German Victory: Thousand Year Reich's Alt. Op. Plan

Operational Outline: 1939 - 1945

I. PHASE ONE - BLITZKRIEG OF '39/'40

• 39' March: Germany occupied/annexes Czechslovakia
• 39' April: Italy invades/occupies Albania.
• 39' September: German invasion of Poland.
• 40' April: Germany invades/occupies Norway, Denmark
• 40' May: Germany invades Low Countries
• 40' June: Germany attacks/occupies France

• Option I: Destruction BEF at Dunkurk under Guderian, Rommel, Goring, Rundstedt

• Option II: Luftwaffe action against RAF sector and radar stations in preparation of Sea Lion.

• Option III: Hitler demands German passage via French N. Africa as condition of Parisian surrender and Vichy formation.

II. PHASE TWO - AFRICAN GAMBIT OF '40 - '42

• 40' August: Italy attacks Allies in Africa
• 40' September: Germany, Italy, Japan sign Axis Pact
• 40' October: von Thoma concludes N. Africa comments
• 40' November: 4 Pz, 3 Mtr Div. to N. Africa (Rommel)
• 40' December: Allies push Italian Army to Libya
• 41' March: 4 Pzr, 1 Mtr Div. push British to Egypt
• 41' May: Germans siezed Alexandria; Cairo; Suez
• 41' June: British Fleet to Red Sea
• 41' July: Yug., Gre., Rum., Bul., Fin. to Axis Pact
• 41' August: 3 Pzr, 2 Mtr Div. to French N. Africa
• 41' September: 1 Pzr, 1 Mtr Div. to Levant; Iraq
• 41' November: Axis in Sp. Morocco; Br. flee Gib.
• 41' December: Japan invades Thai., HK, Sing.; not US
• 42' April: Turk. joins Axis; Iraq joins Axis
• 42' - 43': Germ., Ital., Jap. consolidate Axis Pact
• 44' - 45': Unrest. Sub Warfare in Atlantic
• 42' - 50': Consolidate Zolleverien; Industrialize

• Option I: OKH authorizes seizure of Sp. Morocco; threatens Gib. British flee Malta. Seizure of Dakar, Senegal for use as Sub/Air base against So. Atlantic

• Option II: OKH authorizes infiltration of Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Uraguay; coerces Axis-sympathetic governments to declare for Germany

• Option III: Form European economic community to be dependant upon German aims; threaten Soviet Union into provision - via rail - of vital resources from Levant, Siberia, Far East. Slowly industrialize and expand to face US threat.

 

Between June '40 and June '41 the UK sank 125 Axis supply ships in the Med, sending 450,000+ tons of supplies to Davy Jones locker. This represents a bit less than half of supplies sent. No campaign can succeed with this kind of attrition, especially the axis with a shortage of vessels. During April/May '41(During Crete assault and initial landings in Africa the Axis lose 52 vessels and 240,000 tons of cargo(thats 66% of all cargo). When 2 out 3 ships you send dont get through, you have problems.
All of Rommels advances were halted by lengthening/failing supply lines. Unless someone time transports C-130's to the Luftwaffe I dont see how they win in the desert.
Remember, just because of political ramifications the UK didnt use the bulk of her Indian troops abroad, doesnt mean she wouldnt in a pinch. Tens of thousands of Indians can be moved to Egypt quickly.

 

Ah, but now, without fighting the Battle of Britain or moving towards Barbarossa, German efforts can concentraite on offering further air cover to their convoys.

Additionally, without the fuel which German bombers required above Britain, Italy can at the very least mobilize a greater number of its destroyers and submarine to fend off the British threat.

Crete will never see direct assault, and it is therefore that the entire campaign will never come to be. With Egypt's fall and the subsequent failure of Mussolini's own rather fruitless campaign in the Balkans, Hitler is going to compell the British to surrender at Cairo, thus forcing the Balkan states into a German and Italian orbit.

