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The myths of WWII (Eastern Europe)

Discussion in 'Eastern Europe' started by LJAd, Mar 14, 2011.

  1. Jager

    Jager Member

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    First off. I have family that fought on the eastern front for the Germans. He passed in 2006. I have his combat rifle, uniform, and other equipment to this day. And he would tell you of the conditions that the Germans faced. He always said that they never feared fighting Russian soldiers outnumbered because they were always able to handle immense odds. The Germans always fought outnumbered. The problem was as he said in Russia that they were nearly frozen, they had no support from the air or armor because of the lack of fuel, munitions, and maintanance materials. Secondly, if you want to point to sources. Watch the ploesti air raids video from the history channel. World War II in color. More than half of German oil used for the frontline on the eastern front came from Ploesti. Yes Germany had other sources but your statistics dont say anything about the allocation of those oil sources. Most of those sources produced in Germany were used in Germany, not on the eastern front. And yes mountains are hard terrain for armor but you must not know the cacs very well if you think they are all hills and mountains. the Ural's are only part of the terrain. There are also vast amount of rolling plain perfect for armor. also the mountain regions are filled with lots of railroads suitable for fast and safe transport of troops, material, and tanks. Thirdly, you said it was important for Germany to win a quick war against russia so says Hitler? So you are declaring Hitler a war genius now? Blitzkrieg doctrine did rely on fast movement and deep penetration to end a battle quick and it often failed if the operation lasted too long but not because of the fact that the Russians were too powerful. It's because blitzkrieg relies on logistics to keep the spearhead moving quickly . and if the front lines cant be supplied in order to keep the tanks and planes moving, which were the primary weapons of blitzkrieg. This was also what happened to Rommel twice in Africa. His blitz would push the british back untill he ran out of equipment and supplies. then he would have to retreat. Guderian said that he could have had moscow if Hitler had not stopped him and he was replaced for his criticism of hitler. I believe Guderian before Hitler any day. And I believe an actual soldier that fought in war outside of moscow before I believe any of your historians. I have never read a German's war journal that said he feared fighting the Russian army. It was more like the German feared running out of gas or bullets or food before he feared a russian.
     
  2. lwd

    lwd Ace

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    Not because Hitler said so because the Germans planned for a short war and did so because they didn't have the resources to fight a long one. It doesn't take a genius to realize that if you get caught in a war of attrition where the other side has a huge advantage in population and industry you aren't likely to win.
     
  3. LJAd

    LJAd Well-Known Member

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    Here,I am waiting for you :don't believe Guderian,when he was writing Panzerleader,he was a very sick man,Germany had lost the war,his home land with the memories of his youth (WestPrussia) was gone forever:thus the only thing he could do to give his live any sense,was to claimthat Germany had lost the war because of Hitler,and,if one has followed his avice,there would be no defeat .
    1) Guderian was of course wrong when he claimed that he could capture Moscow :you can't capture a big city with tanks
    2)Guderian was not fired because of his criticism of Hitler,but because he disobeyed a plain order from Hitler and von Kluge to not retreat .
    3)The following figures are from a post from AHF by Chris .Awender:view topic.php?f=76&t=165183
    Tank status report(4 september 1941)available for employment =operational
    PzG II:
    3PD :41 =2°%
    4 PD:49 =29%
    17PD :38=21%
    18PD:62 =38 %
    Thus,when Guderian claimed that he could capture Moscow his PG had 190 available tanks =25 %
    Pg III :
    7 PD :160=43%
    19 PD :12O =42.7%
    20 PD :124 =36 %
    PG III:404 =40.7
    10 PD ((4army):146 =77 %
    Also from AHF (a post by Qvist):viewtopic php?f=76&t=159662&start=75
    A summary only (the post is to long)
    A succesfull operation against Moscow would involve several stages
    1A succesfull annihilation battle at the beginning of september against the Soviet forces facing AGC
    2An advance to Moscow
    3An encirclment of Moscow by PG2 and PG3
    4The reduction of the Moscow pocket and succesfull dfence against Soviet couterattacks.
    These 4 stages would take at least 2-3 months ;
    .At the end of August,AGC had lost 2.500-3000 combatlosses per division,the great majority in the infantry(normal divisional infantry strength was :6000)
    Typhoon costed AGC 70000 men in october,Typhoon in september would cost at least as much.
    Typhoon in september would prevent the arrival of 100000 replacements,who did arrive in september .
    Typhoon in september would mean AGC with 220000 not replaced losses (150000 +70000)=combatpower of 50 %
    Typhoon in october was a AGC with 120000 not replaced losses (150000 +70000-100000)=combat power of 70-80 %
    The losses in november were 50000 men,that would mean a total of 270000,some 4000 men per division ,that would mean an infantry strength of 2000 men per division .
    You get the picture ?
    Even if Moscow was captured,with an infantry strength of 2000 men,the German divisions could not hold the line .
     
