Wavell,[1] was to maintain control of the "Malay Barrier" (or "East Indies Barrier"), a notional line running down the Malayan Peninsula, through Singapore and the southernmost islands of Dutch East Indies. ABDACOM was also known in British military circles as the "South West Pacific Command", although it should not be confused with the later South West Pacific Area command (see below).
Although ABDACOM was only in existence for a few weeks, and it presided over one defeat after another, it did provide some useful lessons for combined Allied commands later in the war.
http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/American-British-Dutch-Australian_Command




http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/abda-the-unsuccessful-band-of-brothers/

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=11&t=151750

 

ABDA stood for A Bad Day Again

 

AFAIK ABDA was a huge headache as, while the British and Australians had similar procedures the US and the Dutch didn't so coordination was very difficult. To make thing worse the Australian troops committed to Malaya had originally been earmarked for the North African desert and had trained for that scenario, the US threw in anything available in the area, (including the Flying Tigers and the remnants of the Asiatic Fleet), but sent no reinforcements, so while on paper ABDA was not that much weaker than the Japanese forces pitted against it in practice it was a very brittle instrument.

 

...and the Dutch naval capacity, their Colonial Navy....can't type that without thinking of BSG!...was equally brittle - size for size, their larger ships were undergunned and under-armoured - while the rest were well-overdue for replacement. It read good on paper, as did the Dutch air and land forces in the NEI, but it was nothing to lynch your pin on.

IIRC holding the East Indies Barrier was a major plank in the Americans' OWN War Plan Orange prior to war breaking out....with or without "Allied" cooperation. Yet when war DID break out, they...as you note...failed to send the forces necessary.

How early did they decide that War Plan Orange was a dead duck? (A sort of duck a l'orange?)

 

IIRC the 'classic' WPO had always excluded the idea of either side having allies. The inclusion of the Malay Barrier must have been a last minute addition and an atypical one too. The war in the Pacific more or less followed the original WPO.

With reagard to (the shortage of) allies forces in the Far East. It was too late when the shooting started. Had more reinforcements arrived 12 to 6 months prior to December, the Allies might have had a chance depending on the amount of reinforcements.

The RAF rushed one hundered or so Hurricanes to Singapore and Java. A potentially decisive number had they arrived in the autumn and had they arrived with skilled pilots, mechanics and been based on proper air fields.

 

That's the problem with Winston's style of moving "stuff" around the game board Churchill thought in terms of moving numbers of aircraft or complete squadrons...but in reality he never realised what an "squadron" actually meant in real terms; HE thought a "squadron" was twelve rostered aircraft plus an "airfield defence" flight...16 in all...

...plus spares, that was four "squadrons" moved to the far East ...

In reality however, a "squadron" was from 220 to 240 men in total, covering ALL the skills, mechanical, adminstrative and support, that kept those twelve rostered aircraft in the air each morning AND it needed decent accomodation, covered maintenance space, spares, spare aircraft, and actually around 22 pilots for those 16 aircraft for rotation and leave. It proved virtually impossible through the war to get Churchill thinking in terms of what a squadron really was.

And if any part of that requirement was slow in arriving, or left behind, or below par - those 12+4 were at a distinct disadvantage!

That's before they even got off the ground, of course! By early 1942 the Hurricane was obsolete as a fighter; it was heavier by half a ton all--up than the MkI of BoB fame, and thus though fractionally "faster" was in reality slower, all that weight had "soaked up" any power advantage in the extra 300+bhp at altitude of the Merlin XX installation The Japanese lightweight fighters of the early war period were always going to outfly/outmanover it; only the Hurricane's rugged construction would give it any...advantage...against the much lighter armed Japanese.

With decent early warning and perhaps radar, the Hurricanes MIGHT have been able to make use of the AVG's "boom'n'zoom" tactics for dealing with those lightweight fighters - it was the only thing that gave any land-based opponent of the Japanese a fighting chance in 1941/early 1942

 

Seem to remember that Churchill decided to send 400 (or was it 200) Hurricanes to Stalin on the eve of the Japanese attack - and was basically unrepentant since the Far East was far less important that supporting the fight against Nazi Germany.

