British armour in Normandy

For those of you who are interested and those of you who helped me find stuff e.g. TOE's here is my recent piece on british armour in normandy. Hope you enjoy.

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The limitation of doctrine and their operational solutions: Anglo-Canadian armoured divisions in Normandy.
A case study: 11th Armoured Division

1. Introduction:

“…by 1944 the Tanks had made themselves the prisoners of their own orthodoxy, keener to adhere to the letter of their cherished doctrine than to win the rewards a violation of it might bring”(1)

John Keegan’s statement is representative of the orthodox view of the British during the Normandy campaign. For many years, the British 2nd Army(2)in Normandy has come in for criticism as being tactically inept when compared to the Germans, and even their American allies. The armoured element has come in for even more criticism, simply stating that the Anglo-Canadians were unable to overcome doctrine and adopt a fluid method of organisation and co-operation in battle as exemplified by the German Kampfgruppe or the American Combat Command. This essay will seek to show that while the Anglo-Canadians’ had failures, which hampered their efforts early in the campaign, by the end in Normandy the Anglo-Canadian armoured forces(3) were adopting combined arms teams and co-operating with other elements of the army successfully. It will do this by looking at the Anglo-Canadians’ pre-eminent division in Normandy, the 11th Armoured which, Russell Hart has called one of the:
“…few well-trained and well-led divisions…[of the campaign]”(4)
It will look at firstly, the training and doctrinal methods pre-Overlord and then secondly, the solutions found in the field to operational problems.

2. Organisation and equipment:

Britain's armoured forces at the time of the Normandy campaign were in the main equipped with the US produced M4 Sherman in various guises. There were several exceptions to this; firstly, the 7th Armoured Division and the divisional reconnaissance regiments were equipped with the A27M Cromwell, a British cruiser tank. Secondly, the Army Tank Brigades were equipped with the A22/42 Churchill infantry tank, this tank was heavily armoured and ideally suited to its role. The armoured regiments used the final vehicle, the M3 Stuart, as a light tank. The artillery elements of the armoured divisions were equipped initially with one regiment of the M7 Priest self-propelled gun, though this was replaced with the Sexton SPG, which mounted a 25pdr. The other regiment was equipped with towed 25pdr guns. The divisional anti tank regiments were equipped with the M10 tank destroyer, which was built on the Sherman chassis; this got rearmed with the 17pdr gun, the most effective tank gun in the British and US armies, and made it a very effective anti-tank weapon.

The basic organisation of a British armoured division in 1944 was as follows:
(Should be a TOE here refer to the endnotes for furthere info)

This organisation was based on several years of experiments(5) both in Britain and in operational circumstances and represented the best compromise based upon Britain’s regimental traditions and the needs of modern armoured warfare. The changes were the realisation of the need for more infantry within the divisions.

The Sherman has come in for bad press in regards of its capabilities especially those that equipped the British forces as they have often been considered those:
“…rejected for overseas combat duty by the U.S. Army.”(6)
However, as John Keegan has commented it was:
“…a magnificent expression of American mass-production…”(7)

While it was not as formidable as its contemporary German tanks the Sherman was easily massed produced, 49000 were produced during the war. However, it did have its defects. They were extremely inflammable, this was due to the dry storage of ammunition, though this was changed to wet storage during the campaign, and gained the nickname ‘Ronson’ by the British after the lighter which always lit first time and ‘Tommy cooker’ from the Germans and it had a high profile making it an easy target for German tanks.

Bill Close, a squadron Commander in the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment comments that in the main the Sherman could not deal with German tanks at ranges over 500 yards:
“Our ordinary 75mm gun could not knock out either a Tiger or a Panther except at 500 yards range, and in the rear with a bit of luck in the flank!”(8)

However, by the summer of 1944 there was one version, the ‘Firefly’ that was armed with a high velocity 17pdr gun that could compete with the latest German tanks. This became the main tank killer of the tank troops and was preciously guarded by the troops. It was initially issued based on one per troop. Though, the Firefly did still have some shortcomings, most notably it high velocity Armour Piercing round kicked up a lot of dust causing problems with aiming and that the new gun made the turret very cramped.

The vast number of Sherman’s produced led them to be easily replaced. For example, in Operation Goodwood, the British lost 36 per cent of their tank strength and as Max Hastings comments that, the vast reserve of tanks meant:
“…that replacements reached almost every armoured division within 36 hours.”(9)

These vast reserves even led to the planning of an operation, Goodwood, which relied heavily on the utilisation of these reserves in order to lower infantry casualties. As Lieutenant General Sir Miles Dempsey commented:
“…tank reinforcements were pouring into Normandy faster than the rate of tank casualties. So we could afford…to plan an operation in which we could utilise …tanks and economise on infantry.”(10)

3. Doctrine and training:

11th Armoured Division was formed in the fall of 1941 and was one of a series of armoured divisions ordered formed by the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, in response to Germanys Panzer divisions, which had rampaged through France the previous summer. Its first commander was the tank pioneer Major General Sir Percy Hobart(11) ; the division’s insignia is taken from Hobart’s family crest.

The doctrine that was used to train the officers and men of 11th Armoured Division came in several different forms. Firstly, the bulk of information came from the War Offices’ Military Training Pamphlet (MTP) series; these covered the majority of trades in the army and every aspect of fighting from minor tactics to the handling of large formations. The second method for the dissemination of doctrine was the Army Training Memorandum (ATM) series. This series was an inter-war series, which meant to keep troops up to date with recent innovations. In the war years, it was regularly published with notes from the theatres of operations, most notably North Africa. Thirdly, there was the Army Training Instructions (ATI). This was used to fill the gap while MTP’s were published. ATI’s could be published quickly, for example, ATI No. 3 Handling of an Armoured Division, was published two months after a cloth exercise occurred, which attempted to solve the problems relating to the handling of an armoured division.

