The Spanish-American war does not occur

i still can't see the spaniards holding on to the philippines well into the 20th century. they (spaniards) have had a dismal record for developing the archipelago and tapping its rich resources. the first wave of american soldiers included veterans of the yukon gold trail in alaska. they immediately worked the gold fields in baguio. in 20 years, baguio was a booming city. the philippine stock exchange was opened by americans in the 30s mainly because of the gold mines.

 

I think you are partially correct, it wasn't likely that the Japanese advance would have occurred significantly faster in the absence of American forces in the Philippines. Historically, the Japanese timetable was not slowed by the stubborn defense of the Bataan peninsula, although that was what was claimed by US propaganda trying to put the best face on the defeat in the Philippines. The chief limiting factors on the speed of the Japanese offensive were logistical shipping, limited ground units, and air support units. The Japanese never had enough troops, shipping, or air support to mount a serious campaign aimed at occupying either Australia, or India. The American build-up on the sea lanes to Australia had commenced before the war started, and in Australia it started on the day the war started. Even without a US build-up in Australia, the sheer vastness of the country meant the Japanese couldn't successfully occupy it. With reference to India, the British were determined to hold that territory and it would have required huge numbers of Japanese troops, not mention aircraft. to challenge that defense; the Japanese logistics were stretched paper thin as it was and trying to support even one more division would have been impossible. I don't think the Japanese themselves felt it was possible to launch offensives aimed at occupying either Australia or India at the start of the war.

The original US war plan envisioned an attack through the Central Pacific and that was what the Pacific Fleet had trained and planned for. Admirals King and Nimitz favored an offensive through the Central Pacific and eventually, in November, 1943, initiated such an offensive with Operation Galvanic. But it was not because Australia was "practically cutoff"; Australia did not figure prominently in US war plans for the Pacific theater until the advent of WP 46, when it became an important strongpoint and base with which to contain the Japanese offensives in the western Pacific.

I think it's questionable whether the US would have had the same strategic outlook if it did not have the Philippines as a focus for it's strategy in the Pacific. I think a more direct approach to Japan would be adopted, perhaps through the north Central Pacific or the Aleutians. This would still require the establishment of Fleet Support bases and therefore would very much resemble WP 46 with a slightly different set of strategic priorities.

I think it's reasonable to assume that the US, in the absence of any interest in the Philippines would consider an offensive along the much shorter northern route including a build-up in the Aleutians (which did occur historically). It's anybody's guess how the difficult climatic conditions would affect the appeal of this route. The US did establish bases and keep significant forces in the Aleutians until quite late in the war as an alternative option, in case the Central Pacific offensive became stalemated. This northern approach had the advantage of being much shorter, thereby obviating somewhat the need for the huge investment in logistical and support fleets required by the Central and Southern offensives.

War Plan Orange, as originally formulated, called for an attack across the Pacific, relief of the Philippines and establishment of a Fleet support base in Manila, a decisive battle with the Japanese fleet (which the US would, of course, win), and, as a final phase, the blockade and bombardment of the Japanese Home islands. With the Philippines in possession of some third country (or Japan itself), this scenario would not be likely, so it would be necessary to capture some Japanese island (Formosa?) for a Fleet Support base. It would be problematical whether this took place before, or after, the decisive battle with a Japanese fleet. The issue was never considered by the American planners because the assumption was always that any war would commence with a Japanese attack on the (American held) Philippines.

I think a putative alternative Plan Orange (without any US interest in the Philippines) would envision a Central Pacific offensive, or possibly one through the Aleutians, the capture of a fleet base somewhere near Japan, a decisive battle, and the blockade/bombardment of the Home Islands. An alternative WP 46, AKA Rainbow 5, becomes much more complicated because WP 46 encompassed a world war with potential allies on both sides. WP 46 envisioned an initial period of defensive fighting in the Pacific until the European war was settled, and then an essentially updated War Plan Orange scenario against Japan.

