I had just read about this in the S&T's World at War magazine issue #3. The story of the raid is by Joachim Karl Scholz who was a member of the Hitler Youth in 1945 and participated in the raid. It is a good example that even though the Germans were beaten they could still have the ability to organize a raid like this. THE DYHERNFURTH RAID. By Joachim Karl Scholz The town named Dyhernfurth is just west of Breslau, the former capital of Silesia once East Germany. It is now part of Poland. In January 1945, the local magistrate evacuated the civilian population, just barely before the revenging Russian's army arrived. On its outskirts, they haphazardly deserted a chemical plant without being given sufficient time to gather important documents, or to destroying top-secret war materials. After the fact, the scientists of the plant made the German military realize, that the abandoned materials were part of a top secret chemical warfare weapon development project. I.G.Farben developed a nerve gas, which if left behind, could place the Soviets into an advantageous military position. This material could be immediately used against the Germans and be a world thread in the future. Having little choice, the German general staff decided to destroy the factory and the materials immediately, no matter what the cost. The following operation may be of interest not only to show the capability of the German troops at this time of the war, but also the leadership proficiency of their commanders. Despite all odds, they planed and executed the following operation. It involved also the politics of securing complete operational freedom, a commodity so necessary to make such an operation a success. Independent action was a rare commodity at that time in the war, when a firing squad could be the reward for any operational reversal. The key figure of this battle-group operation was Major General Sachsenheimer, the youngest General in the German army, who at this time commanded the 17th Infantry Division. He was a soldier's General whom every soldier and officer in his command respected. Courageously he fought with his men to prevent a Russian breakout at the Pulawy bridgehead on January 12, 1945. He then suffered alongside his soldiers during the continuous self-sacrificing infantry engagements against overwhelming quantities of tanks, as they moved in southerly direction toward fortress Breslau and the Oder river. Army Group headquarters recently appointing him commander of the fortress Glogau in Lower Silesia. Sixty miles north west of Dyhernfurth and down stream of the same river. On February 3, the Chief of Staff of the 4th Panzer Armee, Oberst Knüppel summoned Major General Sachsenheimer for a meeting to their headquarters in Lauban, near Schweidnitz. He briefed him on the Dyhernfurth situation and the circumstance that required the raid. Without options this operation had to be successful to avoid unimaginable consequences. The Oberst gave him all pertinent and available facts and requested him to work on an operational plan immediately. The Chief of Staff also gave him a written order, which contents were approximately as follows: Form a battle group to execute an unexpected raid on the Dyhernfurth Chemical Plant. This operation must provide for an opportunity of a chemical warfare officer with civilian volunteers, two scientists and eighteen employees of this chemical factory, to destroy the top secret poisonous gases stored therein. These materials remained behind enemy lines in underground vessels, in liquid form, at the time of the area evacuation. The engineers suggested pumping this material into the Oder river, where it would dissolve harmlessly, using the factory's pump facilities and piping. Further, Army Group ordered to make all the remaining poison gas chemicals unidentifiable. Dynamiting the vessel would be neither practical nor advisable. It would adversely affect the personnel involved in the raid and leave sufficient residue for analysis by the enemy. Further, the battle group was to destroy all the raw materials in the nine storage bunkers, by using explosives or torch. Circumstances considered, the bulk of this material would be too large for evacuation. General Sachsenheimer was to be totally responsible for leading the raid. He was to penetrate the immediate Russian held area, engage the enemy to provide an opportunity for the civilians to accomplish the destruction of the prior described material. He then should withdraw with the entire battle group, returning to the south side of the Oder river. In the mean time Corps General Staff already assigned the necessary troops for this operation. At this very moment they deployed in the immediate area of Dyhernfurth and established a jump-off position by a nearby railroad bridge. Other than infantry, headquarter promised additional troops and special weapons. Specifically they promised two companies of Fallschirmjäger (Paratroopers), two batteries of 88 FlaK (Anti Aircraft Artillery), and one light Sturm Pioniere (Assault Engineer) company, including eighty-one assault boats. The Army Corps General Staffs recommended an early morning surprise attack, after a preceding artillery bombardment of the enemy held defensive positions. During this period, they suggested dropping paratroops to secure the factory. This would allow the ground troop raiding party, after they crossed the river with the civilian specialists, to occupy the chemical factory. General Sachsenheimer had other plans, which he considered more prudent. He based his situation analysis on the recent reconnaissance and intelligence reports. The reports suggested that the Russians were moving troops and armor on all the main east west roads six kilometers north of Dyhernfurth. Large tank columns were crawling in westerly direction toward the