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France fights on in North Africa

Discussion in 'What If - Mediterranean & North Africa' started by T. A. Gardner, Feb 26, 2008.

  1. T. A. Gardner

    T. A. Gardner Genuine Chief

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    What if the French (leaving the politics of this out) decide to fight on in North Africa and begin a withdrawal from metropolitan France in mid-June when it becomes fairly obvious that they are going to lose the campaign? Obviously, the French fleet would largely be intact and operational on the Allied / British side of the war still. A good portion of the available aircraft in France certainly had the capacity to fly to either England or North Africa and could have easily done so.
    Some questions: What size of forces could the French manage to maintain in North Africa? Do they have the manufacturing base there to support operations? What level of outside support would such a move require by the British or even possibly the Americans? How does this change the dynamic of the Mediterrainian war and the war in North Africa (remember, Italy is in the war too at this point). Could the Italians and Germans even manage to send a force like the one under Rommel historically sent to North Africa in such a situation or support it once it did arrive?
    How does the inclusion of at least 5 operational battleships along with one marginal carrier, and numerous cruisers, destroyers, and submarines change the dynamic of the naval war?
     
  2. Skipper

    Skipper Kommodore

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    Well actually this happened not so far away form north Africa and the roads used by the Free French troops went through north Africa. Morocco Algeria and Tunesia joined Vichy for a while, but many soldiers refused and moved to neighbouring countries such as Tchad and Syria. From there thye moved along with the English from Syria via Egypt and Lybia, but also from Tchad to Italy with the Amercians. Leclercs army grew bigger every day with many colonials joining. In Tchad he said his famous sentence "France won't be liberated until I put the French flag on the Strasbourg Cathedral tower"
     
  3. Carl W Schwamberger

    Carl W Schwamberger Ace

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    I thought this thread had been raised once before here, but a quick search did not turn it up. The French leader Reynaud did consider this. He discussed with others in the governement and while there was support from some military and political leaders most he asked were ready to give up. Churchill had just visited France and was of course ethusiastica bout this idea. Most people still did not recognize the muderous intent of the nazis, and the French leaders had the naive idea that they could negotiate a eventual peace and save France from further suffering.

    With the French navy the Italians are badly outnumbered. They will make a brave fight of it with their torpedo boats and smaller ships. Lots of excitement as destroyers trade shots in night actions amoung the straits and islands.

    In the daytime Allied airforces based in Tunisia raid the Italian convoys and bomb Tripolis docks. Eventually there is a captiol ship action or two and the Italian empire in Africa is over.

    Before the armistice the French had roughly 200,000 to 300,000 men in ground units in North West Africa. These were divided between units organized and deployed for suppresing native rebellion, units organized and deployed for training reservists for service fighting in Europe, and a few divsions capable of field service. The latter were organized mostly in a corps facing the Tunisian/Lybian frontier. There was a fair sized airforce, and many more aircraft had arrived just before the ceasefire. The last paragrahs in this link give a general idea of the air units evacuated to Africa in June.

    http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1985/sep-oct/kirkland.html

    Where the air force gets interesting is that France had already taken delivery of over three hundred US made aircraft, a couple hundred more were enroute aboard ships, and a huge number were on order & in production in US factorys. There were a lot of other items for military use ordered as well. France had even been contracting US ship yards to take on the extra refitting of its warships.

    There were still a portion of the French evacuees from Dunkirk in Britian, and afew more groups drawn from the coast further south as the Germans advanced in June, so more soldiers would be added to the total in North West Africa. After that there was the capacity to take a large additional numbers from the ports of Marsallies and Toulon. Of course the French ground forces had largely disitegrated by mid June and the German advance was very swift. Only another week or two would be available before the Germans closed in on the ports.

    The bottom line is the French had the manpower for organizing at least a half dozen field divsions in NW Africa in the short term, and perhaps a full dozen in 1941. Plus the airpower suitable for supporting a army that size. A reliable supply of additional and replacement equipment was needed. Particularly trucks.

    No. Ony the navy had the ability to sustain itself in any fashion for more than a few months. The industrial capacity of N W Africa or the other colonys was inadquate for sustained large scale military operations. There were considerable raw materials the. Cut off from the usual market of French and European industry those raw materials would be available and very usefull for trading with the US.

