What if the Me-262 was created earlier?

First Mistake in your math 2% of 12 is .24 aircraft per day being lost in which the first 50 days of operations equals 12 lost Me-262, well then if by my handheld calculator is corect after 50 days of production we still have 588 Me-262's still operational, by the way if by your assertions that if even we double that to 4% becoming unviable, then can you answer me this that the loss rate of USAAF aircraft during it's European campaign was 5% that is 25% higher casualty rate that even you suggest, plus if yearly production for the Me-262 is 4,380 aircraft 2% loss would equate to 87.6 aircraft, which still leaves 4,292 Me-262s still fully operational. I can tell you the USAAF would be cut to ribbons if they were confronted with facing 4,292 oh and you stated that 20% of the available fleet of Me-262's needing engine changes per day that still leaves in my calculation in the order of 3,433 Me-262's left still active for day to day running.

Now onto fuel, this as i said would not be a a massive problem, as i have already have cancelled the Me-109 series thus the fuel that otherwise would have eventually have gone to those aircraft would be instead have found its way into the fuel tanks of the Me-262's, yes production of fuel would have gone up but not as much as having to fuel both the Me-262 and the Me-109 at the same time. You state that the aircraft would be basically a white elephant, Oh and finnish off one thing you stated that has me thinking as to your statement to the arming of the Me-262 with the Mark 108 30mm Cannon, if you had chosen to read this thread that is when the Me-262 began to go into production in mid 1942 thus the daily output for this aircraft is 24 per day, this is aleiviated with the cancelling of the Me-109 so that frees up allocation of the weapon, easy peasy.

Onto your second set of answers, simply why do you bother coming on a POD "what if" when you can't run with the spirit of the original post, throwing up statistics from the real world never allows you any flexibility whatsoever to attempt any "What If". At least i had a go at it.

 

.....Never teach a pig to sing. It wastes your time and annoys the pig......

Ok, let me go over this one more time. We are dealing with compound interest here not simple interest. The 2% operational loss rate is per day of operations. Therefore, if there are 600 Me 262 in service one can expect to lose 12 (.02 x 600) aircraft per day of operations. If production is 12, then the new aircraft offset the losses and you reach EQUALIBRIUM! Everyday....note that....everyday the 600 fly you lose 12 on average to be made up by new production.
Now, if we throw in combat losses on top of operational losses the number of available aircraft declines (losses exceed production now) until you once again reach a new EQUALIBRIUM at some lower number of aircraft in service.
This is why the Germans never had three or four thousand fighter aircraft in service at one time. They could not produce enough to reach that figure given operational and combat losses. Instead, they reached some equalibrium point at a lower level that could be maintained.
So, if there were somehow 4380 Me 262 in service and all somehow had pilots available, then yes, 87.6 per day (or the appropriate fraction thereof) could be expected to be operational losses with the number available falling until it reached EQUALIBRIUM with available production. The number lost is not 2% per month or 2% per year. It is 2% per day. Therefore the operational loss rate is 60% per month (.02 x 30 days/month) or 730% per year (if we assume they fly everyday).
Of course, this is not totally accurate but it does clearly illustrate the problem here. The Me 262 is never going to be available enmasse. Its operational loss rate and high degree of unreliability ensure that. So, there may be somewhat more than 600 operational and probably a good deal less servicable on any given day. But, there will never be thousands in service. The Germans cannot manufacture enough planes, fuel, or pilots to achieve this.

This same compound interest formulation works on the USAAF. Only there, they had far higher rates of production. For the B-24 this hit between 40 and 50 aircraft a day in 1944. Ford's Willow Run plant alone was making 24 B-24 per day and does not count Consolidated's plants, Goodyear's plants or several other manufacturers. Thus, the USAAF and RAF could maintain much larger air fleets than the Germans simply because they were vastly outproducing them.

