Was the Wehrmacht overrated?

That is certainly true, the U.K. was out-produced by Germany in most key resources except crude oil.

Industrial production of Key Resources from 1939-1945 (in Millions of Metric Tons unless otherwise specified)

Aluminum (in thousands of metric tons)
U.K. 283.0
Germany 2,142.3

Coal
U.K. 1,441.2
Germany 2,420.3

Iron Ore
U.K. 119.3
Germany 240.7

Crude Oil
U.K. 90.8
Germany 33.4

Steel
U.K. 88.5
Germany 159.9


If anyone would like me to post up the numbers for the other major Allied and Axis countries I would be more than happy to.

 

That is strange my book has 283.0 for U.K. and 236.5 for USSR

It is The Library of Congress World War II Companion Edited by David M. Kennedy

BUT....it cites The World War II Databook by Ellis

I wonder if Kennedy (or whoever) just copied it wrong. Or Ellis might have miswrote it in one of his books.

 

Very true, Germany is Europe's most populous nation as well as Europe's strongest economy and has held that title for quite a long time.

Again, well said. like in the Burma theatre people always boast that the British had two and a half million Indian troops. But where were these millions? Why dont we have record of 2 hundred Indian divisions? Because they DIDNT exist in Burma. Anyways, enough thread jacking for me.

 

It was overrated and underrated at differen times during the war. In their blitzkreig through france and almost to Britain, they made it look easy. But in the rubble of Stalingrad, in the air above Britain, in the days after D-Day, they were just "old men and boys" to the Allies. It was a gross underestimation.

 

I don't think the "old men and boys" mindset was held during Stalingrad and the BOB. And in the days after D-Day that mindset wasn't exactly far from the truth. Some formations were very good indeed, but others had been worn down by combat in the east and had not yet been fully reconstituted. Coastal divisions had weak artillery and little inherent mobility. Many of their officers and men had already been wounded, and one division was composed entirely of men with stomach ailments. The Germans made wide use of the Osttruppen recruited from among Russian prisoners of war and comprising a variety of national and ethnic groups: there were no less than 21 "Russian" battalions in the 7th Army alone.

The Germans did loose all of those battles, so I don't really understand how that supports them being underestimated.

 

"A US Sovjet team could probably have defeated Germany ": no way, without the UK no Overlord. Do you think Overlord could start from New York? It took 3 to defeat Germany;if one fell of(UK or USA or USSR ) the other two could no win. That's the reason for Barbarossa :it was the only one Hitler could eliminate. In WW I it took also three to defeat Germany (Russia fell off,but USA was added ).

 

The bigsships of the KM were a waste of money:better build U Boats with it

 

Yes. The US invaded North Africa from US ports. The US invaded Guadalcanal, and every island there after largely from the US West coast and Hawaii. The US could also have simply taken an island or islands off the European mainland and set up bases there first if the need arose.
Now, would it have taken longer or caused the US to have to produce more "stuff" to do it? Probably. The US could have, and initially did, plan to have an army larger than that of Britain and what they did produce combined. The US rearmed 12 French divisions and supplied materials for a good portion of the British and Commonwealth forces in the field by 1943.
Having Britain and her Commonwealth nations made things alot easier but, they were definitely playing well back in the fiddle section in importance.

 

After Midway the Japanese navy knew only defeats. Japan able to fight a limited world war:Japan was much weker than Germany ,in fact it was an underdevelopped country,bankrupt by the war in China,which it could not win;it had no chance against the USA. That's the reason for the"Germany first" strategy. Germany was much more dangerous.

 

I believe the Wehrmacht is overrated now more then it was in 41'. After all, armies facing the German war machine through out the years especially up until 43' had reasons to be nervous and little intimidated.

 

The Us invaded North Africa from US ports :it took them 6 months with British help to win . The Uk was indispensable for the build-up of Overlord ,the Acores could never replace the UK an "unsinkable carrier " and without the UK no air attacks on Germany;the distance from the Açores to the French Westcoast is over 2000 km. You don't mean that a democracy as the US would invade Ireland ?

 

The initial aggressor always has the advantage of being ready to fight, and choosing the place and time. This was Germany's main advantage. Once the objectives were attained, then it became a defensive war. The allies had to get their war machines in gear, which takes time. The Russians traded space for time, and it worked for them. They bled the German army until they had the strength to go on the offensive.

When the western allies attacked, it was against a dug in German army.

Where the US and British armies had a distinct advantage over the Germany army, was in individual initiative. US and British squads, platoons, and companies could often make tactical decisions on the spur of the moment based on a given situation. The German army was never very good at that.

 

True to an extent. The German Army did train their troops to think independently at the beginning. Goals were assigned and the operations were left to the local commanders as the assignments filtered down. Towards war's end, this changed and then your statement becomes true. Those experienced leaders were killed off. The replacements were not trained on how to think independently. So at war's end, the German Army was skantly a shadow of what it was at the beginning.

 

The British in North Africa found the Germans were not as flexible as they (British) were in small units. Long before the German army had been seriously bled.

 

Interesting as most of what I have read depicts the opposite, the Germans did indeed have freedom of operation. For the North Africa campaign, von Mellenthin's 'Panzer Battles'. During this period, the only restrictions were towards the Army/Korps commanders from Hitler's 'no-step back' orders. From late 43' onwards, this filtered down to the lower levels as this was the time (post D-Day) where training of new recruits was being scaled back even more.

 

The March to Tunis by Alan Moorehead. He was a British correspondent who had good access to all British troops, and German POW's. He came close to getting captured a few times. His observations based on those sources had the Germans as somewhat inflexible once orders were given.

 

Hmmm.
At first I thought I would get a heart attack.

The autocratic command system of the British is renowned for killing any form of initiative. The first the serviccemen were taught was obedience.

In the absence of SOP's the NCO's and subalterns had to exercise tight control over the soldiers.

The Germans system of Aufdragstaktik (mission command) is the oposite. Mission command can only function if every member is imbued with initiative.
The Germans used a set of SOP's for every tactical situation. This enabled junior officers to make quick decisions and act decisivly. This would put the germans on the inside of the British OODA loop over and over, since they would call for fresh orders as the situation had changed.

By 1942 events had come a long way to get the British par with the germans. The battledrill movement started at Barnard castle under Wigram, had opened up for a vider latitude of initiative for junior commanders. The battledrill system was blessed by officers like Brooke, Alexander and Monty whom all knew of it from the great war as a tool to make soldiers of the masses recruited to the west front.

By 1944 the British army was finally par with the best and proved it during the campaigns in europe.

 

The very idea of the system you speak of, kills on the spot decisions. If the situation wasn't one of the German set-pieces, they (in reality) waited for orders.

 

I'm still in disagreement. All of the memoirs and reference material I have read from von Luck, von Mellenthin, Dietrich, von Manteuffel and so on state otherwise. Not only those written by them but of them. What you presented was similar to if Gehlen Reinhardt wrote a book on Russian army organization merely because he was chief intellegence on the Eastern Front and had access to Russian POWs. It would be difficult give credibility to anything he would have written when all other sources say otherwise.