the evolution of the tank in the US Army during the period 1919-1940

The Evolution of the Tank in the U.S. Army

This paper summarizes the evolution of the tank in the US Army during the period 1919-1940. It examines the US Army's post World War I concept of future war and explores the evolution of tank design, force organization, and mechanized doctrine through the interwar period. The issues and factors that were crucial to the early evolution of the tank in the US Army were largely responsible for the role the tank played during and after World War II. This suggests that the 1920s and 1930s were the most important period in the history of the tank.

 

That was really a fantastic read, Spartan. They're still dealing with those same issues today, albeit more gradually and with more sophisticated materials.

 

I find it interesting that they didn't include in their biblography The Fighting Tanks 1916-1933 by Jones, Rarey and Icks. Its one of the better single volumes contemporary to that period.

 

I recently read Hunnicutt's Sherman and am now finishing up Pershing and can't help but realize the potential the U.S. had for developing it's armor force had the need and support been there. Our use of industry in developing and mass producing our war needs was unmatched in the world, certainly on the level of the internal combustion engine. Had a few higher ups in the military opened their minds to the thinking that was being written up in Europe by the armor theorists we might have at least had some more prototypes in the works then we did come 1939. As it was we didn't do too badly, thanks to that industry.

 

Interestingly, I started a comparative essay on Guderian's book and the one I listed above by three US Army officers. Guderian's work comes off very poorly in comparison. It wasn't that the US Army didn't have open minded officers. It was that the top ranks, and in particular the ordinance officers (seemingly a perennial problem for the US Army even today), were hide bound conservatives that wouldn't accept new ideas.

 

What I said makes agreement. Junior officers and some mid-grade officers were very open to tanks, development of armored vehicles and, developing tactics and methods for mobile warfare. It was the top ranks, senior officers and, in particular the ordinance department that was adverse to all this. The US Army's ordinance department had the final say, more or less, on what weapons were procured. Then there was a fight between branches. The cavalry wanted tanks. So did the infantry branch. But, they wanted different tanks for different roles.
This fight was won by the infantry and ordinance department for the most part. The infantry could have tanks but the cavalry was shut out. So, the cavalry had "Combat cars" instead. The infantry branch saw tanks as support vehicles for their troops and wanted something that fired HE, had machineguns and, wasn't particularly fast. Ordinance specified tank requirements on that basis inter-war.
The cavalry wanted fast tanks for exploitation. They favored armored cars and things like the Christie tanks. But, these didn't meet ordinance requirements for the infantry and with less pull the cavalry branch was left with just a handful of vehicles to experiment with.
Ordinance mean time, had put in requirements based on tried technologies that met the infantry's needs. This, for example, is why US tanks all have volute spring suspensions at the start of the war. That was THE ordinance department's requirement for all tanks. It wasn't until well into the war and seeing the advantages of torsion bars on the Pz III that these were considered for use by the US. The 75mm on the Grant and Sherman was based on its HE firing capacity with its antitank value coming in second. In initial use the US Army's ordinance department had failed to even provide a good, well tested AP round for it. So, the Army in North Africa grabbed up about 100,000 German 75mm antitank rounds found there and reworked the shot to fit US casings and issued these as an interm fix for the problem!