What if the Germans had their WW1 surface fleet still?

Well that it is the beauty of the interpretation, when i read that section i read it as that Treaty of Versailles and The Washington Naval Treaty did come into fruition, and that because of this German did not face any Naval restriction in what she could have, this on the other hand goes both ways, that i mean that the rest of the world is not restricted either.

I would say that if we include the World stock market crash and the great depression i seriously believe that Germany would not be in a position to retain such a massive fleet, Germany would certainly have dramatically either scrapped or sold off her fleet, i chose the former.

Also as i have previously said i ain't no expert, i don't have a degree in Maritime Naval Engineering, i am just an ordinary schlepp that responded to a question with the limited knoweledge that i have, i did not expect to openly slammed for my lack of knoweledge, how many times must i say this, i was however shocked at T.A Gardners attack that i either have a degree or at least extensive knoweledge on Maritime Naval Engineering to qualify me to participate in this discussion, if this was the case this restriction almost assures that apart from T.A Gardner and Za Rodinu are the onle folk that qualifies to participate on this thread.

It must be nice to be in your position to say anything you want to anyone with absolute sanction from an administrator.

 

Where did I say this?! My only statement was:

A degree isn't. But, when one puts up a hypothesis or position, particularly one calling for something far from historical norms, it is usual for them to support their position with some details. Hence, my question about the conversion of battleships to heavy cruisers you mentioned. Simply saying so-and-so did / does this isn't generally acceptable on its own.
Also, both of my questions addressed to your earlier response were for additional details of this sort.

What I expected was simply some details on your comments, particularly on how to make a heavy cruiser from a battleship. They didn't have to be highly technical just something in general. But, you chose instead to become annoyed with my asking and refuse comment. That's too bad.

Note, the three opening words; well, four if you count the contraction.... I would also state categorically, I have been nothing if not polite in every one of my answers in this thread.

 

You, of course, are entitled to interpret the question as you see fit, However, since the WNT occurred a full five years after the end of WW I and actually had nothing to do with the demise of the HSF, I would think you would make the basis of your interpretation clear by noting that your proposal would only be operative if the WNT never was concluded. On the other hand, such a position would logically require some discussion of the situations of the other major navies of the world as the German Navy (not to mention economy) would certainly be affected by the myriad of naval, economic and political counter factual events which would accrue from such a situation.

Frankly, had the WNT been specifically excluded by the question, I would never have commented because such an exclusion would introduce so many ahistorical variables as to make any rational discussion impossible.

You weren't "slammed" for your lack of knowledge; your conclusions were disagreed with, there's a big difference. I do not have a degree in naval architecture either, and quite frankly, I have little understanding of the finer technical points of naval design, but I have taken the time to study books on warship design such as Norman Friedman's excellent volumes on US warship design history, and M. J. Whitley's WW II Warship volumes. From these books I have learned that, while it physically might be possible, it doesn't make any practical sense to try to turn battleships into heavy cruisers, or convert warships with recprocating engines to turbine propulsions systems.

So when people who have studied the question disagree with you and explain the reasons, it's not because they are personally hostile to you, it's because they know what you are proposing isn't practical. Look at it as a relatively inexpensive education.

 

T.A Gardner, my appologies, my absolute pig headedness is getting me out of kilter, i construded that you wanted fine details on the conversion process, this has thrown me, i understand now what you asked, what i'll try and do is to come up with a simple explanation.

So here is my explanation on conversion if it is technically feasable, please feel free to critise my explanation.

First as regards to the Nassau/Helgoland/Friedrich der Gropfe class ships between interwar years that each ship is to be brought in for complete modification to modern standards, this includes.

Removal of all superstructure and decking, removal of all motive requirments, reconfigure the internal structures as regards to eventual fitting of oil fired or diesel turbines, then replace decking and refit the superstructure, i know this sounds so simple but it is as far as i know with my limited knoweledge is the best i can come up with.

I would love to read on how this could have been done, i should have asked you from the outset on how this could have been done if it could have been done, it is my fault this became a stupid argument.

v.R

 

I have now finished Siegfried Breyer, " Schlactshiffe", "Die Zeit swischen den beiden Weltkriegen" in german.

I can find nothing that contradicts Jak P. Mallmann Showell's statement in his book "The German Navy in WWII", Naval Institute Press, page 12, first column:

Quote:
"In Germany, people became quite happy about these developments when they saw the possibility of sidestepping the peace treaty in favor of the Washington Treaty.
By this ploy, German ship sizes could be increased up to 15% without changing tonnage numbers."

I will agree with Mallmann Showell until otherwise is documented.

Regards
RAM

 

Neither will you find any comment that supports such a statement. Breyer clearly makes the case that the Deutschland class cruisers were designed under the rules set forth in the Versailles Treaty which specified the allowable displacements in tonnes and under normal load conditions. The Germans simply cheated on the design of the ships. Such cheating was probably the result of inexperience in design and measurement of large ships.