This was Admiral King's argument. It had the advantage of allowing the USN to build up it's war experience, and develop an effective doctrine, and also of keeping the Japanese off balance and guessing where and when an offensive might be launched. It was also incorporated into WP 46 in the sense that the USN was tasked with raids against Japanese bases in the central Pacific region. In the event, King prevailed and the US actually launched a limited offensive to take advantage of the initiative gained at Midway. This was more than the Army/Navy Planning board wanted and was the subject of continued low-level internecine warfare within the JCS ranks. It did, however, result in the more rapid defeat of Japan than otherwise probably would have been the case and did not seem to significantly slow the preparations against Germany.

 

"I think it's reasonable to assume that the US, in the absence of any interest in the Philippines would consider an offensive along the much shorter northern route including a build-up in the Aleutians (which did occur historically). It's anybody's guess how the difficult climatic conditions would affect the appeal of this route. The US did establish bases and keep significant forces in the Aleutians until quite late in the war as an alternative option, in case the Central Pacific offensive became stalemated. This northern approach had the advantage of being much shorter, thereby obviating somewhat the need for the huge investment in logistical and support fleets required by the Central and Southern offensives."

Weather consumed resources at a alarming rate. There were some experimental air raids from the Alteutians. A group of B24s made the round trip a few times. Sucess in the Marianas and a half executed plan to establish operating bases in China drew interest away fro the Northern approach. I seem to recall there were deception operations oriented on the Northern area but dont know any details.

 

Yes, weather was definitely a factor in discouraging heavy use of the northern approaches to Japan as an attack route. But the US did mount air raids and bombardment missions on Japanese military installations in the Kuriles over a significant period of time. Early in the war, the US was still building bases in the Aleutians and Alaska in case the northern route had to be used, but by mid-1944, it was probably realized that the climate in the North Pacific was not conducive to efficient military operations. Operations involving aircraft especially suffered heavy operational losses due to the weather.

• "The Americans' "Operation Wedlock", diverted Japanese attention north and misled them about U.S. strategy in the Pacific. The plan included air strikes by USAAF and US Navy Bombers and U.S. Navy shore bombardment and submarine operations. Japanese increased their garrison in north Kurils from 8,000 in 1943 to 41,000 in 1944 and maintained more than 400 aircraft in Kurils and Hokkaidō area in anticipation that the Americans might invade from Alaska.

• Americans planners had briefly contemplated an invasion of northern Japan from Aleutians during fall of 1943, but rejected that idea as too risky and impractical. They considered the use of Boeing B-29Amchitka and Shemya Bases, but rejected that idea too. U.S. military maintained interest in these plans when they ordered the expansion of bases in the western Aleutians, and major construction began on Shemya. In 1945, plans were put on the shelf for a possible invasion of Japan via the Northern route. "

See; Kuril Islands - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Again, the Kuriles - TIME

Columbia Chronologies of Asian ... - Google Book Search

HyperWar: US Army in WWII: Strategy and Command: The First Two Years [Appendix U]

 

When you guys say the weather in the northern route is a big factor why it was eventually dropped as an actual offensive route, I can only say I understand the concept. I've never been in a real cold climate or in freezing snow and ice. The only way I can visualize what you guys say is to imagine a raging typhoon and heavy floods and replace all that water with snow.

 

More than storms and intense cold were involved. The sheer unpredictably of the weather cost many, many men their lives. Aircraft would take off on short flights in near perfect flying conditions, and return an hour or two later to find their airfields in zero-zero visibility conditions. Impenetrable fogs would suddenly form in an hour and persist for days. Storm fronts moved with terrifying speed or stalled and lashed the same islands for a week or more. Sea conditions could be brutal for small craft and even big ships suffered days of fatigue-producing heavy seas that seemed to come out of nowhere. Winds would come up and blow with hurricane force from one direction and then suddenly reverse themselves and blow equally strong from another direction. Even electronics were affected by the cold and unusual electromagnetic environment as the weird "Battle of the Blips' episode suggests. The harsh climate was destructive of both equipment and morale; it wouldn't have been impossible to conduct a campaign in the North Pacific, but it would have been extremely challenging.

