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The loss of U 707 to Fortress IIA J/220 9th November 1943.

Discussion in 'Submarines and ASW Technology' started by Liberator, Feb 5, 2015.

  1. Liberator

    Liberator Ace

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    The loss of U 707 to Fortress IIA J/220 - 9th November 1943.

    No.220 Squadron
    Fortress IIA FL459 J/220
    Lagens, Azores.
    Duty. Anti-submarine escort to convoy MKS 29 (Gibraltar to the UK)

    Crew.

    F/L. R P. Drummond. Pilot
    F/O. R D. Thompson RCAF. Second Pilot
    F/L. G A. Grundy. Navigator
    F/S. J. Fitzpatrick. Flight Engineer
    Sgt. L S G. Parker. ASV Operator
    P/O. J B. Brodie. Mid-Upper Gunner
    F/S. F L. Fitzgibbon. WOP/AG
    Sgt. F D. Galloway. Rear Gunner


    On 9th November 1943 Fortress FL459 J/220 was flying about midway between the Azores and Portugal on route to escort convoy MKS 29A, when at 0725 hours a fully surfaced U-Boat was suddenly spotted almost below the aircraft 37 miles south-west of the convoy.

    The U-Boat was believed to be a 740-tonner, dark grey in colour with a least one flak gun forward and a number of other guns abaft the conning tower. The U-Boat at once opened fire on the aircraft, rather wildly at first. The Captain turned to port and the navigator immediately began setting up his bombing gear, but he had not finished when the aircraft passed eves the U-Boat the second time. The bomb doors were not fully opened and depth charges were not released. During this run, which was made up the U-Boat's track, flak was heavy and fairly accurate. The tail gunner fired long bursts at the conning tower as the aircraft passed over.

    The aircraft again circled to port and attacked up the U-Boat's track, releasing four depth charges spaced at 100 feet, while the U-Boat zigzagged. The exact points of entry of the depth charges were not seen owing to bad light, but the U-Boat was hidden by the explosion plume. After this attack the U-Boat was seen to be stopped and down by the stern, her bows well clear of the water. She had a 45° list to port and all flak had ceased.

    The aircraft again circled to port to make a second attack from the port beam and three more depth charges were released which again com­pletely enveloped the U-Boat in their explosion plumes. On the run in to this attack the crew of the Fortress thought they saw 10 to 15 men in the water. After the plumes from the second attack had subsided, there was a mild glow under water as if from an under water explosion, after which the U-Boat disappeared stern first. A large oil patch began to form, part of which was thick and treacly and part iridescent. It eventually reached a length of nearly half a mile. Much wooden wreckage was seen including a large square yellow object like a wooden hatch or raft. Four or five big shapeless objects were seen just beneath the surface.

    Half an hour after the attack one man was seen swimming amongst the wreckage and two " K " type dinghies were dropped with the usual " K " rations. The second of these was secured by the survivor who climbed in. A parachute bag with rations and a Mae West inside was also dropped, but the survivor was unable to pick these up.

    The aircraft remained circling for an hour and three-quarters, then proceeded to the convoy and reported the sinking and the survivor by V/S to the S.N.O., who replied " Well done."

    Analysis of the attack.....

    A very good effort in the face of intense flak and first rate bombing in poor light resulting in a clean kill.
    This attack serves to emphasise the vital impor­tance of being ready for action at all times, and the bombing gear should have been set up immediately the aircraft left the coast. Failure to do this meant that the aircraft had to make an unnecessary run through the U-Boat's flak. This criticism, however, in no way detracts from the credit which goes to the crew of J/220 for a gallant and most successful action.

    U 707 - Type VIIC (Group Schill) – O/L. G. Gretschel – 51 crew lost.


    Operations against convoys MKS 28 and 29 (German Naval History)

    Between 27th October and 10th November two small-scale convoy operations took place to the west of Spain. It was evident, from our heavy defeat in the action against ONS 20, that a mobile attack on a convoy was still beyond our capabilities, and we therefore decided to sail eight boats simultaneously from Biscay bases for a one-night attack on an MKS or a KMS convoy off the north­west Spanish coast . The group Schill which included three flak U-boats whose fuel capacity precluded their operating on the transatlantic routes, was formed into a patrol line on 27th October, 400 miles west of Cape Ortegal, in readiness for an attack on MKS 28. As radar-equipped FW 200 aircraft were available for reconnaissance, we hoped to receive a continuous series of reconnaissance reports which would enable us to manoeuvre the group so as to make contact with the convoy at dusk on 29th November.

    The convoy was sighted by the aircraft on the 27th and 28th, but on the 29th—the vital day no sighting was made, although reconnaissance was flown both in the forenoon and afternoon. The convoy had made a slight deviation and slipped to the westward. It was again sighted from the air next day to the north-west of the group and, contrary to his original intention, FO U-boats ordered the boats in daylight pursuit, which to our surprise resulted in a contact. At dawn on 31st, U.262 carried out a submerged attack on three large ships and a destroyer and having heard unmistakable torpedo detonations after the appropriate intervals reported four hits. We thus regarded the operation as a success and were encouraged to repeat these tactics; however, it is now known from British records that only one ship of 2,968 tons was sunk in the attack.

    From 3rd to 5th November group Schill moved slowly southwards between 18 and 23 degrees West, awaiting a KMS convoy. Air reconnaissance in search of MKS 29 commenced on 5th and the first sighting was made on the 7th, group Schill thereupon being disposed so that the convoy, if it kept to its last reported course, would pass through the formation in the evening of the 8th. In order to ensure the location of the convoy on that day, reconnaissance was to be flown by three FW 200s, both in the forenoon and afternoon, and on sighting the convoy the aircraft were to direct the U-boats to the target by means of beacon signals. But one aircraft had to drop out of the forenoon flight because of engine trouble, and another in the afternoon because of a radar defect, with the result that, for a second time, the convoy was not sighted on the decisive day. On the evening of the 8th, group Schill, in scouting formation, proceeded south-west at high speed, sighting occasional destroyers but no merchant ships, and it became apparent that the convoy had passed through a gap in the line. When air reconnaissance found it again next morning, the U-boat commanders were given a free hand, two boats searching without success until the following morning, when the operation was abandoned. These experiences confirmed our conclusions of 1941, namely, that air co-operation could only be successful if sufficient long-range aircraft were available for prolonged and concentrated reconnaissance, together with adequate reserves of aircraft and equipment.

    …........................

    Fortress IIA FL459 served with 220, 519 and 251 Squadrons. The aircraft was Struck Off Charge on 22nd December 1945


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  2. Smiley 2.0

    Smiley 2.0 Smiles

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    That was a really neat story! Thank you for sharing Liberator! :)
     

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