When did Germany lose the war?

The unnamed writer of this article agrees with Clint and some others here who say (in effect) that the turn south in 1941 was when Germany lost the war. If they had driven straight for Moscow instead, they would have almost certainly taken the capital and very possibly have inflicted a mortal blow to the Soviet Union. Some background on the subject is necessary, however, before reaching firm conclusions.

This was one instance when a German master plan was not derailed by Hitler’s amateurish interference. The original Barbarossa plan called for the turn south before resuming the drive to Moscow. It was thought that it was vitally necessary to the German war effort to secure food and oil supplies abundant further south in Russia. Without securing such, Hitler and others fretted that when winter came their armies might well suffer the same dismal fate as had Napoleon’s Grande Armée.

However, with the resounding initial success of Barbarossa, many German generals saw an unexpected golden opportunity to seize Moscow before it could be adequately reinforced to withstand the impending German assault. Moscow was not just the capital of the U. S. S. R., but also a major communications and transportation center. If the city fell, the Soviets would have had severe difficulty coordinating their remaining troops throughout the vast country. This is what von Bock, Guderian (most emphatically!) and many other German military figures urged upon their warlord. They argued that in accordance with classic military doctrine, one first concentrates on destroying the enemy’s armed forces and then one can do what one likes with the enemy’s territory and natural resources.

Hitler, however, refused to alter the original plan (somewhat ironically in light of his later frequent improvisations which proved fatal in subsequent campaigns). He still felt the original rationale for the turn south was valid. He especially worried over oil. Additionally, he too was delighted with the speed of the early German successes and felt that there was adequate time to accomplish both objectives before winter set in in earnest. So the turn south happened as planned causing about a month’s delay before the drive to Moscow resumed by Army Group Center. The Soviets were able to use this critical respite to reinforce Moscow under Zhukov’s brilliant military leadership.

In hindsight, it is difficult to argue that the turn south did not prove to have been a very costly mistake. There is little question that von Bock could have taken Moscow had the drive to the capital continued as he had urged. I personally do not see how a mere month’s delay in securing food and oil recourses would have proven fatal to Germany, or even all that painful. However, does this mean that the error of the turn south was fatal to the German cause? I don’t think so.

After the German assault upon Moscow was repulsed and Zhukov launched a major counterattack against the retreating Germans, Hitler’s “hold or die” order was issued. The wisdom of that order is one that was then and has been ever since controversial, with military experts disagreeing over its wisdom. Hitler’s supporters in this argue that his order saved his armies the fate of Napoleon’s troops and prevented collapse upon the entire front. They argue that there were no fixed positions to retreat to and with the roads impassable, the troops would have had to retreat over open countryside with large numbers of men dropping from exhaustion and exposure to die in place. Others argue that a more orderly retreat could have been organized and would have saved a great many men.

The question can never be definitively answered, and I have no opinion. I simply argue on the basis of what actually happened and not upon hypothetical questions. The fact remains that despite severe losses, the German armies survived largely intact and were able to resume the offensive in the Summer of 1942.

On June 28, 1942, the Germans launched a great offensive code named “Case Blue,” which was a two-pronged attack directed against the Baku oilfields in the Caucasus and to the Volga River in the direction of Stalingrad. (It should be noted that Stalingrad was not itself an objective of the original plan. It became so when Hitler became fixated on capturing the city named for his arch-nemesis.) The idea was to block transport along the Volga and starve the North of food and oil. It was a good plan that completely caught the Russians off guard and probably would have succeeded if not for Hitler’s disastrous ad hoc interference.

The writer of this article cavalierly dismisses this grave threat to the ongoing viability of the Soviet Union, arguing that the Germans were finished even had it succeeded. That conclusion is one I hold to be entirely suspect in regard to its validity. In any event, the mere fact that the Germans were able to launch such a powerful offensive in 1942 leads me to the inescapable conclusion that even if Blue had succeeded in its objectives and still did not revive Germany’s prospects for outright victory, then at the very least one can maintain that had the Germans taken a defensive posture in 1942 then it would have been unlikely that the Soviets could have dislodged them and some sort of truce would have eventually prevailed, a truce that would not have been terribly unfavorable for the Germans.

