What would have happened if Hitler would have decided not to postpone operation Barbarossa

Merci & Graci. But, I was merely rephrasing that skit 'WI WWII Had Been a Online Game?

I'm reminded of the early days of the Third Reich game in the 1970s. nazi fan boys used to insist the Supply and Straitigic Warfare rules be discarded as those interfered with their brilliant panzer stratigies.

 

LOL Lets get them all together!!! And where would the fuel come from too. The Italians barely had enough.

 

Not only all together but all together in an area with only three narrow choke points for exits. One leading to a dead end and the other two controlled by the British. Plus the easiest of these to capture can be blocked and leads to another narrow choke point that can be easily mined.

 

There was in fact NO delay in Hitler's attack on Russia. The weather conditions precluded such a move and in any case the Balkan campaign served as a feint to decieve Russian intellegence. The material impact of the Greece adventure was not significant compared to the damage the Red Army did inflict on the Wehrmacht.

If the Germans went on the offensive under different weather conditions, they'd have been royaly whooped as the Russians would not be in the middle of a massive military restructuring as they actually were in '41.

 

Couln't be put more succintly.

 

I never thought of it like that, but I believe that you are correct in your assumption that if the Germans would have taken Moscow in 1941, they would have dug in held onto it as the French held Verdun in WW1. Of course that was the Imperial German Army High Command plan, to hit Verdun and bleed the French white as they held and counter-attacked. Possibly, more than likely a similar scenario would have played out at Moscow. Who knows after that. A repeat of Napoleon's winter retreat? Or a NO RETREAT order? With all the formations tied down (or ground down) in the Moscow sector, the rest of the German line would have been much thinly held. Who knows.

 

What you have proposed goes against everything I was taught in my college WW2 History class - I like it! Makes sense to me. Maybe I can track down my old professor and run that by him. Maybe he would change my B to an A for that class. Probably not.

 

...later on they were holding on to Stalingrad, while the rest of the Red Army poised to engulf 6th Army.

That's a good assumption. Maybe Moscow would work as a magneto as later on Stalingrad did.

But who knows... What-ifs, will-o'the-wisps, they're all on faerie land...

 

There was a reason that the Germans didn't take Moscow and Failed to fully capture Stalingrad. The Russian forces were simply too great in number. Had they captured Moscow, the Russians would have encircled the invading forces just as Stalingrad, and the Germans would have lost another 300000 men, and the war would have ended sooner.

 

So far, I have not been convinced by people claiming that even at this early stage that Hitler could not have won the war. It is true that Hitler's assumptions behind Barbarossa (that the USSR would simply fold, and the gross underestimation of Soviet reserves) were wrong, and that Barbarossa alone could have not have won the war. A second season of campaigning would have been necessary at the very least.

Our scenario here is that Barbarossa happens 4 weeks earlier, so a start of May 24 or so instead of June 22. Would the spring rasputitsa (the spring/autumn seasonal rains that turned the land into horrendous mud) have really prevented the German advance? I don't know about the actual state of the weather, but we also must remember that the Germans would not have advanced deep into Russia within those 4 weeks. Instead, they basically would have advanced into eastern Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and the western portions of Ukraine and Belarus. If anything, the rasputitsa might have slowed down the Russians more than the Germans. I'd need to some some sort of evidence that the spring rains had made a May 22 attack date impossible before I will concede this.

So I think it's plausible to say that the Germans advance as they did in OTL and that most events simply occur 4 weeks earlier. At least up to a point. For the Germans don't just gain the 4 extra weeks by moving up the attack, they also gain an additional amount of time because the October rasputitsa doesn't happen in September.

The Wehrmacht was bogged down from Oct 7 - Nov 15 because of the raputitsa. Since in this timeline, Operation Typhoon (the German drive to Moscow) begins on September 8 (instead of October 2), they get an additional 4 weeks to drive to Moscow before the raputitsa stops them. In effect, we need to judge the German advance not from its date of Oct 2 (because they essentially 5-6 weeks) but from the resume of their advance on Nov 15. We also need to factor in that a September Typhoon would not have had problems with the winter weather as the actual Wehrmacht did in November. These Germans don't need winter clothing yet, nor do they need special engine oils or such. On the Russian side, they have problems. They don't get that 6 week breathing space that allowed them to improve the defense of Moscow. Therefore, I think it's possible that Moscow could have been taken before the rasputitsa that began on October 7.