 

If we assume that the Spanish no longer possess the PI, then who would occupy it?

The Brits? The Philipino's themselves?

One thing is for certain, the Japanese will have occupied the PI by early 1941, and there would be no one capable of stopping them. Nor would the US even consider intervening.

I would even project the Japanese offensive into Malaya and the NEI to take place in summer 1941.

 

if the revolutionaries managed to drive the spaniards out of the islands by 1900, the philippines would have become the first free republic in asia, although regional and inter-denominational strife would have made that republic shaky. in any case, the filipinos would have little sympathy for other colonials under threat of japanese invasion. on the other hand, fear of japanese expansionism was already felt by the philippines long before pearl, thanks to news of china.

if the philippines really became independent going into the 20th century, my bet would be, by the late thirties, the country would enter into numerous agreements with US, UK, and even japan. mostly peaceful developmental projects for agriculture, mining, and production. as to bases and mutual defense agreements with either side, that'll be tough to decide. the middle class would prefer the west, having been educated and aculturated by them. but the government will likely play both american and japanese cards.

 

In this case I suspect there would be a 'Phillipine Lobby' in the US similar to the China Lobby. Any Japanese military threat towards the Phillpines would be taken the same way in the US as Japans armys in China or French Indochina.

 

Mac, I beg to differ. I would say an independent PI would probably be leaning to Europe, probably a Madre España, rather than the United States. I just don't see the PI holding an American card to play under this scenario.
It's also possible that the PI could lean to the British or French, too. If not the British, then it would have to be the French, since the founder of the PI revolution draw inspiration from the French Revolution.
But for me, the bottom line in this scenario is this:
if the PI wasn't an American possession after the Spanish-American War,
the islands would still retain its importance as choke points for shipping. And whoever gets to control those choke points will enjoy an advantage.

 

then the philippines would have tried to stay neutral, possibly offer production sharing agreements with the japanese for stuff like rice, cordage, wood, copper, paper, and iron. that would have been much more advantageous to the japanese than having to invade the country and operate the farms and gold/copper mines through a combination of volunteer and slave labor. but the thing is, by 1941, the americans and british would have enjoyed nearly 40 years of exploitation of philippine resources.

 

I agree with Falcon Jun. Regardless of how the Japanese viewed the Philippine Islands economically, the Luzon Straits represented a chokepoint on the sea lanes between Japan and the Southern Resources Area (SRA). It made absolutely no sense for the Japanese to go to war to seize the SRA and leave Luzon in the hands of a third power, neutral or otherwise. The Japanese had to invade at least Luzon in order to assure their control of, and access to, the SRA.

The natural resources of the Philippines did not represent any materials which were vital to the Japanese, although most would be found very useful in their war economy. However, they would not be likely to tolerate, nor respect, Philippine neutrality for three reasons. First, the military reason mentioned in the paragraph above. Second, the Japanese government strove for economic autarky, that is, the political control of all economic resources that would be required to make Japan self-sufficient. Third, Japan envisioned the Philippines as part of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, which, in practice, meant it would become a colony of Japan, to be economically exploited for Japan's benefit.

For these reasons, I believe that no matter what country; Spain, Britain, France, Germany, the US, or an independent Philippine Republic, might control the islands in the early part of the 20th Century, by 1942, the Japanese would control them, politically, economically, and militarily. The only difference would be when that control would be established.

 

This is not unlike the position of Siam or Thailand. While the Thai had little interest in Japans war or empire they were in the path to Maylasia, Singapore, and Burma. The Japanese Army saw little point in respecting Thai nuetrality and Japans diplomats made the Thai governement a offer it could not refuse. Judging from that historical example DA's take on the fate of the Phillipines is a very likely outcome.

As a side note: When the US OSS went poking into Thailand in 1944 looking for a anti Japanses undground to contact, they were led straight to the Thai government. It appeared the Thai had long anticipated how the war was going and were busy getting ready to run off the Japanese as they weakend.

