Were the Objectives of the Case Blue Flawed?

Watched "Stalingrad" last night and actually some reasons were told by Hitler himself publicly in his speech of the Munich cellar November 1942. The German soldiers listened to his speech on the radio.:

This is part of the speech:

"Stalin expected that we would attack in the center, I did not want to attack in the center, not only because Mr. Stalin probably believed I would, but because I didn't care about it any more at all. But I wanted to come to the Volga, to a definite place, to a definite city. It accidentally bears the name of Stalin himself, but do not think that I went after it on that account.

Indeed, it could have an altogether different name. But only because it is an important point, that is, there 30 million tons of traffic can be cut off, including about 9 million of oil shipments. There all the wheat pours in from those enormous territories of the Ukraine, of the Kuban territory, then to be transported to the North. There the manganese ore was forwarded. A gigantic terminal was there; I wanted to take it. And do you know, we're modest: that is, we have it; there are only a couple of very small places left there.

Now the others say: Why aren't you fighting there? Because I don't want to make a second Verdun but would rather do it with very small shock units. Time plays no part here. No ships come up the Volga any more-that is the decisive thing. They have also reproached us, asking why it took us so long at Sevastopol? Because there, too, we did not want to cause an enormous mass murder. Blood is flowing as it is-more than enough. But Sevastopol fell into our hands, and the Crimea fell into our hands. We have reached goal after goal, stubbornly, persistently.

And if the enemy, on his part, makes preparations to attack, don't think I want to forestall him there, but at the same moment we let him attack also. Because then defense still is less expensive. Then just let him attack; he'll bleed to death that way, and thus far we have always taken care of the situation anyhow. At any rate, the Russians are not at the Pyrenees or before Seville; that, you see, is the same distance as for us to be in Stalingrad today, or on the Terek, let us say;-but we are there; that can really not be disputed. That is a fact, after all. "

Naturally, when nothing else will do any more, they also say it's a mistake. Then they suddenly turn around and say: "It is absolutely a mistake for the Germans to have gone to Kirkenes, or to have gone to Narvik, or now perhaps to Stalingrad-what do they expect to do in Stalingrad? For Stalingrad is a capital mistake, a strategic mistake." We will just wait and see whether that was a strategic mistake.

We see already from present indications whether it was such a great mistake that we took possession of the Ukraine, that we-uh,-took possession of the ore region of Krivoi Rog, that we got our hands on the manganese ores, or whether it was really such a great mistake that we got hold of the Kuban region, the greatest granary in the entire world, perhaps, whether it was a mistake that we, and I can safely say this, have now destroyed or got into our own possession four-fifths or five-sixths of all their refineries, that we alone either have right in our hands or have completely shut off, a production of 9 or 10 million tons of oil, and we have further cut off the transportation of perhaps 7, 8 or 9 million tons over the Volga.


Hitler Speech: November 8, 1942

 

No not at all with Hitler and the Nazi's saying whats what, If I recall there were several German Generals and even those from her allies that supported raising an Army from captured Russian territory and also trying to start up there factories again... None of which became possible once Hitler decided they made good target practiced and encourage the troops to act in such a manner.

Once most of the Crimea had been taken, Its use to the Russians was negligible while it's use to the Germans and Axis was actually better if allowing the Russians to maintain the control over Sevastopol and there landing on the Kerch peninsula. Half the forces Germany would have faced if they had used the Case blue plan before Hitler mucked it up, Came from evacuations in the Crimean region due to the collapse at Sevastopol and the Kerch peninsula.

Does it not make sense to keep your enemies forces away from the Area you intend to attack, Even if that means allowing them to be behind your lines??

As for Soviet counter offensive, Well it would likely take place just outside of Stalingrad, With the Soviets using it as there main base in the region.While it would be a sizable force, It would basically be a stalemate there with neither side pushing forward. Too small an area allowing the Axis to concentrate a number of assets while the Soviets always have plenty of fresh 'recruits'.

In the end it would come down to who gained aerial supremacy first? Which historically I believe the Axis did before it was wasted away on bombing and trying to take Stalingrad paving the way for Soviets to take it.

 

The problems with the river line is that it is first, dependent on leaving no bridgeheads, which did not happen due to the lack of manpower. Second is that what is to prevent a major prepared river crossing. There was not enough manpower to cover the whole river. Its a couple of hundred miles just from Voronez to Stalingrad and then you still have from Stalingrad to Astrakan and that area has minimal roads and would require a lot of trucks for supply. As far as size I said it was almost as big.The issue the Germans had was enough manpower to force the passes for which tanks are of no use, manpower needed to help defend the flanks, remember that the Pz's were not capable of holding territory with out infantry.

