Stalin's Aggressive Plan in 1941

I think that Hitler, defending himself from the USSR and launching preventive war in some way had saved western civilization.

1939 Partition of Poland between Stalin and Hitler
1939 – 1940 Successful offensive war against Japan and Finland
1940 Aggression against six neutral
European states — Poland, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Romania
1941 Preparation for an aggression on a massive scale
More than five million of regular Red Army troops were deployed near the west frontier (not mentioning 1000000 of paratroopers). Also two dozen of thousands of advanced tanks and aircrafts, the best in the world artillery were ready to ‘liberate’ Europe, thereby to paint all Europe red color.
But Hitler had launched his surprise attack and disturbed Stalin’s plan to conquer Europe. Anyway, Stalin did his best to take at least half of Europe at the end of the WWII.

By 1941 USSR had biggest army and the best armaments ever, including more than 23000 of tanks and 18000 aircrafts, 60000 of cannons, while no army in the world didn’t have anything like that even in their military dreams at that moment.​

Hitler simply had no choice at that moment whether attack USSR or not, because he knew very well that the Soviets were preparing offensive operation on eastern borders with dense concentration in south, not far from the Germans only oil in Romania.
But the scale of this preparation made by communists to “liberate” Europe he appreciated much later.
So, if it wasn’t for the Soviets and their aggressive plans Britain would have been strangled by the Germans (just question of time). And at the same time if it wasn’t for the preventive attack on USSR whole Europe would have been painted RED. And there was nothing they could do about it.


"Only naive people believe that the chief task of fortified zones is defence. This is not so. Fortified zones are built so that an offensive may be prepared in greater security. They must also securely conceal the deployment of groupings of shock troops, repel any enemy attempt to disrupt their deployment, and support our troops with all possible fire power when they go over to the offensive. "
Major-General PIOTR GRIGORENKO
(Memoirs, New York 1981, p. 141

 

Hitler did not attack the USSR to spoil the Red Army attack, he attacked to get his Lebensraum.

Remember: " Kick the door in and the whole rotten house collapses!" by AH

I think that means at least AH was not expecting any kind of attack from the Red Army.

And check Hossbach memorandum from the net or in the Forums by search.

 

Also, the Japanese attacked the Soviets which began the boarder wars with the attack at Lake Khasan in 1938. Not the other way around.

 

On June 21, 1941, Hitler wrote a letter Mussolini: “Russia is trying to destroy the Romanian oil fields… The task for our armies is eliminating this threat as soon as possible.” Herein lies the cause of Hitler’s attack. This was not at all a struggle for Lebensraum(living space)


On 17 June 1945, a group of Soviet military investigators were interrogating some senior Nazi military leaders. In the course of his interrogation, Field-Marshal Keitel maintained that

“all the preparatory measures we took before spring 1941 were defensive measures against the contingency of a possible attack by the Red Army. Thus the entire war in the East, to a known degree, may be termed a preventive war . . . We decided ...to forestall an attack by Soviet Russia and to destroy its armed forces with a surprise attack. By spring 1941, I had formed the definite opinion that the heavy buildup of Russian troops, and their attack on Germany which would follow, would place us, in both economic and strategic terms, in an exceptionally critical situation . . . Our attack was the immediate consequence of this threat .”

Colonel-General Alfred Jodl, the main author of the German military plans, adopted the same stance. The Soviet investigators did their best to force Keitel and Jodl out of their postures, but did not succeed. Keitel and Jodl did not change their testimony and, along with the principal war criminals, were sentenced to be hanged by the international tribunal at Nuremberg. One of the main accusations against them was 'the unleashing of an unprovoked aggressive war' against the Soviet Union

 