    The Brits and mostly the US must make up the loss of the modern equipment. In the longer run this is not a large problem, but for the summer and fall of 1940 the French army in Africa will have a limited attack capability. It is easier for Britian to reinforce this NW African front than Egypt.

    Again, the French fleet makes it easy to defeat the Italian navy. Combined with the British ships, and with air support from Tunisia the Italian sea lanes are soon blocked. No supplies or Afirka Korps. Perhaps Rommel drowns. Massive intervention of the Luftwaffe might keep the sea lanes open. Maybe. But, this means there would not be enough aircraft in NW France to support a serious attack on Britian. And it means risking losses that will interfere with attacking the USSR in 1941. What is the point? Germany saves some Italian orange groves, fish canning factorys. and a phosphous mine? Hitler made some dumb choices along the way, but this is certainly a illogical decision.

    I expect a British armored force will be sent to stregthen the defense of the Tunis/Lybian frontier. Tripoli is far closer to this Allied base than the Western frontier of Egypt, so there are attractive reasons for attacking the Italians there, with a attack from Egypt as a diversion.

    In the Atlantic a few French destroyers will continue to support the British ASW efforts. French colonial airbases will be available for ASW patrols.

    Politically French lobbyists and propagandists will flood the US arguing on every corner for aid to the Allies. Historically British efforts like this captured the imagination of the US and helped the Roosevelt group overcome the isolationists and pro German factions. The existance of a 'Brave French Government valiantly fighting on aganst the forces of evil...' doubles that effect.

    In France theGermans do not have the help of a cooperative French government to organize their looting. They can crate their own collaborationist group, but it wount carry the same authority of the Vichy government. So in the longer run Germany gains less economic beenft from its conquest.

    In Asia Japan cant walk all over the French colony of Indochina. Any attempt to land soldiers there, as Japan did in early 1941, places it instantly at war with Britian, and the US will not be far behind. So Japan has a slightly less favorable position when it finally decides for war. That is no bases in Indochina, and no cheap rubber or rice from the Indochina plantations.
     
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  4. Skipper

    Skipper Kommodore

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    I see you worked on the subject quite a lot Carl.
     
  5. T. A. Gardner

    T. A. Gardner Genuine Chief

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    The French had in North Africa about 265,000 men with another 50,000 or so in French West Africa, and more in Lebanon / Syria. Without any equipment arriving from France there were 388 tanks including some Char D1 and a good number of R 35/39 and H 35/39 in Africa already. Supplies of small arms ammunition were adequite amouting to about 200 million rounds. Artillery shells were in somewhat short supply but adequite while there were plenty of mortar rounds available. Clothing and food stocks exceeded needs.
    With additional men and equipment from France the French could have easily fielded at least one armored or mechanized division and about 10 infantry divisions mostly filled with colonial troops.
    Their airforce could have had at least 500 and upwards of 1000 aircraft of all types at a minimum. Additional aircraft might have made it to England. Sustainable airforces would have amounted to maybe half the available aircraft based on parts availability and using some aircraft as spares. More importantly, would be the pilots themselves. Even without aircraft they could have easily been moved to England or Canada for training on other types and made ready for the BoB in a short period. This would have relieved alot of the stress on the RAF to put pilots into squardons in a hurry.
    The US might also have gotten into the act and provided the French in Africa with supplies and equipment. There was a pretty massive list of already extant French orders with US manufacturers for alot of equipment.
    Given the historical collapse of the Italians in North Africa initially, with the French still fighting the likelihood is that Germany would have written off that theater completely although they would still have taken the Balkans no doubt. Crete would have also been harder to take if there was say another brigade or two of French colonials present. They might have made the difference there.
    While a France still in the war in Africa held little chance of reinvading Europe successfully their presence would have undoubtedly decided the Mediterrainian theater in large measure two years early. With Italy folding up and holding little more than the homeland the Germans would likely have seen their erstwhile ally as of little value.
    How this would change the dynamic of the invasion of Russia is also worth exploring.
    Elsewhere, with the French still in the war they might invite the US or British to help occupy other areas of their colonial empire as well. French Polynesia and New Caledonia come to mind. Madagascar would not have distracted the British in the IO where possibly some French ships could have reinforced the RN as well or allowed the British to put more of their own ships there instead.
    French Indochina is another possibility. Cam Ran Bay is an excellent port. Possibly the British could have reinforced French forces there with Commonwealth troops making Japan's move South more perilous. Without this crucial area under Japanese control (and the likelihood of Thailand staying neutral now) their movement into Malaysia is threatened by lack of air cover for the operation. This would cause a re-think of carrier deployments and might have prevented a Pearl Harbor.
    There is alot of good alternatives in this scenario.
     