 

The lack of roads didn't just affect the Germans, It affected the Soviets also.

As for the bridgeheads, While they were there it does not mean they could not be cleared out at a later date, Before the winter came about. Once the Caucasus region would be isolated, The force needed there would have top be no where near as large as it was. It could be cut down to as small as a Panzer division, Several Luftwaffe units and a single army (17th or 11th army likely to standardize logistics to forces within the Caucasus) with the rest of the forces being free to take out any soviet bridgeheads. But this is all best guess.

As for the line being so long that the soviets could build up and 'quickly' cross the Volga or Don, Well I find that quite impossible for the Soviet forces at the time unless they are supplied the needed equipment from the US/UK such as LVT's, DUKW's, Terrapin's etc which would take time and likely not arrive until after '42. Along with that the Soviets would then have to construct the necessary bridges across the rivers (unless launched in winter time, Which in it's own right still had problems). So the Soviets launching a quick river crossing is simply out of the question, Any crossing would be limited and take time for them to build up there forces


In any case this thread seem's to be going from a simple question weather the objectives were flawed to a what if, While our views may differ on if it was doable or not, From looking at the posts I'm pretty sure we can all agree hat the way Hitler played it out it was not doable??

Cheers, von_noobie

 

I recall reading that in sorta early phase the original goals of the operation Blau had been achieved and Hitler started to demand more and more. I wonder if someone has read more about these as I have difficulty finding a a cut off point for the area where the original goals would have been reached and an extended Blau was operational? Thanx!

 

They were on there way to completing there goals, The initial plan called for a blocking force outside of Stalingrad, Not within trying to take the city as the planners realized that took to much time, forces and resources, Especially when the city still has a line of supply. Once reaching Stalingrad another force was meant to head along the Volga while the forces near Rostov were to advance into the Caucasus.

They had completed the first and hardest part of the operation, All they had to do was advance practically unopposed towards the Caspian Sea/Astrakhan but Hitler decided that Stalingrad was more important, Worst thing they did was bomb it.. Easier to hide in ruins then a standing undamaged city. Stalingrad could have fallen had it not been bombed (though with casualties).

 

Of course, rivers are not impenetrable barriers, but they make a better basis for a defensive front than just drawing a line in the steppe. I would expect the Germans to conduct a mobile defense, as they did in the battles on the Chir River on a smaller scale. The "land bridge" between the Volga and Don at Stalingrad would also be a concern.

I think Blau was doable if the Germans had done the seemingly common sense things we've been discussing here.

 

Again, the farther south the infantry goes the farther away from the flanks they are. Look how easily the Soviets crossed the Dnepr. I dont know why people think that Soviets were incapable of crossing the Don or Volga in force and at different locations. I do not give the Germans a lot of ability to detect crossings.

 

They may have crossed the Dnieper, But you must look at both scenarios. Along the proposed Volga-Don line the only land based battle from the get go would be near Stalingrad, While all other area's would have to be crossed via use of an amphibious operation likely against forces that have had time to construct 'limited' defences were as at the Battle of Dnieper the Germans had tried defending the land in front of the river, Once they realised they couldn't do it and started to pull back behind the river the Soviets surged forward thus being able to cross the river at several points virtually unopposed.

So in one scenario the Axis have had months to prepare while in the other they are in a retreat with Soviet forces hitting them in the rear and in some cases bypassing them heading for river crossings. Can either of these really be compared to the other? I personally don't think so, They are completely different.

You must also take into account the forces involved, There level of equipment, training and cohesion, In Case blue the forces would be far superior to those that were used in the Battle of Dnieper.

Simple matter of fact is they chose the wrong side to defend from, It takes time to set your forces up properly along a defensive line, Doing it while under attack and having forces retreating is far more difficult.

 

Also the Germans were not able to make defensive lines behind rivers due to Hitler´s orders. What foolishness. As the German troops crossed the rivers and blew the bridges, there was no defensive lines to go and fight back. So the retreat had to continue as the Red Army had made several crossings right behind or even ahead of Wehrmacht.

 

In summer 1941 Soviet general Timoshenko said: all we have to do is (i) to make the Germans spend as much fuel as possible and (ii) to keep them out of Caucasus. This was brilliantly simple and clear idea which can be converted into a viable military strategy.