NINETY-NINTH DAY

Wednesday, 4 April 1946

Morning Session
Defendant KEITEL

DR. NELT`E: Was it never actually discussed that if one wanted to launch an attack on the Soviet Union, one would previously have to take diplomatic steps or else send a declaration of war, or an ultimatum?
KEITEL: Oh, yes, I discussed that. As early as the winter of 1940-1941, whenever there were discussions regarding the strength of the Russian forces on the demarcation line, that is, in December-January, I asked Hitler to send a note to the Soviet Union so as to bring about a cleaning-up of the situation, if I may express it so. I can add now that the first time he said nothing at all, and the second time he refused, maintaining that it was useless, since he would only receive the answer that this was an internal affair and that it was none of our business, or something like that. At any rate, he refused. I tried again, at a later stage, that is to say I voiced the request that an ultimatum should be presented before we entered upon an action, so that in some form the basis would be created for a preventive war, as we called it, for an attack.
DR. NELTE: You say "preventive war." When the final decisions were made, what was the military situation?
KEITEL: I am best reminded of how we, or rather the Army judged the situation, by a study or memorandum. I believe it is Document 872-PS, dated the end of January or the beginning of February, a report made by the Chief of the General Staff of the Army to Hitler on the state of operative and strategic preparations. And in this document I found the information we then had on the strength of the Red Army and other existing information known to us, which is dealt with fully in this document.
Apart from that, I have to say too that the intelligence service of the OKW, Admiral Canaris, placed at my disposal or at the Army's disposal very little material because the Russian area was closely sealed against German intelligence. In other words, there were gaps up to a certain point. Only the things contained in Document 872-PS were known.
DR. NELTE: Would you like to say briefly what it contained, so as to justify your decision?
KEITEL: Yes, there were -- Halder reported that there were 150 divisions of the Soviet Union deployed along the line of demarcation. Then there were aerial photographs of a large number of airdromes. In short, there was a degree of preparedness on the part of Soviet Russia, which could at any time lead to military action. Only the actual fighting later made it clear just how far the enemy had been prepared. I must say, that we fully realized all these things only during the actual attack.

 

The Battle of Khalkhyn Gol was the decisive engagement of the undeclared Soviet-Japanese Border War, or Japanese-Soviet War, fought between the Soviet Union, Mongolia and the Empire of Japan in 1939.

At the beginning of August 1939, G. K. Zhukov was preparing his surprise strike against the Japanese.

Khalkhin-Gol was the first lighting war of the twentieth century; it was blitzkrieg in the purest form. It was the first time in history that large masses of tanks were used correctly: to strike in depth. This was the prime example of unseen concentration of artillery in tight areas of front. It was an example of absolute surprise attack-during the first hour and half of battle, the Japanese artillery did not fire a single shot and not a single Japanese plane rose into the air

 

Join Date: Aug 2009
Posts: 11



The Hitler - Mannerheim Conversation, recording was made in secrete.

Hitler: ...a very serious danger, perhaps the most serious one - it's whole extent we can only now judge. We did not ourselves understand - just how strong this state [the USSR] was armed.

Mannerheim: No, we hadn't thought of this.

Hitler: No, I too, no.

Mannerheim: During the Winter War - during the Winter War we had not even thought of this. Of course...

Hitler: (Interrupting) Yes.

Mannerheim: But so, how they - in reality - and now there is no doubt all they had - what they had in their stocks!

Hitler: Absolutely, This is - they had the most immense armaments that, uh, people could imagine. Well - if somebody had told me that a country - with...(Hitler is interrupted by the sound of a door opening and closing.) If somebody had told me a nation could start with 35,000 tanks, then I'd have said: "You are crazy!"

Mannerheim: Thirty-five?

Hitler: Thirty-five thousand tanks.

Another Voice In Background: Thirty-five thousand! Yes!

Hitler: We have destroyed - right now - more than 34,000 tanks. If someone had told me this, I'd have said: "You!" If you are one of my generals had stated that any nation has 35,000 tanks I'd have said: "You, my good sir, you see everything twice or ten times. You are crazy; you see ghosts." This I would have deemed possible. I told you earlier we found factories, one of them at Kramatorskaja, for example, Two years ago there were just a couple hundred [tanks]. We didn't know anything. Today, there is a tank plant, where - during the first shift a little more than 30,000, and 'round the clock a little more than 60,000, workers would have labored - a single tank plant! A gigantic factory! Masses of workers who certainly, lived like animals and...

Another Voice In Background: (Interrupting) In the Donets area?

Hitler: In the Donets area. (Background noises from the rattling of cups and plates over the exchange.)

Mannerheim: Well, if you keep in mind they had almost 20 years, almost 25 years of - freedom to arm themselves...

Hitler: (Interrupting quietly) It was unbelievable.

Mannerheim: And everything - everything spent on armament.

Hitler: Only on armament.

Mannerheim: Only on armament!