How would this have affected the war? The Soviets were able to launch their Moscow counteroffensive because they knew - from their spies - that Japan was not going to invade Siberia. The divisions of the Siberian front formed the core of the Russian counteroffensive. Would these have been available if the Germans took Moscow by October 7, 1941? Let's look at the timeline.

The Japanese were divided between expanding north into Siberia for resources, or south towards the East Indies. The army preferred north, while the navy wanted to go south. The decision to go south - and thus attack Pearl Harbor and go to war against the United States - wasn't made until early November. In our timeline, the German offensive was petering out. In this timeline, the Germans already have Moscow by that time. This will undoubtedly affect the Japanese decision. How likely are they to decide to go to war with the USSR instead of the USA?

Well, I started to research more, and according to Wikipedia (I know, I know, very bad - but it footnotes on this point to Gordon Prange's Target Tokyo The Story of the Sorge Spy Ring) the Soviet's chief spy, Richard Sorge told Moscow:

"On 14 September 1941, Sorge advised the Red Army that the Japanese were not going to attack the Soviet Union until:

1. Moscow was captured
2. the size of the Kwantung Army was three times that of the Soviet Union's Far Eastern forces
3. a civil war had started in Siberia"

If true, this points to a very interesting scenario. When the Germans take Moscow, the Japanese decide soon after to attack the Soviet Union. Perhaps this attack does not happen in Winter 1941, but the Spring of 1942. But in any case, the Soviets know that Japan will enter the war. Will they actually take the Siberian troops away knowing that Japan will attack them? I'm thinking they won't. Thus there is no Moscow Counteroffensive.

Instead, Stalin retreats to a provisional capital farther east, and makes war plans assuming that Japan will attack the Soviet Union in the next few months as well.

On the German side, a conquest of Moscow in October means they will now turn to their other objectives in 1941 - Leningrad and the Donets Basin - when the weather improves on November 15. I don't see big offenses at this time because the German army will want to rest during the winter, and since Moscow is taken, I don't think Hitler would mind. In any case, the Wehrmacht is in a much better position than it was in our world.

Of course, the Soviet Union is still a formidable foe, and Hitler's assumptions in Barbarossa was wrong. The Germans have taken enormous losses, but they don't lose land and additional men like they did in the Moscow Counteroffensive. Even if Stalin still orders some counterattack and draws some of the Siberians away, he probably does not strip Siberia like he did in reality. And if the attack does happen, the Germans have made 6 weeks or so to rest their troops and prepare defenses. They aren't caught with their pants down. Thus, even if one argues that some counterattack would have happened, I think the Germans do much better here than they actually did.

In any case, in Spring 1942, Hitler orders Case Blue - or some variant - to advance to the Volga and seize the Caspian oil fields. This operation might be in conjunction with a Japanese offensive into Siberia. This presents a very different position for the Soviet Union than what really happened. And the United States is not in the war either.

Someone who knows more about the Japanese position in 1941 might find flaws in my analysis. I would be interested in knowing more.

 

The wet weather extended into Poland. Werner Adamcyzk, with the 20th Motorized Div, mentions the rain in the first half of June.

Less than the Germans. Moblization of the Soviet ground forces depended mostly on the railroads for movement.

If I were the East Front expert... Cant recall if it was Halder who gave that as the primary reason. Either Guderian or Raus mentions it as well.

The largest flaw or flaws is that you are ascribing the German failure to one factor. Even if the weather is perfect the larger problems of supply transportation and artillery ammunition are still there. After that there are the lack of replacements for tanks and infantry losses.

By 1 December, before the battle for Moscow starts, the German army had lost 800,000 men; the tank battalions were running at 25% strength; the artillery commanders were reporting ammunition shortages from 50% to 75% below requirements for the missions they were assigned. Setting the date forward sets aside very little of that. It may make the transportation problem worse at the start. In any case starting the battle sooner starts the attrition sooner & sets it along the same general course. So, in early November the German army arrives at the gates of Moscow its battalions half strength or less and the artillery unable to compete even 1-10 in shots with the enemy.

If you want to capture Moscow conjure up another dozen railroad repair units, 50,000 tons of rails for track repair, and maybe another 100,000 trucks to haul supply from the railheads to the battle.

 

The wet weather extended into Poland. Werner Adamcyzk, with the 20th Motorized Div, mentions the rain in the first half of June.

Less than the Germans. Moblization of the Soviet ground forces depended mostly on the railroads for movement.

If I were the East Front expert... Cant recall if it was Halder who gave that as the primary reason. Either Guderian or Raus mentions it as well.

