What if Germany had built 7 Carriers before the war?

I think that if Germany had started the war with at least seven carriers and pilots that could maximize their use, it might have had an impact on the war, but unless it could be translated into a quick victory over GB, I expect they would be taken out in short order.

In most cases, submarines were more effective against ships. Over 50% of the tonnage we sank was due to the 2% of total ships in the submarine fleet. Considering the problems early with torpedos, that is significant.

Even if the germans could protect the carriers from allied subs, by war end, the US had 36 carriers and 78 CVEs. The Japanese could not stop the allies and they had built 23 carriers.

In 1941, the British had over 6 carriers, the US had 8, and the Japanese 10. If I remember right, by 1945, the number of British carriers, including CVEs, exceeded 60.

 

Thanx for the information, appreciated.

Regards.

 

The Messerschmitt Me 109T was the projected carrier version of the Me 109E model. About 70 planes of this version were build by Fieseler, several modifications had to be made to adapt these single seat fighters for the use on aircraft carriers:

T-0: 10 Me 109E-3 modified by Fieseler in 1939/40, Span enhanced to 11.06 meters, arrestor hook and catapult mountings. Those aircraft were planed to be used on the Graf Zeppelin and were later used by I/JG 77.
T-1: like T-0, 60 build by Fieseler and delivered to JG 5. Since the carrier was not completed, all planes were modified to T-2
T-2: All equipment for carrier operations removed.
The first 10 aircraft were of the pre production Series (T-0), followed by 60 production aircraft of the T-1 series. When construction of the Graf Zeppelin was halted in 1940, further development of the Me 109 T was stopped, too. In late 1940 Fiesler was ordered to complete the 60 T-1 models but to remove all all carrier-equipment. The result were 60 aircraft of the now called T-2 series which were able to operate from short land airstrips.

The first aircraft were delivered in the beginning of 1941 and were used in Norway until the summer of 1942. The surviving aircraft were then transferred to the Helgoland, a small island in the North Sea, where they were used for point defense up to late 1944.

http://www.german-navy.de/kriegsmarine/aviation/carrierbased/me109/index.html

 

Found this post on the Armchair General Site.
Its by 'RLeonard'
It might be of use

Part 1

"I’ll be the first to admit I don’t know much about WWII in Europe, not something in which I’ve ever had a heck of a lot of interest, but I do know carrier operations in WWII and what worked and what didn’t and why.

The Kriegsmarine had no naval doctrine that included carriers. Great Britain, Japan, and the US, the major players in the aircraft carrier business, had been operating pure aircraft carriers since the 1920’s in case of the later two and, without looking it up, about 1918 for Great Britain. By "pure carrier" I mean carriers whose airplanes are wheeled, are recovered aboard ship by some sort of arrestor arrangement (however primitive in the early years), and could also be operated from land bases. Further, the aircraft in use (again except for the very early models) were specifically designed for carrier operations. The navies of these three nations worked out the problems and challenges of carrier operations in the 20’s and 30’s and became, each in their own way, the best in the business. The feeble attempts of the Germans (and the Italians) to, first of all, develop aircraft carriers, much less carrier aircraft, were, frankly, laughable in retrospect.

Graf Zeppelin was, in theory, anyway, to have incorporated the best features of IJN, USN and RN carriers (circa 1936, remember), but managed to end up a glopping together of some of the worst carrier ideas that had already been discarded by those services.

All you have to do is look at the main guns and their placement aboard Graf Zeppelin and it’s obvious that the Kreigsmarine considered surface vessels as the major threat to their carrier. Even pre-war, the RN, IJN, and USN could have told them that that was a waste of time and effort; that the real threat to the ship was in the air. The USN went down that road with Lexington class and their 8” turrets. By the mid 1930’s it was recognized that those guns were so much dead weight. Note that as soon after the Japanese attacked Pearl the 8-inchers were removed and replaced on Saratoga with 5-inch dual purpose and on Lexington with temporary 1.1 in AAA mounts (Lexington was scheduled to receive 5-inch mounts, but she was sunk at Coral Sea before that could happen).