Hitler: (Sighs) Only - well, it is - as I told your president [Ryte] before - I had no idea of it. If I had an idea - then I would have been even more difficult for me, but I would have taken the decision [to invade] anyhow, because - there was no other possibility. It was - certain, already in the winter of '39/ '40, that the war had to begin. I had only this nightmare - but there is even more! Because a war on two fronts - would have been impossible - that would have broken us. Today, we see more clearly - than we saw at that time - it would have broken us. And my whole - I originally wanted to - already in the fall of '39 I wanted to conduct the campaign in the west - on the continuously bad weather we experienced hindered us.

Our whole armament - you know, was - is a pure good weather armament. It is very capable, very good, but it is unfortunately just a good-weather armament. We have seen this in the war. Our weapons naturally were made for the west, and we all thought, and this was true 'till that time, uh, it was the opinion from the earliest times: you cannot wage war in winter. And we too, have, the German tanks, they weren't tested, for example, to prepare them for winter war. Instead we conducted trials to prove it was impossible to wage war in winter. That is a different starting point [than the Soviet's]. In the fall of 1939 we always faced the question. I desperately wanted to attack, and I firmly believed we could finish France in six weeks.

However, we faced the question of whether we could move at all - it was raining continuously. And I know the French area myself very well and I too could not ignore the opinions, of many of my generals that, we - probably - would not have had the élan, that our tank arm would not have been, effective, that our air force could not been effective from our airfields because of the rain.

I know northern France myself. You know, I served in the Great War for four years. And - so the delay happened. If I had in '39 eliminated France, then world history would have changed. But I had to wait 'till 1940, and unfortunately it wasn't possible before May. Only on the 10th of May was the first nice day - and on the 10th of May I immediately attacked. I gave the order to attack on the 10th on the 8th. And - then we had to, conduct this huge transfer of our divisions from the west to the east.

First the occupation of - then we had the task in Norway - at the same time we faced - I can frankly say it today - a grave misfortune, namely the - weakness of, Italy. Because of - first, the situation in North Africa, then, second, because of the situation in Albania and Greece - a very big misfortune. We had to help. This meant for us, with one small stoke, first - the splitting of our air force, splitting our tank force, while at the same time we were preparing, the, tank arm in the east. We had to hand over - with one stroke, two divisions, two whole divisions and a third was then added - and we had to replace continuous, very severe, losses there. It was - bloody fighting in the desert.

This all naturally was inevitable, you see. I had a conversation with Molotov [Soviet Minister] at that time, and it was absolutely certain that Molotov departed with the decision to begin a war, and I dismissed the decision to begin a war, and I dismissed him with the decision to - impossible, to forestall him. There was - this was the only - because the demands that man brought up were clearly aimed to rule, Europe in the end. (Practically whispering here.) Then I have him - not publicly...(fades out).

Already in the fall of 1940 we continuously faced the question, uh: shall we, consider a break up [in relations with the USSR]? At that time, I advised the Finnish government, to - negotiate and, to gain time and, to act dilatory in this matter - because I always feared - that Russia suddenly would attack Romania in the late fall - and occupy the petroleum wells, and we would have not been ready in the late fall of 1940. If Russia indeed had taken Romanian petroleum wells, than Germany would have been lost. It would have required - just 60 Russian divisions to handle that matter.

In Romania we had of course - at that time - no major units. The Romanian government had turned to us only recently - and what we did have there was laughable. They only had to occupy the petroleum wells. Of course, with our weapons I could not start a, war in September or October. That was out of the question. Naturally, the transfer to the east wasn't that far advanced yet. Of course, the units first had to reconsolidate in the west. First the armaments had to be taken care of because we too had - yes, we also had losses in our campaign in the west. It would have been impossible to attack - before the spring of 19, 41. And if the Russians at that time - in the fall of 1940 - had occupied Romania - taken the petroleum wells, then we would have been, helpless in 1941.

Another Voice In Background: Without petroleum...

Hitler: (Interrupting) We had huge German production: however, the demands of the air force, our Panzer divisions - they are really huge. It is level of consumption that surpasses the imagination. And without the addition of four to five million tons of Romanian petroleum, we could not have fought the war - and would have had to let it be - and that was my big worry. Therefore I aspired to, bridge the period of negotiations 'till we would be strong enough to, counter those extortive demands [from Moscow] because - those demands were simply naked extortion's. They were extortion's. The Russians knew we were tied up in the west. They could really extort everything from us. Only when Molotov visited - then - I told him frankly that the demands, their numerous demands, weren't acceptable to us. With that the negotiations came to an abrupt end that same morning.