Russian held bridgehead at Steinau. He feared that any air drop would alert the Russians and give them enough time to divert armor directly and immediately toward Dyhernfurth. The General considered that securing the factory was only the beginning of the operation. He realized that the time estimated, or necessary, to allow the factory personnel to accomplish their task, may be insufficient. He opted against any paratroop drop. By nature of the design of the German parachute harness, it required the paratroopers to jump into combat without infantry weapons, other than side arms. Simultaneously automatic weapons, light mortars, Panzerfausts, they dropped separately and were collected on the ground. Being Jägers (Light Infantry) by organization and armament, it would make it difficult to resist or hold back an organized armor attack. This impediment would consequently place this entire operation in doubt. General Sachsenheimer discussed his apprehensions with his superior General Gräser. He then left to undertake a personal reconnaissance, to study the area where he intended the raid to take place. Upon arrival at the foremost command post he summoned his long range scouts. At this time local Volksturm (Home Guard) or HJ (Hitler Youth), some age fourteen to sixteen, volunteers supported the most forward positions. They had detail knowledgeable of the surrounding areas and topography. They typically conducted their Spähtrupp missions (reconnaissance) in groups of two or three, far behind the enemy lines. The Russians occupied villages and towns without securing the country side. That is to say placing guards into key positions for observation and counter actions. The German front line units at this location, like most other places in the east, were a mixed group of veterans, survivors of the Vistula bridgehead disasters, Volksturm and HJ. All front line units had up to date weapons, were uniformed and by now were well integrated into operational units. The scouts described the enemy positions as almost harmless, easily bypassed. This was very soon confirmed, when the General with two line officers of this sector approached the river's flood retaining embankment. A Russian light machine gun immediately opened fire from across the river. Both accompanying officers fell wounded to the ground. Without showing anxiety, the General continued his reconnaissances, then crawled back to the line and instructed the medics to recover the wounded men. From behind the river embankment the General observed that the dynamited railroad bridge remained intact, but for the first section. On the German side of the river it hung twisted into the current and drifting ice floats. The bridge was passable, provided the assault group could wade the first part of the icy water. They must obviously accomplish all this under cover of darkness and unobserved. On the north end of the bridge the Russians have placed two twin-barreled 20mm machine guns, one on each side. The next identifiable defensive position was two-hundred meters behind this gun emplacement. The area between, for all practical purposes, would have to be considered mined. After that, the railroad line made a wide left turn toward Dyhernfurth. >From this point a rail feeder line was branching off toward the chemical factory. This feeder line to the factory could be fallowed to find the factory in the dark, even by unfamiliar troops and ignorant of the terrain. It all depended on silently and quickly disposing of the Russian sentries and crews at the gun emplacements. Soviet troops occupied the Dynhernfurth Castle with the adjacent Cloister. They were obviously drunk, laughing and singing, which was clearly audible across the river. The General could see unobstructed for at least three Kilometers toward the north. Existing thin snow cover made the local patches of forests more transparent. The visibility would be quite sufficient to do damage to any attacking armored columns. The General starred at the ground before him and shook his head thoughtfully. The clock kept running. This mission had to succeed with troops he did not know and units who hardly knew each other. He dreaded most the problem of taking civilians, most of them unfit for military service, into a combat operation. He prayed that the Russians in the castle across the river would remain in that drunken stupor for some time to come. In his mind General Sachsenheimer reviewed his decisions again. He raced back to the Panzer AOK4, without waiting for the reconnaissance report from the Engineers or Anti Aircraft Unit. General Gräser approved his revised battle plan. Everything hinged on surprise. They agreed not to drop the paras from the air, but bring them close to the deployment area as a reserves. The AOK4 wired this information to the HOK in Görlitz and got approval for the plan, if General Sachsenheimer will guarantee the success of this mission. Everyone smiled, no opposition from Führer? At headquarters someone must be napping. Major Joos, a Regimental commander of General Sachenheimer's 17th Infantry Division was to lead the charge. The first task was to overcome the two heavy machine guns that guarded the bridge. Next and detrimental was to cross the railroad bridge with a sizeable amount of infantry as quickly as possible. It was equally important to engage and overpower the second defensive position two-hundred meters beyond. Finally, all units had to race along the top of the railroad embankment toward the railroad station and the target area, the chemical factory. One part of the raiders, a smaller group, was to continue the railway toward the village of Wahren. The other, a larger group was to follow the approach road north, toward the village of Seifersdorf. Both battle groups were to establish a defensive position and repel any