 

How is the BEF destroyed? Rundstedt and Hitler both severely underestimated the ability of the English to rescue their soldiers. No one, not even the English knew they would pull it off. Rundstedt and Hitler both wanted to conserve valuable tanks for the destruction French Army,"After all the rest of France remains to be conquered" Hitler. They both considered the BEF marooned and routed and if the British could rescue of few thousand, under Luftwaffe bombardment, more power to them. You're viewing the situation with hindsight they lacked. IMHO, Hitler and Rundstedt would make the same decision again.
Aviation fuel and the heavy fuel oil and coal that the Italian Naval vessels used are completely different substances. Germany has plenty of coal but the fuel oil the newer vessels require is hard for them to come by, to say the least.
If there is no BoB, the English will have the ability to move more aircraft than the Germans could into N. Africa right along with them. What pins them down in England? British fighter production outstrips German production at more than 2 to 1 during this period, plus the English have over 500 aircraft already stationed in Egypt and NE, with provisioned airbases and ample fuel reserves. In a pinch a Spitfire (MK's I-V)with drop tanks has about 1200 miles range, which will get it to Gibraltar on fumes from Cornwall, skirting the Iberian pen. A short skip to Malta then a hop to Alexandria, they dont even have to move them by ship.
Just as they did the UK will move South Africans, Aussies, Kiwi's, and Indians into Egypt while sailing tommy's around the Cape of Good Hope. With no Battle of Britain what keeps England from moving 3,4, or 8 divisions to Egypt? And remember most Italian aircraft are tied down in Somaliland and Abyssinia, which is under British attack.

 

1. The British Expeditionary Force was beset by the panzers under both Rundstedet and Guderian. Had Hitler listened to both of his generals - who until that point had been correct in their preceptions -, it is quite likely that the British could have not only been cut off, but with the contribution of a willing Luftwaffe, destroyed.

2. Assuming the Battle of Britain is not fought at all, the Germans, too, convserve aircraft and are able to at least watch the skies above both convoys and North Africa, as well as Malta.

3. If it was so simple a matter to transfer South African and Indian troops en masse during the war, why did the British not do so when Rommel first began to see victory in Libya and Egypt? Although colonial troops arrived later, with a sustained effort, the Germans could have broken out against them - especially under Rommel - and utilized anti-British sentiment among Egyptians in order to first destabalize and later sieze the region.

4. Assuming they do fight the Battle of Britain, the Germans, concentraiting on regional communictions centers, radar sites, and specific tactical targets, will conserve both planes and pilots for use over Mediter. waters. Meanwhile, Hitler would not have had to waste resources on Crete or in the Balkans, again freeing his hand over the skies of N. Africa.

[ 17 August 2001: Message edited by: Desert Journeyman ]

 

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by talleyrand:
In a pinch a Spitfire (MK's I-V)with drop tanks has about 1200 miles range, which will get it to Gibraltar on fumes from Cornwall, skirting the Iberian pen. A short skip to Malta then a hop to Alexandria, they dont even have to move them by ship.
<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Talleyrand,

I don't have figures for the range of different models of Spitfire and/or Hurricane, with or without drop tanks, so I'll stick with the figure of 1200m for a Spit (I-V) with drops.

I do have an Atlas however. A direct course to Gibraltar from Lizard Point, the very southernmost tip of England, reads at approximately 1050 miles. That course takes you just west of Madrid.

A course 'skirting the Iberian pen' reads at about 1400 miles, probably within sight of the coast at some places.

A direct course from Gibraltar to Malta is about 1150 miles. This route takes you directly over Oran, a little south of Algier and Tunis, dead over Vichy territory. A route staying out of sight of the North African coast adds about a hundred odd miles.

Of course, when you factor in headwinds, climbing time, navigational error and any time spent dog-fighting, maximum distances reduce considerably.