And, yes, about 20% per day need engine changes. The problem is where do the engines come from? Even if Junkers stops making piston engines (unlikely as they would still be needed for some aircraft no doubt) their capacity is finite and much smaller than the US, Britain or Russia in this respect. As I pointed out, at just 600 aircraft operational Junkers needs an increase of 1500% over their historical capacity (300 per month historically or 300 x 15 = 4500 per month) to keep up with use not allowing for any other aircraft that may need this engine.

And fuel is a problem. First, J2 jet fuel is not A4 or B2 avgas. The manufacturers have to switch their production to a fuel used only in jets from one suitable for most piston engined vehicles (eg., 87 octane for example). Second, the Me 109 only requires a quarter of the fuel per sorte that an Me 262 does. That is it takes roughly a half metric ton instead of two metric tons of fuel. So, yes, the fuel problem is huge.

As for the Mk 108. In 1942 it was not being used in the Me 109 nor in the Fw 190. This gun appears in limited numbers in these aircraft starting in mid 1943 and continued to rise in numbers through 1944. Even then, many pilots prefered the 20mm MG 151 for its much higher velocity and flatter trajectory. On that note, there is a thread buried somewhere on this board about this particular problem too where I went over the velocity problem with Tony Williams, a published expert on aircraft weapons of the period.
What it shows is that the low velocity slug thrower (Mk 108) is a poor choice of weapon on a very fast aircraft due to its low hit probability caused by limited firing time, low number of rounds fired, and difficulty in making a successful pass at close range on a target.

As to the "spirit of the what-if," you originally posited:

What I have endevored to show here is:

1. The Germans could not have sustained a large number of Me 262 in action due to poor reliablity and lack of fuel.

2. That those they did have in service would have prodded the Allies to respond in kind and simply have meant that they too would have jets in service by 1943 that were as good or better than those of the Germans and, would have had them in larger numbers.

3. That in the interm, the Allies would have adopted different tactics to mitigate the effects of the Me 262 if it were too effective and could not be directly countered.

4. That the Me 262 was not a "wonder weapon" nor on its own a war winner. The Germans would still lose and likely about the same time as they did historically.

All the detail does is show that when deeply researched using even the most basic operational research techniques is how and why the Me 262 fails to change the war's outcome. I would be very hard pressed to think of a single weapon that did that (change the outcome of a campaign or the war) on its own merits. Not one.

 

Ok, you have given me some impressive numbers and i'll go along with what you have given me, but i'll ask you one question and that You have just been given the Me-262 and it is just gone into full production by say June 1942 by far alot earlier than in reality, how would you handle the situation, i would like to add one condition to this question you are German and how would you turn this aircraft into a war winning one.

Love to read your pro German senario.

 

Psst, Terry, it's really "equilibrium", not "equalibrium".

And you look cute when your'e angry

 

Say again, how do those figures compare to German heavy bomber production?

 

The Me 262 is not a war winner. I would simply introduce it once several units were worked up as another "better" fighter, primarily on the East front where it would dominate the Red Air Force with the Soviets being unable to counter it. The US daylight bomber campaign at that point (June 42) is negilible in its effect. Conventional fighters can easily deal with it for the time being.

If you want a scenario for dealing successfully with the Allied bomber offensive you need a paradigim shift in technology and tactics that completely unhinge the use of conventional bombing tactics forcing the Allies to completely shift their own technology and tactics to the point that they are literally starting over rather than just switching equipment.

