What if Japan never went into China?

I know this is a little far-fetched here, but what if Japan never entered China in 1937. They maintain Manchuria, but do not advance further. Please, for the sake of this thread, throw China out the window.

However, the Japanese still have belligerent intentions, and the US embargoes them after taking Thailand and French Indochina, so relations are deteriorating anyway. The final straw is the Japanese demanding Hong Kong, Guam, and the Sakhalin Islands. With all negative responses, Japan goes to war anyway. How would they fare without having to deal with China? For purposes of speculation we can include the years of buildup from 1937-1941.

 

This is interesting. I have read that the japanese Chiefs of Staff looked VERY closely at having a go at (invading) Australia in 1942, but they decided that they could not spare the required troops from China.

Take China out of the equation and......


John.

 

This "what-if" doesn't make much sense; China was the most logical route for Japan to travel if it wanted to pursue aggressive territorial expansion through military aggression. Indochina would have been very difficult to occupy if most of China had not already been occupied. The occupation of Indochina was what triggered US and British concern because it was Japan's occupation of Southern IndoChina that signalled readiness to attack US, British, and Dutch possessions in Asia and the western Pacific.

In any case, it wasn't lack of manpower that defeated Japan; the country still had millions of troops under arms at the end of the war, and was able to raise dozens of new divisions for the defense of the Home Islands in 1945. What defeated Japan was a lack of a robust economy, lack of a strong industrial base, lack of sufficient merchant shipping, lack of logistical expertise and planning, failure to make the best use of what it had, and a failure to understand the resourcefulness and determination of it's adversaries.

OzJohn mentioned the IJA's decision not to invade Australia. The Japanese Army used it's involvement in China as an excuse, but it's likely the decision would probably have been the same had Japan not been engaged in China; the IJA saw no advantage to invading Australia and some real problems such as logistics and aircover, neither of which could be traced to involvement in China. Furthermore, the IJA realized it would be dependent on the IJN in any operations against Australia to a much greater extent than in operations almost anywhere else in Asia and that was anathema to the Japanese Army.

Ecluding China from Japanese occupation doesn't really change the outcome of the Pacific War because Japan would still have it's fundamental weaknesses, and would still lose in the long run. In fact, it might create yet more problems for the Japanese because Japan viewed China a s a great rival and danger. Japan would be required to keep a great many troops and other combat units on guard against Chinese intervention in the war, just as it kept the Manchurian Army on guard against Soviet intervention.

 

This is an extention of an old theory of mine.

IF japan had NOT taken on the USA at PH, Guam and the Philipine Islands, and simply have headed south to the oil fields and rubber plantations etc, and skirting all American interests it is my view that it would have been all over before the USA finally decided to join the party, if ever.


John.

 

I think that is wrong.

Obviously, the Japanese never believed it either, and probably believed that it was impossible to move South without compromising vital American interests.

In April, 1941, a British/ Dutch/ American conference of military Chief's of Staff developed plans for joint military action should Japanese forces attack any of the participating nation's interests in the Pacific. (see; AMERICAN-DUTCH-BRITISH CONVERSATIONS) In August, 1941, the Roosevelt administration publicly pledged a joint defense against any further aggression in the Pacific. Japan was also privately warned, after the occupation of southern IndoChina, that in the event of any further Japanese aggression in the Pacific, the US would use any and all means to oppose it. The Japanese, correctly, interpreted this as a warning of military action.

In any case, the US had already begun taking steps which Roosevelt and his military advisers realized virtually assured that Japan had to attack the Philippines in order to safeguard it's lines of supply to the Southern Resources Area. The idea that the US would have tolerated a Japanese attack on territories in the Southwest Pacific without a declaration of war does not survive serious scrutiny of historical developments in 1940-41.

 

That can be gotten around by some sort of economic arraignement that makes in unecessary to actually invade. The motivation for attacking China was to control Chinas trade. If that derived from some other mechanism than war in 1937 then...

The downside is the Japanese Army, Army Air Force, and Naval Air Force have no combat experince from four years in China. That combat experince had a lot to do with the extreme skill of Japans pilots in the early months of the war. No war experince and they are little better than the British or US pilots. Ditto for the commanders and their staffs in planning and executing air operations.