The final two methods are the most relevant to armoured warfare as it was considered impossible to keep printed doctrine up to date with the most recent developments. This led to the publication of two battle experience publications. Firstly, Notes form Theatres of War (NTW), this was first publicised at the time of the CRUSADER offensive. Secondly, there was Current Reports from Overseas (CRO). This provided a vehicle for the dissemination of ideas down to brigade level, which did not yet have endorsement from the War Office but did not have the same weight as NTW’s.

Therefore, it is from these sources that doctrine for 11th Armoured Division was based and that training from their formation to their landing in Normandy stemmed. As Timothy Harrison Place comments:
“Between them, Military Training Pamphlets, Army Training Memoranda, Army Training Instructions, Notes from Theatres of War, Current Reports from Overseas…represent the main sources…on doctrine and its evolution up to D-Day.”(12)

The initial conception of armoured doctrine for the home-based armoured divisions came from ATI No.3 Handling of an Armoured Division(13). This publication gave primacy to the tank in operations and that the support group of the division should be used to occupy ground and provide a pivot from whence the tanks could operate. Armour was considered the main striking force and all else was to support this. Co-operation between armour and infantry was considered simply the one handing over to the other. While 1942 saw a significant change in the armoured division structure, one armoured brigade was replaced with an infantry one, at a tactical level little change in the way of co-operation. While a new doctrine was published in 1943, it ascribed much the same role for the infantry brigade as the infantry of the old support group. In actual fact some commanders still saw the role of tanks as that of cavalry as shown when 9th Armoured Brigade charged diagonally across the gun line of the 2nd Irish Guards during exercise SARUM(14). This tactic would again come back to haunt tank crews during Operation GOODWOOD.

Slowly, news from the North African theatre filtered back to the units via the NTW’s and CRO’s and belatedly doctrine was changed to include at least the motor battalions in action, though the infantry brigade remained firmly in the support role. By the time Hobart relinquished command their had been a realisation that their was a greater need of inter-arm co-operation. However, problems remained. The main problem was how to transport the infantry. It was found early on that transporting them on tanks caused discomfort for the infantry. It was not until the introduction of the White half-track in early 1944 that the situation was resolved. Therefore, the main problem of co-operation that existed was how to keep the infantry up with the tanks. Another problem was what role the infantry should play in supporting the armour. The re-equipping of the divisions with the Sherman in late 1943 led to infantry being reverted to a support role once again. This was due to the Sherman having a good HE(15) rounds with which to deal with ‘soft’ targets.

The period of 1942-43 saw the increase in the attempt to co-ordinate armour and infantry. This was intensified when Major-General Roberts(16) took over the division in early 1944. Roberts with his experience in the desert saw the need to improve co-operation between armour and infantry. Roberts also saw the need to change the tactics used when launching an attack. Prior to his arrival their had been an attempt to use set piece tactics to assault a position, he change this by ordering that upon closing with the enemy the armoured brigade commander send his regiments around the flanks of the enemy. He ordered that regiments keep on the move and that deliberate reconnaissance be abolished. These were some of the advantages conferred on the division with the arrival of a commander with battlefield experience.

Another failure in training was the inability of the division exercises to be realistic. They suffered from being under the guidance of umpires who sought their regiment to be victorious rather than a fair comprehension of the battlefield environment. As Harrison-Place comments about 11th armoured’s exercise EAGLE that was:
“…partial umpiring by umpires whose first loyalty was not to realism but to the interests of their own units.”(17)

As has be seen the implementation of these publications and their associated doctrine was patchy and led to mistakes both in training and in operations. While attempts were made, belatedly, to correct the failings in training and doctrine, most notably with the arrival of Roberts from the Mediterranean, the problems encountered in training would come back to haunt the British in the early operations of the Normandy campaign. Had the lesson of North Africa been more forcefully implemented at both division and regimental lesson many mistake could have been avoided.

4. Operations EPSOM, GOODWOOD, and the failure of doctrine:

Operation EPSOM was launched on the 26th of June under a massive bombardment of 700 guns. The objective of the operation was to gain the high ground of Hill 112 and then breakout into the Odon valley below. The operation was to be carried out by Lieutenant General O’Connor’s(18) VIII Corps, which was newly arrived from England. This corps included Robert’s 11th Armoured Division(19).

The initial attack by the 15th Scottish went well and in the first few hours of the division made an inroad of several miles on a front of three miles. Suddenly German resistance began to stiffen and the failure of the supporting operation of I and XXX Corps meant that VIII Corp was prone to a counter-attack on three sides. This occurred on the 27th. It was at this point that O’Connor decided to commit the 11th Armoured to the battle. Eventually the tanks of 29th Armoured Brigade reached Hill 112 but without an infantry, support they were forced to relinquish the position on the 30th after II SS Panzer Corps launched a counter attack. The previous day Montgomery had ordered a halt to EPSOM realising, it was going to go no further.

During the operation, 11th Armoured operated in virtually 2 distinct formation, 29th Armoured and 159th Infantry brigades, and conducted operations independent of each other. Initially in the operation, the 159th took Baron sur Odon and encountered heavy fighting there and from there subsequently served under various formations. When this occurred 29th was ordered to try to fight a way through to achieve a breakthrough from Cheux. This was the first mistake. Instead of using the tanks once a breakthrough had been achieved, O’Connor attempted to use the tanks to achieve the breakthrough. This meant that by the time any sort of gap had been created the armoured unit were too tired and exhausted to exploit it. The other major failure for the division during EPSOM was it lack of co-ordination between infantry and armour. Harrison-Place comments that:
“…Roberts reached the…conclusion…concerning the need for tank-infantry co-operation within the armoured division.”(20)
Though he was frustrated in his wish for greater co-operation as during the EPSOM operation his infantry brigade served under three commands, 11th Armoured, 15th Scottish and 53rd Welsh divisions, which meant that he could not develop co-ordination between his units. Therefore, the only infantry that was supporting the tanks was the mechanised infantry of the 8th Rifle Brigade, and while they did sterling service, they were too few in number to be of effect.