For example two technology items that would do this in combination are the R4M rocket and the development of an operational SAM. If for example, the Germans built a SAM along the lines of the US Nike missile and deployed it in 1943 or 44 it would have literally made both British and US bomber tactics obsolete overnight.
A single Nike carried nearly 1000 lbs of explosive in three charges along its length. These were such that a tight bomber box like the US used would have lost several bombers to just one missile. There was no stopping it once successfully launched. Jamming might be possible but that would be more a continual game of cat and mouse than a flat out fix.
Night would likewise make no difference so the biggest British advantage is taken away.
The R4M also shifts the technology and tactics in a way that negates the Allies tactics. It allows any aircraft to literally blow a bomber, any bomber, out of the sky in a single pass without a high risk of defensive fire from the defenders. It makes it possible for a pilot with limited experiance to make a low or high side pass using deflection to successfully attack a bomber. Given a bit more range the R4M would likely also pose a threat not only to the bomber under attack but others nearby. Adding a fuze that detonates the rocket after so many seconds of flight also adds another dimension to its danger.
The R4M gives the Germans an alternative to expensive and heavy cannon on their aircraft. It means that their aircraft once they unload their rockets can optimize their performance to get away unscathed from escorts. This applies equally to jets and piston engined aircraft.
Back to the SAM: If it is reasonably cheap to manufacture, uses a minimum of critical materials, and is fueled with something that is not a burden on the petroleum industry then it is a better alternative to huge numbers of manpower intensive and ammunition draining antiaircraft guns and vulnerable heavy fighters.
These two weapons in combo would make it difficult to fly in tight defensive formations for the US. It would also make it more difficult for the British to stream their bombers into a target. The Germans would also have to make a decision to carry the fight to the British attacking them along the whole route they were taking rather than the tight control system of the Himmelbrett system of the Kammhuber line.

 

Interesting first bit, you would deploy the Me-262 in the East while conventional aircraft would still defend the west, with what, you are forgetting (Intentionally i suspect) what my hypothesis would be, and that is the cancellation of the Me-109to free up production line space for the Me-262, can FW manage to make up the numbers, plus you have to assign several more units of FW-190's for their sole role of airfield protection as the Me-262 was vulnerable to attack in take off and landing.

In tatics i would have the Me-262 attack the main bomber streams en masse (like the hurricane in the BoB) with their Mk-108 30mm cannon, either destroying or making then ecconomic writeoffs, while the Fw-190 would take care of the escorts, and once it becomes to dagerous for the USAAF to launch daylight raids, and once the USAAF stop their foray into Europe, i would launch seek and destroy missions into Britain against known RAF and USAAF bomber bases (Operation Bondeplatte) three years earlier.

The second bit if the Germans had it (by 1942) they would have used it.

 

The total number of He 177's built was around 1,000.

 

sounds to me we are mixing 1942 what-if's with reality of 1944-45 with Allied escort's attacking 262 airfields. I can tell you a LW field commander would prefer a late mark 109G over an Fw 190A in any day defense of Allied escort fighters at high altitude, the Fw 190A may be the better arms platform but that is about it. ........... geez lets not get into the what-if the Dora 9 had been developed by 42 as that would be another drawn out story with an unknown conclusion

 

The main problem on a site like this that some can't for whatever get into the spirit, they like to continually throw real world facts into the mix, and that can never happen, they are doggedly inflexible, when someone tries to create a set of circumstances to fit a senario, once again the usual suspects try to shut it down, and then we have the (HAGL) Habitual Anti-German League, there are some who will give no credit whatsover to the Germans had a set of hypothetical circumstances being in their favour, they whatever with habitually run them down.

Oh and to your point, that is what this particular thread is all about, a fully operational Me-262 by mid 1942, had the Me-262 programme gone almost without major glitches. As i have said that Messerschmitt can't mass produce the Me-262 and Me-109 together, one must give, so i chose the cancellation of the Me-109, with the Fw-190 taking up the slack, one thing that can have a positive effect and that the improvement in the Fw-190 could have gone quicker without the Me-109 in the mix, and i have addressed the issue of aircraft needed to protect Me-262 airfields. Oh you say a Luftwaffe field commander would swap the Fw-190A for a Me-109F, but you forgot the pilots, the stories i have read on the two aircraft were that the Fw-190A was a dream to fly and handled well in combat while the Me-190F was a nasty piece of work, i state the Me-109F because the G variant wasn't around in June 1942 (correct me if i am wrong).

