Were there any Canadian forces slated to invade Japan?

I know that the Canadians fought with the Americans in the Aluetians and I suspect that being part of the Commonwealth they may of been involved in the actions in Burma, but does anyone know if the Canadians were to be part of the invasion of Japan?

The atomic bomb ended all the reason for invasion. But who were intended to to invade Japan.

Thanks for your input.

KTK

 

I dont know of any hard numbers, but If I remember correctly, it was estimated that over 1.5 million troops would be needed on the ground for the epic land battle. Certainly the US didnt have a magic wand to wave for new soldiers so I would think it there could be as many 4-500k non-Americans involved. So certainly you could expect 1-2 divisions making the show but I doubt anything more.

 

HyperWar: Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific [Chapter 16] This site notes the various places and types of roles Canadians had in the Pacific Theatre, as well as Hong Kong, and the Aleutians.

See the section following the quote below, for the plan for operations against Japan following the defeat of Germany,

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"Policy on Participation in the Pacific

Serious consideration began to be given to Canadian participation in the final phase of the war against Japan about the beginning of 1944. When the Prime Minister of Canada went to England for the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers held in May of that year he took with him a General Staff appreciation which did little more than point out that Canadian Army forces might operate either with British forces from Burma and Malaya, or with U.S. forces "on the other flank", through Hawaii and perhaps the Aleutians. In the former case the troops might come from the Canadian Army Overseas (one division was suggested "as a basis for discussion"); in the latter case the troops "would be best supplied from the Army in Canada"-as many brigade groups as could be "secured from the forces available". No recommendation was made as between the two possibilities, nor is it entirely clear whether the two were considered mutually exclusive.[SIZE=-1]18[/SIZE]

There was little discussion of the question at the London conference, but after Mr. King's return to Canada the Canadian civil and military authorities dealt with it further so far as they could do so in the absence of information of any settled overall strategy. On 27 June Mr. King cabled Mr. Churchill suggesting that Canada's position in the matter was subject to certain "special considerations". The message dealt mainly with the R.C.A.F., and the direction in which opinion in Ottawa was moving was indicated in the remark, "It would clearly be very difficult to have the major Canadian air effort based, say, on South East Asia if large United States forces were to operate from Northwest America".[SIZE=-1]19[/SIZE] General Murchie, the Chief of the General Staff, had written on 13 June, "it would appear desirable that the Canadian Army participation should take place at a stage and in a theatre where its operations would be directed against Japan proper or against the Japanese Army in China proper rather than in preliminary campaigns in Burma or the Malay Peninsula"; this would entail less retraining than operations in tropical areas.[SIZE=-1]20[/SIZE] Churchill referred the matter to the British War Cabinet's Joint Planning Staff, which on 24 July produced an aide-memoire on the employment of Canadian forces after the defeat of Germany.[SIZE=-1]21[/SIZE] This, while again unable to offer a firm recommendation "until the main strategy is decided", agreed that it might be appropriate for Canadian land forces to make their contribution in the North Pacific in the event of the main invasion threat against the Japanese homeland being directed from that area. It recommended that Canadian land forces allocated to the war against Japan should be moved to Canada as soon as practicable; and suggested that an appropriate contribution, allowing for some demobilization after the defeat of Germany, would be two divisions, in addition to one employed in the occupation of Germany.
The Canadian Chiefs of Staff reviewed this paper and on 6 September made formal and definite recommendations to their Ministers.[SIZE=-1]22[/SIZE] They considered that "Canada's contribution should be based on Canadian capabilities and proportionate to the continuing effort of the United Kingdom and the United States". It emphasized the importance of the North Pacific area to Canada and recommended that, in the event of a major effort being inaugurated by way of this area, either through Hawaii or the Aleutians, Canada should "be represented in the final assault on the Japanese homeland". It was specifically recommended that with this in view "the Canadian Army operate in the North or Central Pacific area", using "one division with necessary ancillary troops". It was recognized that this would entail acting under American command. The R.C.N. should reinforce the Royal Navy in the Pacific; the R.C.A.F,'s main effort should be in conjunction with the R.A.F., but it should be represented by a token force in the event of a major operation taking place in the North Pacific.
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The same day the whole Cabinet considered the matter and agreed that, after the end of the war in Europe, Canadian military forces should participate in the war against Japan in operational theatres of direct interest to Canada as a North American nation, for example in the North or Central Pacific, rather than in more remote areas such as South- East Asia; that government policy with respect to employment of Canadian forces should be based on this principle; and that the form and extent of participation by the three services should be determined following the second Quebec Conference, then in immediate prospect.[SIZE=-1]23[/SIZE] On 8 September the Cabinet further authorized, "as a basis for planning, but without any commitment", one division and ancillary troops as the Army quota for the Pacific war.[SIZE=-1]24[/SIZE] With policy thus crystallized, Canadian ministers approached the contacts with British and American authorities that would accompany the conference.
The Canadian Army Pacific Force


When the "Octagon" conference opened at Quebec on 12 September, Allied prospects were bright. A brilliant victory had been won in NorthWest Europe and it appeared that there was a possibility of an early German collapse. In the Pacific, American forces were firmly established in the Gilbert, Marshall and Mariana Islands and about to land on Morotai and in the Palaus; the invasion of the Philippines could now be undertaken. A Japanese invasion of India designed to interfere with Allied air transport to China had been beaten back into Burma by British and Indian forces, while the Allies were also advancing in Northern Burma and the re-opening of land communication with China was in sight.