An ungrateful Stalin told Eden (I think) that the Hurricanes were rubbish and disliked by his airmen.

Also seem to remember that they were counting on promised American fighters and bombers from the Philippines to cover the deficit.

 

It was in the 30's I believe, Id have to look it up, that the US navy decided that relieving the Philippines was not feasible in one bound. The logistics were simply impossible in the face of resistance. There is a good book about the history of WPO titled War plan orange.

 

Bahhh, the Wildcat had the same problem. Her empty weight had grow a lot too and she was actually slower than a Hurricane II. Did it stop Wildcats from holding their 'ground'? No at all! They were giving better than they got from day one of the war.

The difference was made by pilots and tactics. The Hurricane pilots who ended up in places like Java, Singapore and Sri Lanka were neither experienced nor well trained. Same goes for the USAAF fighter pilots on the PI.

The AVG was a made up by highly skilled military pilots and lead by an expert on Japanese military aviation. Hence they figuring out that Japanese planes were fairly easy to counter. Don't let the speed drop below 250 mph and don't try to outclimb them.

 

It's often forgotten that Chennault persuaded the Chinese authorities to institute a remarkably effective human-based early warning net The landscape of China from the front line inwards to prospective targets and the AVG's field was covered with village elders supplied with telephones or shown how to use radios, and the moment that Japanese aircraft crossed the putative "frontier" their movements were being tracked.

Hand-in-hand with this, the Chinese had observers outside every Japanese airfield supplying movement information; thus when raids crossed the frontier the Chinese already had a point of origin and a second compass bearing on any raid's inbound progress - this allowed the AVG to have altitude on any incoming raids, altitude they could trade for speed in a boom'n'zoom on any escorting fighters - hitting them from above and behind in a single fast pass, then diving away while any remaining fighters were still accelerating in their wake, trying to catch them.

 

Just having a look around; there were actually just over 50 MkIIB Hurricanes crated and sent to Singapore...along with 24 pilots, the majority of which were actually BoB veterans! They...together with surviving NZ aircrew from the Brewster Buffalo squadrons originally stationed at Singapore...and since overwhelmed...formed the scratch 232 and 448(NZ) Sqns. But I doubt that by the time that the Hurricanes arrived the said NZ pilots could be described as anything less than "veterans"

The other 48 Hurricanes were those MkIIAs that arrived at Palembang on board the Indomitable...unfortunately 30 were destryed on the ground in quick succession in japanese raids, until soon after this the remnants of 232 and 488 Sqns arrived on Sumatra from Singapore...and soon on again to Java...but by this stage there were only 18 of the original 99 surviving.

Two factors with the Hurricanes themselves were regarded as contributing factors to combat losses; the large Vokes air filter, and the gun and munition load of the twelve-gun IIA/Bs made them too heavy AND less aerodynamic than their oppoisition. Interestingly, a dozen IIB supplied to the Dutch on Java were flown without the Vokes filer and with half the guns removed, and flown with only half fuel loads and half munition loads - and THEY could stay in a turn with their Japanese opponents!

 

The big problem with the allied forces was that they had incorrectly evaluated Japanese capabilities and so trained for the wrong war, the troops were not "green" just not trained for what they had to face. Jungle infiltration tactics and the highly manoeuvrable fighters could be countered. But developing tactics takes time the allies were not given by their highly aggressive opponents.

Do not discount the Dutch fleet, the submarines put up a good show (though that may be because Japanese ASW was abysmal) and while the cruisers were overage they would have stood a good chance against any Japanese ship short of a second generation heavy cruiser, unfortunately for them the Japanese did commit enough of the big CA to the theatre while the USN sent only Huston and Boise plus the CL Marblehead to back Exeter (the Brooklyn class were "heavy" cruisers in all but definition and even Marblehead was more than a match for any Japanese light cruiser).