  4. LJAd

    LJAd Well-Known Member

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    That tanks and planes are the primary weapns of Blitzkrief is very debatable. IMHO,there are no primary weapons,because tanks and planes do not operate in a vacuum:without the support and protection of mobile infantry and armoured and mechanized artillery (always forgotten),tanks are very vulnerable .
     
  5. LJAd

    LJAd Well-Known Member

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    These are the figures for German tank losses and replacements in the East
    june + july :-579 + 87
    august:-699 +9
    september :-230 +14
    october:-300 +316
    november:-366 +74
    StuG and Pzbef are not included
    on 1 september,there was a netto deficit of 1182 tanks (33% of the 22 june total)=70 per division .
    I already posted some exemples of how many(better how few) of the remaining tanks were operational .
    We are even not talking about ammunition,fuel,...
    The claim of Guderian that on 1 september he was ready to attack Moscow is,IMHO,a post-war invention .
     
  6. Jager

    Jager Member

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    lol thank you for posting those operational numbers for me. i was not about to take the time to post them. That is direct evidence that the Germans had difficulty maintaining their army or aka they had logistic issues that prevented them from moving forward. Not the Russian army. Now as for Guderian. lol If you really think he was trying to capture moscow with just tanks and just tanks of that availability then you are misinformed. Guderian insisted with Hitler that a forward base be established for re-supply, maintanance, and for air support capabilities so that he could take the city. No encirclement of Moscow was planned because High Command was not sure what was on the other side of Moscow which is the real reason why Hitler ordered Guderian south to relieve the 6th army. Hitler was afraid that if Guderian went into Moscow he would be encircled like what was occurring at Stalingrad. You should note that most of the Russian army was in between Moscow and Stalingrad at teh time and actually not in Moscow. Guderian plan would have enabled him to establish a position in moscow, and the Russian army would be forced to split itself between Containing both German Armies which would have made it possible for the 6th army to fend for itself. Guderian acknowleged this but was shot down by Hitler in which he directly criticized. And yes Guderian did refuse one of Hitlers orders which was the final act of him being discharged but he was well on his way out before that. And the replacement numbers are not logistical issues. That would be production issues which was also not a problem caused by the soviets but the USAF and the RAF.
     
  7. Jager

    Jager Member

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    I think you fail to realize how many resources are used not to just make your army but to maintain it. The Germans had a large army with even more equipment that resulted in large maintainance costs. The conditions the Germans were fighting in made Maintanance even more difficult. Why do you think the T-34 was so successful around this time? I guess you would say because it was a superior to German armor and built in great numbers. In reality the T-34 was easy to maintain and could operate under harsh conditions. Something German armor was not equipped for. Germans did not have trouble taking on T-34's in their Panzer III's or IV's. Problem was they were lucky to get their Panzers to the battlefield while the T-34 was already wreaking havoc.
     