attacks. They anticipated that the soviets will be mounting a counterattack from this direction. The FlaK deployed itself immediately east of the rail road bridge. In a way that kept them out of sight, hidden below the rivers flood retaining embankment. Being extremely short of 88 mm FlaK and ammunition, they understood that they will fire only when they effectively can strike at any approaching massed infantry or tanks. The combat engineers with their assault boats where to contribute to the battle by crossing the river and engage any enemy that would attack toward the bridgehead area. After the completing the battle plan briefing, General Sachsenheimer flew back to his command post in his Storch (German observation plane). During the flight he explained the proposed battle plans to First Lieutenant Röhrig, the commander of the combat engineers. They intended to keep one platoon with twenty-five assault boats near the bridge in reserve. The remaining boats were to cross the river in two groups. Precisely thirty minutes after the infantry crossed the bridge, the moment the mortar and light artillery started to fire into the Russian revelers in the castle and cloister. They intended this barrage to divert attention away from the river and support the crossing by the combat engineers. One party was to cross by the river kilometer marker 286 the other 288. They were to deploy into defensive position to repel any Russians that may be advancing along the river from the west or town of Dyhernfurth. The artillery and mortar barrage was to continue shooting at opportune targets and to cause as much confusion and damage as possible. In spite of the short time, for planning and issuing of orders, deployment of equipment and troops worked in good order. It was a sign of good soldiering, considering that most of the participants were neither briefed nor have ever fought together as a cohesive unit. General Sachsenheimer than stripped from his division headquarter part of his staff, a communication platoon, some experienced line Officers and Sergeants from the reserve of his 17th Division. This side-show, planned and prepared for action in an almost impossible short time, was if nothing else a statement of military professionalism. It is noteworthy that this raid took place only eleven weeks before the end of the war. In the night of February 5, Major Joos and his assault force raced across the bridge in total silence and darkness and disposed of the machine gun crews. The raiders kept on running massed on top of the rail embankment, to avoid possible mines on either flank, and jumped into the next Russian defensive position. They totally surprised the Russians who offered almost no resistance and perhaps also suffered from major hangovers. The Germans could hear the bulk of the Russians singing and screaming from within the castle of Dryhernfurth as they continued in their drunken orgy. Already sixty-five minutes into the raid the plant technicians and chemical warfare experts were working to make the factory generators and pumps operational to complete their part of the mission. The work progressed faster then anticipated. HOK was kept current through radio communication. Field Marshall Schörner personally requested General Sachsenheimer to come to the radio microphone, apparently to wish him success, or to restate the importance of succeeding in this mission. It appeared, that by so doing, he wished to become part of the accomplishment and praise. General Sachsenheimer ignored his request, instead he personally joined the two scientists in the factory and remained there until the job was completed. He than asked his accompanying adjutant to sit at a typewriter, where he dictated a statement. In essence it stated that all the gas, all sensitive material and documents have been properly disposed of. He than handed the typed statement to the two professors for signatures. All during this time there were fire fights, disorganized battles, going on throughout the area, all around the perimeter of the factory. It was not until 13:00 that the Russians figured out what was going on. At this time they started a concentrated counter attack, with well-placed thrusts, toward the factory area. From the north, from the village of Seifersdorf, eighteen tanks, some T34 mostly T52, advanced with good speed, they quickly spread out into a V-formation. Right from the beginning General Sachsenheimer decided not to deploy PaK (anti tank guns) across the river. It would have taken to much time. Nor could he be certain that they will have sufficient time and opportunity to retrieve them. Instead he placed two Hetzers (75 mm antitank guns) onto the left side of the river. They now had a clear sight field and started to fire at the Russian tanks. German outposts, which they placed far ahead of the blocking positions, returned post haste, just ahead of the attacking tanks. They informed the camouflaged blocking force of the enemy's approach, direction, strength and pinpointed likely target areas. Panzerjagdkommandos (tank destroying specialists), spread out for action. They were all volunteers. The army seldom had a shortage of it. For each enemy tank destroyed by individual combat would mean one week of furlough, deferred of course. The tactic was to let the enemy tank approach to within thirty meters, before firing a Panzerfaust (hand held anti tank rockets), preferable from behind. This weapon had a smoke tell-tail and a wise soldier planed a getaway route. By the end of the war magnetic mines were seldom available and throwing an anti tank mine in front of a track too dangerous. Using a bundle of grenades required throwing the explosives on top of the engine compartment. This tactic required to walk close behind the tank to avoid injury. The Russian tank, although plentiful, were