EPSOM, therefore, shows the first major blooding for the division and started to show up the failing in their training especially, as commented above, the lack of effective inter arm co-operation.

11th Armoured’s next operation was GOODWOOD. This operation was launched on the 18th July as a precursor to the launch of the Americans operation COBRA. It had many conflicting aims. Montgomery had to up the objectives of the operation in order to gain the support he wanted from the strategic air forces, though he never fully believed the plan could be a breakout. Whereas, the commander of the 2nd Army, Lieutenant General Dempsey, believed it could achieve a breakout on the eastern flank. The operation has often been compared to the charge of the light brigade as it saw the use of an all armoured corps, VIII Corps(21), and had very little infantry support.

The operation began under a massive preparatory bombardment by RAF Bomber Command and then the divisions jumped off from their position by the Orne River. 11th armoured objectives were Bras, Hubert Folie, Verrieres and Fontenay. Moving off without support from the infantry, who were fighting a parallel action, the tanks encountered their first problems, an anti-aircraft battery of 88mm anti-aircraft/tank guns, at Cagny(22), which knocked out 16 tanks. The division had only just started to move out. Worse was to come, the only Forward Air Controller was killed and the units behind 11th Armoured were caught in huge traffic jams. Roberts then ordered Cagny to be masked by the 8TH RB and 23rd Hussars. This was a mistake because once they moved into position they were in full view of German tanks and the 23rd Hussars took heavy casualties. For most of the day, units received flank attacks to their exposed positions. As Bill Close comments on the losses received by the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment:
“We had received a considerable number of casualties with seven tanks knocked out from my squadron and a similar number from B and C squadron.”(23)

The 19th would see much the same problems as the previous day. 3rd RTR attempted to take Bras. The major problem in attacking Bras and Hubert Folie was the 3000 yards of open country between them and the divisions start line. In this area were many dug 88’s and infantry armed with Panzerfausts who took a great heavy toll on the tank units, who had limited infantry support to deal with the positions. Though by the end of the day their was an attempt at forming battle groups, for example, one was made up of the 4th KSLI, 3rd Mons and 23rd Hussars while they attempted to hold onto Hubert Folie.

Operation GOODWOOD has attracted much criticism, some quite rightly so. It was ill conceived to send in an all armoured attack into country that was perfect for German anti-tank guns that had the range to knock out all Allied tanks with ease. There is also a sense of bad luck for the forward units of 11th Armoured to of had their FAC knocked out so early on in the operation. The biggest failure in doctrine though was the distinct lack of co-operation between the armour and infantry. Once again, O’Connor forced 11th Armoured to fight as two separate entities. Roberts to his credit was dismayed by this fact, after seeing its effect in EPSOM, but when he attempted to change it, he was threatened with his division loosing the lead in the operation. Therefore, despite attempts pre-invasion to train the divisions to operate with infantry in GOODWOOD they were denied that opportunity and as Harrison Place comments:
“Their deployment disregarded the doctrine in which they had been trained. No wonder that few successes came their way.”(24)
Bill Close also comments that:
“Goodwood was a shambles, but only because our method of advance was forced upon us without infantry…”(25)

Both EPSOM and GOODWOOD had shown failing in the British armoured division not just at tactical level but also there employment at a higher level. They had shown failings and proven once and for all that tanks could not, and should not operate without infantry and also that they were a fine instrument for exploitation not a blunt one with which to take and hold ground. Thankfully, the armoured units reputation would be regained in their final operation, BLUECOAT, where 11th Armoured would lead the way.

5. Operation BLUECOAT and success:

BLUECOAT was to see the coming of age for Britain's armoured divisions. In the operation they would use combined armour-infantry teams to deal with the problems the bocage country gave them. This was especially apparent in 11th Armoured who led the way with the tactics and they were finally being run along the lines suggested in the training documents of 1942-44.

Even the planning of the operation was done in a new fashion; it was left to the divisional commander to formulate the orders and movements of his units. For Roberts this meant complete freedom to organise his units into combined armour-infantry groups. For the operation, he formed four battle groups from his division. By this time the armoured reconnaissance regiment was being used as a fourth armoured regiment as the division had the 2nd Household Cavalry attached. This use of battle group was the first success for the doctrine, which had been attempted to be laid down in Britain in the years 1942-44.

The operation opened on the 30th July with VIII Corps heading for Vire and XXX Corps launching an assault against Mont Pincon. The division was ordered to march for Le Beny Bocage. Before it could do this, it had to take St Martin-des-Besaces. Initial movement on the first day was slow but by the second, the German front began to crumble in front of VIII Corps. On the morning of 31st St Martin was attacked by the battle group of the 2nd Fife and Forfarshire Yeomanry and 4th KSLI. It was during this attack that a gap in the lines was found by the 2nd Household Cavalry, who were attached to 11th Armoured, at what is now known as Bull Bridge over the Souleuvre River. This was an opportunity for the division to shift its weight of advance and gain an advantage, which it duly did by the end of the second day. The cause of this gap was uncertainty of the two German divisions in the area over who was to blow the bridge. By realising, there was a gap the battle group of the 3rd Mons and 23rd Hussars were ordered to concentrate there and strike out. As Major J J How comments:
“…Roberts saw his chance and seized it.”(26)
This small action early on in the operation shows the flexibility that could occur when an armoured division and its commander were given the opportunity. By controlling the battle himself and not always checking with his Corps commander Roberts was able to take the opportunity and seize a vital crossing over the river that would help speed up his advance.

