How could US Offensive Tactics have been improved?

Offhand, I would suggest much more ship to shore naval bombardments, lasting for weeks on end, rather than a paltry day or two. I would have also listened to Admirals like Halsey, who suggested to cancel the Peleliu Invasion and instead, concentrate on the Philippines.

 

I would also suggest clamping a tight submarine blockade on every island group that the US intended to invade, several months in advance of the actual invasion date, in order to cut their supplies of weapons, construction material and food. It almost worked on Saipan, but not nearly enough.

 

You cant keep capital ships around for too long due to their logistical needs, plus each day on one spot meant more and more Japanese attacks.

I see the need for the AAF B24's to carry larger capacity bombs on a more frequent operations rate. Even if it meant the AAF had to request Lancasters from the RAF, so be it.

Other than that, the allies learned a lot in each invasion and progressively got the tactics, doctrine and specialized eqmt down to an art.

 

I can't agree. The US Navy Fleet Train capabilities after 1943 were practically infinite. At sea and underway replenishment was down to a science by that time. This was "a fleet that came to stay."

 

No, the capabilities of the US Navy Fleet Train weren't "practically infinite" at any time during WW II. The size and abilities of the US Navy Service Squadrons grew while barely keeping pace with the requirements of each succeeding military operation.

You need to read "Beans, Bullets and Black Oil" by Worrell R. Carter.

HyperWar: Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil (FLeet logistics in the Pacific)

 

There were specific errors, certainly, but I don't see much to condemn generally. The most common criticism I hear regards the effort in the Solomons. A single-prong advance is offered as a superior alternative. I have no opinion on the subject.
A simple way to improve matters would be to give the fleet a decent set of torpedoes--not a policy matter, but a big improvement nonetheless.

 

After fall 1943, they became redundant. The conversion of the mounts to AA served the ships better in the long run.

As for single prong or double prong, history showed that the allies had enough men and material to do both.

One thing I would have done as soon as as possible, is to go on a sustained oil offensive against the oil refineries in the NEI that were within range of Darwin. The 380th BG did hit them on occasion, but nothing sustained.

 

Radar controlled gunfire was far more effective.

Surigao Straight proved that.

 

From August, 1944, until June, 1945 a squadron of B-24's was stationed at Darwin and carried out very long range bombing attacks against oil refineries such as those at Balikpapen on Borneo. These were, however, fairly small refineries and bombing them did not severely affect Japanese oil production. The other refineries on Borneo, such as Miri (where my wife's family was in WW II) were beyond the range of air attack from Darwin.

The two largest oil refineries (capable of a combined output equal to 75 % of Japan's requirement for aviation gas) were at Palembang on the Island of Sumatra. These also, were far beyond the range of any Allied bombers stationed at Darwin during WW II. The Palembang refineries were raided by British carrier aviation in January, 1945, but by that time, no petroleum products of any kind were reaching Japan or most of the rest of her far-flung empire.

 

Most of the damage at Surigao Strait appears to have been inflicted by torpedoes.

 

I think history showed that submarines could not mount AA firepower sufficient for self-defense purposes, though I don't recall any that sacrificed their torpedoes for that extra edge against planes.

 

I am referring to the destroyers that mounted the tubes.

Youre being sarcastic?

 

The 380th BG was based at Darwin beginning May 1943 and flew several missions to Balikpapin and others. But because of the reality of having only a single B24 group in that part of the world, most missions were of a dozen AC or less.

As for the importance of this refinery, it was #2 in the scheme of things and a very high value target. With a little fore sight from the 5th Bomber Command, more B24 assetts could have been made available to the 380th (or move a B24 group there permanently in late 1942), and a systematic bombing campaign against all refineries within range could have been done.

 

The Balikpapen refinery was "#2 in the scheme of things"?

In size? In output? What "scheme of things"? According to my sources it was small and contributed very little to Japan's stock of refined petroleum products. So who says it was that "high value"?

The fact is very few of the refineries in the NEI were within B-24 range of Darwin. Being able to bomb some of the smaller ones just didn't make that much difference. And because most were a long way from Darwin, the B-24's couldn't carry useful bomb loads.

Besides that, in 1942 the Japanese were still bombing the hell out of any air bases near Darwin. So how do you conduct a "sustained bombing campaign" with the enemy destroying your airfields, equipment, ordnance, aircraft, and personnel?

 

No, more roundabout. We can't say that improved torpedoes in late 1943 would be redundant, as there remained a vast harvest of ships that torpedoes could account for--in fact, DID account for, as this was the period when quality torpedoes gutted the Japanese merchant fleet. My suggested change makes these quality torpedoes available at the outset of the fighting. Maybe it would be redundant in late 1943 if the successes to that date left a paucity of worthy targets, but it's hard to forecast that.
It's also worth noting the possible changes to the Midway battle, with the Devastators carrying a decent weapon. Yorktown survives?

 

Sorry, but I don't understand your reference to Midway in this context?

If Balikpapen crude is not refined, why was there a refinery there?