 

Don´t know if it was posted before, but they lost the war at the time they decided to start it! Sounds silly but is the truth. They had not enough resources for a longer war, they didn´t believe that the Brits won´t sign peace with them, they read the map of Russia very bad and to make it the worst, they declared war to the USA.
The Wehrmacht had not enought tanks and only a few with a main gun bigger than 3.7cm or 5cm at the beginning at France and had luck that the French were lousy strategists and sent their tanks only as small groups instead of sending them en masse. The other western Europe countries stuck with their Armies in tactics and strategies and equipment in the great war of 1914/1918 and were impressed by the succsesses of the Wehrmacht that made the beginning easy, but then....

 

That Fall Blau would have succeeded if there was not Hitler's interference,only is a variation of myth number one(invented immediately after the war by the generals):if only Hitler was listening to the advices of his generals.

 

At his War Trial, Keitel's response to the question "when did you know that the war was lost?" He gave a one word reply

MOSCOW

Guderian was also of the same opinion.

From what little I have read, Hitler was ecstatic when he heard of Pearl Harbour and could not wait to declare war on the USA - apparently Hitler thought the Japanese attack would win the war for the Axis, although other than hoping that Japan would attack Russia, I can't think any other reason that lay behind this (mistaken) belief.

 

Führer Directive Number 45 is no myth! If you are largely unfamiliar with the Blue campaign, then even reading the Wikipedia article will provide some insight into Hitler’s disastrous interference in military matters. Directive No. 45 stands in the annals of military history as perhaps the most incompetent and disastrous military order ever issued.

 

Hitler’s initial response over the news of Pearl Harbor was, predictably, elation, despite the fact that German foreign policy had been directed at convincing Japan to attack the U. S. S. R. and—most decidedly—not the United States. Nevertheless, he vacillated and waited several days before declaring war upon the United States, thus saving FDR (who had not even mentioned Germany in his post-Pearl Harbor address to Congress) the trouble of finding some machination to get America into the European war as well.

Even the lackey foreign minister von Ribbentrop gently tried to persuade Hitler against going to war with the United States. Hitler finally stated that if Germany did not declare war then the Axis pact was effectively dead, and he did indeed mention his joy at having a wartime ally which had not lost a war in several hundred years. (He apparently discounted the recent border war with the Soviet Union as a mere skirmish.)

However, he said that the real reason for going to war was that the two countries were already de facto at war, alluding to FDR’s decision to escort merchant traffic into British waters and the several incidents at sea that had already occurred. Indeed, one might agree that FDR’s provocations against Germany did amount to a valid reason for the declaration of war by Germany.

In regard to Guderian indicating that Germany lost the war when they failed to take Moscow in 1941, as I mentioned already he had been the most ardent in trying to persuade Hitler to postpone the turn south in favor of driving on Moscow. Therefore, his opinion is somewhat biased. Keitel, on the other hand, surprises me as he had been another glorified lackey of Hitler’s. Nevertheless, I do not believe that Germany had lost the war at the gates of Moscow for the reasons I gave in my recent post. I believe they lost it as a result of Hitler’s disastrous interventions during Case Blue.

However, even after Stalingrad, by assuming a defensive posture (allowing penetrations followed by counterattacks (von Manstein’s forte)) they might have been able to salvage a truce at the demarcation line in Poland at the time when the invasion had been launched.

 

With hindsight, it would seem june 22nd 1941...?

Hello David Scott,
Stalin too meddled in military affairs. Kiev alone cost Russia 4 Soviet armies.

 

Without boasting,I may say that I am very familiair with Fall Blau .
The point is,that your starting point is wrong :you are arguing,as if there was no Rad Army opposing the Germans,and,the reason of the failure of Fall Blau was the resistance of the Red Army,what Hitler was deciding,was not determining .
Very short :Fall Blau was
1)principal object:the capture of the oil fields of the Caucasus
2)secundary :going to the Wolga,to protect the left flank of AGA (the units that were advancing in the Caucasus)
Both aims had to be reached at the same time;if ONE failed,Fall Blau failed.
Both aims had to be reached as soon as possible:before september .
Now (from Hitler's War P139):
Success or failure of the German plan de campagne of 1942 depended on being able to destroy large parts of the Soviet Army in Southern Russia IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE START OF THE OFFENSIVE and preventing their withdrawal to the Volga and the Caucasus .
If the Germans failed to encircle and destroy the bulk of the Soviet Southern and South-western Fronts,as well of the opposing Bryansk Front, at the very beginning of the atta

 