By being given, the freedom to plan his own operations and fully direct his division’s operations Roberts was able to advance quickly and eventually seized Perriers ridge. This created a salient in the front as Guards and the Americans on either side were advancing much slower. This led to a halt in operations and to hold the ground that had already been seized. The 6th August the division, two brigade boxes on the ridge came under a counter attack by the 10th SS Panzer Division. The division by utilizing combined operation from all elements were able to hold their position but it was close run thing as the historian of the 23rd Hussars confidently comments:
“General Eberbach had reported to von Kluge that 10th SS Panzer had captured Hill 224 – not true!”(27)

Operation BLUECOAT shows several elements of how to make the best use of an armoured division. Initially by allowing Roberts to plan his own operations he could tailor his division to the mission it was given. Secondly, the operations that occurred around St Martin and Bull Bridge show is a good example of what should happen when an opportunity arises and how to exploit it. By being able, to exploit the situation at hand Roberts managed to get a head start on his advance and was eventually ahead of XXX Corps who were supposed to be leading BLUECOAT but whose attacks had become bogged down. The final example of the actions on Hill 224 show that when used to good effect and supported by infantry, armour could hold a static position against determined counterattack.

6. Conclusion:

As has been seen the 11th Armoured in Normandy went through many problems that stemmed from areas of their training and doctrine and regimental system.

During their training period, there was a distinct failure to disseminate the information coming back from the front. While these did come back in the form of NTW’s and CRO’s they were never fully formed into official doctrine and therefore, not fully disseminated.

The other major problem facing the force in its early years was the problems of inter-arm service co-operation that was enshrined in regimental tradition, as Russell Hart comments:
“…traditionalism enshrined in…regimental system…continued to retard development of the interarm and interservice co-ordination…”(28)
For example, officers of the RTR were adamant that the tank had primacy in warfare and sought to see the survival of their Corps. They also based much of their theories on the work of Basil Liddell Hart and Major General Fuller who also sought to protect the Corps and the role of the tank. This is most notable with Hobart, a disciple of the work of the former, who sought to use the tanks of 11th Armoured as the main weapon of the division, whereas, Roberts, with his experience, saw the importance of co-operation between the various services of the division. Both EPSOM and GOODWOOD showed the fatality of the use of the early theories of armoured warfare and the realisation that what was trying to be taught, greater inter-arm co-operation, was the way forward. This is something that Roberts knew. BLUECOAT showed that his efforts to improve inter-arm co-operation after taking command had not been in vain once he was given the opportunity to exercise command of his division fully.

The divisions in Normandy initially threw away anything they had been taught from their experiences in the field. It took them making several mistakes early in the campaign to bring around a realisation that tanks could not operate effectively without some form of infantry support. This throwing away of the training book was in part to preserve infantry casualties, as by 1944 21st Army Group was a wasting asset. Therefore, there was an attempt to use what the army had a lot of and that was tanks. This was a costly error, which eventually led to the formation a battle groups and the realisation of the doctrine of 1942-44. As Russell hart comments:
“…in Normandy British ground forces enhanced their capabilities in…combined arms co-operation.”(29)

While this essay has shown that 11th Armoured were able to realise the limitation in their training and the control from higher command most of the other Anglo-Canadian armoured divisions had a similar learning curve in the Normandy campaign. Another example of where the Anglo-Canadian forces managed to overcome the limitation in their doctrine was during operation TOTALISE/TRACTABLE. In the early stages Canadian II Corps failed to use, it has armoured forces effectively and use them to find weak points in the German defences and seek exploitation. Instead, they became bogged down in fighting. However, by the start of TRACTABLE the armoured division were, like 11th Armoured, operating in battle groups and seeking operational manoeuvre against the enemy. The 1st Polish Armoured Divisions action around Trun was very similar to those that happened to 11th Armoured around Hill 224. therefore, the anglo-canadian armoured division were as flexible as their allies and enemies armoured formation by the end of the campaign.

Therefore, it can be said that the problems faced in Normandy were down to failure to disseminate doctrine properly and the limitation to implement at the right level and therefore, train the units effectively. As Harrison Place comments that, the problems faced could be:
“…traced to doctrinal error, consequent training error and incompatibility…with official doctrine.”(30)

9. Bibliography and References

Beale P (1998) Death by Design: British Tank Development in the Second World War
Brisset J (Translated by Bates T) (1989) The Charge of the Bull: A History of the 11th Armoured Division in Normandy 1944
Close MC Major B (2002) A View from the Turret: A History of the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment in the Second World War
Delaforce P (1996) Marching to the Sound of Gunfire: North West Europe 1944-5
Delaforce P (1993) The Black Bull: From Normandy to the Baltic with the 11th Armoured Division
D’ Este C (1994) Decision in Normandy
Fletcher D (1993) The Universal Tank: British Armour in the Second World War Part 2
French D (2000) Raising Churchill’s Army: The British Army and the War against Germany 1919-1945
Harrison Place T (2000) Military Training in the British Army, 1940-1944: From Dunkirk to D-Day
Hart R (2001) Clash of Arms: How the Allies won in Normandy
Hastings M (1984) Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy 1944
How Major J J (1984) Hill 112: Cornerstone of the Normandy Campaign
How Major J J (1981) Normandy: The British Breakout
Jarymowycz R J (2001) Tank Tactics: From Normandy to Lorraine
Keegan J (1994) Six Armies in Normandy
Tout K (2002) Roads to Falaise: ‘Cobra’ and ‘Goodwood’ Reassessed