Thats hitting the nail on the head. The economics, particularly the inadaquate cargo fleet, prevents the army and navy from accomplishing anything more than they did in the Pacific. Japan started 1942 with less than 600,000 tons displacement of tanker ships, and just under six million tons displacement of cargo ships. In 1940 the Japanese flagged cargo fleet was roughly 40% of that required to clear all imports and exports across Japans docks. Forigen flagged ships made up the difference. Thus Japan lacked the cargo ships to even sustain its economy let alone spare those needed for far ranging military operations.

 

I belive part of this was to mount aggresive reconissance patrols out of the Phillipines and imeadiatly report all observed IJN ships to the Britsh and Dutch. The communications channels were being tested and information already shared in October/November 1941. Another trick contemplated was to declare a "Nuetrality Zone" similar to that already established in the Atlantic, around the Phillipines. A radius of 450 nautcal miles from Manilia would crowd Japanese ships right up against Chinas coast making it impossible to navigate the South China Sea. Several attacks on Japanese ships violating the Nuetrality Zone around PI and the other US possesions would have done the trick. A few days before Japans attack British Adm. Phillips met in Manilia with his US counterpart there for a exchange of last minute plans and techincal details on these and other measures.

 

Resources in china would be depleted for the Axis and Pearl Harbor wouldn't have been as strong as it was

 

Care to elaborate on why you think so?

 

I think that the only thing not going into China would have accomplished was the huge number of troops still there when the war ended would have been funneled home to defend against the impending US invasion of the home islands. The Japanese ability to produce and maintain the economics for war was over by '43, and it doesn't matter if you have a million man army if you can't get them where the fighting is, and they have to throw rocks. China had very little to do with the outcome of war, aside from being a manpower suck.

 

That makes some sense if you assume the IJN accumulates no combat experince without four years of operations over China.

 

My understanding was that Japanese forces going into Indochina either came amphibiously from Hainan island, or overland from Guanxi, and that Hainan and Guanxi had both been taken by amphibious landing. If that is correct, then it doesn't seem too far-fetched to contemplate a scenario where China is left unmolested and non-belligerent, and instead a major landing is made (from Taiwan?) in IndoChina. How far could the IJN project amphibious forces? If Hainan was e.g. taken by forces staged through Canton then Indochina is probably too far. If they could reach Hainan without jumping-off the mainland then Indochina might be possible.

Most certainly. However all these flaws were exacerbated by having to equip and support the forces wallowing in the morass of China. Partially offset by loot and resources seized, as well as experience gained, but still a net loss for the Japanese war economy in my opinion.

My impression was that given the choice, the KMT would have preferred to concentrate on fighting the communists and warlords, and not gone after the Japanese for a good few years. Similarly Stalin also had other fish to fry in the Baltic region. If that was the case, the Manchuko army probably didn't face very serious threats on either front unless they went looking for trouble.

However I agree with you that this "what-if" doesn't make much sense. One of the main reasons Japan went to war was because the western powers opposed its attempts to grab China for itself, and were backing china with loans, arms, and embargoes.
If Japan leaves china alone (thereby leaving the 'open door' the US so wanted) and contents itself with picking up as 'protectorates' the french/dutch colonies, it seems unlikely the US would be so opposed that a war would start. The UK is in no position to go looking for trouble.
Indochina and the East Indies together with Manchuko would give Japan pretty much everything they need for the foreseeable future, so why go poking the hornet nests by demanding Guam, HK and Sakhalin?

 

Oh, they could have gotten the troops to Indochina, no doubt, though it would have been more difficult than just bringing them in from adjacent areas of China (Hainan and Guanxi). But the reason Northern Indochina was occupied was primarily to provide air bases for Japanese air units and threaten the overland supply routes from Burma. And that would have made it very difficult to maintain their own supply routes if the rest of China had not been mostly already occupied. Then there is the political justification; Japan used it's involvement in China s justification for what was, essentially, and act of war against a European power. That soemwaht softened the international psychological reaction against Japan.

