What if... Italy had found the Oil under Libya?

I see that you never heard of Erschriebene Siege, Holding down the front and the Himmerod Memorandum .

The German officers who eagerly collaborated after the war with the enemy in The Historical Division (where they were safe for prosecutions for war crimes) used this to falsify history and to attribute to Hitler and Hitler only the responsability for the outbreak of the war, for the defeat and for the Holocaust.They did this successfully during 14 years under the direction of Halder,Ruge was one of them .

 

No : the mission of the RM was NOT to control the Mediterranean, but to protect the convoys of the Italian merchant fleet,especially to NA, but not only to NA .The RM did this successfully, but that does not mean that it controlled the Mediterranean . That after the Italian capitulation the RN could use again the mediterranean was not because the RN controlled the Mediterranean again, it was because the Axis was expelled from NA and Sicily .

 

Hitler did not attempt to fight a two front war, he was forced to fight a two front war .

 

To say that they didn't do it is very questionable, it is even biased .

 

I'm not convinced it was the Regia Marina that stopped the Royal Navy from challenging the central Mediterranean. My understanding is that it was the air power of the Regia Aeronautica, and the Luftwaffe that made sailing there hazardous, with Axis air power in Italy, Sicily, and Tunisia / Libya. All major powers found air power to be more effective against navies than they'd expected. The RM and RA efforts were were seldom co-ordinated well, (Italians had no dedicated fleet air arm).

 

You still believe no one notices when you respond to yourself?

Nothing in your reply is a response to anything I wrote.

 

My response was to LJAd's rather absolutist comment (aren't they all ) that Italy lacked the ships 'on paper' for the RM to be a factor in controlling the central Med. Regrettably my choice of words were not as precise as I might have wished, but I did point out that multiple factors prevented them from being used to their full potential. You are correct Air power was the most effective deterrent to Allied movements in the central Med. If the RM had the items listed by me and those by you (Training, leadership, air coordination and fuel) they could be that force with the ships they 'had on paper'.

The first three were reasonably doable, the last not really without a serious rethink of Axis strategy.

 

Please describe to me the Commando raid where a bunch of burly Brit's parachuted into Berghof and twisted his arm till he cried uncle and promised to invade Russia?

Barbarossa was a choice (a very bad one), not a compusion.

 

Questionable? How? Biased? How?

Hitler sent Rommel and his under strength Afrika Korps to help Italy retain his Libyan toe hold in North Africa, not to conquer Egypt and points east. Rommel took it upon himself to inject mission creep into the equation, something Hitler then endorsed even though the troops and resources to achieve this were unavailable. Sustaining a 'siege' at El Alemein simply wasted fuel, equipment and lives that could not easily be replaced.

The very definition of misuse of available assets.

Rommel had just enough troops and resources to wage a mobile defense of the Egyptian frontier, no more. For a time he could hold this line, but eventually Allied production and American troops would upset this balance and Rommel, the DAK and the Italian troops deployed would either be destroyed or forced to evacuate. It's just possible that with the sacrifice of the static Italian Infantry as cannon fodder the troops at least of the DAK and mobile Italian units might have been withdrawn to be reformed with new equipment to counter the next, almost obvious, move of the Allies. An invasion of Italy proper.

The very definition of misuse of available assets.

Before this there was the Balkan's. Hitler grossly over reacted to Mussolini's failure in his Greek invasion (these assets should have been used to support NA) and the change in the Yugoslav government. While less compliant than the previous government, they would not be so foolish to interrupt oil shipments from Romania seeing how the Axis could (and did) easily crush them. What Hitler should have done was use diplomacy. Force Italy to make peace with Greece, something the Greek's would have jumped at. Used the threat of the stick to ensure no interruption of oil from Romania, they won't like it much, but the alternative would be far worse.

Instead, upon the launch of the greatest German military operation in history he first diverts significant forces to conquer Yugoslavia and Greece. The time lost was not the problem, the wear and tear upon his forces was. This could have been better spent either in Russia or North Africa. The error was compounded by the diversion of so many Axis troops to fight a partisan war they can't win because of all the other commitments they have. These troops could have been better served in Russia to keep lines of communication open or to supplement the Atlantic Wall. Finally this whole affair is capped by the effective death knell of the German Paratrooper arm at Crete. Though the force will grow afterwards, it will never be the same or used in its intended purpose as a elite attack arm. It will be a superb light infantry and earn great credit in defensive actions, yet they would have been better employed had they been disbanded and parceled out to the Heer as high quality replacements to keep existing units at a high level.

The very definition of misuse of available assets.