Since you have finally seen fit to cite some support for your theory, would you mind citing the primary source Showell relies upon for his bizarre conclusions? Also, if the Germans felt they could legally use the WNT measurement standards, how does Showell account for the fact that the Deutschland class cruisers would also be illegal under WNT measurement standards?

 

If the Germans had their surface fleet post WWI it could have been extremely useful. Not likely to have been but could have. Consider this option. First they sell off all or almost all of it. This should give them a pretty good stash of cash. The then use it to pay off reparations and/or build up their economy. Net result is that they don't suffer nearly as much in the depression. This leads to the Nazis never coming to power and a peaceful prosperous Germany in the 40's. Not only do they come off better so does most of the rest of Europe.

 

The reparations owed by Germany under the Versailles Treaty amounted to $33 billion, although they never paid more than about $4.5 billion before the debt was forgiven.

Assuming the HSF continued to exist after WW I, Germany would have been able to realize from the sale of the entire fleet, only a small fraction of the amount they eventually did pay in reparations. The German Navy ships were not in good shape at the end of the war owing to the long inactive period they had spent after the Battle of Jutland, without much maintenance being performed. In addition, many of the ships were old and of an outdated design and would of been of interest only to very small third world countries who wouldn't have been able to pay much for them. Also, the other major navies of the world also had older WW I era ships which they were trying to unload so they could build some newer designs; most of these vessels ended up being sold for scrap value. The whole HSF in, say 1920, wouldn't have been worth more than around $50-60 million dollars. Certainly not enough to materially improve Germany's economic situation.

 

Well if they kept the fleet the war would have had to end a bit differently. Reparations would have been less or perhaps non existent. There was a building spree for a short while after the end of WWI and the German ships had a decent reputation. Certainly they wouldn't have gotten a huge amount for them but then the Nazi take over was a close thing. I'm reading The Wages of Destruction right now and the impact of the reparations was considerable anything that would have reduced or eliminated them could have made a big difference. Even scrapping them might have been a worthwhile exercise.

 

There is no complicity on this matter at all with any Moderator towards me. You are not aware of the warning PMs I sometimes get.

What this

means is that you come here with an inane argument and then are surprised that nobody with better reading on the subject will support your view. If the what-if has no legs and people bring this to light who can you blame beside yourself if you can't build and present a proper argument, only might-have-beens? Anything can be a might-have-been in the Twilight Zone.

Oh, and

would make Friedrich II somewhat annoyed, as the proper transliteration for Friedrich der Große is Friedrich der Grosse, not Gropfe which as a word does not exist in the German vocabulary.

German for Beginners: Das Abc - The German Alphabet

But this thread is too interesting for sidenotes of this kind.

 

I certainly agree that Germany would have been better off getting rid of any fleet left over from WW I, even if it meant scrapping or simply scuttling them. The major economic benefit, however, would not have been any revenue realized from the sale of the vessels, but the money saved by not having to maintain them and their crews; this amounted to a considerable sum even in those days. No political or economic advantages accrued to Germany by virtue of maintaining a large navy.

I think Hitler probably would have achieved power in Germany regardless of the economic conditions in Germany in the 1920's. The economic situation did give Hitler an excuse to blame the Jews and the communists, but the psychological issues were more important. Don't forget that in the 1920's and 1930's, fascism and communism flourished in almost all developed countries whether they collected, or paid, reparations from WW I.

One thing that hasn't been mentioned is that the HSF was a major center of communist activity among the enlisted crews in the later years of the war, and would have continued to be a communist power base if the crews had not been dispersed immediately after the war. This alone would have been a divisive factor that would have led the German government to dispose of the fleet as quickly as possible.

 

Mallmann Showell doesn't name his source, but if you look at the acknowledgments you will find following persons that have directly contributed to the book:

Ing. Franz Albert
Rudolf Bahr
Patrick Beesley, Royal Navy
Henry Birkenhagen
Wilhelm Brauel
Bundesarchiv Koblenz by Dr. Haupt and his staff
Buchhändler Vereingung by Waltraut Schütte
Michael Cooper
Kpt.z.Sa.D. Hans Dehnert.
Roel Diepveen
J.F. van Dulm, Royal Netherlands Navy
Trevor Dart
Admiral Kurt Freiwald
Professor Ulrich Gabler
Kpt.z.S.a.D. Helmuth Giessler
Kontréadmiral Eberhart Godt
Kpt.z.S.a.D. Rolf Güth
Korvettenkapitän a.D Jan Hansen-Nootbaar
Flotillenadmiral a.D. Otto Kretschmer
David Lees
Heinrich Lehmann-Willenbrock
David Littlejohn
Kpt.z.S.a.D. Hans Meckel
Peter Nops
Commander F.C. van Osten, Royal Netherlands Navy.
Arthur Pitt, Royal Navy
Richard Reskey
Donald Ream
Kontréadmiral Hans Rösing
Professor Dr. Jürgen Rohwer
Daniel Rose
Helmuth Schmoeckel
Kpt.z.S.a.D Herbert Schulze
Flotillenadmiral Dr. Werner Schünemann
Franz Selinger
Mr. R.E. Squires
Tom Stafford
Hans Staus
Fredrick J. Stevens
Commander Craig Waller, Royal Navy
Captain J.J. Wichers, Royal Netherlands Navy
Garry York

If you have contributed with information to a book, you usually get a copy of the manuscript before it's published to check if the content is correct.
I doubt if the above mentioned gentlemen would have their names printed in a book bringing false information.

