The seizure of Indo China by Japan, the final step to war

Sorry, OP. I don't mean to suggest they were on the immediate eve of WWII. The IJN certainly had a decent working relationship with the RN into the 20s I would guess, but that's somewhat short of a formal alliance. (They sent attachés to study RN carrier doctrine in the late teens or early 20s, and the influence is visible in the original "flying off decks" of Akagi and Kaga.) I would guess that that relationship began to deteriorate around the date of the Washington Naval Conference, and Japan's departure from the Second London Naval Conference is a good sign that things were pretty far gone.

But at the same time until Japan and Britain are at war they remain at least officially neutral, and I wouldn't call them an "Axis Power" before the Tripartite Pact.

I'm curious what primary evidence there might be in Churchill's writing, or Chamberlain's before him about their views of Japan. Given that "Germany First" can be traced back at least as far as ABC-1 in spring of 1941 Britain was beginning to plan for eventual hostilities with them. (Or at least conceding the need to plan some kind of holding action.) And even if the movers and shakers had, as Scipio suggests, been unconcerned with Japan, does that necessarily mean that the good folks back in Liverpool and Leeds share that opinion?

I can certainly see Scipio's point that Britain "shouldn't" have wanted war with Japan from a purely military point of view. (Every soldier, sailor, and airman diverted to Singapore is one not in North Africa.) But I'm not sure that military pragmatism equates with historical reality. Which is to say while it makes a certain sense, I'm not sure it's true. Sorry if I wasn't clear. I'm still waiting for someone to point to interesting primary sources. (I've done a little digging, but I've not found anything interesting yet.)

And of course the way the lines fall out politically in the early part of the war is darned interesting and seems less inevitable than I once might have believed. Sorry to muddy the waters. I'm just very long winded when I say . . . "Hmm. Interesting. I don't know, but it's a good question."

 

Yes it is true that the British allowed the treaty to lapse and relations were deteriorating throughout the period and improving with the USA. The British knew they had a weak hand and just wanted to keep the status quo in South East Asia.

Its not pretty but the British were stopping supply to the Chinese via Hong Kong and Burma in mid 1940 (soon reversed). But if it required appeasement to avoid war then so be it.

America always had a love affaire with China but I can't beleive that the British public much cared other than the usual tut tut terrible massacre at Nanking .

I agree it is very difficult to fathom the logic of some of the Japanese decisions. Clearly they thought that Britain was finished after Dunkirk and that there were a lot of easy pickings.

They had an easy opportuny to snap up Ceylon and Madagascar (Vichy) in 1942 which would really threatened the British in SE Asia but did not take it because at that stage it was always Hold Off the USA while China is conquered. With fait accomplie they mistakenly thought the Americans would back off.

 

I have never seen anything of how Winston felt about the Japanese aggression, but I still think that as long as Japan did not get near British territory then they probably would be live and let live. After seeingwhat non aggression did for Hitler then why would Churchill and Roosevelt think Japan would behave any differently and Indo-China was one of two key bases Japan used for its drive south and east. I dont know if Japan realized how the seizure of Indo-China would be viewed, but since the drive for war was so prevalent it may that Japan did not care. Also Japan knew America was rearming and this was as good as a time as any due to the weakness of Britain and AMerica

 

Code:

Also Japan knew America was rearming and this was as good as a time as any due to the weakness of Britain and AMerica

I absolutely agree. There was a window of opportunity for the Japanese due to the weakness of Britain, Defeat of France (Vichy Vietnam) and growing strength of America from a relatively low base.

If it had not been for pressure from America, would Britain have supplied Japanese with Rubber from Malaya - I think the answer is yes. Would Britain have supplied war materials once Pearl Harbor was attacked - then clearly No.

In the intervening period supporting the American blockade put Britain and the Dutch in Indonesia in the Japanese firing line. (PS I have never seen anything about the Dutch attitude but would be interesting if it not adhere to British policy)

The choice was not a pleasant one for Britain but clearly the American option was the better one.

I asked my father - poor sample I know - but he said the man in street did not care about China. There was more sympathy for Finland.

Churchill's real fear about the Japanese was Madagscar and that is why the British fought a 6 month war there against the Vichy French to forestall a Japanese take-over of the Island. Loss of Madagascar would have seriously jeopardised supplies to Egypt (against Rommel) and suppies from Middle East and India. Ceylon might have given a cheap Japanese victory if India had revolted. However the Japanese fleet present at Burma which could have ruled the Indian Ocean was withdrawn and never reappeared after 1942.

 

I think that raiding was about as much as Japan could do in the Indian Ocean. Their navy's capacity for sustained air operations at sea was very poor and I think Madagascar was really beyond Japanese capacity. But Churchill didnt know that and his agreement to go along with the embargo was based on his fears of Japanese intent. I imagine that since the Dutch were so dependent on the Empire that they would go along with anything.

 

I don't know that I'd go that far. From what little the subject has come up in other books I've read (and I mostly read naval histories, so the politics is a little peripheral) it seems that US policy toward Japan's war with China was an extension of the Open Door Policy, though certainly public outrage at the atrocities in Nanjing (or Nanking, if you want the older spelling) did a nice job of solidifying sentiment against the Japanese.

OP, do you have any poll numbers you can point to on English opinion of Japan? I'd be especially interested in those.

(Sorry if I seem to be putting you on the spot, but you're the guy that always knows where to look. You find the best online sources. Which may because you've scanned so many source documents and put them there yourself.)

 

I agree. There was a window of opportunity - France and Netherlands beaten and the British close to being finished off (in Japanese eyes) together with an America gearing up but nowhere near full potential.