 

If the Japanese had control of the PI by 1941, then there was no rational argument for the US to support the Brits and Dutch in their colonies from further Japanese aggression.

I see no way for the US to support them without having major ports along the way from which to operate from.

 

All very true.

However, Thailand did have something in common with Japan; it had never been a colony of another power. Japan managed to maintain that status with a strong military, Thailand did it with diplomacy.

Another interesting point is that Thailand, at Japan's behest, declared war on the United States on January 25, 1942. The Thai ambassador in Washington, however, refused to deliver the declaration of war to the US State Department, and the US, although aware of Thailand's action, ignored it and never reciprocated.

 

The US had plenty of logical reason to support the British and Dutch possessions in Asia, with or without the Philippines in US hands. There was the war in Europe in which the US had undertaken to guarantee that Britain would not be defeated by the Axis powers; allowing valuable British and Dutch colonies in Asia to fall into the hands of another Axis power would seriously undermine that guarantee and hand an important advantage to the Germans.

Furthermore, US foreign policy in Asia was in direct conflict with Japanese policy in Asia. Allowing Japanese aggression againt British and Dutch possessions in Asia would seriously imperil an independent China, to which US policy was dedicated. In addition the US realized that possession of the British and Dutch colonie in Asia would significantly strengthen Japan and make the US foreign policy objective almost impossible. All of these goals were taken quite seriously by the US and were the reason that the Roosevelt administration pledged to militarily support British and Dutch efforts in the Pacific if either, or both, were attacked by Japan, even if US territroy were not directly involved.

Without a major naval base in the Philippines, the US could still be able to support British and Dutch forces in the Southwest Pacific. WP 46, adopted in 1939, assumed that the US Philippine bases would rapidly be lost or at least made unavailable for use by the US Pacific Fleet. Therefore, WP 46 directed the US Navy to secure the supply lines, through a chain of US islands from Hawaii to Samoa, to Australia; this task was started before the war even began. Australia was to be held against the Japanese and provided important bases for action against Japanese forces in the SWPA. Further, Britain and Dutch representatives offered the US the use naval facililities in Singapore and the NEI to deter Japanese attack. In the event, the offer, except for minor use of Dutch facilities, was not accepted, but the US definitely had numerous options for basing it's forces in Southeast Asia in order to oppose Japanese aggression.

Claiming that the Philippines were the only reason for US involvement in the Western Pacific is an extreme example of historical tunnel vision.

 

why can't the US bring the war straight to tokyo bay?

 

There's a vast difference in wishing to support, and being able to support.

Without a reason to have the American fleet in Asia for purposes other than to defend European colonies, Id say the political will to fight the Japanese was not there. It was marginal in real life (on the eve of Pearl Harbor) and it sure wouldn't be there as long as the Japanese do not attack the US directly.

And the bases in the South Pacific were not going to be able to handle the Pacific Fleet for several years. So why even bother sending your fleet into harms way, far from home and for no reason.

 

It did in 1945.

In 1942, there was an obstacle called the Imperial Japanese Navy.

 

See posts 4, 5, 24, 25, 27, 29, 32, 35, 37, 39, 49, and 56 for an explanation of why the US would still have reason to be involved in any Pacific war, absent it's possession of the Philippines.

Clint's post # 29 demolishes the myth that there was no support for a war against Japan prior to Pearl Harbor; both the Roosevelt administration and the American public supported a war to stop Japanese aggression on the Asian mainland; and that support was motivated not by any unrealistic hopes of maintaining possession of the Philippines, but by concern for the US "Open Door" policy in China.

And, as I have explained several times, the Philippines were not the only, and perhaps not even the most important, US interests in Asia and the western Pacific. Without the Philippines to worry about, the US would still have substantial forces in the Pacific.

As for the bases in the South Pacific, they did, in fact, support significant elements of the US Pacific Fleet within six months of the outbreak of war. In point of fact, the US Pacific Fleet was able to successfully take the offensive just eight months after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor using the bases established in the South Pacific. Your assertions do not hold water.