Regards
RAM

Oh, by the way, I almost forgot to mention the acknowledgments in Breyer's book: None, whatsoever. Not a single one...

 

In terms of real dollars you are almost certainly correct. However selling the fleet then using the money on say infrastructure would have sent a powerful message.

One of the points that Wages of Destruction makes is that the Nazi party was actually declining in power and membership when Hitler became chanceler. I haven't finished it or read much else on the topic but the impression I get is it wouldn't have taken much to change things at that point in time.

 

I partially agree with what you say, scuttling ships is a waste of resources, although several ships could be allocated as target ships or gunnery training vessels, the sale of essentially older obsolete ship would not be financially viable.

And if you include my point that the stock market crash of the late 1920's followed by the great depression of the 1930's would not make it financial sense for the Germans to keep a large navy.

The main problem is what to keep and what to get rid of, what would you do if you had the choice.

v.R

 

Get rid of it all. If done during the mini building boom before the naval conferences you might even get a pretty good return for them. There were quite a few BBs planned or under construction during that period. The major builders may even have bought some of them for scrap. German steel was high quality even then as I recall.

 

What I'm getting at, is how does Showell know the German designers relied on the standards in the WNT. Or is he just guessing? If he doesn't cite some original documentation that discusses the WNT as a standard for German designers, I'd have to conclude he is just guessing. As for Breyer he makes no attribution because he makes no such assertion.

As for the German designer's experience with larger ships, it was zero by the time the Deutschland class was designed. Even if they had been very experienced, it would not have been easy to keep track of the weight of a projected ship. As Friedman points out, even the extremely experienced British and American designers routinely over- or underestimated the displacements of projected designs by several hundreds of tons. With the inexperienced German designers the overweight condition of the Deutschland class could easily have been due to inexperience.

However, if as you say, the Germans were fully aware they were violating the treaty by building heavier ships, that validates my point that they were not trying to substitute the standards of the WNT for those of the Versailles Treaty; they knew they were simply cheating.

 

Yes, I suppose selling the fleet would have sent a "powerful message"; But buyers with bountiful cash in their pockets would have been hard to find and there needs to be someone around to read the message.

As for the inevitability of Hitlers ascension to power, that is one of the imponderables of history. It's impossible to tell what would have made a significant difference.

 

Well, yesterday I received the english copy of Breyer's "Battleships and Battle Cruisers 1905-1970"
At last we can speak the same language now, so to speak...

I bought a second hand copy, there were no new ones available.
It had a dust jacket covered and reinforced with plastic, and it appeared to be brand new. I'm very much impressed!
It was a signature inside which I couldn't read and the number -87.

I haven't had time read all of it yet, only the section dealing with the german ships.

On page 286, first column, Breyer states:
Quote:
"The requirements was now for a fast battleship which according to its characteristics would be more like a cruiser with heavy armament. This is how designs "I M 26" and "II M 26" were produced. Both were now based for the first time on clearly formulated and technically feasible military requirements.
In view of the fact that the prospects of getting away from the Versailles treaty and of being included in the WNT was slender, the best solution seemed to be building a ship which was always superior in one respect to the Washington types, ie superior to battleships in speed and superior to cruisers in heavy guns."

On page 288, first column, Breyer continues:
Quote:
"Outside Germany this type of ship was first not taken seriously and it was nicknamed "pocket battleship". This assessment soon gave way to a recognition of the value of these ships because as a result of diesel engine propulsion their radius was increased substantially.

Great progress in electric welding made during the post war years gave weight savings of about 15% on the hull alone compared with a conventional riveted hull.
This made it possible to fit armament which was surprisingly heavy compared with the size of the ship and the speed was raised to such a point that these ships was faster than all battleships at that time, apart from three battlecruisers of the British navy.
(The three or four japanese Kongo-class battle cruisers were not taken into account because Japan was no longer regarded as a potential enemy.)

At that time these German pocket battleships were indeed faster than any battleship and more powerful than any cruiser.
The decision in favor of the pocket battleship was above all a purely political consequense dictated by technical possibilities under the restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles."

This supports Mallmann Showell all the way, and shows that the germans used WNT as an excuse to increase the size of their ships.

The germans felt humiliated by the harsh terms of the Versailles treaty, and this fueled the political unrest that brought Hitler to power.

RAM