Finally, after the Anglo-American landings in Northwest Africa, the 15th Army (along with significant air formations) is formed from assets sent to Tunisia to fight a battle it can not hope to win. A quarter million troops (more than Stalingrad) are captured by the Anglo-American forces along with all their equipment for no significant delay in Allied operations. Do I really have to point out the value of these assets had they been available to counter Husky and Avalanche?

The very definition of misuse of available assets.

The only bias I will confess to is calling bad strategy and the pointless loss of life the best you can do.

 

You don't get it : the choice was imposed .

Germany was faced with a war with Britain, it was convinced that this would be a long war and that the longer the war would last ,the sooner there would be also a war with the US and that it had no chances against the combination of Britain and the US .

The only possibility to prevent war with the US was to force Britain to give up .Hitler hoped that this could be done by defeating the SU in a short campaign, if Britain did not give up, the conquest of the European part of the USSR woulf enforce Germany's position.

Of course, we know that these 2 assumptions were not more than illusions, wishful thinking .But for Hitler there was no other alternative than to wait til the Yanks were coming and til the German cities would suffer the fate of Coventry .

He was cornered and Barbarossa was only a desperate attempt to get out of the corner .

 

You disagreed when I said that Ruge could not be impartial : I have given 3 sources indicating that Ruge belonged to a group of German officers who were very partial in their writings after the war .

Ruge belonged to those who after the war tried to save their professional reputation by blaming Hitler for the defeat and who tried to convince the world that the WM had nothing to do with the Holocaust .

 

On post 69 :

Hitler sent forces to NA for political reasons= to prevent the fall of Mussolini . The strength of these forces was limited by logistical factors . About the German strategy in NA : for Rommel it was better to fight at Alamein than at Tunis , and I think he was correct, because it is an illusion to think that the Axis could have held NA by adopting a defensive strategy . For the Balkans, the German intervention was caused by the fear that there would be a British intervention while the main part of the WM was occupied in Russia . There were already British troops in Greece before Marita was launched . Hitler had tried to make peace between Greece and Italy ,but he failed . Besides Marita was already decided long before Barbarossa,which was planned without the Marita forces . Yugoslawia was an other thing , there was a British inspired coup d'état,which forced Hitler to commit Barbarossa forces . While I agree that the airborne myth is only a myth, the point remains that for Hitler the British presence on Crete was a danger for the oilfields of Romania,and that tha attack on Crete was justified .

About the commitment of the 15th Army in Tunesia : there were no 250000 Germans lost in Tunesia, but only some 85000 (LW and KM personnel not included) who belonged to 15th Army and to the AK . And their commitment delayed the end of the war in NA till may 1943 .

 

There were other options; what you paint is a false dichotomy.

1) Seek peace with greater fervour.
2) Invade Britain
3) Conquer North Africa

But Hitler and the WM was full of hubris after the destruction of France, and actually believed they had a chance vs the USSR. They also understood, that with regards to Soviet industrial expansion, that time was not on their side, if they were to deal with the Soviet threat. It was never just the continued belligerence of Great Britain that caused Hitler to turn East. That was a convenient excuse. Had Britain thrown in the towel upon the collapse of France, Germany would still have invaded the USSR.

Thus it cannot be said that Germany was "forced" into a two front war. Germany lept gleefully into it.

 

It is very unlikely that the Germans would have attacked the SU in 1941 if Britain had surrendered in 1940 .On 14 june 1940 orders were given to demobilize 39 divisions and to bring the army gradually back on peace strength .

 

Except those divisions were mostly Landswehr, filled with older men, with obsolescent equipment, or former fortress divisions, with little mobility, and even fewer records. Basically, it was a public relations exercise. Internal, and external.

 

I see your comprehension is as problematic as ever. I pointed out that your standard of impartiality is skewed - I said exactly ZERO about whether or not Ruge could be impartial. Your methodology is rather than analyzing impartiality based upon what the person says, it is by where the person works. In a similar vein I can say you cannot be impartial because you post here and at AHF. It is the self-licking ice cream cone of logical argumentation.

Or, I could point out you cannot be correct about anything, since you were incorrect about Ruge's position and authority. Same logic and reasoning you use for evaluation.