There were four topics. The one topic that, involved Finland was, the, freedom to protect themselves from the Finnish threat, he said. [I said] You do not want to tell me Finland threatens you! But he said: "In Finland it is - they who take action against the, friends, of the Soviet Union. They would [take action] against [our] society, against us - they would continuously, persecute us and, a great power cannot be threatened by a minor country."

I said: "Your, existence isn't threatened by Finland! That is, you don't mean to tell me..."

Mannerheim: (Interrupting) Laughable!

Hitler: "...that your existence is threatened by Finland?" Well [he said] there was a moral - threat being made against a great power, and what Finland was doing, that was a moral - a threat to their moral existence. Then I told him we would not accept a further war in the Baltic area as passive spectators. In reply he asked me how we viewed our position in, Romania. You know, we had given them a guarantee. [He wanted to know] if that guarantee was directed against Russia as well? And that time I told him: "I don't think it is directed at you, because I don't think you have the intention of attacking Romania. You have always stated that Bessarabia is yours, but that you have - never stated that you want to attack Romania!"

"Yes," he told me, but he wanted to know more precisely if this guarantee...(A door opens and the recording ends.)

​

 

Wasn’t it daft to believe soviets comrades and to waste tons of paper in order to write thousands of books and dissertations based on fairytales which have been made up by communists.
NO, it wasn’t, but unfortunately only in one case, if such “history” was, and for some of them probably still is, convenient for the both parties.
Initially I felt pity for historians like John Erickson, under the assumption that they were just treacherously deceived by those who were representing regime which seemed to be such a philanthropic, pacific and truthful ever, that it is simply indecent not to believe soviet comrades and everything they were saying.
But wait a minute. Were John Erickson and his colleagues deaf and blind? Never heard about cold war and evil empire. Don’t think so.
And truth, as usually, sometimes can be very nasty. The history they wrote was convenient, suitable, excusatory and even profitable for both parties.
For one (USSR) - impunity, for another - general recognition of historical society, orders, glory and money, and, of course, mass publications rubbish.

Western historians stupidly followed the Soviet Union's interpretation of WW II. In spite of all the freedom to research the past most western scholars became lazy and let Soviet’s historians do their thinking for them.
A lot of these “brilliant” historians were invited by USSR, treated like a girl on the first date, with drinks, sweets and promises. They melted and believed in every piece of fabricated information. I wonder if these guys ever ask themselves why Soviet comrades were so anxious about their historical careers.
One of the important aspects of Communist Party policy was lie. To cover crimes they lied to its own population, lied themselves, because the truth was never in favour of communism. So, why they would tell the truth to their sworn enemies?????


It is time now to shed some light on the “professional historians” I refer to here. Who are they? Well, to my best understanding, it seems there is a group of friends at the top including, David Glantz, John Erickson, Gabriel Gorodetskey, Jonathan House. This core is also highly supported by other famous names, such as Jonathan Haslem, Robin Edmonds, Roger Reese, John Lukacs, among many others. If you read their works, their articles, their interviews you will immediately notice their tendency to praise each others works. Those from the outer circle, usually not military historians, would contribute by a praising book review of their works in renowned journals, such as Foreign Affairs is.

In case you want to understand the historiography of WWII, make sure to read BOTH SIDES OF THE STORY and make up your own mind about it! Only then you will begin to understand the whole complexity of the problem.

 

Reading "Icebreaker" are we???

Not a single well respected historian believes that Hitler attacked Russia in order to save himself.... Are you familiar with Mein Kampf??? Hitler outlined his plans for Russia over a decade before he attacked.

And Russia did not attack Japan it was the other way around!
Battle of Khalkhin Gol - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

As for the tanks, Russian has over 22,000 now and guess what, most of them are on the Western boarder. Maybe someone should launch a pre-emptive strike on Russia because Europe is again in danger.

 

Most of what Hitler said in public was propaganda to substantiate his actions. But that is neither here nor there. What is important is where is the proof that Stalin was planning to invade the West? I have yet to see anything that shows he was intending to invade. What I have seen is that Stalin was building up a defense against invasion from Hitler. His pact with Hitler was a stall for time. Having the most modern equipment does not equate to success. Look at his attack on Finland. Successful but at what cost? It had nothing to do with modern equipment, just sheer numbers and no consideration to the casualty list. After his purge, I think Stalin knew he was not in any shape to attach anyone.

