563rd Signal Air Warning battalion

Here is all that I can find:

Credited with these campaigns:
Tunisia
Sicily
Naples/Foggia
Rome/Arno
North Apennines
Rhineland
Central Europe

They were cited in GO 159 by the 12th Tactical Air Command, dated 18 Sep 1945. Event & date of event not recorded.

 

I was able to get the text to come up but not the pictures. I hope this isn't too much and is what you were trying to access.



1942
SEPTEMBER 1942
Sep 28
The 563rd Signal A. W. Battalion was formed at Drew Field, a little north of Tampa, Florida. It was activated on Paragraph 1 of General Order 44 of the Headquarters Army Air Base on 28 September 1942 and was stationed at Drew Field as a training unit and as such processed many inductees and placed them in units under the orders of the Fourth Signal Air Warning Training Battalion. The original TO&E was 11-440 which authorized 45 Commissioned Officers, 17 Warrant Officers and 592 Enlisted men.
OCTOBER 1942
Oct 1
The 563rd was quartered at Drew Field, Tampa Florida.
Oct 10
Capt. Merl Crowley of the 501st Signal Air Warning Regiment and five Lieutenants were recent graduates of the Eastern Signal Corps Officer Candidate School were assigned and joined.
Oct 13
Capt. Merl Crowley assumed command of the 563rd. Eight-one enlisted men from the 551st Signal Air Warning Battalion were assigned to the battalion.
Oct 21
The battalion was moved from Drew Field, Tampa, Florida to Plant Park, Tampa, Florida.
Oct 30
On 30 October 1943 the battalion issued a Historical Report. It covered the period from 25 September 1942 thru 25 December 1942 as follows;
Oct 31
The strength of the battalion was Commissioned Officers 10, Warrant Officers 0 and enlisted men 96.
NOVEMBER 1942
Nov 19
The 563rd lived in the hutment area at 10th and F Streets on Drew Field.
Nov 20
A detachment, later to become Company C, departed for the Sarasota Air Base, Sarasota, Florida for Field Training."
Two hundred and twelve men were assigned from the 501st Signal Air Warning Regiment. The unit was moved to Drew Field and were quarter in the hutment area at 10th and F Streets on Drew Field.
DECEMBER 1942
Dec 1
Lt. Col. Robert W. Maloney assumed command on.
Dec 3
Lt. Col. Maloney was transferred out and Lt. Col. Ron T. Richards assumed command of the 563rd.
Dec 27
The Battalion was reorganized on General Orders 72 Par 1 Headquarter Army Air Base, Drew Field, Florida to consist of a Headquarters and Plotting Company, Company A, Company B, Company C, and Company D.
31 Dec
The strength of the Battalion was increased to Commissioned Officers 75, Warrant Officers 0, enlisted men 585.
MAY 1943
MAY 31
Capt. Roger F. Detman assumed command of the 563rd.
AUGUST 1943
Aug 3
Capt. Alfred A. Foard assumed command of the 563rd.
Aug 31
Maj. Charles F. Smithson assumed command of the 563rd.
OCTOBER 1943
Oct 1
Maj. Thomas F. Fitzgerald assumed command of the 563rd.
Oct 6
Lt. Col. William McBride was the Commanding Officer of the 4th Training Battalion when he was transferred into the 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion on 6 October 1943. He issued 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion General Order 11 assuming command and relieving Maj. Thomas F. Fitzgerald. Maj. Maurice E. Byrne was also transferred into the battalion on this day but the new commanding officer of the 4th Training Battalion who replaced Lt. Col. McBride, on the recommendation of his Executive Officer, would not release Maj. Byrne at that time. The Executive Officer of the 4th Training Battalion had also been Lt. Col. McBride's Executive Officer in the 4th Training Battalion. The reason given for the delay in transferring Maj. Byrne to make him responsible for breaking in the new S-4 of the 4th Training Battalion. This delay went on for several weeks.
Oct 7
Lt. Col. McBride issued General Order 11 transferring himself into the Battalion from units in the Fourth Signal Air Warning Training Battalion where he was the Commanding Officer.
The 4th Taining Battalion supervised the unit organization and training of Air Warning Signal Units designated for overseas shipment. At that time the unit was designated for shipment to England for assignment to the invasion of the continent. Lt. Col. McBride was a American Telephone and Telegraph executive in civilian life and was an officer in the Massachusetts National Guard. He had served in combat in the famous "Yankee" Division in World War I as a First Sergeant. Although he was commissioned as an Infantryman his expertise in communications dictated his assignment to the Signal Corps.
He selected his headquarters staff and company commanders from personnel in the Training Battalion. The Signal Corps orga- nizations were team oriented. A battalion with company commanders would be assigned teams which became platoons in the companies. Within several weeks all the teams were assigned and the Battalion was full strength. They were then moved out into a maneuver area for unit training. Maj. Byrne was appointed Executive Officer and S3 of the Battalion, just previous to this he had been S-3 of the Fourth Training Battalion. In civil life he was an Electrical Engineer for the Idaho Power Company and was a Reserve Officer inducted into the Air Corps as an Aircraft Engineering officer at Hamilton Field near San Francisco, California. Later the Air Corps transferred all that were Electrical Engineers to the Signal Corps for duty in Radar units and subsequently sent to Harvard University for advanced electronics and then to the RAF radar School in Clinton, Ontario, Canada. Lt. Robert O. Schurke was assigned to the 563rd as Adjutant. He also had served as adjutant for the Fourth Training Battalion as Battalion Adjutant to Lt. Col. McBride.
Oct 18
On 18 October Lt. Col. McBride issued the first Training Schedule himself, with the aid of Lt. Schurke and the following Schedule was issued to be effective during the period 18 October to 23 Oct. At the time the Battalion was still short Company B. Note that the training week ended with inspection by him. This was always an inspection of troops and a retreat parade. Other training schedules during this period just prior to the starting of final operations training in the field were not preserved. Note the adherence to basics in the training. Lt. Col. McBride's idea was to start out with finished soldiers then let them apply what they had learned in technical schools.
The Operational Field training was put into motion in November and several of the Training Situations were preserved. The operational training was a simulation of combat operations which were set in motion by the issuance of a Field Order. These field orders were written in the same form as an actual combat field order and contained the plans the units were to follow in the simulated training. These field orders were issued along with appendices, some of which were detailed maps of where the units were to bivouac and the placement of the radars.
Most of the history of the 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion that has been related in the history and in these transactions occurred after the Battalion was designated to serve in the Task Force for the invasion of the Germany.
On 18 November the following Training Order No 1 was issued and this started the final operational training of the Battalion in the field. Training was under the supervision of the Battalion Plans and Training Staff and Lt. Paul E. Rapp was the S-3. The Battalion was operating for training from the 563rd Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) manual written by Maj. Byrne while still assigned to the 4th Training Battalion. During the operational training period this document was updated and finished up by Lt. Rapp. This document was well received by the Overseas Shipment Inspection Team and the 4th Training Battalion adopted it for future units receiving operational training for overseas's assignments. The Operational Training Schedule follows for the period of 18-23 Octonber follows on the following pages and on the same day the Training Directive was issued by Lt. Rapp under Lt. Col. McBride's direction. The Battalion was located in the Bivoac area north of Drew Field where the temporary headquarters Unit Training ScheduleUnit Training Schedulewere located. Following it the Training Order:
HEADQUARTERS 563rd SIGNAL AIRCRAFT WARNING BATTALION DREW FIELD Tampa, Florida 18 November 1945