Without boasting,I may say that I am very familiair with Fall Blau .
The point is,that your starting point is wrong :you are arguing,as if there was no Rad Army opposing the Germans,and,the reason of the failure of Fall Blau was the resistance of the Red Army,what Hitler was deciding,was not determining .
Very short :Fall Blau was
1)principal object:the capture of the oil fields of the Caucasus
2)secundary :going to the Wolga,to protect the left flank of AGA (the units that were advancing in the Caucasus)
Both aims had to be reached at the same time;if ONE failed,Fall Blau failed.
Both aims had to be reached as soon as possible:before september .
Now (from Hitler's War P139):
Success or failure of the German plan de campagne of 1942 depended on being able to destroy large parts of the Soviet Army in Southern Russia IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE START OF THE OFFENSIVE and preventing their withdrawal to the Volga and the Caucasus .
If the Germans failed to encircle and destroy the bulk of the Soviet Southern and South-western Fronts,as well of the opposing Bryansk Front, at the very beginning of the attack, there was hardly any hope of their taking Stalingrad and the valuable areas in the Caucasus before the onset of winter .
Unless you can prove that without the interference of Hitler,the Germans could have destroyed large parts of the Soviet Army in Southern Russia IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE START OF THE OFFENSIVE,your reply is wrong .
In 1941,the Germans had 10 weeks to destroy the opposing Russian forces,they failed .
In 1942,the Germans had 4 weeks to destroy the opposing Russian forces,they failed .
In both cases:the reason was not Hitler,but the reaction of the Soviet Army .

 

My opinion

1. June 22nd 1941
2. The declaration of war to the US only fastened this process.

 

When Germany dishonored Munich agreement. On her own She couldn't even defeat Britain (whose trust she lost completely after that affair) let alone USA and USSR.

And please not again if only Hitler hadn't interfered and listened to his generals crap....

 

Hello;this is a facinating topic, I am of the opinion that a combination of the events listed above no doubt cost Hitler the war. Declaring war on the USA while still fighting in Russia and at war with Britian and the Commonwealth was unwise to say the least . He involved Germany into a war of attrition against two superpowers and the British empire that with their limited capacity (look at tank production allies vs axis) Germany ultimately had no hope of winning. Then there is Hitler's meddleing as a military leader he was after all a corporal , and as his health declined his ability to cope with the situation also declined. I have parkinsons disease and even with modern drugs and the best of care there are days I can't carry a full cup of coffee let alone take on about 1/3 the world in a war , take it from me modern drugs have side effects God only knows the concotions his doctors were giving him this coupled with the fatigue common with Parkinsons it's a wonder he could function at all !!

 

The problem is that there are still people thinking that Germany lost the war at Day X,hourY,minute Z.,while it was an evolution:the Germans had less chance to win in june 1941,than in june 1940,in june 1942 than in june 1941,etc
Already in july 1940,when Britain decided to continue the war,Germany was faced by a strategical crisis,it was the same ,when at the end of august 1941, Barbarossa had failed .But that thus not mean that 22 june 1941,was the German doomsday:if,in the autumn of 1941,the SU had given up, Germany still had a big chance .
About 11 december 1941,was this the end for Germany ? This is not certainnly in february 1943 were the first units of the US ARMY engaged in a fight against the Germans,that means that Germany still had a year to "eliminate" Britain or the SU.

 

I found an excellent analysis of Case Blue written by a naval officer (Glenn F. Robbins, LCDR, USN) for the Naval War College that I would urge all to read who are interested in military planning in general and with a particular interest in Germany’s Russian campaign in WWII, especially Case Blue. Commander Robbins identifies Blue as a classic example of faulty planning that included a grossly incompetent and nebulous command structure and one that failed to set clear objectives.

Robbins points out that not only was there no theater commander appointed (analogous to Eisenhower), which meant that the army group commanders were operating largely in the dark concerning the larger picture, but Hitler abrogated all final decision making but that of his own to the point where he was actually issuing orders directly to division commanders!

It appears from the outset that Hitler himself didn’t know what exactly his objectives were beyond largely destroying the Soviet military in the South (which you note) but also to seize the oil fields in the Caucasus and to affect a land blockade (as I noted) of the resource rich Southern Russia depriving the governing North of the resources needed to continue the struggle. I contend that even if the first two objectives were not tenable, then the blockade of the Volga-Don basin had been achievable and might have crippled the Soviet war effort.

Here are some excerpts from what I consider to be a masterful military analysis of Blue by Commander Robbins:

“Despite what has been identified as failures in the foundation of the planning process, it is impossible to determine if BLUE had any chance for success. The Russians were caught largely unprepared for the initial onslaught, but Hitler undermined his own forces by changing his objective and introducing more error into an already flawed solution.”