  8. LJAd

    LJAd Well-Known Member

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    What was proposed by Guderian was impossible:daily average rail shipment for AGC (without the LW) was
    july :24 trains with 10700 tons
    august:22.7 with 10215
    september:26 with 11700
    For an average of 50-6O divisions,that would mean 200 tonnes per day (more for PD,less for ID),that was not sufficient .
    The T-34 were not available in great numbers in 1941 and were not successful:eek:n 22 june :1256(10 %),on 1 december :322(16 %)
    In the first period (22 june-1 september) :the Germans tried to defeat the SU,but failed,the SU tried to dislodge the Germans,but failed,the result was that the Germans were blocked .
    In the second period(september till 1 december),the Germans tried again ,but failed,the Russians tried again ,but failed,result the Germans were blocked.
    In the third period,(december till april) :the Russians tried again,but failed .
    The reason of the German failure in the first period was that the SU was to strong
    For the second period,the reason was that the Russian defensive capacity was stronger than the German offensive capacity .
    For the third period,the reason of the Russian failure was that ,while the German offensive capacity was exhausted,its defensive capacity was greater than the offensive capacity of the SU .
    In june,the Russians had 12000 tanks and 32000 artillery pieces,in december :2000 tanks and 17000 artillery guns,for aircraft,it was 10000 and 4000
     
  9. Jager

    Jager Member

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    The T-34 had been in production since 1940. Maybe only a certain model your thinking of, perhaps the 1941 model, was in limited numbers but the T-34 was running amock in summer of 1941 from the very first day of the invasion on June 22. T-34's came into constant contact with the 17th Panzer. The T-34's however were not effective at stopping the German advance untill winter of 1941. Why? because the T-34 could handle the conditions of the weather and terrain where the panzers could not. This is from Alfred Jodl One of the first known encounters with a T-34 involved the 17th Panzer Division near the Dniepr River. The appearance of the T-34 in the summer of 1941 was a psychological shock to German soldiers. The armor is mobile, has adequate firepower, and is tough to crack. However, with proper precision and execution our tank crews can handle them in similar fashion of the heavily armored French tanks we encountered a year ago. and ill take this from good ol' wiki. Again During the winter of 1941–42, the T-34 again dominated German tanks through its ability to move over deep mud or snow without bogging down; German tanks could not move over terrain the T-34 could handle. The Panzer IV used an inferior leaf-spring suspension and narrow track, and tended to sink in deep mud or snow.[SUP][45][/SUP] so even if the T-34 werent produced in the staggering numbers it was the tank could still function where as you pointed out less than half of German tanks could. This was the true advantage of the T-34. And again it proves that had the German War machine been able to keep its soldiers supplied, its tanks operational, its planes within fighting distance, etc. then Guderian would have been able to do what he intended. And this was possible had Hitler chosen to allocate German resources appropriatly. You are acting as if Guderian was some fool when he is one of the greatest war minds the world has seen. He en-doctrined Blitzkrieg warfare and knew what he was doing.
     
  10. Jager

    Jager Member

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    Again the Soviet Union was not too strong for the German army. The soviet army was in dis-array and the fighting quality of the russian war machine was very inadequate against the Equipment and experience of the German army. However, the russian army had the advantage of fighting on ground they knew how to fight on while the German's were not equipped to fight in the conditions. As a result, Germany equipment was more or less useless because it wasnt operable and the Germans had to resort to fighting on their experience alone. The Germans fought most battles outnumbered and won so the russian numbers that you keep posting really make no difference. The Germans knew they would be outnumbered. They were not aware that Russia had tanks that could function in areas that their's could not. Only later in teh war say 1943 ish did the overwhelming numbers actually catch up to the German army.
     