When trying to reinforce the fighter defence of Malta, aircraft carriers (including USS
Wasp and HMS Eagle) manoeuvred to a point north of Bizerta before flying off Hurricanes and Spitfires, precisely because flying from Gibraltar to Malta was anything but a short hop for standard production models.

Even when flying off from carriers, it was a risky business. On at least one occasion almost a whole group of Hurricanes were lost into the sea because of a combination of unexpected headwinds, weather conditions forcing flight at less than optimum height, bad navigation and enemy action.

Had it been relatively simple to reach Malta from Gib in a single seat fighter the aircraft carriers and big escort fleets would not have been risked in a needless major operation in the Mediterranean narrows.
FDR would not have allowed the Wasp to make two risky runs if Malta could have been reinforced in another way.

[ 17 August 2001: Message edited by: Ste ]

 

Ste, ok maybe not(measured with my Rand Mcnally world atlas and plastic ruler late last night). But are not my other points valid? The Germans didnt take Egypt because of supply problems. supply supply supply

dont have no gas, aint gonna kick no ass

 

Assuming the Germas do not commit to the Battle of Britain, there are plenty of aircraft and dive bombers on hand to safely escort merchant shipping.

Concentraited around the island of Malta, they could deny the Royal Navy and Air Force any access to the area, and would probably deal damage to a degree sufficient to sink, let's say, a RN carrier. This would give pause on the British homefront.

The Germans could likewise order Kurt Student to sieze Malta, a much more likely operation than Crete should have been. With air power, this might have been possible.

Meanwhle, if the Germans do conduct the Battle of Britain, concentration on central monitering stations and radar posts is key, not terror bombings in London or elsewhere.

 

How and why do the Germans do anything different?
Remember, "Russia is rotten to the core, we must only kick the door in" Hitler.

 

We must assume here that Hiter is not an insane maniac. Yes, wishful thining. But this was a plan or victory, not necessarily reality.

 

How would things change if the russians would have launched an offensive at the west?

 

The Russians lacked the competanc even to secure a nation such as Finland, where no standing military seemed capable of doing much to stop so great an entity as Stalin and his Red Army.

While Russia would have the benefit of T-34 medium tanks, this is diminished by their insistence of spreading these thin and not permitting radios in all vehicles.

The Russians would face a determined and well-trained Rumanian Army, a competant, veteran Finn Army, and a massive German-Italian war machine with potential allied backing. It would have been a disaster for Stalin. And the free world, since Germany could hide behind its status as "saviour of Europe".

 

Good point, I don't know much about the romainain army being well trained from what I have read about them, but I'm probably wrong.

 

The Romanian army was a paper tiger. Low percentage of machine guns, very few trained vets, officer commissions above Lt. were a political appointment, very few tanks, very few aircraft, poor Army infrastructure(few trucks, old trains, poor rolling stock), poor transportation infrastructure, old windy lanes with poor bridges etc, serious lack of asphalt and rails. The Romanian Communist Party was in no way held in check like in Germany. Communists continued to handicap the Romanian war effort for the entire war. Ceausescu formed a corp of Anti-Hitler patriots who at any time the chips are down for Romania, stand a good chance of toppling Antonescu and giving him a .30 cal lobotomy. Antonescu rules a shifting house of cards, inches from overthrow/exile through most of the war, he holds no mandate.

 

Stalins army was caught with its pants down massing at the German border preparing for an offensive in June of '41. It is widely excepted Stalin planned to invade Germany as soon as Germany heavily committed itself to launching an invasion of England. If Germany doesn't attack the Soviets and instead launches an invasion of England in '42, Stalin would backdoor the Germans. I give him 50/50 odds of taking Berlin if Germany is heavily committed elsewhere.
Stalin will not attack the Germans alone, ie, no second front. But he might pick off Romania, Iran, we know he tried Finland, and others if left alone.

 

Iran would almost certainly have fallen, yet I officially contest your opinion of Rumania and its armed forces.

