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US Army "Repple Depple" system

Discussion in 'WWII General' started by JCFalkenbergIII, Mar 18, 2008.

  1. JCFalkenbergIII

    JCFalkenbergIII Expert

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    What do you think of the "Repple Depple" system in 1944? Do you think that the system was flawed and was wrong to send so many undertrained or untrained soldiers to military units? Especially during the Battle of the Bulge? I have read of for one example soldiers being sent to tank units with no training and or even familiarization of what they were going to use. The loss rate for these replacements must have been horrible. I know that there were some units that were in the line for long periods of time . I seem to remember one unit having suffered over 250% casualties .I find it kind of sad IMO to send replacements with no knowledge at all of what they were expected to do to combat units. Most hadn't even fired a weapon at all since bootcamp.
     
  2. Ceraphix

    Ceraphix Member

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    I guess Germany wasn't in much of a position to waste time training soldiers at that point in the war when they were outnumbered probably 1.5-2 to 1 in men in the West and at least 4 to 1 in the east. However, one could also argue that though the soldiers were untrained, the equipment they were given was effective enough to offset this.
     
  3. JCFalkenbergIII

    JCFalkenbergIII Expert

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    The "Repple Depple" system is a US Army replacement system. It really seems to have broken down in 1944.
     
  4. Ceraphix

    Ceraphix Member

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    Oh, my bad. It sounded like something German to me :rolleyes:.
     
  5. Slipdigit

    Slipdigit Good Ol' Boy Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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    I don't necessarily think it was the "system" that was at fault, rather it was from a poor expectation of the numbers of casualties that the infantry in the ETO was going to face. The training problems arose from men being culled out of jobs they had been trained for and then shuttled into infanty roles, for which they had not, and in an expedient manner due to unexpectedly high losses in infantry formations. A large number of these men had been trained in AAA battalions and found themselves not needed as the Luftwaffe was not as looming a threat as had been thought by early war planners.

    Ceraphix, it was American slang for Replacement Depot.
     
  6. JCFalkenbergIII

    JCFalkenbergIII Expert

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    Like the ammunition shortage in 44 the US hadn't planned on having to use additional troops that late in the war. It was an act of not proper planning.Especially after the Bulge.Some preformed quite well in thier new jobs. But quite a few didn't.
     
  7. C.Evans

    C.Evans Expert

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    BTW, the German replacement system was that German units got their replacement from the Wehrkries that was where they originally were from. So for most of the war, men from say, Hamburg, were sent to units that had been formed from recruits that were from Hamburg. That really made things more simple IMO.
     
  8. Slipdigit

    Slipdigit Good Ol' Boy Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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    One problem with the German replacement system was that the soldier stayed on the divisional rolls while he was recuperating, whether he was in the field or in the hospital. Therefore, a replacement was not sent because the wounded man was still a part of the unit. If he were to be gone for, say, three months, no replacement was sent for him unless he was placed on permanent disability or had died. So, it could take days or weeks for him to be removed and a replacement authorized. A German combat unit could very conceivably be at "full strength" and still have large numbers of men scattered throughout medical facilties and you have to consider this when looking at German unit troops strengths. Men counted as being in the unit may not actually be there.

    US casualties were removed from unit rolls as soon as they hit a battalion aid station or hospital further back and replacements were authorized then, often times resulting in next day arrival of replacements. Strength numbers for US formations were usually fairly accurate and allowed quicker rebuilding of troop levels, provided the men were available.
     
  9. Seadog

    Seadog Member

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    The repo depot system was very effective. When a soldier got injured, it was necessary to replace them immediately. A large number of the replacement troops were those that received minor injuries that kept them out of their units too long. Most US troops trained as a unit and were sent over as a unit. The big problem was that you had a large number of inexperienced, but trained troops, going on the line together. In many cases, they were used to give front line troops a breather and just used to hold captured territory. Or held in reserve during movement. However, if the Germans found out that they had a new unit in a position, they would attack that front. The only real problem with the repo depot system is that some troops would go AWOL from there to rejoin their unit. The units would welcome them back and make adjustments to their documentation, but it could leave the depot system short. All American troops are trained in infantry tactics before learning their skill position. If they are not needed in one position, they can be reassigned to another area. And when push came to shove, cooks, clerks, and drivers would grab their weapons and go to work. Since combat is a skill, it is not surprising that new soldiers are at a disadvantage. You cannot duplicate combat in training. You can duplicate the physical challenges, but the mental challenges are what really matters when the trigger is pulled.
     
  10. JCFalkenbergIII

    JCFalkenbergIII Expert

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    Yet In 1944 troops like cooks, clerks and drivers along with surplus AA troops were were rushed forward to infantry and armored units who had not fired a weapon since bootcamp. Some not for years since. And some with not a single minute inside a Tank nor even been near one. A severe and potentionally deadly disadvantage for themselves and those around them..
     
  11. Earthican

    Earthican Member

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  12. harolds

    harolds Member

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    I think the real problem with the American system was that newbies were sent up to the line, usually at night. Many didn't even survive the night. They didn't even know what unit they were in or even their squad leader's name. Thus, they were thrown into the deep end and had to sink or swim. This in itself led to many unnessassary casualties. It worked better when, like the German system, they waited until the unit was back of the front line, then mated up with their new unit and everyone got to know them.
     
  13. Slipdigit

    Slipdigit Good Ol' Boy Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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    By and large that is accurate, but not consistent throughout the various units. The 30th ID was known not to engage in this practice. Replacements were held until the unit they were joining were pulled into reserve, even if it was just a company that became the battalion reserve.
     
  14. Earthican

    Earthican Member

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    I have yet to see anybody prove that with period documents or an analysis of the dates and numbers.


    While most commanders knew it was bad practice to feed replacements directly into combat, many seemed to find it convenient or expedient. I imagine it saved on staff work.

    When the main attack faltered, blame was directed on the supporting attacks and pressure applied from above. Without any other resources to apply, units on the flanks put all their infantry on the line and used the replacements to "fake" combat worthiness. Meanwhile units in the main attack got regular rotations and rest periods.

    Applicable in the Huertgen and for the Third Army. Late in 1944, Patton was conducting the ultimate supporting attack (not counting Italy). Looking at the few divisions Third Army had and the frontages they covered, his army lived on replacements.

    None of this was intentional. Mostly it just happened.
     

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