Another major failing in the Graf Zeppelin design was in an incomprehensibly low avgas storage capacity. The smallest and oldest carrier in the IJN, Hosho, had a capacity of 98,000 gallons and carried but 22 planes. Essex class carrier contemporaries of Graf Zeppelin had up to 240,000 gallons avgas capacity and, in practice, were replenished every three to four days during combat operations. And Graf Zeppelin . . . carried a paltry 65,000 gallons. How do you suppose they were planning on replenishing their avgas supply, not to mention their bunker fuel? Yes, yes, I know, the Germans had successfully experimented with underway replenishment, but I’d suggest they never experimented on the scale necessary to maintain carrier operations and especially in the face of some very aggressive enemy carriers looking to put that scalp on their lodge pole. Ideally, one likes to pull off to some out of the way corner of the ocean for such evolutions . . . once Graf Zeppelin hits the Atlantic, there no out of the way corners.

Further, how many pilots, crew, and aircraft was Germany prepared to sacrifice to bring their carrier into operational being? Carrier aviation, though somewhat safer today, and "safer" is an extremely subjective term, in the 1930’s, 40’s and 50’s was an extremely dangerous profession. Where were the Germans planning on training their folks to operate their hybrid craft off carriers? In the Baltic? How nice for them, nice enclosed seas with, compared to the reaches of the North Atlantic, nice calm waters. What’s going to happen when a pilot who has trained in calm waters is suddenly faced with crappy North Atlantic weather with the horizon a short 5 miles away and a flight deck that rises and falls 25 to 30 feet as he attempts to land. Did the Kreigsmarine have a plan for training LSOs to deal with this problem as they coaxed the pilots aboard? Were there flight deck officers who knew by feel just when to launch a plane so that it doesn’t just “thuup” into a wave? News flash, the folks doing these jobs in the USN, RN, and IJN had had a lot of practice at this and even they made mistakes. And what of the poor pilots? Do you suppose their training included flying their craft to their extremes of range; fighting an action; making their way back to where they think their carrier is going to be; if they’re lucky, finding it; and then trying to land in the dark on a pitching deck with their engine running on fumes?

The development of carrier aviation in the "big three" over the years pushed operational limits such as these. Leaders in carrier operations knew that conditions would never be perfect and would probably be the worst imaginable. USN fleet exercises in the 1920s and 30’s often had admirals such as Reeves and King wondering if they’d ever see their planes again as they were sent off on long missions to attack the make-believe "enemy." Even so, non-combat aircraft losses combined with combat operational losses, i.e., aircraft lost through accident not related to combat damage, but on combat missions, were high.

For example, in the USN, for the entire war, in the course of some 388,000 plus flights (of which 147,000 plus were combat action sorties) there were 4,863 losses of carrier-based aircraft. 1,877 were directly related to in combat losses, either in combat with enemy aircraft or to enemy AAA; 1,001 were combat operational losses; and 1,985 were non- combat related. 61.4% of losses did not result from holes being poked in aircraft or pilots. What do you suppose the rates would be for a single operating aircraft carrier whose entire crew and air group has maybe six months experience in carrier operations? What do you suppose their losses would be like in just achieving that six months of operational training? And for that matter, once in action, how do you suppose this aircraft carrier is supposed to make up it’s losses when, to be effective and strike the enemy it must operated outside the range of any land-base re-supply or support?

Making the comparison a little more manageable, looking again at the USN experience, in calendar year 1942, for all carriers in action, in some 6775 flights, including 2559 action sorties there were 155 combat losses, 63 combat related operational losses, and 66 non- combat flight losses.

Statistically, one can take the numbers of carriers in action per month during the period and come up with a composite carrier’s operating numbers: Flights: 2755; action sorties 1043; combat losses: 61; combat operational losses: 26; non-combat related losses: 28; for a total of 115 aircraft lost in a 12 month period. For 1942, that means a US carrier, had it been in action for all 12 months, be it Lexington class, Yorktown class, Ranger or Wasp could have experienced aircraft losses in excess of an entire air group. The USN had the means and flexibility to make up such losses with new planes and pilots. How do you suppose a single German aircraft carrier could continue to operate with those kind of losses? What would be their plan for such replenishment? Where would the additional trained carrier pilots come from? Was the German navy aware that the majority of aircraft losses would be from flight deck crack-ups, launch failures, and pilots simply getting lost and never seen again? Somehow, I just don’t think so."