 

the F 109 seemed to be fine until replaced by the G in Afrika which was even better and yes it was available in 42. and since this is a what if would Allied escorts-RAF been a prob over 262 airfields ?

 

I thought that the Me-109F was a beast of a plane to fly, mainly the engine produced to much torque and that many simply rolled over on takeoff, and it was prone to violent yawing also again on takeoff and landing resulting in many accidents.

 

many feel especially in Germany that the F was the best of the Bf 109's, personally not me. When the G-2 was introduced into JG 27 in Afrika the pilots thought now they had a craft. I would go with the later G-10 but that is another story. part of the problem with the Fw 190A in all variants was the oversized BMW, the pilots could not see around it on take off - same situation with the big P-47 Jug. All pilots learned if given the chance of later flying and yes accidents were in the LW line-up for all fighter a/c

 

The problem with doing that cold is what do you use in the interm? It takes about a year for a good sized plant to fully tool up for manufacturing a new aircraft enmasse. There are quite a few jigs and other special fixtures that have to be made along with arranging machinery and other special tooling to be manufactured. And, no, much of this cannot go on while you are producing another aircraft. One system gets in the way of the other.
So, if you cancel the 109 cold there is a gap that may be very significant in the air war. This is one reason many countries passed over marginally better, and even occasionally significantly better designs for ones already in service to just soldier on even if they were less than optimal.
This is why I would prefer to limit the 262 in service while improving its reliability substancially. Also, with service experiance better designs could be worked out. In this scenario I would view the 262 as an interm solution rather than an acceptable service solution.

The problem here is that stopping daylight raids does nothing to stop nighttime ones. The USAAF could easily have switched just as they did in the Pacific. Trying to launch raids against England buys the Luftwaffe little. The Me 262, like the 109 before it hasn't got the range. It has a limited flying time of about an hour, the same as the 109. Therefore, the problem is the bombers go unescorted and get shot down in droves as the Luftwaffe's bombers are far more vulnerable than Allied ones.

Yes, they would have. But, most likely just as they used the Panther at Kursk, the Bismarck, guided bombs, and a plethora of other supposed war winning devices. Each one was deployed in relatively small numbers. Each time they were used initially successfully in a handful of operations that brought small tactical or spectacular singluar successes. By the time there were sufficent on hand and their reliability had improved to a truly useful point the Allies had fully countered them and their effect was negated.

What the Germans need is a paradigim shift not a better weapon. In WW 1 they invented the Stroßtruppen tactics that became the blitzkrieg. They nearly won WW 1 with them and won handily early on in WW 2 with the now motorized version of them.

The British introducing the Dreadnought in 1905 changed the nature of battleship design and construction such that every nation was back to a clean slate. This allowed the Germans and US to nearly catch the British in naval forces.

The carrier was another paradigim shift at sea. It negated the battleship and previous methods of naval warfare.

The USMC revolutionized amphibious warfare in ways the Japanese could not have previously imagined. In doing so they negated the fortress island concept that Japan thought impegntrable.

Radar and orgainzed air defense systems negated the fast bomber and the thinking of Douhet and Mitchell.

Throwing a faster fighter plane against the Allies only ensures that they in turn build and deploy like systems in short order. What the Germans need is a way to literally stop the bomber offensive cold. There are only two realistic possibilities. Cause sustained losses that force the Allies to halt the offensive as the British did in the Battle of Britain. Or, find a method that nullifies the effect of the bombers making them irrelevant. The later is unlikely. The former can only be won by the Germans by adopting weapons that do not require strategic materials, make high demands on skilled manpower, and are effective in the face of opposition.
The missile fits this bill nicely. A new expensive fuel guzzling fighter does not.

 

Fair call, so where does that leave the Me-262 in circa june 1942 as per original thread.

 

Sez you. It might be your daughter reading out aloud our posts and typing your replies.

 

First round to Za Rodinu 10 to 8.