 

[SIZE=12pt]The supposed demobilization of the Heer at the end of the French Campaign is a long-standing story, but is badly misunderstood. What was the actual effect of the “demobilization”?[/SIZE]

[SIZE=12pt]Panzer Divisions. There were ten in existence at the beginning of the French Campaign. Then, between the end of the French campaign and the opening of the spring campaigns in the Balkan’s, ten more (11 if you count 5. Leichte Panzer) new divisions were formed.[/SIZE]

[SIZE=12pt]11. Panzer-Division on 1 August 1940 from 11. Schuetzen-Brigade and Panzer-Regiment 15.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]12. Panzer-Division on 10 January 1941 from the reorganized 2. Infanterie-Division (mot.).[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]13. Panzer-Division on 9 October 1940 from the reorganized 13. Infanterie-Division (mot.).[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]14. Panzer-Division on 15 August 1940 from the 4. Infanterie-Division.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]15. Panzer-Division on 11 November 1940 from the 33. Infanterie-Division.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]16. Panzer-Division on 2 August 1940 from the 16. Infanterie-Division.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]17. Panzer-Division on 1 November 1940 from the 27. Infanterie-Division.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]18. Panzer-Division on 15 October 1940 in Wehrkreis IV, partly from the specialized Tauchpanzer developed for and equipping Panzer-Regiment 18.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]19. Panzer-Division on 1 November 1940 from the 19. Infanterie-Division.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]20. Panzer-Division on 1 November 1940, also from elements of the 19. Infanterie-Division.[/SIZE]

[SIZE=12pt]So, the Heer lost two Infanterie-Divisionen (mot.) and five Infanterie-Divisionen, but gained ten Panzer-Divisionen. Thus the net increase was three.[/SIZE]

[SIZE=12pt]Motorized Infantry Divisions. Two of the existing four Infanterie-Divisionen (mot.) converted to Panzer-Divisionen after the end of the French Campaign. Seven more were created by motorizing existing Infanterie-Divisionen, so there was no net increase or decrease in the overall size of the Heer.[/SIZE]

[SIZE=12pt]3. Infanterie-Division (mot.) in fall 1940 from the reorganized 3. Infanterie-Division.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]10. Infanterie-Division (mot.) on 1 November 1940 from the reorganized 10. Infanterie-Division.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]14. Infanterie-Division (mot.) on 1 November 1940 from the reorganized 14. Infanterie-Division.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]16. Infanterie-Division (mot.) on 2 August 1940 from the reorganized 16. Infanterie-Division.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]18. Infanterie-Division (mot.) on 1 November 1940 from the reorganized 18. Infanterie-Division.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]25. Infanterie-Division (mot.) on 1 November 1940 from the reorganized 25. Infanterie-Division.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]36. Infanterie-Division (mot.) on 1 November 1940 from the reorganized 36. Infanterie-Division.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]60. Infanterie-Division (mot.) on 17 July 1940 from the reorganized 60. Infanterie-Division.[/SIZE]

[SIZE=12pt]Mountain Divisions. The existing three divisions were reinforced by the creation of three more during 1940. All were active by the fall. Thus this represents a net increase of three divisions in the Heer, all during 1940.[/SIZE]

[SIZE=12pt]Light Divisions. Four new divisions were created, all after the end of the French Campaign. Thus this represents a net increase of four divisions in the Heer, all during 1940.[/SIZE]

[SIZE=12pt]97. leichte Infanterie-Division was formed on 10 December 1940.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]99. leichte Infanterie-Division was formed on 10 December 1940.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]100. leichte Infanterie-Division was formed on 10 December 1940.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]101. leichte Infanterie-Division was formed on 10 December 1940.[/SIZE]

[SIZE=12pt]Infantry Divisions. Before the beginning of the French Campaign, ten new divisions were created (290., 291., 292., 293., 294., 295., 296., 297., 298., and 299. Infanterie-Divisionen). All were formed in January-February 1940 and were barely operationally ready by 10 May 1940. In addition. a total of 34 Infanterie-Divisionen, mostly of the 11.-14. Welle, were formed after the close of the French Campaign.[/SIZE]

[SIZE=12pt]102. Infanterie-Division was formed 10 December 1940.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]106. Infanterie-Division was formed on 10 December 1940.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]110. Infanterie-Division was formed on 10 December 1940.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]111. Infanterie-Division was formed on 5 November 1940.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]112. Infanterie-Division was formed on 10 December 1940.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]113. Infanterie-Division was formed on 10 December 1940.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]121 Infanterie-Division was formed on 6 October 1940.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]122. Infanterie-Division was formed on 2 October 1940.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]123. Infanterie-Division was formed on 10 October 1940.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]125. Infanterie-Division was formed on 2 October 1940.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]126. Infanterie-Division was formed on 23 September 1940.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]129. Infanterie-Division was formed on 22 October 1940.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]131. Infanterie-Division was formed on 17 September 1940.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]132. Infanterie-Division was formed on 5 October 1940.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]134. Infanterie-Division was formed on 5 October 1940.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]137. Infanterie-Division was formed on 5 October 1940.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]199. Infanterie-Division was formed on 1 November 1940 in Norway from existing elements of other divisions in garrison there.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]302. Infanterie-Division was formed on 15 November 1940.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]304. Infanterie-Division was formed on 15 November 1940.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]305 Infanterie-Division was formed on 15 December 1940.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]306. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 November 1940.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]319. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 November 1940.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]320. Infanterie-Division was formed 18 November 1940.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]321. Infanterie-Division was formed 2 December 1940.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]323. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 November 1940.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]327. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 November 1940.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]332. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 November 1940.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]333. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 November 1940.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]335. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 November 1940.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]336. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 December 1940.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]337. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 November 1940.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]339. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 December 1940.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]340. Infanterie-Division was formed 16 November 1940.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]342. Infanterie-Division was formed 21 October 1940.[/SIZE]