 

Part 2

The Germans had no tactical doctrine for carrier operations, whereas the RN, IJN, and USN had had twenty years to develop, refine, and hone the same. While actual combat led to the out and out abandonment of some cherished carrier operations doctrinal theories (the concept of deferred departure comes to mind), development and adoption of new doctrines (compare the USF-74 of 1941 to USF-74 of 1943 and 1944) went along rather quickly, at least in the USN, largely pushed by squadron commanders and pilots who had seen what had worked and what hadn’t and were in a position to do something about it by virtue if being responsible for the Fleet doctrine re-writes.

Germany had no plan that I’m aware of for underway replenishment of flight stores (ordnance, avgas, etc) or aircraft. And there appears to be little thought as to how many vessels could be committed to any underway replenishment and how were they to make their rendezvous with the Graf Zeppelin task group? Who was going to protect them? How were they to get past a now energized RN or combined RN USN search and destroy operation? And just how were they intending to get replacement aircraft aboard Graf Zeppelin? In any case, they apparently had no sufficient inventory of replacement aircraft. They were apparently not really aware, or at least refused to recognize, of all the pitfalls in developing a carrier arm. This especially obvious in their building/conversion programs; they simply didn’t plan for enough carriers, nor screening vessels. One or two carriers, committed piecemeal, won’t do it. They’d be attacked and sunk, either together or in detail.

Much of the sort of thinking about how successful a Kreigsmarine carrier would be IMO goes along with the “what-if” scenarios where the guys who never did XYZ suddenly have perfect knowledge and are able to pull off XYZ event while the other side is securely tied to their historic ABC position.

Doesn’t work that way. If Graf Zeppelin had ever ventured out into the Atlantic it would have lasted less time than Bismarck. An untried, unrealistically trained, understrengthed, and hybrid aircraft equipped air group, with no operational doctrine, flying off an equally untried aircraft carrier, and undoubtedly insufficiently screened (look at Kriegsmarine destroyer losses), facing two, three, or even four RN carriers with air groups having all the advantages the Germans would not. If they don’t come out until 1942 maybe even a couple of USN carriers would get into the act as well. Remember all the US Essex class CV’s were built on the east coast and did their pre-commissioning and shake down cruises in the Atlantic. They would have the same advantages as the RN (exception being that USN air groups might tend to have a higher percentage of nuggets, but their leadership in squadrons were generally combat experienced or naval aviators with 8 to 10 years experience behind them. And even the old USS Ranger, all by itself, was more than a match for Graf Zeppelin and had the experience pool to do the job. This is a no-brainer and in short order . . . score Allies 1 Axis 0.

I think folks tend to give the German’s far too much credit or benefit of the doubt. In this case, I’m sorry, but for all their technology, know-how, and all their supposed skill, it would make absolutely no difference what-so-ever. Here is a ship type they have never before operated. Here’s a ship that is already a less than optimal design, carrying an insufficiently sized air group. Here are planes that are, perhaps somewhat hastily, modified from land-based types to operate in a carrier-based environment. Here is a command structure where the Kreigsmarine commands the ship and the planes are commanded and flown by the Luftwaffe. (The RN experience of the FAA being part and parcel of the RAF for so many years was ample evidence that that particular arrangement is a logistical disaster looking for a place to happen. Looks like the Germans didn’t get that message.) And here’s an operating environment that is totally alien to anything done before by the Luftwaffe. Do you really think the good Reich’s Air Marshal Fatty is going to send his best and brightest? I suspect he already saw the writing on the wall and did as little as possible to encourage the project.

To expect either the Kreigsmarine or the Luftwaffe to absorb the lessons of a generation of institutional knowledge in carrier operations as acquired, the hard way, by the RN, USN and IJN, to, in a blinding flash of insight, foresee all the potential problems, I think, is asking a bit too much, even for the Germans. Not that the RN or USN were likely to provide them any short cuts. And do you really think they’d really, I mean, really, listen to the advise from the Japanese . . . remember this is Nazi Germany here.

