I can agree that the Auchinleck counter attacks were not intended to stimulate a impulse that would induce Rommel to dig in, but this is not a totally uncommon effect. Battles, especially protracted ones, can take on a life of their own. Guadalcanal is a good example of this. I can also agree that in retrospect Rommel withdrawing to the Egyptian frontier was probably the best possible course for Panzerarmee Afrika, but that could have been said about R.E. Lee disengaging from Gettysburg on July 1st.
The thing is both commanders were in similar positions. Acknowledged as the best "tactical" commanders in the theater they operated in. Both had come off significant victory's and had just been held in check by a defensive action by their opponent. Both faced unfamiliar enemy commanders of unproven ability. Both at the extreme extent of their logistics, open to possible interdiction by the enemy. Both with a reputation of being able to seek out a enemy mistake or miscalculation and exploiting these to gain victories against long odds on paper. Both supremely confident in the troops they commanded to do what the enemy can not. Both faced a long term unfavorable strategic situation.
Lwd offers "victory disease" and certainly that is probable for both commanders.
But just as for Lee on the evening of July 1,1863 unilaterally falling back from a enemy who appeared to be on their heels was neither the easy or obvious choice to make. Every time before Rommel had got the resources to renew an attack posture, every time before the British made some mistake in their disposition's, or drew off some portion of their growing forces for some other front/threat (Greece/Pacific).
As for his comparison to other German commanders of note, yes some were better Army group commanders, but I'm not sure they were morally superior in any real sense. They all served the immoral master and all of them listed are stained by the acts of atrocity committed in the East under their noses. Further they generally retreated only when under direct pressure and when holding the line was no a longer viable option. Pre-emptive withdrawals because of possible enemy action almost only occurred with the Fuhrer's permission and then only to free up troops for other threats/options. One must also acknowledge that Rommel was in a unusual position for a German army group commander of a isolated commander with no one on his left or right flank.
I have said before that in my opinion Rommel was a superb Corps commander, Better than average Army commander but as a Army group/front commander only average. Being average in a unfavorable strategic situation with a unforgiving and unreasonable master is not going to be kind to your reputation in the long term.