What was fat hermann thinking when he told AH that he could supply the 6th Army from the air, in ideal conditions with the aircraft available it was never going to be remotely a viable option, hitler not mad although shakey surely would have seen that airdrops were not way to proceed?
I believe the idea stemned from a similar operation a few months earlier when a cut off Army was re-supplied by air. However because Stalingrad was already at the end of a precarious supply line I think the logistics were just too impracticle in the end. And of course the Russians had Air Superiority by the time it got underway which meant that the Luftwaffe was already fighting a losing battle ...
It would have much better for the Germans if they had used the aircrafts to airlift the surrounded army out of Russia rather for them to receive airdrops of supplies..
I agree with the idea of airlifting the experienced combat troops out of Stalingrad, to allow them to fight another day. But I think Stalingrad was more a symbolic battle for Hitler, he would not let the German army retreat from the battle field or the city itself.
And of course the Russians had Air Superiority by the time it got underway which meant that the Luftwaffe was already fighting a losing battle ...
The idea of airlifting the experienced combat troops sounds really interesting, but such an operation wasn´t able in 1942/43 ... not enough transport capacity for example, russian air superiority and naturally the russians wouldn´t let them go without attacking the remaining troops. Taking nearly 200.000 soldiers out of the Kessel would take some time ...The only possibility to rescue the experienced combat troops was probably a very early break-out in the direction Paulus proposed shortly after the russian attack - but this was no option for Hitler. The rest of the story everyone knows ...
It was the "victory" of the Demyansk Pocket in the Winter-Spring of '42 that led the Nazi's to believe their own propaganda; that it could be achieved and was worthwhile doing so. Indeed, it was this example that led to Göring's affirmation that it could be done (even though the cost in machines and manpower had been prohibitive), and this promise led to requiring Paulus to dig in, rather than withdraw. It is also interesting to note that this was at a time when Göring's influence at the Nazi court was waning, so he couldn't really say the LW couldn't do it either. This is typical in organisations that do not tolerate openness or honest reflection.
Actually, the decision to try and supply the 6th Armee by air just wasn't a decision by Goring off the top of his head. When Hitler asked the question, Goring turned to Jeschonnek, his chief of staff, and he in turn, said that he thought it could be done. Soon after, Jeschonnek did the math and it didn't add up. He volunteered to go to Hitler and take the blame but Goring told him he couldn't go back on his word to Hitler. So on that, 6th Armee and a large part of the German air transport service was condemned to slow death.
Gentleman, and Ladiies, According to the Second Book of David Glantzs "Stalingrad Trilogy" The actual desciaion to put the Stalingrad Airlift in motion was made on November the 20th, 1942. Present for the decision was Luftwaffe Commander HANS JESHONNEK, and Adolf Hitler Hitler was not so sure it could be done. Jeshonnek convinced the Leader, changed his mind based upon an initial estimate of 300 tons of supplys needed per day, that the Army had control of the forward airfields, (Gumrak and Pitomnik), AND that the operation would be of a short duration, based upon the idea that Manstein's gruppe would arrive to lift the siege. Baseds upon these arguments, Hitler was persuaded BY JESHONNEK. Goring was at a conference concerning oil supply and production at Karinhall on the 20th of November. Goring arrived at Berchtesgarden two days later, and was immediately buttonholed by Hitler to discuss the Stalingrad airlift. Based on Hitlers descision, which was in turn baseds entirely on Jeshopnnek's advice from November 20, Goring called a conference to discuss tonnage, and despite his own reservations, put into practice Jeshonneks decision basing it entirely on his desire not to contradict Hitler's decision. Hitler's decision.... Further, at the conference, the Sixth Army, (Paulus) had been asking for a minimum of 700 tons a day, anmd both Goring and Jeshonnek had advised a 350 ton/day total under the very best of circumstances. Hitler brushed this aside, and despite Gorings information dovetailing with Jeshonneks estimates, Hitler let his own descision stand, and brushed aside objections from anyone from then on. David Glantz has become more than well known for busting many myths that have arisen from the Great Patriotic War, and have been spread falsely by the likes of Overy, Beevor and Shirer (and incidentally, made there waty into Wikipedia as qwell. This is another example of Glantz's good work. Hermann Goring was far away at Karinhall when Jeshonnek and Hitler made their decision. /Goring definitely did not want to contradict that DECISION. And being surrounded by "yes men" was something that only one man could have been blamed for...Adolf Hitler Chris
As mentioned earlier this over confidence of resupplying Stalingrad by air until relieved, was the success earlier in the year in the Demyansk/ Kholm pockets. Bad weather, logistical problems and the Russian AA guns simply waiting for them, doomed of supplying the 6th Army with even the bare minimum. Read along the way that some of the air drops included boots (all for left feet), pepper, bottles of wine, summer clothing but the most bewildering thing had to be the shipment on November 19, when a whole lot of condoms were dropped. Perhaps it was a cosmic message about how doomed the trapped soldiers were. Demyansk Pocket - Wikipedia
