i haven't come across official accounts from the Japanese high command. most japanese accounts were made by field commanders. only the american side gave any good holistics. so let me put it this way: wasn't guadalcanal the opportunity yamamoto sought and failed to find at midway? at midway, the americans refused to come out to an all-out engagement. they relied on long-distance carrier strikes to cripple the japanese striking force. but in guadalcanal, the americans were maintaining a toe-hold and throwing everything they had to keep it. shouldn't have yamamoto dispatched his nine battleships and five aircraft carriers to destroy both turner and fletcher in an all-out fight? we know that at midway, the japanese lost their four best carriers and 300 of their best pilots. but their remaining carrier strength was still formidable, more than a match to what the US had after midway. the americans early on still had no battleships. i can't understand how nagumo conducted the carrier battle in the solomons. in two attacks (one by submarines, the other by bombers) the americans ended up with just one operational carrier in the south pacific. why were the japanese not able to capitalize on this? why send out battleships in pairs down the slot and just invite stronger and stronger opposition? why not send out all nine to challenge the surface force in the open sea?