What if Italy didn't enter the war in 1940?

I did some search and apparently this hasn't been tried before.

AFAIK the decision to enter the war in June 1940 was mostly Mussolini's brainchild and dictated by a fear of being cut out of the "spoils distribution" process rather than from any long range planning. His assumption was that the war was going to be over within a few monts but I believe it's entirely possible he could decide not to "jump in" if he had a better grasp of British determination or some of his advisers, that had a better knowledge of Italy's unpreparedeness but a strong interest in "hiding their failures from the boss", convinced him.

All other things stay the same but after the failure of the Battle of Britain, the Italian participation was negligible so it's going to follow history, Mussolini recognizes the stalemate and waits for events.


Some areas were I see an impact are:

• No "stab in the back" will this affect the French surrender?
• Italy can freely trade with the rest of the world, while the RN may do it's best to prevent this, like it historically did up to June 1940, what it can do is limited by international treaties. AFAIK the international embargo that followed invasion of Ethiopia was still in place but it's scope was limited (though it was one of the main reasons behind Mussolini's hostility towards Britain and France), so the axis economic situation may improve.
• No southern front so the resources Germany historically allocated to Yougoslavia and Greece will be available for use elsewhere. Hitler will still need to send forces to Rumania to discourage Stalin from further actions after Bessarabia.
• If something like Vichy France happens (and if France sues for a separate peace I don't see any other possible outcome), with Italy neutral the North African ports are outside Hitler's reach so no Mers-el-Kebir and possibly a less British hostile Vichy.
• No North Africa "training experience" for the western allies so if they attempt an invasion of Europe most troops are going to be very green and doctrine is anybody's guess.
• With Italy neutral is the US position going to change?
• No morale boosting desert victories for Britain.
• No prize shipping available for the atlantic convoys at a critical period (total tonnage of Italian shipping lost because outside the Med in June 1940 was 1.200.000t but a number were interned in neutral ports so unavailable to either side) my guess for 1940 is around 600.000t but is possibly overestimated as a lot of ships were in US ports so were not taken before Dec 1941.

 

Are you saying that Italy does not enter the war at all, or drops out of the war after France falls as things are clearly not going to "end in 3 months"?

 

That would have been the smart move for Mussolini. He just could not stand being upstaged by the junior fascist partner. Fascist Italy could have survived just as fascist Spain did.

 

I read it as not entering the war at all. And, yes this idea has been discussed many times before.

*No "stab in the back" will this affect the French surrender?

Slightly increases the possibility the French government moves to Africa & does not surrender France that summer. Italy was a minor factor in the decision to surrender, but not having to worry about a hostile army in Lybia or navy in the Mediterranian is something.

*Italy can freely trade with the rest of the world, while the RN may do it's best to prevent this, like it historically did up to June 1940, what it can do is limited by international treaties. AFAIK the international embargo that followed invasion of Ethiopia was still in place but it's scope was limited (though it was one of the main reasons behind Mussolini's hostility towards Britain and France), so the axis economic situation may improve.

The British were already placing pressure on the Italians economically and pushing the limits of international law and custom. As for the 'Axis' the italian bankers and businessmen were already disturbed by Germanys 'creative bookeeping'. They would have probablly demeanded much more from Germany in terms of cash and for interest payments on the credit already extended. Germany had very little in cash reserves, even with the loot from France. This situation favors Italy in the short run. If Germany tries to pressure Italy by shorting coal sales, or taking control of the Rumanian oil that Italy was buying this forces Italy closer to making decision for leaving nuetrality.

*No southern front so the resources Germany historically allocated to Yougoslavia and Greece will be available for use elsewhere. Hitler will still need to send forces to Rumania to discourage Stalin from further actions after Bessarabia.

Not a decisive change in stratigic terms. It is also possible that British plotting could result in a Balkans campaign later. Italys DoW against Greece was just one posiblity for igniting a war there.

*If something like Vichy France happens (and if France sues for a separate peace I don't see any other possible outcome), with Italy neutral the North African ports are outside Hitler's reach so no Mers-el-Kebir and possibly a less British hostile Vichy.