10. Further Reading

Adair A HS (1986) A Guards’ General: The Memoirs of Major-General Sir Allan Adair, BT, GCVO, CB, DSO, MC, JP, DL
Beal P (1995) Tank Tracks
Cary J (1966) Tanks and Armour in Modern Warfare
Carver Field Marshal Lord M (1979) The Apostles of Mobility: The Theory and Practice of Armoured Warfare
Harris J P (1995) Men, Ideas and Tanks: British Military Thought and Armoured Forces, 1903-1939
Harris J P and Toase F H (eds.) (1990) Armoured Warfare
Hunnicut R (1978) Sherman: A History of the American Medium Tank
Larson R H (1984) The British Army and the Theory of Armoured Warfare, 1918-1940
Macksey K (1967) Armoured Crusader: A Biography of Major General Sir Percy Hobart
Macksey K (1976) Tank Tactics, 1939-1945
Macksey K (1971) Tank Warfare: A History of Tanks in Battle
Ogorkiewicz R M (1970) Armoured Forces: A History of Armoured Forces and their Vehicles
Roberts G P B (1987) From the Desert to the Baltic
Tout K (1998) A Fine Night for Tanks: The Road to Falaise
Tout K (2000) The Bloody Battle for Tilly: Normandy 1944
Verney G L (1954) Desert Rats

Endnotes:

1. Keegan J (1994) Six Armies in Normandy, Pg. 197
2. This formation contained British, Canadian and Polish units.
3. Anglo-Canadian Armoured forces in Normandy comprised the following: Guards, 7th, 11th, 4th Canadian and 1st Polish Armoured Division, 4th, 8th, 27th, 33rd and 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigades and the 6th Guards, 31st and 34th Tank Brigades.
4. Hart R (2001) Clash of Arms: How the Allies won in Normandy, Pg. 304
5. To see the changes made in the structure of the Anglo-Canadian Armoured Division see Harrison Place T (2000) Military Training in the British Army, 1940-1944: From Dunkirk to D-Day, Pg. 98-100 and is the source for the above chart.
6. Hart R (2001) Op Cit, Pg. 309
7. Keegan J (1994) Loc Cit, Pg. 197
8. Cited in Delaforce P (1993) The Black Bull: From Normandy to the Baltic with the 11th Armoured Division, Pg. 13. Bill Close is also the author of Panzer Bait and had no fewer than 11 tanks knocked out from under him in the northwest Europe campaign.
9. Hastings M (1984) Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy 1944, Pg. 279
10. Cited in D’este C (1994) Decision in Normandy, Pg. 355. Taken from the paper ‘Operation Goodwood’ by Basil Liddell Hart. In 1952, Liddell Hart persuaded Dempsey to talk at length about Operation Goodwood.
11. For a Biography of this early pioneer in Britain’s armoured forces see - Macksey K (1967) Armoured Crusader: A Biography of Major General Sir Percy Hobart
12. Harrison Place T (2000) Op Cit, Pg. 14
13. This was published on the 19th May 1941.
14. This exercise took place in July 1942. Unfortunately, for the Irish Guards, the umpires deemed 9th Armoured to far away to do damage with their 2pdr gun. 9th Armoured were subsequently criticised by Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke for their charge. For details of this incident see Harrison Place T (2000) Op Cit, Pg. 108
15. HE – High Explosive rounds. This type of round was used to destroy targets such as trucks and artillery. Previously the armoured units had been equipped with British cruiser tanks that were armed with 6pdr that did not have an effective HE round.
16. Previously Roberts had commanded an armoured regiment in the desert before being command of 23rd Armoured Brigade in Tunisia under the 1st Army. He also had the distinction of being the youngest Major General in the British Army.
17. Harrison Place T (2000) Op Cit, Pg26
18. O’Connor was a veteran of the North African campaign and had been captured during Operation Battleaxe but escaped from his Italian prisoner and on his return to England was given command of VIII Corps.
19. Other divisions in the corps included the 15th (Scottish) Infantry Division and43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division
20. Harrison Place T (2000) Op Cit, Pg. 156
21. This consisted of 7th, 11th and Guards Armoured Divisions.
22. Apparently, this Luftwaffe battery was ordered by Colonel Hans Von Luck of the 21st Panzer Division to turn the guns on the tanks. He initially objected but Luck managed to persuade him. See Hastings M (1984) Op Cit, Pg. 276
23. Close MC Major B (1998) A View From the Turret: A History of the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment in the Second World War, Pg. 121
24. Harrison Place T (2000) Op Cit, pg. 159
25. Cited in Delaforce P (1993) Op Cit, Pg. 68
26. How MC Major J J (1981) Normandy: The British Breakout, Pg. 54
27. Cited in Delaforce P (1993) Op Cit, Pg. 94
28. Hart R (2001) Op Cit, Pg.304
29. Hart R (2001) Op Cit, Pg. 320
30. Harrison Place T (2000) Op Cit, Pg. 167

 

Nice! Very well done, impressive piece!

Quick things...
TOE? I know, I should know what that stands for...

You mention that Monty had to up his aims for Goodwood in order to have the operation approved. I've always heard differing versions of this- what did Monty realistically hope to achieve with Goodwood? Was he of the mind that a breakout could not really be achieved by the British forces, and thus intending all along to only fight a holding action against the last of the German armor?

Do any of your sources offer any ideas as to why it seemed like the allied armor forces in Normandy used some of the poor tactics/doctrine? Was it mainly just to hold down infantry casualties, or is this your theory?

 

I second Crazy's comments Ross.....job well done !

A question that has always bothered me since the 1960's when I first strated researching the W-SS committment in Normandie. Why wasn't the W-SS truppen and Pnazers bombarded into oblivion during Epsom, Bluecoat and Goodwood. The Allies had superior recon capabilites at least from the air, and even with the light AA used by the Germans the Allies could easily peer through the camo and hillocks to find dug in emplacements. Really would of thought the 9th AF T-bolts and the RAF Typhoons would of reigned total destruction upon the W-SS and Wehrmacht units to add a softening up to British artillery salvo's as a pre-warm up before starting off......oh well it's an almost what-if.

~E

 

Wondering what factors played into the succesful employment of DD Shermans,fascines,funnies,etc. on the British beaches as compared to the tragedys experienced by U.S. forces with their vehicles.