  11. LJAd

    LJAd Well-Known Member

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    Guderian claimed he endoctrined Blitzkrieg.
    The German warmachine was NOT able to keep its soldiers supplied,etc,etc,thus,saying that Guderian would have been able to do what he intended,is something unproved .A What If claim .
    About the T 34,I am sceptical about what was saying Jodl,because the east was not his business :it was an OKH theatre,without interference by the OKW .The T 34 was not stopping the Germans (they would be stopped without the T 34.The Germans already were stopped before the winter (unless you think that the Russian winter is starting on 1 november).That the T 34 dominated the German tanks in the winter is irrelevant,because the Russian offensive failed .
    In 1941,the Soviets were sending 1 million men per month to the front (and they all had a weapon),and the Germans some 60000 .Would that not be a reason of the German failure ?
     
  12. Rockfella

    Rockfella recruit

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    1) Hitler underestimated the vastness of SU.
    2) He was over-confident thinking his army would win SU before winters/whatever reason he should have provided full winter clothing to the army specially when the operation was delayed by weeks.
    3) He split the army in SU.
     
  13. LJAd

    LJAd Well-Known Member

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    Do you mean
    1) thesere are mistakes of Hitler?
    2)or these are myths ?
     
  14. Jager

    Jager Member

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    1) Guderian did not claim he en-doctrined Blitzkrieg sir. He in fact did. He was the leader in the development of armor and armored tactics during German re-armament. In 1933 he wrote numerous papers in describing the use of Mechanised warfare. In 1936 he wrote Achtung Panzers which was the official doctrine of the combination of air and armored tactics to form a combined offensive and that book is still read, taught, and studied in modern armies. And even after initially dismissed by Hitler he would be reinstated as Inspector General of the Armed troops and was a leader in advocating the development of German armor.
    2) Alfred Jodl was not a part of the eastern fronts operations but he was dispatched by Hitler several times to provide a report on the front. His first being the report on the T-34. His second. visit was "Hitler dispatched Jodl to the Caucasus to visit Field-Marshal Wilhelm List to find out why the oil fields had not been captured" (hmmm... i thought you said the cacs would do nothing for Germany? Yet this was an objective for the German army why do you think the 6th army was in grad and not by moscow?). "Jodl returned only to corroborate List's reports that the troops were at their last gasp".And i could go over his other reports but that should be enough.
    3) The factors surrounding the halt of the offensive by Moscow were primarily logistics, weather, and Hitler himself. The T-34 was what required the Germans to have the materials needed to keep their army maintained as they would not be able to advance without something to counter the T-34. All AT guns were completely innefective against the T-34 except the Pak 40 which was scarce and only partially effective. Germans were well outside the radius of proper air support and German Panzer were un-operational. Had the Germans been able to keep their Panzers moving the offensive would not have stopped. So yes it was the conditions that primarily stopped the German advance, not the Red Army. I guess its only coincidence that every great army in history stalls when it enters deep into russian land. and that the real reason is because the red army is so great that the red army could stop armies before it even existed. maybe in some glorified fairy tale but not reality.
    4) If you really think that mass numbers of men account for something then you need to refer back to the first world war when mass amounts of men account for nothing when you have the technology to kill them faster than they can come. Or maybe you should read into the Battle at Thermopalye where large numbers of persians accounted for nothing. And that was ancient times before the MG. When you have automatic weapons mass numbers really account for nothing. As i said before the Germans were always outnumbered. This meant nothing. Not untill the end of the war after stalingrad had fallen and the Afrika Korps had surrendered did overwhelming numbers of Russian, British, American, and other allies really start to make a difference. And rest assured it took the numbers of all allied nations not russia alone to overwhelm German firepower. The Germans were winning battles to the very end of war despite the numbers. Kurt Knispel lost his life when a small number of Tiger II's kept Vienna from being overrun by russian soldiers during the final months of the war. Was that not a victory even when the German War Machine was crippled and outnumbered?
     