And folks can talk until you’re blue in the face about how good the Me 109Ts, Fi 167s and the Ju 87Cs were, but, I’m sorry, the 87’s and the 167s would be hopelessly outclassed and the 109s would be in for the fight of their lives. By the time GZ could have put to sea it would probably be late 1942. RN carriers were already carrying F4Fs. The Seafires were coming on line, but suffered throughout the war with severe structural problems resultant from the repeated bruising of carrier landings (see Brown, The Forgotten Fleet). Gee, do you suppose the Me 109T might suffer the same problem? Not to mention it’s overall unsat ergonomics in terms of carrier operations. Its one thing for the German’s to structurally reinforce a design and test it a couple of times; repeated violent exposures are another matter all together. Just how many landings do you think these hybrid aircraft would be able to withstand? Sure would be embarrassing to have them start pulling apart when operating under at-sea combat conditions and not from their nice safe test site landing field.

And what about the GZ air group? Some 40 airplanes comprised of, roughly, 10 109s, 13 87s, and 20 167s. The performance statistics for the 109s, on paper, weren’t too bad, but the 87s and the 167s look like a top end of somewhat more than 175 knots … sitting ducks for FM-2s. And only 10 (!!) fighters … oh, please! Let’s see, that’s 5 to protect the ship and 5 to escort strikes … oh, boy, that will work real good won’t it? I can tell you, anybody in World War II who thought they could adequately defend a carrier with only five fighters or adequately escort a strike with five fighters was dreaming or desperate. The USN and the RN put more fighters that that on their CVEs! And the first time you lose one of these 109Ts, be it a combat or not-combat loss, you’ve cut your fighter strength by 10%; that’s what we call ‘decimate’. Lose another and you’re down 20%, the traditional cut off for unit capability. How long do you think that could go on? This during a period when fighters on USN fleet carriers were going from 18 to 28 to 36 as a regular complement.

And what about pilot training? Sure, fighter pilots can fly fighters and dive bomber pilots can dive bomb, and torpedo plane pilots can drop torpedoes or even glide bomb, but how do they get where they need to go and, more importantly how do they get back? I strongly suspect, largely because they never had to, the Germans never thought that one through, either. Navigation over water was, in those days, pretty much a matter of a plotting board, a compass, a clock, and knowledge of how fast the plane is flying. The FAA, for a long time, held that even fighters had to be two-seaters so that that one fellow could handle the navigation while the other fellow drove the plane. In USN practice, individual pilots did their own navigation; of course, some were better than others. And what was to be the German doctrine? Were individual pilots responsible for their own navigation? Were the fighter pilots to use one of the 87C or 167 pilots as a guide? What if he gets shot down? What was to be their scout doctrine? How many of the, oh, so few, 167s would be delegated for scouting as opposed to strikes? And how were they to find their point option (the place where the carrier is supposed to be when a mission is over)? Had they worked all that out? What if the carrier wasn’t where they thought it would be? Did they have a standardized search pattern? Did they have a homing signal system? There’s no railroad tracks or roads to follow. There’s no “just head east until you see land” method … there’d be no land, just miles and miles of an empty ocean.

Finally, in the real world, in their only encounter with Luftwaffe fighters, FM pilots (FM’s being a slightly souped up F4F) from HMS Searcher’s 882 squadron were credited with 4 Me 109s to one loss (26 March 1945). The FMs were dealing with German fighters that were attacking strike planes they were escorting … i.e, they were on the receiving end of an attack, a decided disadvantage in the fighter world, yet, they seemed to do alright anyway.

Lambs to the slaughter. The Germans may have dreamed of the GZ doing well as a convoy killer, but the reality would have been that as soon as she had set to sea, the RN carriers would be all over her. If she comes out any time in 1942 or later, then it would be the RN and the USN finishing her off in short order.

Regards,

Rich"


Thanks to RLeonard

 

I'm not so easily sold.
No doubt the 109 was an excellent fighter, but...
Under carriage was weak and prone to failure with all but chioce conditions ? A pitching deck of a Carrier combined with poor visibility (down/front) ?
I have pages of "cracked-up" Corsairs on carrier decks.
Without fighters (good fighters) you are a "Turkey Shoot" to those who do.
The range issue is prominent/significant as well. The ocean is big (duh, obvious).
For sure even one (more than one) Carrier battle group(s) would make a huge difference.
Air protected Capitol Ships, no need to hide in Norway or anywhere.
Strike groups could've wiped out/captured convoys in a combined arms action. U-Boats-Capitol Ships-Airplanes, and brought a mano e mano fight to anyone with no disadvantages.
Search patterns would extend beyond Destroyer (picket lines)/U-Boat (blind groping) and would change everything.
Building them (enough of them), equiping them (with good stuff), training them (to be contenders), and having the "Stones" to use them, are the unanswered questions.
They started too late to play "Catch-up" with another "Wonder Weapon".

