FDR and the oil embargo.

So the emabargo was a indirect way to help the USSR? You know, The Siberian troops ...

 

Hello O.P.,

I don’t see a motion of FDR in helping the Chinese as such via an oil embargo. Loads of weapons soldiers and instructors would have been a real support.

In the first place he wanted to restrict the movement of the IJN; the Japanese didn’t really need oil to further conquer China – but rather an additional 10 million soldiers.

I sure that FDR was well aware of the Japanese eyeing towards South East Asia, for this they needed a Navy with loads of oil. That the effects of the embargo resulted into a Japanese strike towards Pearl and the Philippines, is for military and geographical reasons understood. Pear-knockout the US Navy threat and get your back- (Philippines)free before heading further south.

Regards
Kruska

 

FDR´s politics were also concentrating on giving countries their independence in Asia, one of the main targets being India, and Winston was not very happy about that....

 

Hello O.P.,

FDR could have send just about as much stuff to China as he did to Britain and Russia - the problem IMO was more on how to get or secure the $ for that "help" and the Kuomintang being orriented more towards Stalin and Hitler. Upon the Chinese/German breakup small support started to dripple in (e.g. Flying Tigers) since Russia had other problems then to send weapons to China. After Pearl these political concerns didn't matter since the US needed another Front in Asia.

Britain being engaged by Germany, with Holland, France out of the game - it was obvious were the Japanese would move in.
Placing an oil embargo on the Japanese before things escalate was IMHO a very smart thing to do.
That it couldn't prevent a war between the Japanese and the US is understood - but to my understanding FDR didn't forward it in regards to avoiding a war at all, since he wasn't interested in himself and the US being a bystander watching Sake San taking over Asia, or crazy Adi taking over Europe.

The question for FDR was, how to get the Japanese/American relationship to a boilingpoint were the US could appear as the one party being (1) attacked first, (2) having to defend itsself or (3) having to kick out the Japanese from further occupied territories. (The last version is the one he was certainly trying to avoid).

The oil embargo surely helped in regard to version (1) and (2) however didn't help so much in regards to (3).

Regards
Kruska

 

On a couple of books I have read this but don´t have the authors, however maybe this will help:

Roosevelt VS British Colonialism

 

Hello O.P.,

sorry can't follow you ..

You actually believe that?

Regards
Kruska

 

I see..

regards
Kruska

 

It wasn't just the inabilty of the Chinese to repay the "L-L" stuff, there was also an ongoing Chinese revolution going on in China itself. While the two Chinas sort of agreed to quit fighting each other and focus on the Japanese, they never really did so actually. It was more complicated than shipping to the British or the Soviets, or anyone else in the Lend-Lease list.

As to the embargoes placed on Japan it seems to myself that, in relationships between nations; economic sanctions and embargoes have been applied as an alternative to war, i.e. to reprimand and hopefully "correct" other nations for acts considered contrary to established norms of international behavior by applying economic pressure. In light of that, would it not be correct to remember that in mid-1940, during the meeting between Ambassador Horinouchi and Secretary Hull the documents clearly show that?

When The Export Control Act of July 2, 1940 was signed and authorized by FDR, it was basically in the interest of our own national defense, to prohibit or curtail the export of basic war materials to (all) aggressor nations. Under that act, licenses were refused for the export to Japan and Germany of aviation gasoline (not crude oil) and most types of machine tools, to be implemented one month later, in August 1940. After it was announced in September that the export of iron and steel scrap would be prohibited, Japanese Ambassador Horinouchi protested to Secretary Hull on October 8, 1940 that this might be considered an "unfriendly act".

The Secretary told the Ambassador that it was really "amazing" for the Japanese Government, which had been violating in the most aggravating manner all the American citizen rights and interests throughout most of China (through the thirties), to question the fullest right of this Government to impose such an embargo. To go further and call it an "unfriendly act", the Secretary said, was still more amazing in the light of Japan's conduct in disregarding all law, treaty obligations, and other rights and privileges as well as the safety of Americans, while proceeding to an ever-increasing extent to seize territory by force on the Asian mainland.
America started limited embargoes on limited items as Japanese aggression increased on the Asian mainland. It started with refined aviation gasoline (Aug.,1940), when that didn't get their attention it was upped to exclude scrap steel and iron (Oct., 1940), when that still had no effect their assets were frozen in the US, but they could still purchase crude oil and take it home for refining.

It wasn't until all of those economic measures, sanctions, and warning had no effect was a total embargo on crude oil imposed on July 26th of ’41, a full year after the first embargoes were imposed. Those ships in harbor, bound for Japan which were loading with crude were allowed to complete the loading and left for Japan. It wasn't like America "dropped this embargo" on the Japanese out of the blue.