 

I certainly don't have the info/sources on this one that Mahross does, but...

Wilconqr, some info from a video set I have- "Tanks", British production videos, not sure offhand who did them...
This video sets sets out the idea that as far as the "funnies" were concerned (the specialized sherman tanks), there simply were not enough of them to supply the American landing beaches in addition to the British and Canadian beaches.
As far as the Sherman DD tanks deploying for the American sector- from what the video, and a couple other sources asy, I've always gotten the idea that the Sherman DDs were deployed in too deep water too far from the beach. In addition, apparently there was a cross-wind for the American tanks, which further caused them to lean towards the side and flounder.

Erich- that IS a good question, isn't it! From the same video referenced above, I do get the idea that by the time Goodwood came around, the Germans (1st SS) were down to about 100 operational AFVs. I guess the allied A/C did catch quite a few german tanks... but I also guess that some were just SO camoflaged and dug in and whatnot- probably not visible unless they were to move.

 

Read before that the U.S. forces opted to NOT use as many armored vehicles during their assaults, unlike their British allies who made good use of demolition,bridgelaying,fascine, and DD Sherman tanks. Question- Was the British Cromwell tanks like the ones used at Dieppe ever fitted with any experimental flotation devices or did they just have the snorkel system used for wading to shore?

 

From what I have read and chatted with so-called experten on this is that many of the Panzers came through bombing /rocket attacks without problem and what was scored as a tank was actually MT or motor transport and soft skinned vehicles. Can imagine the light AA crews on those open bed 1 ton's most probably paid the dues for their defence of the armored columns.....and the horse drawn wagons.......

~E

 

For Goodwood some unfortunate things happened for the Allied ( =Monty ).

1. Somehow the reconnaissance failed to notice that Caen was empty of Germans and even though the main bombing did destroy alot of German tanks the main reserves were totally untouched just outside the city. Instead 3,000 French civilians dies. AS well the 5-line defence ring was totally unnoticed by the Allied reconnaissance. I think the bosses ( Monty? ) was sure that the bombings would destroy everything and they´d juts walk right throught he lines in Caen and further...
You want to read how the allied were stopped read Von Luck´s book.

2. The starting point area was narrow if I remember correctly so the tanks had to pour into tha battle scene through a bottle neck...88´s just love that...

3.

I don´t think there was any lack actually as the infantry was separated from tanks because the Allied command HAD ORDERED SO to keep the men losses down.
Ok, so the 88´s and at guns shot some 400-450 tanks, a total of 1/3 of western front allied tanks...If the infantry had been there mayeb they could have eliminated the 88´s...who knows?

And I don´t really think Monty was just holding down the German forces...you put 1/3 or more of the tank forces in Normandy in attack and call it defending yourself? I don´t believe in that. That
is major breakthrough attempt!

PS. Almost forgot, very well written work, Mahross!

[ 28. May 2003, 01:49 PM: Message edited by: Kai-Petri ]

 

well I think to add to what Kai reported......smoke was a major hindurance to British armor as well as supporting infantry walking across groves of high stnading wheat.
Still seems to me that the German positions or at least some of them could have been softened up much more than what they were, instead of using the "go at them" attitude.

~E

 

Yeah, Erich,

it´s actually unbelievable how anyone can survive the bombings and naval artillery...

But like I said for Goodwood they bombed empty trenches mostly..the German soldiers in the furthest front indeed were bombed to kingdom come though, total destruction.

And as well one must remember that bombing the roads and ground make it harder for your troops to attack as well! It´s not so simple as to just blow everything away if you want to advance fast when it´s time!

 

Bombed empty trenches? Not sure about that aspect...

http://www.legionmagazine.com/features/canadianmilitaryhistory/98-11.asp

An elaborate bombing program was devised for Operation Goodwood, the British armored blitzkrieg of July 18, 1944, and Atlantic–the code-name for the Canadian portion of the operation. Christopher Evans, a young air historian who has written a detailed account of Bomber Command’s role in Goodwood, argues the bombing achieved almost all of its objectives. The weakness of the plan was the absence of a second, equally powerful onslaught the following day.

The targets were arranged in a complex U-shaped pattern. The industrial zone of Caen on the south bank of the Orne and the stone villages on the left flank of the tank corridor were to be destroyed with 1,000-pound, delayed fuse bombs. Mosquitoes of 8 Pathfinder Force employing Oboe, the navigation system based on radio beams, marked the targets with red smoke markers dropped from 22,000 feet. Behind them, flying into morning sun, the master and deputy master bombers corrected for wind drift dropping yellow target indicators. Finally, the Halifaxes and Lancasters approached the targets at heights of between 6,500 and 9,500 feet. The weather was clear and in slightly over 30 minutes the bombs were gone, leaving unbelievable destruction behind. Six of the 1,014 aircraft that took part in the operation were shot down.

http://www.geocities.com/CollegePark/Den/7664/caen.html
The British air attack began at dawn and the armor began to roll an hour later. The bombardment by over two thousand Allied heavy bombers not only destroyed the front line German infantry divisions, but the soft skinned vehicles of some of the armored formations. The German forces were badly scattered and out of communication with other units, but individual initiative of many commanders allowed small kampfgruppes to be organized and ambush the advancing British units.

and...
http://www.poeland.com/tanks/scenarios/goodwood/
The attack was preceded by a huge air bombardment dropped by over 1,000 British and American bombers. This carpet-bombing was severe enough to flip Tigers upside down, bury vehicles, and drive German infantrymen to madness. German lines and communications were completely disrupted.

But logistics slowed the British armour: minefield crossings, railroad line crossings, and dealing with hundreds of enthusiastic but inexperienced drivers. By the time the 11th Division reached the heart of the battlefield, the Germans had begun to regroup. 7th armour followed the 11th; and Guards held the eastern flank in close terrain.