—Please note that while Cmdr. Robbins does not state that Blue definitely had any chance of success regardless of its execution, he does not deny the possibility either. He does, however, saliently note Hitler’s gross interference in the plan which served to undermine it. What follows are examples of Hitler’s incompetence as a warlord.

“On July 11, 1942, two weeks after the campaign started, he issued Fuhrer Directive 43, which tasked von Manstein with attacking into the Caucasus after securing the Crimean Peninsula no later than August 1, 1942.

“Not satisfied with progress around Voronezh, Hitler fired Field Marshal von Bock and replaced him with General von Weichs on July 13.

“Eight days later, he issued Fuhrer Directive 44, which contradicted Directive 41 and ordered operations to resume along the northern front based on his assumption that the occupation of the Caucasus was a foregone conclusion. Hitler claimed victory despite the fact that not a single German soldier had set foot on the oilfields.’"

—Please note well:

“On July 23, 1942, less than four weeks after the campaign had started, Hitler issued Fuhrer Directive 45 claiming that, ‘In a campaign which has lasted little more than three weeks, the broad objectives outlined for the southern flank of the Eastern front have been largely achieved. Only weak enemy forces from the Timoshenko Army Group have succeeded in avoiding encirclement and reaching the further bank of the Don.’

“His conclusions about collapsing enemy resistance were based on his false beliefs that the Russians were withdrawing into the Caucasus rather than eastward towards the Don and Volga Rivers. Therefore, rather than encircling the Red Army as he had originally envisaged, he inadvertently allowed it to trade space for time and the majority of the Russian forces slipped away to the east. Moreover, if Hitler truly believed that his objectives had been met then he should have reconvened his leadership and started the planning process for follow-on operations."

—Cmdr. Robbins’s conclusion regarding Blue allows for at least the possibility of a German victory had it not been for Hitler’s gross incompetence and interference in military affairs. I personally believe that had Hitler appointed von Manstein (his most brilliant strategist and tactician) theater commander and refrained from interference that at the very least Germany would have achieved a very favorable truce with Stalin and perhaps complete victory. (I favor the former possibility.):

“Had he included Stalingrad in his original objectives and properly staffed the planning process he might have defeated the Russians in the south, or at the very least avoided the disastrous defeat.”

Reverting to the larger point of my original note (and away from the narrower point of the execution of Case Blue), I maintain that notwithstanding the blunder of the turn south in 1941, Germany was far from finished at that point and that victory, or at least a favorable truce, was still within the grasp of Germany had it not been for the megalomaniac Hitler’s belief that he was a military genius.

Here is the link to Commander Robbins’s paper which I, once again, urge all to read if one has any interest in the subject of Case Blue:

http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?hl=en&gs_sm=c&gs_upl=3328l9656l0l12531l9l9l2l0l0l0l204l1142l0.5.2l7l0&q=cache:KBo69A9vRg0J:http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA463987+fuhrer+directive+45&ct=clnk

 

I think you have a wrong translation of Fuhrerweisung 43:the German text says that the 11th army had to make all preparations (!) for attacking in the Caucasus,not later than 15 august(!)
Nach der Sauberung der Halbinsel Kertsch und der Einahme von Sewastopol ist es die naechtste Aufgabr der 11.Armee,unter Aufrechterhaltung der Sicherung der Krim,bis SPAETESTENS MITTE AUGUST alle VORBEREITUNGEN zu treffen fur eine Ubergang mit der Masse der Armee uber die Strasse von Kertsch .

 

For the remainder,it is still the classical thinking (=fault IMHO)that with an other commander,there would be an other result .Manstein (btw:before the fall of Sebastopol,he only was a not distinghuished an not known general) was not a miracle man :without reinforcements(from men to tanks,fuel....) he would not do better than an other general .
I also do not see why the removal of von Bock by von Weichs,would be a mistake .
1 also would question the importance of Weisung nr 45,because,IMHO,the dies already were cast on 23 july 1942:AGA had lost all chances to capture the oilfields,and AGB had lost all chances to reach the Wolga AND secure the left flank .
The reason is simple :both AG's had failed(on 23 july) to destroy the opposing Russian forces .
Weisung nr 41 indicated:
that it had to be prevented that the Red Army could escape from the encirclments and that it had to be avoided that (as in 1941)the junction between ID and mobile forces would be lost,because the mobile forces would go to fast .
The result was that the mobile forces had to wait on the ID,and,that, as in 1941,large parts of the Russian forces could escape,and,as the German LoC became longer,could block the Germans (as in 1941).
If AGA and AGB could not destroy the opposing forces in july,why could they do this in august?
I have not seen any proof that the German failure in july was caused by Hitler;one could argue that it was caused by the Russians.