*No North Africa "training experience" for the western allies so if they attempt an invasion of Europe most troops are going to be very green and doctrine is anybody's guess.

Probablly less important for the US Army. 80% of the combat units used for Overlord were not veteran, and Bradleys staff does not look like it learned much anyway. How that would affect the British is less clear. I can say that the Brit or Commonwealth artillery doctrine emerged after the 1940 experience & the US artillery doctrine was largely set in 1941. Neither seems to have changed changed much until after the large scale fighting in Normandy and the German border battles in 1944. & in that case the changes were techniical and not a fundamental shift.

it is also possible, perhaps even probable a secondary front would be opened elsewhere in between 1941 & 1943. Churchills ideas about the "Soft Underbelly of Europe" may eventually lead to a Balkans campaign. A Norwegian or Scandinavian adventure is another. Fianlly for lack of other alternatives the Roundup or Sledgehammer plans might be attempted.

Finally, without the Med. Front the Allies will be able to build up the air campaign against Germany sooner.

*With Italy neutral is the US position going to change?

Not in the long run. Hitler declared war on the US. It was not up to us.

*No morale boosting desert victories for Britain.

No morale eroding defeats either

*No prize shipping available for the atlantic convoys at a critical period (total tonnage of Italian shipping lost because outside the Med in June 1940 was 1.200.000t but a number were interned in neutral ports so unavailable to either side) my guess for 1940 is around 600.000t but is possibly overestimated as a lot of ships were in US ports so were not taken before Dec 1941.

Thats offset by the ships not lost in the Med. campaigns, and no ineffciencies of having the primary sea route to Asia & India circle Africa. In fact with no Med. campaign there is a much smaller requirement for shipping to India/Asia. No endless military supply ships to Egypt. So both the cargo ships, and escourting warships can be better concentrated in the Atlantic.

A lot of trade offs with Italy nuetral.

 

Yes the idea was Italian neutrality, not a separate peace.

You make very good points but some I don't fully agree with.

No Italian attack may lengthen the campaign by a few weeks, whether this will affect the war is questionable but it if lasts until it's too late to envision a 1940 Seelowe it might well have far reaching consequences.

From what I know most Italian bankers were convinced Hitler was going to win up to US entry, the nazi's "creative accounting" was not that easy to see through. Italy can probably get oil for it's peacetime needs from the USSR if the historical Rumanian source dries up because Germany is absorbing the whole production. It will need cash to pay for it as Stalin is only really interested in military technology were Italy has very few "cutting edge" products. Coal (and most of Italy's industry is coal not oil driven) is probably available from Germany or Belgium. Cash for imports will need to be generated by exporting manufactured goods either to German controlled Northern Europe or to South America, this is "business as usual" as it continues the pre-war pattern and unless the RN does more about it, with possible bad consequences on US pubblic opinion that is traditionally sensitive to "freedom of the seas" issues, it will continue. The 1.200.000t of shipping outside the med in June 1940 are a good indicator trade was still brisk.

Fully agree with your scenario here, and likely Mussolini will not be able to resist the temptation to attack somewhere bringing the war back to history.

Taking the full German army head on with "Kasserine level" troops and commanders may be disastrous. AFAIK air ground cooperation and combined arms were strongly influenced by the North African experience.

I don't see the US helping the British with a Mediterranean strategy and if the British go at it alone I see a large scale Leros as a real possibility.

Yes, but with Italy neutral it' not a given thing he will, the "axis" pact would be already dead so why remove the restrictions neutrality imposed on FDR ?.

I think the former were a lot more important. With no desert or East Africa victories to show and no active land front Churchill's job will be a lot tougher. IMO it was the BoB that generated the British resolve but a late victory in France may prevent it from happening.

Merchant shipping losses in the Med were not that significant, using the shorter route is but would still require escorts as the Regia Marina is otherwise likely to harrass Britsh shipping in retaliation to the RN behaviour.