_________________________________

So it sounds like the bombing was rather effective. Sounds to me like it was more a matter of terrain issues and tactics. The terrain around Caen was extremely unfavorable to tank usage and forced vehicles to essentially stay on the roads, making perfect ambush targets.
And tactics- because the British decided to make the attack an all-armor operation, there was no reliable method available to take out anti-tank weapons. A single soldier with a panzerschrek could hold up the entire advance. It seems telling that each of the main armored groups involved encountered similar circumstances. The 11th made good progress- until a counterattack stopped their progress. Similar situations arose with the Guards Armored Division and the 11th- each made good progress but was suddenly stopped by a counter attack. This sounds to me like a situation that could have easily been avoided through the use of infantry and armor co-operation. If infantry had also been part of the offensive, many german ambushes could have been avoided by early discovery, and maybe even some of the allied attacks could have kept their momentum. Once the armor was stopped by the german defenders or counter-attacks, there were no forces to step into place and keep up the momentum of the attack.

Makes me think in some ways of the Battle of the Bulge. The attacking german armored forces were far stronger than the american defenders - much like the British armored forces were likely during Goodwood much stronger than their german enemies, who had lost even more tanks during the bombing. BUT- even these minor forces caused major delays in the German advance. During Goodwood, the allies seemed to have encountered the same thing. Even though their armored forces were much stronger, every little ambush and battle caused too many delays for the allied operation to succeed.

my 3 cents worth...

 

congrats on now batting a thousand !

didn;t Kurt Meyer pull back the 12th SS from the lines several kilometres back since he had suspected such a bombing event , and the 79th ? infantrie stayed put and paid the price.....same mision/operation ? got to go check the files

~E

 

Crazy D,

well, I wonder if the bombing of the Caen area was the name for a successful bombing mission. Sure, they did actually what was asked. 1,000 British and some 400+ US planes dropped bombs in Caen area. And yes, the Luftwaffe troops that were the first in line were hammered death, tanks flew in the air.As well, don´t forget, 3,000 Caen civilians were killed. But the German main reserves were practically "untouched".In that sense all the bombs droppped did not do their job I think. Just "raised the British soldier´s morale" as they saw everything being bombed to kingdom come.Unfortunately for them the morale sank fast as tank started breewing up 200/day.

The bombing went as planned but it didn´t make the expected results. Or how is it possbile that the attack was stopped and the British lost some 450 tanks and 6,000 dead soldiers ( I´m not sure on the latter figure if it was casualties or KIA+MIA ).

I think the plan was too much based on the bombing´s as there were loads of other points that made the attack totally sad-looking:

1. the start up point was small, all the troops didn´t fit there, a traffic jam. As well four bridges available only caused that tanks went ahead but artillery followed very late behind.I guess by the first evening there was a huge traffic jam at the starting point still.

2. As well the first phase for the tanks was to pass the British mine fields one by one and the clearing of the route had to be done seconds before the beginning of the attack.

3. There was an airman in the tanks who was supposed to contact the allied aircraft where to attack, except that the Germans ( who knew to destroy the commander tanks first naturally ) killed his tank first, and later on nobody else suitable was found to the job. So the group of planes had to do on their own.

4. The reconnaissance did not notice LAH tanks come in ( and more tanks destruction happened ) as the Panthers and Stug´s and others could shoot the allied tankd in the hull-down position.

By the way, von Luck mentions that the British did not do reconnaissance further than 7 kilometers behind the lines??? Can it be?

5. there was also a storm at one point during the 19th that stopped the air force working for the rest of the day.

Just some points I read on this ...

PS. I wonder after two years of battle Monty et co preferred tanks without foot soldiers to protect the tanks...



PS. Congrats on the 1,000th post CradyD!!!

 

Hi guys thanks for the replys and compliments. this thing was a bit of a lbaour of love. i might one day make into something larger. maybe a thesis. we shall see. now for some of the points raised.

Crazy - TOE - table of organisation and equipment. On monty and goodwood. yeah basically monty never fully believed that it would be the breakthrough that dempsey did. dempsey pushed him on it and eventually in order to get the support from the strategic bomebers he claimed it would lead to a breakthrough. most of what i have read on monty and the op has claimed that he never beleievd in it. alos he never liked using an all armoured corps especially after the fiasco at the begining of the battle of el alamein. goodwood was dempseys idea, he believed it would work and therefore, to get the necessary firepower he wanted monty had to play up its aims harris and spaatz. this almost got him fired as tedder tried to have him removed after its so called failure.

The tactics were really poor they were badly implemented. the use of tanks over inafntry was a through back to earlier theories of armoured warfare most notably fuller and liddell hart. they both believed tanks didn't need inafantry and this permeated into the RAC and led their doctrine in the early years and due to certain inter service rivalries and traditions was very hard to get rid of. this led to some of the early failures until some of the younger commanders most notably Roberts and Adair came on the scene. Tanks were also greatly used as there were more and easily replaceable, infantry was not. by 1944 the british army had a manpower shortage especially with infantry. this led to the development of tactics to reduce their casualties. most notably the use of overwhelming firepower be it strategic or tactical. this was why there was very little inafantry in Goodwood. This is support by a recent Phd thesis by stephan hart who concluded that it was montys startegy to use his Collassel Cracks startegy in order to preserve casualties. this permeated at all levels of command. this is why some of the early mistakes were made as they tried to replace infantry with overwhelming firepower.

Erich - while stratgic bombing had an awe factor it very rarely affected the opposing troops for long. it did damage vehicles but as long as troops dug in they were unlikely to be hugely effected. the bombing also tended to be to deep aswell. for example at goodwood by the time the brits had reached the positions of th 12ss the effects had worn off. for good infor on this read Terry Copps 'Montgomerys scientists' this is a collection of reports by the operational reseacrh scientists of the time and has some good info on the effects of startegic bombing on the campaign.