 

Stalin wanted to attack the West!

What a load of rot.

If Stalin wanted to, why the hell did he step up giving oil and materials to Germany in 1940?

Read Ivan's War and you will see what shape the Russian Army was in.

 

Both sides were underestimating their opponent and their own ability. Germany just did it better and that is why they lost.
Russians were very close to attacking Germany in 1941. Hitler had no choice but to attack Russia.
Yes people say Russian military was not ready for war and were taking defensive positions.
They might have not been ready as we look back now but:
Russians were pioneers in airborne operations. Airborne is not for defense.
Russians had more light amphibious tanks than all German tanks combine. Light swimming tanks are no good for defensive operations, but are very good for lightning attack and quick breakout to the rear of Western Europe.
Russians were dismantling their defensive belts along Western borders. (STALIN LINE)
Russians have moved a lot of their airfields closer to the front.
Russians started to move their supplies to the frontier areas.
Russians have begun to move their border troops (NKVD) to the rear.

There are a lot of these examples of aggressive moves by Russian army which make me believe of their immanent attack.
People say Russian military were backward and not prepared but they were not stupid.

 

Stalin needed Hitler to conquer Europe and then to liberate it for himself.
Communism can only happen after a world wide revolution. In order for that to take place Bolsheviks had to take over the world.

 

Just because a country has offensive weapons does not mean that it intends to attack. Ever heard of counteroffensives? Once attacked, a country would be in need of paratroopers or amphib tanks and forward air bases. Having such offensive capabilities also deters invasions. Again, there is nothing that I have read which shows that the Soviet Union had plans to attack Germany. Having offensive weapons is not a sign that they were intending to invade.

 

Not through overt invasion. Subversion was their method. The people had to revolt of which the Soviet Union provided monetary and military support.

 

ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-SEVENTH DAY
Wednesday, 5 June 1946

Morning Session
The Defendant Jodl

DR. EXNER: In your diary-the so-called diary-Document 1809-PS, Volume I of my document book, Page 83, you write on 24 May: "Situation in the East becomes precarious due to the Russian menace against Bessarabia." That is on 24 May 1940. That is what you wrote in your diary. How did you come to this conclusion?
JODL: The reason was a dispatch from Canaris reporting the concentration of 30 Russian divisions against Bessarabia. Whether the note expressing anxiety originated with me, or whether it was an idea of the Fuehrer's which I jotted down, I can no longer say today.

DR. EXNER: Now, when did you first hear of the Fuehrer's fears that Russia might prove hostile to us?
JODL: For the first time, on 29 July 1940, at the Berghof near Berchtesgaden.
DR. EXNER: In what connection?
JODL: The Fuehrer kept me back alone after a discussion on the situation and said to me, most unexpectedly, that he was worried that Russia might occupy still more territory in Romania before the winter and that the Romanian oil region, which was the conditio sine qua non for our war strategy, would thus be taken from us. He asked me whether we could not deploy our troops immediately, so that we would be ready by autumn to oppose with strong forces any such Russian intention. These are almost the exact words which he used, and all other versions are false.


DR. EXNER: Tell me, in these statements, which Hitler made to you, was there ever any mention made of such things as the extension of the "Lebensraum," and of the food basis as a reason for a war of conquest, and so on?
JODL: In my presence the Fuehrer never even hinted at any other reason than a purely strategic and operational one. For months on end, one might say, he incessantly repeated:
"No further doubt is possible. England is hoping for this final sword-thrust against us on the continent, else she would have stopped the war after Dunkirk. Private or secret agreements have certainly already been made. The Russian deployment is unmistakable. One day we shall suddenly become the victim of cold-blooded political extortion, or we shall be attacked."
But otherwise, though one might talk about it for weeks on end, no word was mentioned to me of any other than purely strategical reasons of this kind.

DR. EXNER: Did the reports which you received contain indications of military reinforcements for the Red Army?

JODL: From maps which were submitted every few days, which were based on intelligence reports and information from the radio interception section, the following picture was formed: In the summer of 1940 there were about 100 Russian divisions along the border. In January 1941, there were already 150 divisions; and these were indicated by number, consequently the reports were reliable. In comparison with this strength, I may add that the English-American-French forces operating from France against Germany never, to my knowledge, amounted to 100 divisions.