 

I also have a BIG objection to the source you have given .The author mentioned that the aim of his paper is to give an analysis of the German defeat at Stalingrad .While Fall Blau and Stalingrad are linked,there is no proof that the German failure in july was causing the encirclment of the 6th Atmy in november .
About the chain of command:
First:The chain of Command in Normandy was not that simple/logical:although Eisenhower was supreme command,in fact (till 1 september) he commanded nothing,because the temporary commander of the ground forces was Montgomery(and his policy was to make that this "temporary" would become definitive .
But,as usual,no US military is capable to understand the German CoC,although it was simple:
The OKH(Brauchitz/Hitler and Halder -directed the war in the east .
Keitel (who was in reality MINISTER OF WAR) had no operational authority (the same as Stimson).
Jodl :he was responsible for the war in North Africa,and,this was all .
Normally,Keitel and Jodl,who had nothing to do,would remain in Berlin,but were always with Hitler (Rastenburg/Obersalzberg),intriguing to increase their power,what they could not do in Berlin .The center of decision was where Hitler was,not in Berlin .The best place to intrigue is the White House,not the Pentagon .

 

It is also very questionable that the blockade of the Caucasus would be decisive,because,the SU was not that dependent on oil:this is a 2011 Western mistake,and,the SU had a lot of oil elsewhere .
2 exemples :
First oil:
the Russian oil production was in 1940 32.7 million ton,of which 27.2 in the Caucasus and 5.5 elsewhere
In 1945:it was:19.4:13.1 in the Caucasus and 6.3 elsewhere
1)Although the Germans did not capture the Caucasus,the production fell to 50%(main cause :destructins)
2)Although the Caucasus oil fell to 50 %;and the increase elsewhere was insignifiant,the Red Flag was waving on the Reichstag
Coal:
the production was in 1940:146.7 million ton Donbassin :85.5 elsewhere 61.2
In 1945roduction :156.2 Don :36.9,elsewhere 119.3
1)The Germans captured the Donbassin,causing a loss of 48.6 million ton
2) this loss was more than repaired by the increase of other coalfields

 

@ David Scott

The way you are portraying Hitler's decisions as if they were all taken in a vacuum. Did he alone thought of all those things you claim, sitting in a dark room.

I can't take the paper that you presented seriously a bit, you know why because that paper left out a very important part which is called red army.

And besides generals don't win war, then surely robbins doesn't know a bit about USSR of 42 if he was predicting a defeat in 1942.

Then, manestein is most overrated generals of all, please not this fanboyism.

 

The vulnerability of the Baku and other oil fields to the west of the area was well understood by Stalin and the Soviet oil production people. Sabotage and removing the resource for an enemy had been well prepared for. Just in case Hitler’s troops were not stopped before they reached Baku, Stalin entrusted one man with making sure that the Nazis could not avail of the city’s legendary oil; Nikolai Baibakov.

Stalin told him that if any oil went from Baku I to the Nazis, he would be shot. Stalin then also told him that if the USSR couldn't get the field working again when the Nazis were expelled, he would be dug up and shot again. By the autumn of 1942, 764 wells were stopped up with cement and prepared for destruction and 81 sets of drilling equipment together with the personnel were sent to East Baku (Baku II), on the opposite shore of the Caspian Sea.

None of the captured fields ever sent many barrels of crude back to the Nazis, in fact the pipe they (the Nazis) had brought to the western Caucus oil fields of Maikop/Grozny were captured by the Soviets when they returned. Those German pipes were then used to ship the petroleum to the Soviets!


After the wells in Baku I were capped off with deep injections of cement, the Soviets transferred their petroleum production to the known but non-developed Baku II fields on the east shore of the Caspian (Turkmenia). The Baku I area didn't get back into production until post war, when the Soviets themselves repaired the damage they had done when they withdrew. Nikolai Baibakov had succeeded in both tasks laid to him by Stalin, the Nazis never took any oil out of Baku I, and he was able to get them back into production as soon as possible when the Nazis had been thrown back and were no longer a threat. The Lend-Lease import of American POL was one of the reasons the lowering of the production of the Soviet fields could be countered with much more ease than the loss of oil for the Nazis could be countered.