crude. Many lacked a turret-coupled standing basket for the loader and the gunner. This rendered the crew blind and unable to properly function while the vehicle was traveling or the turret rotating. The Russian tank commanders had the habit of keeping their turret hatches open, and their head popping out. When they spotted a German approaching any of their tanks, they would fire on him with their submachine guns or with the on board machine guns. Tank hunting teams where very effective counter measures. It did not take long before the attack came to a standstill, with all the Russian tanks stopped, destroyed or burning. Everyone remained alert, everyone knew that Ivan was not going to give up easily. Later in the afternoon, just before daylight started to fail, seven Russian tanks with accompanying infantry started to attack from the village of Kranz. They moved and fired relentlessly at the railroad embankment leading to the factory. The Russian's success would mean the ruin of the raid with all the deployed troops stranded without an escape route. The Ruskies finally figured out what was going on and what they needed to do to stop it. It was for such a circumstance that the 88 FlaK's were placed concealed near the bridge. In record time the battery prepared for action. They raised the barrels and leveled just barely above the river embankment. All aiming at pre picked targets and fired as fast as they could load. The unmistakable sharp crash and long red-yellow mussel flashes of the 88's brought death and destruction to the Russians. At five to seven-hundred meters distance tanks were blowing up, one at a time. Some continued to advance and continued to fire at the railroad embankment. They apparently thought that it was from there that they drew fire. Only one tanker got smart, he raced his engine turned around, pointed his tank toward a patch of woods and with full speed escaped. This short but decisive engagement apparently paralyzed the Russians, they pressed no more attacks. The battle around Dyhernfurth gradually came to a halt with burning tanks and dead Russians all over the countryside. It was dark by now. The raiders prepared to withdraw, taking along all the equipment, wounded and dead comrades, of which they had very few. The raid was almost a success. The raiders also had some unexpected casualties in the factory. After they pumped the gas from the underground vessels, they could pump some neutralizing agents into them. The combat engineers prepared explosive charges to blow the valves and deny the enemy accessability and opportunity for chemical analysis. During this process, a valve broke, opened and sprayed gasses at some engineers and civilians. The men were instantly blinded. They immediately rushed them out of the combat area to qualified medical help. They regained their sight within several days. The paratroops, which headquarter promised, never arrived. Not even to be available as a reserve force, as General Sachsenheimer predicted. The Russians angered by the defeat, torched the Dyhernfurth castle and part of the adjacent cloister with all its contents, including a priceless library. The cloister and church mausoleum they forced opened, plundered and destroyed the sarcophagus of the local nobles. They stole everything of value, scattering the remains and the dead. They kept undisturbed the local brewery and schnapps factory, which is still existing today and producing spirits for the new locals, the new masters of Silesia, the Poles. The factory is in ruins along with many other parts of the town, too much work to clean up the area.
Interesting, I had read about this in Duffy's "Red Storm on the Reich", I think, but this has more detail.
Theres even more information in the S&T's World at War magazine issue #3. The OOBs and other details.
Not that I know of. I have been picking up a copy of Strategy & Tactics for years. And they just started the new magazine World at War a few months back.
Strange... I was a subscriber but then like I said in the early 80s it went down. Most likely it was picked up later on by another crew. Do they still offer an hex game with every issue?
I found this interesting too though, "Panzerjagdkommandos (tank destroying specialists), spread out for action. They were all volunteers. The army seldom had a shortage of it. For each enemy tank destroyed by individual combat would mean one week of furlough, deferred of course. The tactic was to let the enemy tank approach to within thirty meters, before firing a Panzerfaust (hand held anti tank rockets), preferable from behind. This weapon had a smoke tell-tail and a wise soldier planed a getaway route. By the end of the war magnetic mines were seldom available and throwing an anti tank mine in front of a track too dangerous. Using a bundle of grenades required throwing the explosives on top of the engine compartment. This tactic required to walk close behind the tank to avoid injury. The Russian tank, although plentiful, were crude. Many lacked a turret-coupled standing basket for the loader and the gunner. This rendered the crew blind and unable to properly function while the vehicle was traveling or the turret rotating. The Russian tank commanders had the habit of keeping their turret hatches open, and their head popping out. When they spotted a German approaching any of their tanks, they would fire on him with their submachine guns or with the on board machine guns. Tank hunting teams where very effective counter measures."
Paraphrasing Orwell, "All WWII tanks were made blind, only some were blinder than others". Quoting the Aide-Mémoire de l'Officier d'Infanterie, 1940, "Le char est sourd et aveugle" - "tanks are deaf and blind.
Seems like that was the fact for most tanks for sure . I havent heard of many that could function while moving.