On 14 September the War Committee of the Canadian Cabinet held a special meeting at the Citadel of Quebec. Mr. King was in the chair. Mr. Churchill attended, as did also Lord Leathers (British Minister of War
* As in previous cases, Canada was not a party to the second Quebec Conference (except as host); but there were concurrent discussions, on this occasion, with both British and American civil and military authorities. ​

Transport) and the British and Canadian Chiefs of Staff. Mr. King explained the Canadian policies that had been developed. These discussions were followed on the same day by a meeting between the British and Canadian Chiefs of Staff,[SIZE=-1]25[/SIZE] on 15 September by a conference between Messrs. King, Roosevelt and Churchill,[SIZE=-1]26[/SIZE] and on 16 September by a conversation between Generals Murchie and Pope* on one side and General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, on the other. General Murchie explained the situation as to Canadian Army participation, emphasizing the Canadian desire "to share in the final assault on Japan".[SIZE=-1]27[/SIZE] General Marshall received the Canadians very cordially and told them he could see no obstacle in the way of meeting their government's wishes; but no commitment was made on either side.[SIZE=-1]28[/SIZE]

The "Octagon" conference did not produce a final strategic plan for the defeat of Japan; the Americans, with whom the primary responsibility rested, were considering alternative lines of operation through Formosa and through Luzon (Philippines).[SIZE=-1]29[/SIZE] But the final report of the conference[SIZE=-1]30[/SIZE] expressed agreement upon a programme of lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by air and sea blockades, intensive air bombardment, and destruction of Japanese air and naval strength; followed ultimately by invasion and the seizure of "objectives in the industrial heart of Japan". Mr. Churchill had mentioned at the plenary session on 16 September that the Canadian Government were "anxious for an assurance in principle that their forces would participate in the main operations against Japan", adding that they would prefer that they should act in the more northern parts of the Pacific, "as their troops were unused to tropical conditions".[SIZE=-1]31[/SIZE] The final record accordingly noted briefly, "Canadian participation is accepted in principle".[SIZE=-1]32[/SIZE]

During the weeks that followed, the matter was canvassed in the War Committee on 22 and 27 September, and 11 and 20 October. The three services' Pacific proposals were examined, and those of the Navy and Air Force were considerably reduced. Finally, on 20 November, the full Cabinett approved the programme, including Canadian Army participation to the extent of one division, with necessary ancillary troops as required, up to a total of 30,000 men. It was accepted that the bulk of the force would have to be selected from men then serving overseas, since there were not enough trained men in Canada and battle-experienced troops were wanted; and that transportation, refitting and leave in Canada would require six months.[SIZE=-1]33[/SIZE]

Detailed planning for the Canadian Army Pacific Force now proceeded. The Canadian proposals were put before the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff by General Letson, who had succeeded General Pope in Washington, and were accepted, "with the understanding that this force will be available for
* General Pope was now Military Secretary of the Cabinet War Committee. †The War Committee did not meet between 9 November and 11 December.


use in any of the operations mounted in the Pacific".[SIZE=-1]34[/SIZE] On 7 March 1945 the War Committee agreed that the whole Canadian programme should be re-examined with a view to the possibility of a greater degree of integration between the Canadian services; but the Chiefs of Staff reported on 20 March that participation on a self-contained Canadian basis was impossible without a greatly increased commitment by all three services and the creation of a separate logistic organization.[SIZE=-1]35[/SIZE] The War Committee accepted this on 22 March and the plan was not altered. On 4 April the Prime Minister made a statement on the Pacific programme in the House of Commons. This included the information that the men to be employed against Japan would "be chosen from those who elect to serve in the Pacific theatre"; in other words, there would be no compulsion.
Four days after this statement, and as a result of this policy concerning voluntary service, the C.G.S. and the Adjutant General (Major-General A. E. Walford) recommended that an armoured division should be substituted for an infantry division in the plan. (It is likely that they had been influenced by the fact that Generals Crerar and Montague had lately expressed the opinion that the men required from the overseas army could not be obtained by volunteering.)[SIZE=-1]36[/SIZE] They pointed out that an armoured division would give an opportunity to men of the four overseas armoured brigades (as well as the reconnaissance units) who otherwise could continue to serve only by transferring to other arms. At the same time, however, by reducing the infantry requirement from three brigades to one, they wrote, "we limit the numbers needed from the arm from which it can be expected there will be the greatest difficulty in securing volunteers"; and the "overall war establishment commitment" would be reduced, as the armoured division would be only about 10,800 strong as compared with about 14,000 for an infantry division on U.S. tables of organization.[SIZE=-1]37[/SIZE] This plan was accepted by a Special Committee of the Cabinet* on 19 April; but it did not meet with American concurrence. On 15 May the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a letter to General Letson covering a memorandum by their Joint Staff Planners which remarked, ......"

Also:

HyperWar: The Canadian Army 1939-1945: An Official Historical Summary [Chapter 17]

See Plans for the Pacific Force further down the page on the link above.

Canadian Army Pacific Force - Canadian, Invasion, Army, Japan, American, and King

Canadian Army Newsreel | Program | Television | CBC Archives A Canadian Army Newsreel clip about the Canadian Navy's planned participation



www.canadiansoldiers.com

Juno Beach Centre - Return to Peace
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