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  15. LJAd

    LJAd Well-Known Member

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    1) there were other German generals that had as much right to claim the en-doctrination of the Blitzkrieg(Guderian was ONE of a lot)
    2)about the T34:there was no PAK 40,but,PAK37,47,50 and a few (104) 88 Flak also used as PAK
    From a Soviet war study the following weapon types as responsible for % of T34 destroyed (june 1941-september 1942)
    weapon calibre :
    20 mm:4.7%
    37 mm:10 %
    short 50:7.5mm
    long 50:54.3 %
    75 mm:10.1 %
    88 mm:3.4 %
    105 mm:2.9 %
    unknown :7.1 %
    About the battle of Moscow,the importance of which is overrun,exagerated :eek:nly by miracle could the Germans captured Moscow,because,at the end of august,the dies already were cast :Germany already was to weak,a Blitzkrieg of 6 months was impossible(and this was for all armies) :the only thing possible was a short blitzkrieg (some 10 weeks),and this failed :a German advance on 1 september was impossible.And,you are totally wrong to think that the Russians had no automatic weapons :from 22 june to 1 september,every week,the Germans lost more than 40000 men.
     
  16. Sloniksp

    Sloniksp Ставка

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    My oh my, we do live in a fantasy world dont we?

    Ever here of Model? After the war he stated the following: " It was neither the weather nor terrain that defeated Germany but the Russian soldier".

    Otto Carious too thought very highly of his Russian adversary who he faced quite regulary in his Tiger. He describes this well in his famous PANZERS IN THE MUD.

    And lets not forget Von Bock or Heinrich Henrici......

    Believe it or not, I too have spoken with many war veterans (both German and Russian) and to my surprise both sides respected each others fighting ability. The difference was that the Russians wanted to fight and defend therir homeland, while the Germans that I had spoken with and read about would have rather fought elsewhere.

    Logistics only became an issue when the Germans began to encounter more problems caused by the Red Army than ever anticipated. Germany never imagined suffering 800k casualties before the battle of Moscow thus was unprepared in replenishing these losses not only in men, but also supplies and equipment. Had Germany encountered the same enemy which she had expected to conquer in 3 months, logistics would never had been a problem.
     
  17. Jager

    Jager Member

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    im sorry but I have read Carius work and he says constantly that the determination of the russian soldier is enormous and points to a russian soldiers ability to handle harsh conditions but on a tactical and mass level they are easy to handle. He says Russian soldiers lack sever communication and often stray which made it easy to en trap. You should read "The Small Action Units During the German Campaign in Russia" written by several German officers including Hillebrand and rienhardt. The piece talks about the difficulties of the weather and terrain and describes the soldier.
     
  18. Jager

    Jager Member

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    And as for Model. I have not found this quote nor heard of this quote before. What work is this in as it surely is not in a military document?
     
  19. Jager

    Jager Member

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    All German military works i have read all point to the same conclusions on the failure of the Initial offensive and describing the russian war machine. The initial failure was due to the fact that Russian weapons functioned under harsh conditions where German weapons did not. Russian soldiers were more adapted for battle on their terrain while the German soldiers had to be re-equipped and adapt. The German offensive had extended too far too quickly for logistics to keep up. The Russian soldier is described as being extremely tough, determined, and often un-predictable. However, Russian soldiers often are over aggressive and are easy to force into favorable positions that result in them being isolated and easy to co-ordinate against. And to the other guy. British officers had an idea about using blitz in world war I. But Guderian was the only one who established a principle, theory, and philosophu of combined arms warfare primarily through the advance of mechanised units under air support. Guderian en- doctrined blitz. And I never said the russains did not have automatic weapons. I said numbers do not make a difference with technology like auto weaponry. refer to world war I for that. Moscow could have been taken had Hitler not been afraid to. Multiple Germans that fought there talk of it. Model and Carius were not there. Those two would be more credible on other aspects of the east front.
     
  20. Sloniksp

    Sloniksp Ставка

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    He also later stated that he would rather face 80 allied troops than 10 Red Army men......

    I will locate the exact quote.... a bit later.
     

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