DR. EXNER: Then, in your opinion, the Fuehrer waged a preventive war. Did later experiences prove that this was a military necessity?
JODL: It was undeniably a purely preventive war. What we found out later on was the certainty of enormous Russian military
preparations opposite our frontiers. I will dispense with details, but I can only say that although we succeeded in a tactical surprise as to the day and the hour, it was no strategic surprise. Russia was fully prepared for war.
DR. EXNER: As an example, could you perhaps tell the Tribunal the number of new airfields which were discovered in the Russian-Polish area?
JODL: I recall approximately that there had been about 20 airfields in eastern Poland, and that in the meantime these had been increased to more than a hundred.
DR. EXNER: Quite briefly, under these conditions what would have been the result of Russia's having forestalled us?
JODL: I do not want to go into the strategic principles, into the operations behind the front; but I can state briefly that we were never strong enough to defend ourselves in the East, as has been proved by the events since 1942. That may sound grotesque, but in order to occupy this front of over 2,000 kilometers we needed 300 divisions at least; and we never had them. If we had waited until the invasion, and a Russian attack had caught us in a pincer movement, simultaneously, we certainly would have been lost. If, therefore, the political premise was correct, namely that we were threatened by this attack, then from a military point of view also the preventive attack was justified. The political situation was presented to us soldiers in this light, consequently we based our military work accordingly.

 

In September 1939, as a result of the Red Army’s “war of liberation” in Poland, the new western border of the Soviet Union advanced in such a way that the so-called Belostok bulge formed in Byelorussia- a powerful wedge that, like a ship’s bow, broke into the territory occupied by Germany. The same thing happened in the Lvov region – there, another powerful wedge of Soviet territory formed. The Belostok and Lvov bulges were like two Soviet peninsulas in the German sea. Basic military logic dictated: if the Red Army intended to defend itself, it could not keep troops in the Belostok and Lvov bulges. Already, in peacetime, enemy troops surrounded the Soviet army on three sides in the bulges. The Soviet flanks were open and vulnerable. A sudden and decisive German attack on the flanks in these bulges would have cut off the best sections of the Red Army from the main forces and supply bases. In the event of an enemy invasion, such an alignment of Soviet troops inevitably and immediately would have led to catastrophe.

That is exactly what happened in the 1941. Before the German invasion into the territory of the Kiev military district, the most powerful Soviet front was deployed: the Southwestern Front. The three most powerful armies of that front were in the Lvov bulge. In peacetime, these three armies were already almost surrounded. Hitler only had to shut the trap on them. On June 22, the very weak 1st German Tank Group hit Lutsk, Rovno, and Berdichev, quickly cutting of all three Soviet armies in the Lvov bulge – the 12th (mountain), 6th, and 26th.
The 1st Tank Group, faced with open, unprotected operational space, immediately went through the Soviet rear, crushing air bases, staffs, and hospitals. Here, in the rear, they found tremendous quantities of Soviet weapons, fuel, ammunition, foodstuffs, and medical supplies. The Germans seized truly remarkable trophies. The three Soviet armies in the Lvov bulge were left with a problem that had two solutions, both of which were catastrophic: either remain in the trap and wait for the 1st Tank Group to completely lock the encirclement, or run to the east, abandoning everything that cannot be carried. They ran. Soon, they were left without fuel and ammunition. The entire Soviet Southwestern Front crumbled from one rather weal blow. But that was not all: this same blow threatened the entire Southern Front.
In Byelorussia, the Red Army had an even worse time. The Western Front had four armies. The main forces of the front were concentrated in the Byelostok bulge. Two German tank groups struck the undefended flanks and linked east of Minsk. The 3rd, 10th, and parts of the 4th and 13th armies, all together almost thirty divisions, found themselves in a pocket. The Western Front collapsed even quicker that the Southwestern and the Southern Fronts.
Could it be that before the war General Zhukov did not understand one cannot herd huge numbers of troops into bulges that become trap?

General Vlassov. In a protocol from questioning on August 8, 1942, it was recorded:
“Regarding the question of whether Stalin had intentions to attack Germany, Vlassov declared that such intentions, undoubtedly, existed. The concentration of troops in the Lvov region points to the fact that a strike against Romania was being planned in the direction of the petroleum sources. . . The Red Army was not prepared for the German invasion. Despite all the rumors about the operations conducted by Germany, in the Soviet Union nobody believed in such a possibility. During preparations, the Russians meant only their own offensive.” There is no other explanations for the concentration of Soviet troops in the Lvov and Byelostok bulges.