You are right the Japanese Army Minister was advocating as early as 25th June 1940 that the Time for Seizing Indo-China had come but wiser heads at the Navy had war gamed it which ended with Japan being defeated if she had not achieved victory (against the Americans) within 12months.

The British had few options - American Support was vital but they still did not want to antagonise Japan. The British, I think, had to reluctantly support the American embargo, and take the risk that war with Japan became closer.
I don't think China - whether it fell to a corrupt Nationalist Chinese regime or the Japanese was critical for the British in the short term.

For the British preserving the Indian Ocean for supply to Egypt (against Rommel) was vitally important. That is why Churchill ordered the attack on Madagascar (Vichy control - conflict lasted almost 6 months) to forstall an easy next step (as would have been Ceylon) for the Japanese Navy in 1942.

 

At the risk of being accused of cut and paste, I think the articles below give a fair summation of Churchill's position. Malaya was one of his blunders in my opinion but the Great Man never lost sight of the main objective - survival, defeat Germany and bring America into the War. Malaya and Indo China were bottom of the heap when resources were so stretched. He took the gamble and failed. He never thought much of the Chinese Nats and consistently tried to open Roosevelt's eyes to their deficiences. His concerns were for the Empire, India, Australia and New Zealand.

This sort of thread makes you relook at your ideas and I have been surprised at the very different views and factions that made up the British response - similar in someways to the debate in Japan. the British Navy was becaming very anti-Japanese but the Treasury would not pay for ships and in any case the Politicians were almost all relaxed about the potential Japanese threat.

Last comment - from the British point of view the Washington Accords in 1922 (I think this is the right date) enabled them to square the circle between maintaining good relations with Japan and the USA in the 1920s and maintaining the status quo. When this broke down in the thirties due to increasing Japanese militarism and more importantly the rise of Hitler, Britain had to chose the USA.

Here are the Churchill bits:

 

View attachment 13920 Sorry can't get it to work so here the link if you are interested.

http://i1105.photobucket.com/albums/h354/HFGEL/th_churchillmalaya-1.png

 

It might seem insignificant in 2011, but in 1940 Indochina ( the spelling is not Indo China) was one of the main (if not the first ) producers of natural rubber. This resource was dearly wanted by the Japanese for their vehicles and uniforms for example. It was not as essential as steel or oil, but rubber was certainly another reason why the Japanese took over the plantations . I remember a testimony of a former settler who mentionned seeing a Japanese officer driving through a town (Saigon? ) in a captured Citroen and his men were equipped with WW1 Lebel Bayonnets.

 

Absolutely right! The Germans would have been screwed without the invention of BUNA - synthetic rubber by IG Farben (BASF).

Standard Oil (ESSO) was castigated at the time for its links to IG Farben but the patents it obtained (Germans were too canny to hand over a lot of technical know how) enabled the USA to build its own synthetic rubber plants. With the loss of Malaya this was absolutely essential and a huge amount of money and resources had to be devoted by the US to this essential task.

I just had one of those mad ideas moments with regard to oil supply to Japan.

The Japanese Navy had been contemplating in April 1940 if it would be possible to take over Indonesia without going to war with the US or Britain. BUT what if the Government of Netherlands and the Royal Family had not decamped to the UK and set up a a Government in exile. If the Dutch had done the same as the French or Belgians then Indonesia would most probably be in a similar position to Vichy Vietnam and would then have supplied Japan with Oil.

Synthetic rubber technology from Japan's new friends the Germans results in problem solved. No war with the US and the vital supplies for continuing the war against China.

So hats off to the Dutch Royal Family, I say!

 

While Chiang Kai was a thug and not a good ally, his wife was very sophisticated and modern and her family, the Soongs did a master propaganda job in the U.S. about the poor Chinese being being robbed and murdered. A key part was that some Chinese were Christian and this appealed to many in the U.S. It was not just oil, Japan did want Malaysia for other resources, but if Japan could ahve taken the DEI with out a fight it would have really put the British in a bind.

 

It would certainly have been uncomfortable. But the Japs don't have to take Indonesia - they buy the oil.

There would have been pressure on Britain from Australia and New Zealand but what could realistically have been done. Remember Churchill closed off Burma and Hong Kong for a short while under Japanese pressure. He was going to go a long way to avoid war. Even on the Eve of War with Japan he was sending 400 modern fighters to Stalin in preference to supporting Malaya - as well as an Indian troops to Egypt.

What would McArthur and the Philippines have thought about it?

Of course there is a conspiracy theory (which seems too far fetched to me) that Churchill wanted to be attacked by the Japanese since that was guaranteed to bring the US into the War - while he regretted loss of US lives, he was certainly a very happy man when Japan attacked at pearl Harbor.

I understand the point about the Soongs and Madame Chiang but when he had such damming information on the Chinese Nats venial corruption late in the War coming from Stilwell and the American Ambassodor, it still took Rooseveld and the top admin a long time to even vaguely acknowledge it. I don't think the British were ever taken in by this Chinese propaganda and were always very suspicious of the Chinese Nats.

 

I suppose my real point is that the British had a clearer view of just how bad Chiang's lot were. I am interested in how Americans viewed his regime - I get the impression that from Roosevelt down they looked upon Chiang with rose tinted spectacles. Having read about Stilwel, I am fascinated how difficult his task was - he seemed at times to have more difficulty with his own Government than with Chiang.

We are probably in danger of going off thread here but a Nat Chinese controlled China was a pretty unpalatable choice for the British too. Hong Kong would be in the firing line and some remaining "concessions" in Shanghai etc.

PS the Chiang's regime was not just the "normal Chinese level" corruption - it was mega - the Communists did not have to do much to show that they could offer the peasants more.