Instead, the Nazis military reasoning was handicapped with economic and even ideological reasons. The Germans &Co. wanted to have all the Russian fuel just for them, although that large quantity of fuel was much more than they really needed. As the matter of fact Germans had enough fuel to wage a war by keeping consumption at reasonable level. For example, in 1943 the Germans had more fuel at their disposal as never before, despite the failure to capture the Caucasus. The reasons were: increased own production of synthetic fuel, increased production in Rumania and the "loss" of Italy, who consumed large quantities for nothing. Despite, German economists exaggerated the need for more oil while a report indicating logistic problems with transportation of the Caucasus oil to the Reich was overlooked. Ludendorff’s problems with transportation of the Russian oil during the Great War were also ignored.

Instead of highly ambitious objectives of the Case Blue they could have achieved much more by adopting more modest strategy of just cutting the Soviet supply lines from Caucasus and associated facilities instead . They could just come close enough to Caucasus to bomb refineries and transportation lines towards Russia. That would give them several months to beat the Red Army weakened by the lack of fuel.

Instead, they had a gap year. One year after the beginning of the Case Blue they were where they were at the beginning of that costly adventure, but much weaker opposed to the Red Army ready to wipe the floor with them.

Fortunately, Nazis forgot that modesty is a virtue.

 

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
AH was suffering from Parkinsonès induced dementia, compounded by the effects of Dr Morrelès treatmetns. In essense, by 1942 he ahd beeen mainlined Meth plus other junk at an increasing rate.

The Maykop oil fields were distroyed ( Surprise) & new wells had to be drilled. the Chechnyia fields
The Jamestown Foundation: Oil in Chechnya: A Brief History
Are shallow high grade deposits & have produced up to 23 million tonnes a year, (100 million BBl)
wher e Germany needed approx 72 Million BBL in total
The Jamestown Foundation: Oil in Chechnya: A Brief History
&The Role of Synthetic Fuel In World War II Germany
so the 875,000 men wasted at Stalingrad coulde have captured Grozney, put the fields in operation, & possibly won the war.

 

It was not 875,00 get your numbers right. Even if Germany had captured Grozny if would have helped, but not won the war. The big issue was getting the oil back to Germany. There was no pipeline, the raillines were very limited and would have needed massive upgrading. The German still would have had serious issues defending the Don line, especially when winter froze the river.

 

Numbers from wiki - your counter quote welcome
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Stalingrad

Wiki NEVER WRONG Wiki No lie!

Chechyn oil is high grade, low mineralization, easy to refine.
Best alt is to refine it on the site & distribute to the OK Ost.

example :CANOL Project

 

The argument about the Don line being difficult to hold is a little out there, Would they have been better of 20km back with zero supporting natural terrain??

The Don provided a line for which to build up the defenses, and as I have pointed out to you before, The freezing of the Don never provided any certainty that it was thick enough to support the weight of a soldier, let alone a tank. The Soviets tended to use frozen river crossings only when it was in there hands with ownership of both banks so they could check the ice thickness. Even at Leningrad they delayed delivery of supplies to check the ice was thick enough to support all the transport. Any simple rush across the ice without thinking leaves you open to massive failureor simply looking like a bunch of drunks to the Axis forces on the other side wit you going all over the place, Ice is very slippery =).

 

Interesting!
so youfeel that the figures quoted in The Role of Synthetic Fuel In World War II Germany
are nto correct?
Becker says that the peak for sythetics was 36 million bbl a year- before the plans were bombed.

 

the 875.000 men lost is incorrect.

 

A small suggestion, If you claim something is not correct then you should back it up with your counter claim. Saying something is wrong and then not giving your 'facts' doesn't look very good.

Also before claiming something is wrong, Check under what parameters the claim is made under as the 875,000 could very well be right as there were 700,000 in the Stalingrad area at the time of the encirclemnt, Add in wounded that had been removed over the cource of the battle or units shifted out for a bit of R&R and it could easily reach 875,000 men in total.

 

Various scholars have estimated the Axis suffered 850,000 casualties of all types (wounded, killed, captured...etc) among all branches of the German armed forces and its allies, many of which were POWs who died in Soviet captivity between 1943 and 1955. 400,000 Germans, 200,000 Romanians, 130,000 Italians, and 120,000 Hungarians were killed, wounded or captured. Of the 91,000 German POWs taken at Stalingrad 27,000 died within weeks and only 5,000 returned to Germany in 1955. The remainder of the POWs died in Soviet captivity. In the whole Stalingrad area the Axis lost 1.5 million killed, wounded or captured. 50,000 ex-Soviets Hiwis (local volunteers incorporated into the German forces in supporting capacities) were killed or captured by the Red Army
The Battle of Stalingrad (July 17, 1942 - February 2, 1943)
850,000 plus an estimated half the hiwis equals 875,000

 

To be fair we will never know the true casualty amount but most estimates put it any where between 700,000 and 900,000.