It was years of ratcheting up of sanctions and expressions of displeasure at Japanese aggression in the Far East. When America (the largest exporter of petroleum at the time) closed the spigot and convinced both the British and Dutch to follow suit, the Japanese acted with even more aggression rather than accepting that their activity was "disliked" by most other nations

I think there is something to keep in mind, and occasionally overlooked. The Neutrality Act of 1939 (November 4) retained the "cash and carry" formula devised by Bernard Baruch for the 1937 Act. This meant that belligerents were permitted to buy American goods including arms and strategic materials, but they had to pay cash (gold transfer) and to transport the goods in their own hulls, or at least in ships flying their flags.

This provision, it was believed, would prevent America from being drawn into war either by holding debt of some belligerent countries (which might be defeated, and the debt negated) or by violating blockades while transporting supplies. It also allowed FDR to tailor the U.S. approach to all the circumstances of unique conflicts and perhaps better reflect America's interests as they developed in this rapidly changing economic and war atmosphere.

This was still in effect when the Lend-Lease Act was passed (March ’41), and would have applied to the Soviet Union before they were included into the Lend-Lease recipients list after they had been invaded by Hitler’s military.

Originally only the UK, its dominions and commonwealth nations, Free French, Nationalist Chinese, Free Norwegian, Free Poles, etc. were on the Lend-Lease list after the Act was passed. Only those governments in exile, or nations actively combating the Axis powers were on the list. The Lend-Lease Act, which had been passed by the U.S. Congress (both houses) in March of 1941, gave President Roosevelt power to; "sell, transfer, lend or lease war supplies, food, machinery and services, to nations whose own defense was considered vital to the security of the United States", during what would eventually become recognized as WW2.

Eventually there were over forty nations included, but originally the Soviets were excluded from the Lend-Lease, but the Chinese couldn’t meet the "cash and carry" clauses of the 1939 Neutrality Acts. Before the "cash and carry" portion was added to our Neutrality Acts, we (America) were prohibited by law from selling "war material" to any belligerent nation all through the thirties. We (FDR) got around that law by declaring some of our stockpiled WW1 stuff to be "scrap/salvage" and sell it to American firms from our Armory Stockpiles as "junk". Then those companies could turn around and sell said "junk" to the UK and China if they could afford it.

Remember we also put all of the Soviet assets in the US into the "freezer" the day the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact was announced. This didn’t mean we (America) didn’t trade with the Soviets, just that we didn’t/couldn’t sell them war materials. Prior to Barbarossa, the USSR’s major trade partner in terms of imports was (wait for it) the USA. It should be pointed out that this remained true in spite of the trade provisos negotiated under the 1939 German-Soviet Treaty of Friendship; in 1940 Soviet imports from Germany amounted to some 316.3 million rubles, that from the US of some 338.4 rubles.

While Soviet exports to Germany exceeded imports, Soviet exports to the US amounted to 85.5 million rubles. Overall, in terms of value Soviet exports approximated imports, trade imbalance was strictly governed, earlier Soviet debts incurred during it’s industrializing had been largely paid off in the 30’s, i.e. before WWII. Even though the USSR was an oil producer, US petroleum and various goods, largely supplied the Soviet Far East. It’s easy to understand why just by looking at a map, the USSR is huge. Most of the USSR’s industry and petroleum industry pre-war, was way off to the west by rail, transport across the Pacific from the US was much cheaper. The US in spite of disdain for Soviet terms with Germany and aggression in Europe, was still willing to deal with the Soviets, Soviet shipping on the US west coast was not that unusual a sight between late 1939 and mid-1941.

The Soviets didn’t need a military navy in the Pacific either, in fact escort ships would contravene the terms of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact. Over the course of the war, some 940 Soviet and Soviet Leased ships (including some 125 from the Western Allies, sailing under the hammer and sickle) routinely sailed unescorted from the west coast of North America, across the Pacific and between the Japanese held Kuril Islands and the La Perouse Straits dividing Japanese southern Sakhalin and the main Japanese Island of Hokkaido, to Vladivostok. This route, which overall handled the bulk of Lend Lease, well over half over the course of the war. While because of the strictly enforced neutrality, in theory at least no military weapons could be carried, some would argue that it was the food, medicines, sheet steel, sheet and bar aluminum, raw materials, boots, fuel additives etc.; that the Soviets shipped on this route that they needed most anyway.

The day after the Nazis invaded the Soviets, FDR "unfroze" the Soviet assets and applied it to war material for immediate shipment so that they could receive our "stuff" before the Congress got the USSR included into the Lend-Lease list.

And while FDR did need an overt act of aggression on the part of the Axis, he didn't want it to come from the Japanese. He had pledged (a politican's pledge) that American boys would not be sent to fight on foreign soil, or otherwise be involved in the war, unless we were attacked. And FDR was saved the inconvenience of declaring war againt the Germans (who hadn't attacked us) by Hitler doing so three days after war was declared by Congress against the Empire of Japan.

 

Ever heard of "Rainbow Five" ?