Redcoat said it all !

 

Supposedly, the struts were strengthen but that did not resolve the design problem of having the gear coming down inward and providing a very narrow base for landing unlike the FW-190 where the gear comes down outward and provides a wider base with more stability. Like you have said, imagine landing a 109 on a flight deck that is moving up and down with crosswinds. eeek!

 

Thanks for posting those, Redcoat. The "training" picture looked gloomy for the Germans. And where or how to train relacements when the carriers were out to sea.

 

I forgot about what Hawkerace said as well, depending on the time-frame...
With one lone friendly shadowing/calling in location...
A 1,000 plane raid of B-17s could churn the water of any Nazi Battlegroup !
Bravo Yankee, Bravo Yankee

translation = BY BY

 

That's exactly the point I was trying to make, too expensive and too risky.

 

I have to admit that I am pleasantly surprised by the number and thoughtfulness of your replies.

I personally and envisioned this force to allow the invasion of Britain, but convoy hunting would work as well. Assuming that the Germans were even able to field a functional carrier fleet.

 

On the Me 109, the Spitfire was modified for carrier operations so the former certainly could have been operated from a carrier successfully. But, the Germans could have used the He 112 or later Fw 190 as alternatives so, they had aircraft that could have flown successfully from a carrier. And, there is always the possibility that once a carrier or two was in service they would develop aircraft specifically for carrier operations that were totally new designs.
As for using large bomber raids on carriers:
There are two major problems here. The first is that carriers are mobile. Sending a strike that will take say 3 or 4 hours to arrive will mean that it might find open ocean where the carriers were by the time it gets there. Happened historically with both carrier strikes and land based ones against ships. Having a very large strike miss their target is very expensive and wasteful.
The second problem is cost. Is this an economical means to make a strike against a battle group? Planning will take days or possibly weeks as this was true even with the original 1000 bomber raids against fixed targets. This sort of level of planning is obviously impossible against a mobile target at sea. Also, there are few air force commanders or planners that would be willing to idle that large a force in preparation for such a strike.
The best defense against carrier aircraft at sea is having carriers of your own.

 

Just "Spoofin" about the thousand bomber raid. I realize what it would take.
If....I was after em, I'd bird dog em with PBYs and sink em all with submarines. Their prowess with U-Boats would come back to haunt them. I doubt it would take much encouragement to talk the Silent Service into some GRT, especially with the lack of expierence/numbers of destroyers at ASW.

 

While they did share a similar type of undercarriage (though the Bf 109's was narrower) the landing and take off characteristics couldn't have been more different. The Spitfire had the take off and landing characteristics of a basic trainer, while the Bf 109, especially during take off, was noted for its ability to catch out the unwary and, unlike the Spitfire, a large number were lost in landing and take off accidents

 

Things would probably be worse for Germany as they would have had to put battleships to protect the carriers and this would have provided a bigger target for the bombers. Allied ships and aircraft would have lost less time trying to find hiding places and therefore save time that would have accelerated the end of the battle of the Atlantic and made D-Day possible earlier.

 

And to reinforce the issue the engine of the Me-109 was too powerful for the aircraft especially the Me-109G which had the notorious distinction of severe torque and some pilot turned turtle after take-off, but i have seen photo's of Me-109's with inward retracting undercarriages specifically for carrier use.

 

We should also mention the petrol issue. A carrier + ACs would have needed large quantities of the black gold and after 1942 there would have been no way that Germany could have had sufficient supplies for a carrier fleet.

 

Did big bombers sink a carrier in WW2? I cant think of any that did.

 

I agree with assesments in regards to the use of ME 109s on a carrier. The FW 190, with its smaller amount of torque, and the overall more rugged nature would have been better suited for carrier operations