The main disadvantage Japan incurred in invading China was a drain on manpower. The economic drain was there, of course, and the need for greatly increased petroleum consumption, but the Japanese Army in China largely subsisted on local resources. Compared to Japan's lack of a developed infrastructure, a robust economy, modern industrial methodology, an adequate merchant fleet, and lack of planning and coordination skills, it's entanglement in China was a minor annoyance.

It wasn't a simple "either/or" choice. The KMT's campaign against various warlords, for example, embroiled it in conflict with Japan because Japan was hedging it's bets by supporting certain warlords other than Chaing. We also tend to forget that Manchuria was a nominal part of China and Japan was already occupying Manchuria; this caused quite a bit of conflict between the KMT and Japan. Assuming that Japan had stayed out of China (including Manchuria), Chaing might well have succeeded in unifying most of China under the Nationalists flag, and without the debilitating burden of corruption that developed atendant to US lend-lease aid.

That would have created an entirely new dynamic in the region, especially with regard to the Soviets, who initially backed the KMT. It's not beyond the realm of possibility that Chaing and a unified China could have largely solved it's political/economic/military problems and become at least a regional power rivaling Japan. Allied with the Soviets, and with the support of the US, this would have presented immense problems to Japanese expansion, especially if it continued to be driven by the Japanese military. It's impossible to speculate about detailed situations in this scenario, but clearly traditional Japanese interests would have been seriously threatened.

Guam, Honk Kong, and even Sakhalin probably weren't that high in Japanese priorities in the mid- to late 1930's. Nor would the need to secure additional petroleum resources be so pressing if Japan were not engaged in a war with China. So, it's questionable whether Japan would risk a war with European powers or the US over the NEI. It's more likely the Japanese Army would continue it's border disputes with the Soviets. But, it's almost certain the US would not tolerate Japanese arned aggression against either British or Dutch possessions in the Pacific since, presumeably Japan was still a member f the Axis and the US was supporting those two countries in their fight against the Axis. I don't accept for a moment that war could be avoided by Japan simply because it forebore to attack China; if it otherwise continued it's aggressive expansionist policies and associated itself with the Axis, the US and Japan would eventually clash.

 

I think there was also an element of cutting supplies from Hanoi and other ports to China. But you're certainly right that without the war in China, the logic of occupying Indochina is even less compelling.

Manchuria/Manchuko would definitely have brought Japan and China to blows again sooner or later, as would the development of a strong chinese nation able to assert itself. However my interpretation of events is that foreign support of China was mainly to check Japan, and (for the west) maintain economic access to China. The prospect of a China capable of rivalling Japan probably wouldn't have been at all welcome to those nations who had taken the chance to carve out territory and privileges over the last century. Definitely a huge challenge for Japan, but everyone else would also want to meddle and god knows how it would have played out. However, given the degree of lunacy in the Japanese high command I think it's safe to say it would have gone badly for Japan.

Indeed. The problem with the scenario is that it's just too big a departure, akin to asking "How would ww2 have played out if Hitler had stopped after getting the Sudetenland?". No Czech/Polish invasion means no ww2 as we know it, but probably a different european (possilby world) war at some later date for different reasons. The rivalries and the potential for conflict are still there, but the proximate causes start to evaporate, not least because the hypothetical could never arise without a totally different (and more rational) bunch of people in charge.

It's remotely conceivable that the US might have allowed Japan to nab the NEI and no more, provided it didn't interfere with US assets there, if it was perceived as turning Japanese expansion away from the Pacific and US areas of interests. But the prospect of a bunch of European empires on deathwatch being turned into an expanding asian empire would definitely have raised hackles in washington. However it's hard to know how fast that could have been turned into support on Main street for kicking off a war with one bunch of funny-eyed foreigners over who rules another bunch of funny-eyed foreigners. It might have bought a few years for Japan, maybe. At the end of the day Japan had the same problem as the UK - a small clapped-out island with outsize ambitions just couldn't hack it as a superpower when entities like the US and USSR were in the game, and sooner or later would learn the hard way.

 

Absolutely. The French port of Hanoi was certainly part of the reason the Japanese wanted to occupy northern Indochina in 1940. I'm not sure how much material was flowing through Hanoi to Chaing's forces, but the Japanese certainly perceived it as an important port.