The consequences of Zhukov’s positioning were catastrophic. In order to divert the attack on Moscow, the Red Army had to send, urgently and under heavy enemy bombers’ raids, railway trains with divisions, corps and armies form the Southwestern Front to the Western Front. There, again under heavy bombing , the trains were unloaded and the troops went straight into battle. What happened was that the 16th Army had just advanced from the Trans-Baikal region to Ukraine, meaning south of Polesye. The army had just begun to unload when the German invasion happened. They were forced to urgently load the 16th Army back into trains and herd it several hundred kilometers to the north. The staff of the 16th Army arrived at Smolensk from Ukraine and began to unload, but the communications battalion could not be found. Without communication, it is impossible to command troops. An entire army found itself without command. And there are plenty more examples.

But Zhukov was not thinking of defense, and was not planning it. There is plenty of testimony that right before the invasion Zhukov, Vatutin, Vasilevsky, and all the generals and officers of the General Staff worked sixteen and seventeen hours a day without weekends and holidays. The areas for the concentration of primary efforts were not chosen by Soviet commanders in the interests of strategic defense operations (such an operation was simply not foreseen and planned), but for entirely different means of action.

 

I'm using facts and clear logic.
Are you ? I bet you never opened Mein Kampf in your life.
And I supect your role on this site is only to spread propaganda.

Lands in the East were not his immediate task, only a perspective for centuries to come. It didn’t not at all follow from MU that Hitler would advance to the east. There is a mention of lands in the east, but no indication of when Germany needs to conquer those lands.
He even said (in Part 1, Chapter III): “The effort would have to be envisage in terms of centuries; just as in all problems of colonization, steady perseverance is a far more important element than the output of energetic effort at the moment.” Hitler was planning to build a thousand-year Reich. Even in the famous, repeatedly quoted passage, he speaks of centuries:”We want to return to that point, at which our previous development stopped six hundred years ago.” So, “lands in the east” is a very foggy concept, and there is no particular mentioning of Poland (any German movement “towards the sun could only go through the Poland) and Russia. This declaration could have applied to anyone. One phrase in his book transformed Hitler into a source of fear for all his eastern neighbors. This does not at all testify to his mental capabilities.

The number one priority for Hitler were his mortal enemies France and Britain.
Mein Kampf, Chapter XIII: “We must take every point of the Versailles Treaty separately, and make it clear to the broadest masses of the population. We must achieve an understanding among 60 million German men, women, and children, and make them feel the shame of this treaty. We must make these 60 million have a deep hatred for this treaty, so that their scorching hatred brings the will of the people together and evokes a cry in unison: GIVE US BACK OUR ARMS!”

That is precisely what Lenin dreamed of: “that someone would emerge, who would raise a struggle against the Versailles Treaty.” This someone did emerge. Adolf Hitler raised a struggle against the Versailles Treaty and against France. He demanded arms. Stalin put a sword in his hands. It is why the proclamation about lands in the east did not scare Stalin. Mein Kampf is against France, as can be read in Part 2, Chapter XIII:
“We must understand the following to the end: Germany’s most evil enemy is and will always be France”. Also: “The task of the day for us is not the struggle for world hegemony.... France systematically tears apart our people and according to her plans strangles our independence.... We simultaneously hear protests and slogans against five or even ten different countries, and meanwhile forget that first of all we need to concentrate all our physical strength and mental powers to deliver a blow to the heart of our vilest enemy.... France will inevitably strive to make Germany into a weak and crushed nation....
At the current moment, our only enemy is France – that nation, which deprives us of our rightful existence.” Further in the book, Hitler continues in the same spirit for many pages and chapters.

 

Well lets see how this began shall we?
From wiki, which looks like where you posted from.

and also

Now again, Japan began the boarder war with the Soviet Union earlier than that with the Battle of Lake Khasan in 1938

 

Exactly. Also the Soviet Union might have had invasion plans but according to Chris Bellamy in his book Absolute War, they were pre-emptive in nature. Bellamy does a good job demolishing all theories of Soviet invasion. All good militaries plan for every eventuality, the Soviets would be no different. So to further your point, just because countries have invasion plans doesn't mean they are going to use them.