Wilconqr - i have got any info on me but if your interested to know more on the funnies PM me. The cromwell did have an experimental DD device fitted to it but was not used operationally. so did the valentine.

Kai - you are right the prep bombing di create as many problems for the advancing troops. that is why by tatalise/tractable they were bimbing to side of the adavnce so tanks didn't fall into craters. they ahad stated to use marked out corridors with high powered searchlights to direct the advances.

 

Mahross, compliments are deserved on a quality piece of writing!

TOE... damn... I was going through all the abbreviations I could think of... how'd I miss that?!

On the overall effectiveness of the bombing.. I wonder- do any of the sources mention anything to the effect of what exactly the bombing hit? I'm wondering how many German tanks and AFVs were taken out. I certianly sounds like the bombing before goodwood was "effective"... but what does "effective" mean to these authors?
Did the bombing knock out large amounts of troops AND tanks, along with the noted "disruption of communication lines"? Or did the bombing only kill a few troops and cause some minor disruptions, while leaving most of the German formations intact?

From the sounds of it, the major problem for Goodwood was British disorganisation, or inadequate planning? I see examples like the one mentioned by Kai, where the only [?] forward air controller was put in one of the first tanks. Wasn't there any provision for having a back-up air controller?
And could the route of attack have been planned better to accomodate armor?

Very interesting stuff, no doubt!

(thanks for the congrats, gents... ... although I would much rather point to the 1000+ posts from other forum members that have provided so much info!)

[ 29. May 2003, 09:48 AM: Message edited by: CrazyD ]

 

CrazyD,

I don´t have any numbers with me but from Tim Ripley´s Steel Rain Waffen-SS Panzer battles in the west 1944-45 ( I think you got it ) the bombing in his view destroyed and made inoperable at least the 16th Luftwaffe Field division, and some of the remnants of the 21 st Panzer Division.( after all the battles only remnants of the 21st were holding its position ). However the reserve positions were not badly hit.Small groups of determined German soldiers were preparing for what would happen next. The Waffen-SS units were virtually untouched ( Leibstandarte and part of HJ division at Bourguebus ridge ).

----------

From one site I found this but I cannot say it´s absolutely right

http://www.geocities.com/CollegePark/Den/7664/caen.html

-On the left flank, a company of the 22nd Pz Regiment of the 21st Pz Division was mauled along with a company of the 503rd Heavy Tank Battalion. In the center of the corridor, most of the guns of a battery of the 21st Pz Division's Assault Gun Battalion and part of its I Battalion/125th PzGr Reg were put out of action.

-devastated 272nd Infantry Division.

-shattered remnants of the 16th Luftwaffe Field Division

 

The bombing on July 18th is where the famous 'Tiger upside-down' photo came from. At least 2 Tigers were totaly destroyed and indirectly the bomb craters trapped up to 3 others. All in all and not counting the PzIV's wrecked not a bad day for the air enthusiasts!

 

Close, Kai- I've got his Battles in the East, but haven't picked up West.

Also- the site you listed- same one that I listed above! Seems pretty good, but you're right, no way to tell.

Very interesting stuff though. Based on the information M.Kenny provided... at least 5 Tigers were put out of action. I'll have to check (unless Mr. Kenny provides! ) on how many Tigers s.Pz.Abt had operational at this time.
But- that would certainly suggest that at least the German armor was in fact hit by some of the bombing.

I'm getting the idea here that the failure of Goodwood was much more based on plannign and logistical problems, as opposed to serious german resistance. Sounds to me like most fo the resistance came from small groups of German soldiers ambushing the tanks with any weapons they had. Problem is, if the tank operation only has a couple routes to use... or, like Mahross notes, if there is no infantry support- this means that each little ambush holds up the entire offensive. Seems like it would not necessarily matter specifically how strong the german ambush parties were, or even what kinds of weapons/tanks they had. Just as long as the Germans could knock out a single tank, they could hold up the whole offensive.
Again, we could use the example Kai noted of the forward air controller. No back-up? No contingency plan?

 

I still don't understand the thought of not using the Air-bombing offence as a more front line role, instead of always attacking behind the lines, road crossings and the usual back troop movements and MT to the front line's. Would think a 6 hour preparation of saturation bombing could really have slowed down the defences in such a way but........
one of the major problems was the long range hitting power of the Pz IV and Panther followed up with the Tiger 1's. Heavily camouflaged with local brush and trees, including hay stacks, the Germans were usually able to get in the first shot at long range. what do you do with this......attack en masses like on the Ost front ? no, use the superior air power U have to localize and destroy these targets and then move ahead.

two cento's

~E

 

Erich, on the front line role the bombings I think had to be dropped, especially after the "fiendly fire incidents". The worst possibly being the one with operation Cobra, with killing more than 100, wounding 500. ( Ripley and Waffen-SS western front battles 44-45 ).

--------

CrazyD, I think the first phase of stopping the British was done by these small troops as they were buying time for the LAH and HJ forces to enter the scene. The LAH was ready the first day´s afternoon, part of HJ ( the division was still in repair situation ) that was usable the next day.

What armor they had by Ripley ( to start with ):

----------

Leibstandarte Panzer Regiment under Peiper´s command:

59 Pz IV´s, 46 panthers

The division´s assault gun battalion

35 Stug III

----

101st SS Battalion with Wittman in command

25 Tiger I´s

-----

Kampfgruppe Wünsche

the number of vehicles I don´t know now

-----

In total 4800 infantry, 200 tanks, 50 assault guns, 36 pieces 75 mm AT guns, 72 pieces of 88 mm Flak, 194 Field guns, 17 nebelwerfer rocket launchers

By Ripley

[ 30. May 2003, 02:21 PM: Message edited by: Kai-Petri ]