  6. Carl W Schwamberger

    Carl W Schwamberger Ace

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    Gardner... I've started taking notes on this subject. Do you have agood source for the strength on the French ground forces in the colonys?
     
  7. anaruka

    anaruka Member

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    Just registered because of this subject:
    Literature about Vichy even proofs that the commanders in the colonies were not at all ready to accept capitulation with not one shot being fired from their ready trained units. There was also a plan on the table to unify France and UK in order to avoid capitulation. Everything was prepared for signing the treaty on a battleship, when Reynaud was forced to resign.
    I think it is even worth to explore a little bit farther: At the 1940 capitulation France was not even half taken. The southern part of France is mountainous and easier to defend then the plains in the north. It is not even sure, that the Wehrmacht would have been able to occupy the whole of southern France, the allies could have kept some footholds there, perhaps also in Corsica, seen the difficulties that Italy had with Malta…
     
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  8. Carl W Schwamberger

    Carl W Schwamberger Ace

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    If Italy is distracted by the fighting in Lybia, or quickly driven out of Africa, I think it unlikely Mussolini woud try any Balkans adventures. That leaves Greece out of the equation, at least for the short term, and makes the Yugoslavian goverment more likely to take a nuetral stance. That is no pro Axis treatys or pro Allied coups. Maybe the airbourne corps would have been directed at some African target, like Tunis, or at a objective in the USSR?
     
  9. Skipper

    Skipper Kommodore

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    Hi Anaruka, welcome to this fine forum. Feel free to go to the new member section and introduce yourself. You will meet many fine chaps here.
     
  10. Carl W Schwamberger

    Carl W Schwamberger Ace

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    The English language historys touch on all this, but lack depth. The details of French politics of this event are largely unknown to us. Where exactly did the opposition to continuing the fight come from? What factions or partys favored seeking a armistice with Germany?
     
  11. clems

    clems Member

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    Petain didn'y cared very much about Africa. Only metropolitan France was important for him, he never served in the colonial wars. And he considered only the politics were guilty and that the only thing to do was ton engociate. And even if he didn't like the germans, he did like some nazi ideas. As seen during the Dreyfus crisis, he didn't liked jews and was opposed to any form of socialism or communism.

    Weygand was convince that the war was over, he knew they were no manufacturing base in africa, the equipement was obsolete and more than 50 % of the french population lived in metropolitan france.

    In fact, he could have organized a plan for retreat before that, and could have began the evacuation in May, but in this case, he would have been forced to abandon France. He choose the other option by creating a defence line on the Somme.

    Despite the legend, Reynaud himself didn't relied much on this option, he didn't want to stop but admitted the defeat in private. Daladier too:

    Gal Gamelin is talking to Daladier about the situation.

    Daladier: It can't be, it is impossible! Launch a counter-attack!

    Gamelin: I don't have ebough reserves.

    Daladier:... So it is the destruction of the french army?

    Gamelin: It is the destruction of the french army.
     
  12. anaruka

    anaruka Member

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    Of course the situation in june 1940 looked quite desperate - the whole northern part of the country was on the roads, whole cities like Reims became ghost towns, others like Limoges overcrowded by refugees, so that the question is less, where the opposition to continue fighting came from, but more why the leaders at the time failed so drastically to consider the long term consequences of capitulation and all the other options. Gerd Maak in his book "In Europe" claims that Reynaud could have become one of the great leaders of Europe, if... it was one of the most serious "leadership crisis" of history, with a tremendus impact for all successive events, holocaust and Russia included. If Weygand had the conviction of de Gaulle, he would have been more dynamic on searching alternatives to French industrial supply, if Reynaud had the perspectiveness of Churchill he would have done anything in order to avoid capitulation. It was a situation, that required leadership and France only found Petain for this who betrayed freedom and democracy for the only sake of order.
     