Looking at the ships the one area where the Japanese had a big advantage was in destroyers, a "special" was more than a match for any allied DD, and the Japanese DDs were trained to work together while coordinating allied ships from different nationalities in a flotilla would be close to impossible.

The campaign is another classic example that doctrine, momentum and cohesion often count for more than raw numbers in warfare, the whole axis strategy was based on that as the numbers were against them.

 

You guys probably know this but,

Who had the better manoeuvrability depended on the actual speed. The A6M and the other early war fighters had large control surfaces that gave them unmatched manoeuvrability at ~200 mph but at 250mph the same large surfaces got so much air pressure than it was very difficult to move them.

Western fighters had smaller control surfaces that could still be moved at speeds exceeding 350mph. As a result they could literally fly circles around Japanese fighters at higher speeds. No idea if they did this, if you are faster than your opponent ‘hit and run’ looks to me like the sounder tactic anyway.

Last but not least, the geography hampered the air defences. In Burma the RAF and AVG benefited from the kind of rudimentary observer network pylo described but only until the Japanese crossed some river. After than the system no longer had the required ‘depth’ to work. The defender’s success until then was helped by two other factors.

Initially the Japanese concentrated on Malaya(more later) and 2/3 of their fighters were obsolescent Ki-27, the rest were up to date Ki-43. The A6M was pretty much not there.

In Malaya the attacks initially came from the sea, where only radar could provide warning. Later, when they came over land from Thai and ex-RAF bases, the defenders had already been beaten. The picture was the same in the DEI with A6M being the main Japanese fighter IIRC.


To go back to the ABDA, this command came into being only after the war had begun! Another case of too little, too late.

 

In all reality ABDA never stood a chance unless one of two thing's had happened.

1. All nations involved sent plenty of reinforcements 6 - 12 months before..

or

2. All nations involved began naval exercises and officer swaps with one another to better get used to their respective strengths and weaknesses 6 - 12 months before.

Personally the 2nd would be the preferable option, Throwing more men and ship's into an ad hoc force with no co-ordination would just leave more ships at the bottom. That being said I think there was something of 60+ submarines between the Dutch, British and US.. Im surprised they didnt make a bigger dint in the IJN in what is relatively an enclosed region with few routes of travel...

 

There wasn't much for the Allies to work with in the opening days of the war. Maybe the ABDA held up the Japanese advances for a few weeks at most, but I'm not sure. The ABDA had to be dealt with before Japan made any moves south, and south was the way they wanted to go. At best the ABDA was a speed bump for the Japanese.

 

Regarding all nations in the potential alliance being able to send reinforcements 6-12 months before...

Obviously, the Dutch were a bit screwed! The KNIL and KNIL-ML were actually better in equipment terms than Dutch domestic forces BEFORE May 1940...the Dutch being a longstanding Neutral who opted for the "weak", don't hurt us 'cos we couldn't hurt a fly ourselves school of Neutrality. And after May 1940, there was of course very very little the Dutch could do themselves to reinforce the NEI; what they'd have had to do was reach a defence agreement ahead of schedule with their potential allies in the Far East and allow them to site forces in the NEI...but that would have of course violated their appearance of neutrality in the Far East.

They also encountered another issue When the Dutch government in exile - one of the wealthier exiled adminstrations BECAUSE of all that oil! - went shopping for arms in the U.S. they often ended up at the bottom of the list despite having the cash to pay up front. There are stories of Dutch orders for fighter aircraft being cancelled on several occasions, for example...

I can partly understand priority being given to the British Purchasing Commission in 1940 early1941...but given their more real and direct military concerns in the Pacific, you'd have thought that Washington would have been rushing to support the Dutch, one of the bulwarks against their own prospective opponents there! Do I get a faint whiff of Washington keeping the defences of the NEI as weak as possible for as long as possible in case the Americans should have to march in???

 

No! The Germans were judged to be more dangerous, the Brits were a bit underestimated.