Fully agree here and I probably opened too many "sub threads" I didn't expect having to discuss all of them, it makes for long posts and long posts are not good.

 

"Taking the full German army head on with "Kasserine level" troops and commanders may be disastrous. AFAIK air ground cooperation and combined arms were strongly influenced by the North African experience."

Yes and no. The units there were clearly influenced by it, tho not always for the best. Conversley the more I dig into it the less evidence I find many of the lessons were passed on. And, as I wrote earlier relatively few of of the units and command staff had experince from the Med. ie: of the Five US divisions used for the 6 June assualt of Neptune two were combat experienced. The other three had no combat experince anywhere, and there were a insignificant number of combat veterans transfered into their ranks. The two corps commanders on 6th June had no experience in the Med. Collins did have experience fighting the Japanese, but none with a beach assualt in combat.

Later in June, or July and beyond the proportion of 'Mediterrainian experinced' to green units declined further as many other nonveteran US battalions and divisions arrived in France. As of 5 June 1944 the US Army had exactly seven combat experienced divisions in the ETO & some like the 2d Armored Div had just a few weeks of relatively light experience in Sicilly.

In the case of close air support the critical techniques were little changed from two years earlier. Neither the experince of the Mediterrainian campaign nor the Pacific were applied, until Quesada replaced Bereton in command of the US Fifth Air Force in July 1944.

"Yes, but with Italy neutral it' not a given thing he will, the "axis" pact would be already dead so why remove the restrictions neutrality imposed on FDR ?"

Italy had little to do with Hitlers decision to take his war against to US as well. He had been angered over the US support of Britain for a long time. Aside from the vast supplies to the UK and the USSR through the Lend Lease system there was the steadily constriction of critical items that had been imported to Germany via the nuetrals. ie: Davis Oil and Standard Oil exports of oil to European nuetrals like Spain in 1941 were interfered with. Analine Dye, a chemical business jointly owned by DuPont and IG Farben came under legal attack.

Hitler was also aware of US military personnel in the UK providing technical support to Commonwealth forces, of Commonwealth military personnel undergoing specialized techincal training in the US, of the USN harrassing German submarines in the Atlantic.

 

Italy had little to do with Hitler's decision to DoW the USA but honoring the "axis" agreements did, though they were officially defensive in nature. If the agreements were already dead because of continuing Italian neutrality it may make a diffference. BTW you are forgetting Lend Lease that was Hitler's biggest grievance, basically the USA was subsiding his enemy's war effort !!.

 

Italy would have had to get inolved because of the Tripartite Pact.

 

"to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three contracting powers is attacked"
Germany wasn't attacked, they attacked first. They were not obliged to delcare war on anyone. Same for Germany declaring war on the US after Pearl Harbor.

 

It will have no effect on the German victory, the French forces used were mainly static ones used to garrison the area, any that could have been released for use in the North would have been of little use

A neutral Italy would have no need to harrass British shipping.

 

I am not saying that they would be obligated because of the actual writing in the pact. I am saying that Germany would want Italian forces to help them defeat the allies.

 

Why would Britain try and stop Italian trade?

 

There two main reasons for the "harrassing":

- The British didn't want goods reaching Germany through Italy or Germany selling goods to Italy to acquire much needed cash, and bulk goods like coal usually went by ship so were vulnerable to harrassment.

- The British didn't want Italy to build up strategic reserves of strategic goods in case it eventually entered the war.

At the same Britain tried to buy military equipment from fascist Italy right up to the DoW, two instances I recall were planes and MTB engines, so the situation was rather ambiguous.

 

I wonder what planes the British sought to purchase?