AmericanHeritage.com / THE BIG LEAK
It is about FDR's warplan to get to Europe - War against Germany
Rainbow Five also covers the RAINBOW FIVE PHASE ONE AFIRM (PTO)

It is amazing to see with what forsight the later PTO was taken into account. It goes right down to Malaya and New Guinea
Fantastic forsight for someone who didn't expect war or was sooooo surprised.

Now if the US Command screwed up on it, or was deliberatly opening a window to Japan - I will leave that to the conspiracy experts.

That FDR was in vain to get to war with Hitler and that he was taking Japan as a future target/adversary is obvious - fact.
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/Rainbow5-USN.html
Enjoy the read, for the lazy one's I paste some of it below.
U.S. Navy Pacific Fleet Basic War Plan (RAINBOW FIVE)
This was issued in July 1941
0401. At the date of issue of this plan, the U.S. Pacific Fleet has virtually mobilized, and is operating, with intensive security measures, from the Pearl Harbor base. It is expected, therefore, that the major portion of the Fleet can be ready for active service within four days of an order for general mobilization. To provide for the contingency of M-day being set prior to the date on which hostilities are to open, the day of execution of this Plan is designated throughout the Plan as W-day. The day that hostilities open with Japan will be designated J-day. This may or may not coincide with W-day.
1314. The concept of the war in the Pacific, as set forth in ABC-1 is as follows:
a. Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war, the military strategy in the Far East will be defensive.
b. The United States does not intend to add to its present military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends to so augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East.

c. 1332. It is conceived that Japanese action will be as follows:

1. The principal offensive effort to be toward the eventual capture of Malaysia (including the Philippines) and Hong Kong.
2. The secondary offensive efforts to be toward the interruption of American and Allied sea communications in the Pacific, the Far East and the Indian Ocean, and to accomplish the capture of Guam and other outlying positions.

1. Move the maximum practicable portion of second Marine Division to Hawaii for training in landing operations.
2. Guard against surprise attack by Japan.
3. Maintain air patrols against enemy forces in the approaches to Oahu and outlying bases.

3401. The execution of this Plan may be in one or two steps depending on whether Japan does or does not become a belligerent on the first day of execution.

1. If action against European Axis Powers only is to be taken the dispatch will be "EXECUTE NAVY PLAN OPTION DASH ONE RAINBOW FIVE PHASE ONE".
2. When action against JAPAN is to be taken the dispatch for execution will be "EXECUTE NAVY PLAN OPTION DASH ONE RAINBOW FIVE PHASE ONE AFIRM".

3402. In the event of an overt act of war by a foreign power against the United States prior to the existence of a state of war, it is the duty of the senior commander on the spot to take such action in the defense of his command and the national interests as the situation may require, and report the action taken to superior authority at once.

1. This Fleet, while protecting the sea communications and territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific Area, and supporting the operations of the British Navy south of the equator as far west as Longitude one hundred fifty-five degrees East, will:
   1. Conduct an initial sweep with light forces and aircraft against enemy merchant ships and raiders.
   2. Raid Japanese communications to westward of NANPO SHOTO with cruisers.
   3. Patrol Japanese homeland with submarines.
   4. Conduct a reconnaissance and raid against the MARSHALLS, in order to divert Japanese forces away from MALAYSIA, and to prepare for the capture of the MARSHALL-CAROLINE area.
   5. Task Force Three.
      1. Move from SAN DIEGO to HAWAII the remaining units and equipment of the Second Marine Division and continue training for landing exercises.
      2. Continue preparations and training for landing attacks on Japanese bases in the MARSHALLS with particular emphasis on plan for capture of ENIWETOK.
      3. Furnish additional defenses for outlying bases as may be requested by Commander Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) and approved by the Commander-in-chief.
   6. Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force).
      1. Subject to the specific tasks prescribed below, operate patrol planes in the HAWAIIAN Area including outlying islands so as to gain the earliest possible information of advancing enemy forces. Use them offensively only when other types of our own are not within striking distance, and the risk of damage to the planes is small; or when the importance of inflicting damage on the objective appears to justify the risk of receiving the damage which may result.

Regards
Kruska

 

Hello brndirt1,

Before 1937 or after December 1941? come on this argument totally fails - especially after December 1941. Or did the US just fly in the chash for Chiang?

I think you should really take the time and read the below article

AmericanHeritage.com / THE BIG LEAK

It gives a very good and clear account on how this declaration of war was may I say "pushed" by FDR.
FDR wasn't an isolianistic,senile, stupid old man, in a wheelchair - he knew exactly what he for the (US) wanted, and how to get it done.

Regards
Kruska

 

Which one?

It is not a backdoor its a huge frontdoor. - could it be that you are also conducting an online-chat about where to find the masses of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.?

Well it's is an American Forum site so please allow me to say good by to this thread - I don't like the cooler so much due to getting into US topics

Regards
Kruska