Well, I have to say your analysis has a great deal of merit. The only reason Chaing didn't put up more resistance to Japanese occupation of Manchuria was that he had not yet consolidated enough power against the rival warlords. So, yes, Manchuria definitely would have become a bone of contention between Nationalist China and Japan.

I also agree with your take on the European reaction to a resurgent China with one very important exception; the United States. The US, and especially the Roosevelt administration, wanted (rather irrationally) to see a strong and economically successful modernized China. Part of this was to enable China to successfully oppose Japanese aggression, but another motive was that the US leadership really believed that a strong and independent China would stabilize Asia and initiate a new age of economic prosperity (and trade with the US) in the area. This was a rather naive reading of the Chaing regime which actually was more authoritarian and fascistic than Roosevelt realized. But the US nevertheless wanted to see China as at least an economic power in Asia, not just a milk cow for European imperialism.

Yes, I quite agree. The scenario eliminates the basic motivations that drove interaction in Asia during the first half off the twentieth century. The logical dynamic is changed in so many ways that it's entirely impossible to predict various reactions to potential events.

Excellent analysis.

Although I'm not sure I agree that Japan wold be able to seize the NEI without arousing the ire of the US. There is that "remote possibility", but I think the US must act, or lose any pretense of leadership in the Pacific. I think it would be akin to Iraq seizing Kuwait; no matter how apathetic the US population, I'm confident Roosevelt would find some way of involving the US. In this scenario, the US still holds the Philippines and the US could use that strategic position to cut off the trade routes between Japan and the NEI thus provoking war between Japan and the US.

I definitely agree that Japan was playing well out of it's league and that it was only a matter of time before it's ego got it into an impossible situation with one or more of the real super-powers.

 

If the stars were to align in such a way as to have Japan voluntarily stop bullying China, then we are in the realms of remote possibilities indeed

Not sure how a Phillipine 'neutrality zone' would work in practice. Presumably it would need to extend into Chinese territorial waters to be 100% effective, which might be a bit complicated legally, also the eastern route would still be open. However, it's usually a lot easier to start trouble than to stop it, and where there's a will there's a way. Perhaps the Paracel or Spratly islands might become of pressing interest, or a "Celebes Sea Incident" might occur, but sooner or later it would kick off, for sure..

 

Very true. It would be almost impossible to predict either Japan's or the United States' actions or reactions in such a world.

Roosevelt wasn't one to shy away from complicated actions, or policies of questionable legality when it came to provoking the Axis. And I'm presuming Japan still joins the Axis in this scenario. Roosevelt did resort to dangling bait in front of the Japanese hoping to encourage an "incident" in the days immediately prior to the outbreak of the Pacific war, but that little ploy was overtaken by unforeseen events further east. No doubt a Japanese seizure of the NEI would certainly make life tougher for Roosevelt in the absence of any hostile moves by Japan towards US territory or interests in the Far East, but there would be a multitude of issues involving American interests in any forcible seizure of territory in the Southwest Pacific. Japan would have to lean over backwards to avoid offending those interests and that was not particularly Japan's forte in that period.

I agree, however, that war between Japan and the US was almost inevitable given Japan's association with the Axis and it's infatuation with military aggression in Asia and the Pacific; it was just a matter of time.

 

Very true. It would be almost impossible to predict either Japan's or the United States' actions or reactions in such a world.

Roosevelt wasn't one to shy away from complicated actions, or policies of questionable legality when it came to provoking the Axis. And I'm presuming Japan still joins the Axis in this scenario. Roosevelt did resort to dangling bait in front of the Japanese hoping to encourage an "incident" in the days immediately prior to the outbreak of the Pacific war, but that little ploy was overtaken by unforeseen events further east. No doubt a Japanese seizure of the NEI would certainly make life tougher for Roosevelt in the absence of any hostile moves by Japan towards US territory or interests in the Far East, but there would be a multitude of issues involving American interests in any forcible seizure of territory in the Southwest Pacific. Japan would have to lean over backwards to avoid offending those interests and that was not particularly Japan's forte in that period.

I agree, however, that war between Japan and the US was almost inevitable given Japan's association with the Axis and it's infatuation with military aggression in Asia and the Pacific; it was just a matter of time.