I have run across a credible claim the Brits asked the USSR about purchasing tanks in early 1940. Ihey thought it might be more efficient to transport tanks from the USSR to Egypt than all the way around Africa to Egypt

 

No Italy in the war will mean the Invasion of the USSR will take place on May 15th or if climatic conditions are decided a factor June 1st.
This will give the Germans at least 22 days extra campaign time in the USSR.
They will also have 8 extra divisions used to occupy the Balkans, the Afrika corps, all the equipment lost in the Balkan and North African campaigns and the use of paratroopers in the USSR as they would not be mauled in Crete.
On the downside for the Germans the British will have far more ships to use in the Atlantic.
Italy could use it's neutrality to invade Yugoslavia as it originally intended to do in 1940 rather than Greece as the transports used in Africa would now be available and German pressure against the move much less.
This could be a winnable war for Italy and be over by the end of 1940 if they can persuade Hungary and Bulgaria to join the attack.

All in all it Italy out of the war may well strangely benefit Britain, Germany and Italy.

 

Few things would have benefitted Hitler more than having the entire Mediterranean neutral.

Does stay out of "the war" include no attack on Greece? Strictly speaking an Italo-Greek conflict would be separate from the Anglo-German war, but Churchill was eager to "assist" the Greeks, despite the circumstance that they were holding their own prior to British - and German - intervention.

By 1941 the looming crisis in the Far East would attract otherwise idle British and Empire forces, further foreclosing whatever limited options Churchill had for engaging the Germans by land. Preserving its empire was as much a goal for Britain as defeating the Axis per se, and it was mainly the ongoing conflict in the Mediterrean theater that prevented them sending signficant reinforcements to Malaya. The Japanese would be no more willing to submit to the oil embargo etc., but seizing the Far East would be vastly more difficult if not impossible.

So we have Hitler's southern flank secure and Britain embroiled in the Far East during the crucial 1941-42 campaigns in Russia.

 

Aren't you forgetting the agreements between the UK and Greece for "mutual support"? Churchill later defended pulling troops and equipment out of the North Africa theater and placing them in the Balkans for that very reason. He wouldn't ignore existing treaties and promises, as he thought that was "dishonorable" and would tarnish the image and such of the British, much as the breaking of the French promises to the British as per the Germans had.

Also one must remember that the Greek throne was related by blood with the British throne as well.

PS. how do you like this forum? Glad you came over for a look-see and joined up!

 

Churchill was more eager to "support" the Greeks than the Greeks were to be supported - rather a reversal of the usual form, in which the endangered party asks for assistance! It was only after Metaxas died that he was able to persuade them to accept British forces, although IIRC they had allowed use of Suda Bay in Crete by the RN. It doesn't take hindsight to realize that British help was likely to be nothing but, since it was almost certain to bring the Germans in. Indeed that was Churchill's basic goal. As we've been discussing, he had few options for engaging the Germans by land or in significant force. He admits himself in The Second World War that his goal was to open an anti-Axis front comprising Greece, Yugoslavia, and hopefully Turkey (one of his obsessions throughout the war, though I cannot imagine why the Turks should consider it), despite the circumstance that these countries' principal rivalries were with each other.

One thing I wonder is when Churchill learned about Barbarossa, keeping in mind that he was pressing the Greeks to accept British troops from the moment the Italians first invaded. A Balkan front hardly seems viable when the Wehrmacht is almost entirely unoccupied. He also would have looked rather foolish if his scheme had caused Hitler to defer attacking Russia!

Getting back to our original topic, I wonder if Churchill would have been so eager to intervene in an Italo-Greek war had Italy not already been at war with Britain and in alliance with Germany? A neutral Mediterranean was of benefit to Britain also, and no one appreciated just how hollow the Italian military would prove.

Hitler would also have been in conformance with international law - something of a novelty for him - in pointing out to Greece that Germany was neutral with regard to their war with Italy but was at war with Britain. Greece in our scenario would still be neutral with regard to the Anglo-German war. Allowing British forces into Greek territory would be a legitimate casus belli.

p.s. enjoying it so far, difference pace from THC

 

Hello gents,

having read through this rather interesting thread, the IMHO most interesting aspect would be T.O.S's posting:

So if no Seeloewe/BoB well then a lot of versions would indeed be open from July/August 1940 onward.

One could rewrite history entirely

Regards
Kruska

 

If Italy stayed neutral the Germany would have to finish Britain no matter what or the Eastern campaign would have to be thrown out.