The largest flaw or flaws is that you are ascribing the German failure to one factor. Even if the weather is perfect the larger problems of supply transportation and artillery ammunition are still there. After that there are the lack of replacements for tanks and infantry losses.

By 1 December, before the battle for Moscow starts, the German army had lost 800,000 men; the tank battalions were running at 25% strength; the artillery commanders were reporting ammunition shortages from 50% to 75% below requirements for the missions they were assigned. Setting the date forward sets aside very little of that. It may make the transportation problem worse at the start. In any case starting the battle sooner starts the attrition sooner & sets it along the same general course. So, in early November the German army arrives at the gates of Moscow its battalions half strength or less and the artillery unable to compete even 1-10 in shots with the enemy.

If you want to capture Moscow conjure up another dozen railroad repair units, 50,000 tons of rails for track repair, and double the trucks to haul supply from the railheads to the battle.

 

I think it's even worse than this. For one thing the Soviets are on the defencive. As they fall back they chew up the roads they are retreating on which are then the ones the Germans are advancing on and then trying to move supplies on. Most people today don't have a real understanding of what sort of problem mud can be. I saw 50 boy scouts once turn a perfectly serviceable trail for individuals into a morass where chunks of wood were dissapearing several feet into the mud and that was just in one pass. Construction workers will see mud developt to the point where they are in danger of loosing vehicles (bull dozers). Then once the roads are chewed up to that point a lot of labor is required to repair them which can't really start until the mud season is over.

As for Japan by 41 they were really hurting for oil. How do they gain that by attacking the Soviet Union?

 

Your assertion that Japan did not decide to attack the Southern Resources Area (SRA) until November, 1941, is way off.

The Japanese essentially made their decision to move to the South in July, 1940. (see; MONOGRAPH 146-POLITICAL STRATEGY PRIOR TO OUTBREAK OF WAR PART II ). They knew they did not have the strength to attack both the SRA and the Soviets in Siberia. Although discussions as to the wisdom of each option continued as the situation in Europe changed with events such as Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, the Japanese were preparing for war with the US and Britain over the SRA from July, 1940, on.

However, when the Japanese decided to occupy the airfields in southern French Indochina in July, 1941, the die was cast. For it was this action that caused the US, Britain, and the NEI to impose a petroleum embargo on Japan. At that point, Japan had no option but to surrender and withdraw from China, or go to war with the US and Britain.

The fact is, that after July, 1940, the Japanese did not intend to attack the Soviets, and after July, 1941, there was no possibility that Japan would attack the Soviet Union.

 

Ah logistics... what a cruel harsh mistress you are...

Oh and don't forget some extra fording gear and that the rails had to be set soviet gauge so it would still be required to change trains between the eastern and western fronts. And, you'd have to have some quick way of filling airports with some kind of tarmac so that the Luftwaffe wont loose 50%++ of their planes in take-off/landing accidents and increase the number of available aircraft in the air to make up for the low numbers of artillerie. Plus, Factories producing 10X more tanks just to have a strategic reserve and be able to put tanks in the front as soon as they were lost increasing the number of available tanks. And by tanks I mean every kind of motor transportation particularly half tracks as the negotiate better with the mud... Well, I think Kattenrads wouldn't be required in bigger numbers but still... Oh and of course, more Oil, rubber, tungsten, copper, concrete, steel, *place strategic resource here*.



Cheers...

 

Did your "professor" do his doctorial discertation on "Hogan's Heroes" ?

The only true professor in academia is that of Math, and all things mathematical, everyting else is opinion and conjecture.

Brad

 

But mathematics is just the construct of applying logic to a set of assumptions. It may be the ultimate tool but without science to guide it's application it's just another art form.

This is just about as far off topic as I have ever seen a thread get by the way.

 

You missed the point...........Math is not based on "opinion". There is only one interpetation for any set of given values.

History is influenced by opinion and interpetation and the point I was making is that the closer you share an opinion with a history "professor" the better your grade.

 

The when do parallel lines intersect?

 

Originally Posted by formerjughead
...
The only true professor in academia is that of Math, and all things mathematical, everyting else is opinion and conjecture.


No offense but what does this have to do with the subject of "What would have happened if Hitler would have decided not to postpone operation Barbarossa"? Granted that this is in regards to another post. But to hijack the thread on something that has nothing to do with the subject with something ,that perhaps could be dealt with in it own thread, takes away from the discussion.