[SIZE=12pt]This completed the mobilization through the 14. Welle.[/SIZE]

[SIZE=12pt]The “disbanded” infantry divisions. Some 19 or 20 divisions are usually said to have been “disbanded" after the end of the French Campaign. Of those, four were Landwehr divisions (209., 228., 331., and 358. Infanterie-Division). In common with the other Landwehr divisions (205., 206., 208., 211., 212., 213., 214., 215., 216., 217., 218., 221., 223., 225., 227., and 228., which were not demobilized) they were mainly composed of older and often married men, some of the more senior of them Great War veterans. Their mobilization probably had had an adverse effect upon the Reichs economy as a whole. The equipment of the divisions was often obsolescent.[/SIZE]

[SIZE=12pt]Six other divisions, also most of them Landwehr, were converted to field commands occupying conquered territories. These included:[/SIZE]

[SIZE=12pt]365. Infanterie-Division, reorganized as Oberfeldkommandantur 365.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]372. Infanterie-Division, reorganized as Oberfeldkommandantur 372.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]379. Infanterie-Division, reorganized as Oberfeldkommandantur 379.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]393. Infanterie-Division, reorganized as Oberfeldkommandantur 393.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]395. Infanterie-Division, reorganized as Oberfeldkommandantur 395.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt]399. Infanterie-Division, reorganized as Oberfeldkommandantur 399.[/SIZE]

[SIZE=12pt]Finally, 15 Infanterie-Divisionen (271., 272., 273., 276., 277, 307., 310., 311., 317., 341., 351, 380., 555., 556., and 557.) were all supposedly formed shortly before, and disbanded shortly after, the French Campaign. Some of these (555., 556., and 557.) were created in February 1940 by the renaming of Fortress divisions (Stellungs-Divisionen) as Infantry divisions, which did little to increase either their mobility or their combat readiness (556. Infanterie-Division was formed on 11 February 1940 from Divisions-Kommando z.b.V. 426 and Landsesschuetzen Batallion II/XVII). However, many left little or nothing in the way of records behind and it is unclear how far along their organization was before they were disbanded. It is also unclear if the personnel that had been mustered for these divisions were in fact discharged or were incorporated into the other divisions whose formation was completed. It is curious that all three of the former Stellungs-Divisionen were disbanded as of 1 October 1940, just as the first of the 11. Welle divisions began activating.[/SIZE]

[SIZE=12pt]Thus, the Heer created approximately 69 new divisions in the Feld-Heer by the end of 1940. In the same period 19 divisions were disbanded, for a net increase of 50 divisions.[/SIZE]

[SIZE=12pt]There was no order or intent to "bring the army gradually back on peace strength".[/SIZE]

 

As I said; an exercise in PR, for internal and external consumption.

 

Oh yes ,there was such an order, as is mentionned by Klink in Germany and WWII (German Edition ) Part 4, pages 260 and following . That this order was later cancelled changes nothing on the subject . The order was already given by Hitler on 28 may 1940 and the final stage would be an army of 66/76 divisions .The order was repeated on 15 and 30 june.

On 30 june the order was given to disband 35 divisions :

5th and 6th Welle + the Landes schützendivisionen total : 18

4 Stellungsdivisionen and 13 divisions of the 3th Welle .

On 13 july, Hitler decided to disband only 17 divisions, because the situation was changing .

 

Or, I could point out you cannot be correct about anything, since you were incorrect about Ruge's position and authority. Same logic and reasoning you use for evaluation.
[/quote]

You don't get the point : that Krancke was the official KM commander in the West, does not exclude the possibility that Ruge was de facto commanding,a title does not mean anything : in WWI the Crownprinz was commander of the 5th Army, but it was a public secret that the real commander was his chief of staff von der Schulenburg. There are countless such exemples in the armed forces, administrations and the private business of all counties .

Whatever,the fact remains that Ruge was not the man Ohne Gewehr was presenting : during the war he was almost insignifiant, after the war he belonged to the liars of the Historical Division , whose motto was : Jobs for the boys , and finally he got what he wanted :the post of IG of the KM .Ohne Gewehr was wrong to present him as an authority .