  13. Skipper

    Skipper Kommodore

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    Yes the fact that half of the country was on the roads all the way up to the Loire and lower will never been emphasized enough. some refugees were straffed by Stukas, reinforcments were blocked , cars broke down , horses were stolen , people were mugged or killed and their car /belongins stolen , houses were plundered by starving civilians, by soldiers( from both camps), people were thrown on the roads by force , even those who did not want to leave. Add to this refugees from Belgium, retreating troops, some deserters, and the fear of the fifth "collumn" and you can imagine the distress of these poor people who neither had news about those thye had left behind or their house. If you are intereste din this I recommend the book by Van Wehrt called Frankreich auf der Flucht (1940) . It is obvioulsy propaganda but he is nevertheless a journalist who travelled with refugees across France all the way to the Spanich border. He was there as a German civilian and arrived at some places before the army.
     
  14. clems

    clems Member

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    And general Gamelin was quite a weak commander. He always said when saying his orders " i don't want to interfere with the command of the war but..."

    Or the legendary answer:
    "General Corap? The Meuse? This don't interest me."


    And we mustn't forget that the french empire population was 70 millions of people, i don't know if this include the metropolitan france, but the population of france herself was 42 millions of people. So in the population of the french empire, France had a big part.

    Also, the speech at the radio of Petain on 17 june was a critical error. The Armistice became effective the 25 June. Before the 17 june, they were 9000 french prisonners per day, between the 17 and the 25, they were 132000 prisonners per day. And in July, the 400000 soldiers based in the Maginot line surrendered without being defeated.
     
  15. Skipper

    Skipper Kommodore

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    Petain's speech of June 17th was heard by millions. De gaulle's speech of June18th was almost unheeded. Many did not even know he existed or who he was. Petain was a WWI hero. Who could have expected he would shake Hitler's hand at Montoire? In the middle of a huge chaos he was about the only figure left, that's why so many had faith in him and took months to realise he had sold out to the Nazis.
     
  16. Carl W Schwamberger

    Carl W Schwamberger Ace

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    I'm pleased to see so many with French addresses posting here.

    Am I correct to think the decsion for accepting a armisitce came from two things? First the suffering of the French population in June as the catastrophe grew. Second the idea that the German leaders were ultimately civlized and reasonable men who could be negotiated with.

    That is the French leaders thought a armistice and eventual peace soon atainable, and the occupation until peace was settled no worse than in 1871?

    Thus any French government that decided to continue resistance and reestabllishment in the colonys would see the suffering of the population extended and made worse?
     
  17. Carl W Schwamberger

    Carl W Schwamberger Ace

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    I noticed this thread has a five star rating attached. Nothing else in the What If forum of recent date displays any stars. Why so many stars?
     
  18. Slipdigit

    Slipdigit Good Ol' Boy Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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    One or more persons rated it five stars at the top of the page to the right.

    I can see why, it is a most interesting thread.
     
  19. anaruka

    anaruka Member

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    However, it is interesting to see all the missed opportunities. Until the 17th of june the turnout was all but inevitable. The tragedy of Monnet's Anglo-French unity project is that, pronounced one week earlier, it probably would have given a complete different slent to the situation. Perhaps it was even a matter of days or, who knows, hours. de Gaulle, Churchill, Monnet and perhaps even Reynaud must have had an idea what this surrender could mean. So the stunning fact is that, from the start of the battle of France (for not mentioning the planning phase - the Dyle plan that required, because of Belgium's neutrality, to rely on the instant collaboration of forces, that had no opportunity to train this in advance) until the 17th of June there was mistake after mistake, defeat after defeat, mischief after mischief, lost opportunity after lost opportunity but only the decision of surrender finally cracked down all other outcome.
     
  20. Carl W Schwamberger

    Carl W Schwamberger Ace

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    With the legitamate government departed and hostile to Germany, how much worse will the occupation be for the French? I'd imagine there would be the inevitable collaborationists willing to form a pro German of Facist government, which would not be very popular.

    Would resistance to occupation & facism expand faster, would facist organisations like the Milice appear sooner? My understanding of French politics of this era are very weak & I am unsure of the various directions this might go.
     

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