 

It wasn't just the Dutch that were a bit screwed, but all Allied parties were seriously screwed. Britain was essentially fighting for it's life and the USA was struggling to play military "catch up" with all of it's armed services following the fall of France.

At least in the years leading up to World War II, the Dutch, specifically the DEI, were America's best customer for military exports from 1937-39. Once the war in Europe began, the US was swamped with military export orders from Britain and France, and the Dutch, safely "sitting on the fence", quickly saw their orders being placed on the back burner. Late 1940 thru 1941 was no better as the US had to keep Britain supplied, as well as, build up their own armed forces. The British were also apply "grease" to the US aviation & armaments industries, by infusing it with cash to help US companies expand to meet the orders they were placing - hence, their priority in the "food chain". Let's not forget that the US had few problems manufacturing the airframes to meet orders, the breakdown came with all of the ancillary equipment such as engines, radios, weapons, etc. The US aviation industry just could not produce these as quickly as the airframes, hence many orders were held up for lack of parts. For example, a Dutch order for 28 Curtiss 75s(export version of the P-36) was refused because there were no engines available for those aircraft. Another example, shortly before the fall of France, was of an order of Brewster Buffaloes that had been cancelled by the Belgians, that the Dutch has looking into, but the order was quickly snatched up by France. Finally, during Princess Juliana's visit to the US, in March, 1941, FDR told her delegation, that concerning aircraft shipments, priority was being given to those countries actually engaged in hostilities. However, the US could readily fulfill the need for small arms ammunition.

Also, at the time, the NEI is also walking a very fine line, diplomatically, between Japan and the United States, not wanting to provoke either during 1940-41.

"more real and direct military concerns in the Pacific"?

I was under the long-held impression that the Americans had already long ago written off holding the Philippines in the event of war with Japan(at least until MacArthur's intervention changed all of that shortly before the outbreak of the Pacific War). So, if the United States is not "rushing" to defend it's own territory, the most certainly will not be rushing in to defend another nation's territory. However, once the decision was made to defend the Philippines it was just "too little, too late."


With that out of the way, Von Noobie's proposal for massive reinforcements 6-12 months before.
Unfortunately, 12 months prior is out of the question, as at that time, there was not much measure of cooperation between the US, UK, and the NEI in the Pacific...There was a lot of talk, sure, just not much in the way of cooperation. Military meetings were held between the UK and DEI(and to a point, with the US included), however no firm commitments were made, and the US did not make any firm commitment to entering a war should Japan attack either British or Dutch holdings in the Pacific - by this point both the DEI & UK saw US commitment as imperative for any action. As of the end of March, 1941, the UK & DEI were still trying to win a firm commitment for the United States. Further, while, by this date, while the military officers partaking in these meetings had agreed that action was necessary, commitments from their respective governments was required, and those had not yet been given. By mid-April, 1941, Neither the US nor UK governments were willing to enter into a formal military agreement with the DEI - the UK was stretched thin as it was, and the US political concerns at home would not support such an action. The staff conferences continued, but the defeat of Germany was the first and foremost principal war aim, and that would not be shaken by any Japanese action in the Pacific, essentially, a war in the Pacific was to be a defensive one until such time as an offensive could be mounted.

For a good idea about the DEI view and diplomacy, these 2 PDFs will provide you with a good idea of those chaotic times
1 November, 1940 - 31 May, 1941: http://www.historici.nl/pdf/LOD/LOD19401101.pdf
1 June, 1941 - 7 December, 1941: http://www.historici.nl/pdf/LOD/LOD19410601.pdf

 

About the only bright spot for the ABDA was the defensive action on Timor. Australian and Dutch troops there gave the Japanese a bloody nose and hung on for almost a year before the end of operations there. But after the disaster at the Battle of Java Sea, the Malay Barrier was smashed. That was the main mission of the ABDA anyway, to hold that line. After that, the fronts were re-organized.

 

Well said, the Timor episode is hardly ever mentioned but it was quite a good cooperation between both armies. without the Java sea battle, they could probably have hold on longer and allow allied reinforcements. It would be an interesting "what if" topc