During a recent article, 'Forgotten Axis: Rumania to 1943' in Strategy & Tactics Mag., the author cites that due to the relatively high value of Rumanian patroleum, Bucharesti could afford to purchase arms and equipment far out of proportion to their domestic industrial standards.

Rumanian mountain, frontier, and royal guard divisions were superb, veteran units often cited for their key role in the siege and later capture of Odessa. Meanwhile, it was Rumanians who filled out and bolstered the handful of shattered German units in Crimea, providing a much-needed infusion of willful, hard-fighting troops who had seen battle.

While Rumania's 3rd Army is most remembered for breaking outside of Stalingard - mostly due to Hitler's refusal - after the death of his Iron Guard cronies - to provide adequate artillery or armored support. Rumania did provide, during the course of the war in the Russian territories, more troops for the Axis cause than any of Hitler's other allies in the European theater.

Of these, at least three divisioned were considered universally to be "crack" along with perhaps a half-dozen brigades. This does not include Rumania's fairly competant armored division. Rumanian troops held a major front in the Ukraine where German infantry and armor seemed likely to fail. Many commanders turned to Antonescu for aid after Hitler denied them additional support.

 

I asked a friend today about the romanain army and he told me that they held out against the russians for 3 days during the stalingrad attack before running out of amumations. Can anyone verify this.

 

I can't legitimize that certain claim, but I can verify that such an exploit was probably likely, especially given the capacity of the Rumanian Army to hold out against odds which might daunt even the Whermacht.

At times, the only legimate "support" that Antonescu's troops recieved was in the form of German SS divisions - far better than the handful of Heer deployments which Rumania had been compelled to support for much of the early war. Rumanian units were often "bolstered" by German regiments or battalions, but after the performance values of both, one must wonder who was doing the bolstering.

 

Romanian Military strength upon entry into WWII:

Total military manpower: 686,000
This includes Army, Navy, Border police, etc.

The Romanian Armored division was equipped with some of the most fearsome AFV's ever to see service The Pz-38(t) being the baddest boy they owned, and these only in small numbers. The S-IIa, two man MG tanks, and FT-17's that also equipped this force were garbage as MBT's.
Most Romanian units were completely unmotorized. Most any transport they used was German. They did have several mobile cavalry brigades, but these cannot be compared to motorized Soviet units.
They had almost no indigenous war industry and without heavy German aid, will completely fail to supply combat units quite fast.

 

According to Strategy & Tactics, a magazine which wrote the article 'Rumania: Forgotten Axis', the Rumanian Army could rely on fair degrees of industrial output.

Rumania produced a crude if very servicable submachinegun, modified tank destroyers for use against the Soviets (refurbished Czech, Soviet, or Hungarian marks), a light anti-tank gun, and the Axis powers' only "true" indeigenously-produced fighter, the IAR, a remarkable achievment for a nation still based to a great degree on agriculture as opposed to service or industry.

Rumanian troops fought extremely well in the Crimea, siezing Odessa and investing regions such as the Caucasus or Black Sea with some excellent - if costly - ratings of success.

The magazine states specifically:

"It appears that no one on the Axis side intended Rumanian troops to do much fighting after the liberation of Bessarabia. Even as Soviet armies fell back in disarray, bitter resistance held the Germans desperate for help. And so the Armata Romania began an offensive "on the fly", while lacking the planning, training, or equipment for such operations. Despite massive casualties, the Rumanians captured Odessa and made possible the capture of Sevastopol and the Crimea, helped overrun the Ukraine and penetrated deep into the Caucasus. Without Rumanian aid, the Germans could not have penetrated nearly as far into the Soviet Union and their defeat would have come much sooner."

Rumanian divisions were well-equipped by the German standard at the war's start, support coming in the form of anti-tank company for all deployments of that size - many of which were designated as brigades yet equaled both Hungarian and Italian units of division size or larger. Germany held back on Rumania, admittadly, and many Generals later shifted blame to them.