 

It's a Geocities site and that closed last year.

I'll look in my book again. The type is miniscule and smudged, I may have misread it.

 

I'm using Mozilla Firefox, When I click on the various 'titles' it goes to a "not there" page, but I scrolled down to the info. There is a TON of information, (just scratched the surface),- good luck. I could cut and paste a few sections if you can't get through. Let me know.

ww w.geocities.ws/m29003/n563a.html
SIGNAL AIR WARNING BATTALION IN COMBAT IN THE ETO WW II

HEADQUARTERS 563rd SIGNAL AIRCRAFT WARNING BATTALION DREW FIELD Tampa, Florida 18 November 1945 TRAINING ORDER
NO 1
1. INDIVIDUAL SPECIALISTS TRAINING
a. The individual specialists training for personnel will be completed on 20 November 1943. By that time all individuals will have had sufficient training as individuals to enable them to conform with the standards prescribed in AAF Training Standards 10- 2-1, the teams will have been formed and functioned as teams and each team member will understand his function within the team.
b. On 21 November 1943 unit training will begin. For this phase all individuals will eat and sleep in the field, instruction and operations will be carried on, on 24 hour a day basis with full field equipment at close in distances. This phase will continue until 26 November 1943.
2. CLOSE IN OPERATIONAL UNIT TRAINING PHASE
a. In this phase stress will be put into instruction of teams in the SOP, the set-up and takedown of equipment and facilities, continuation of certain Basic subjects, and actual operations. No emphasis will be put on camouflage and defense of an area. During this phase practice will be conducted in the installation of defensive measures only inasmuch as the teamwork is involved. Consequently, any defensive measures will be in the nature of instruction and demonstration. Instruction will be carried out on the basic subjects listed in Par 4a Warning Order 1 and shifts will be arranged in accordance with Training Schedule 23 November to 26 November so as to include medical training listed thereon which will be conducted in the Battalion Mess by the Battalion Surgeon.
b. Radar Platoons will stress takedown and set-up of radars. Each set will be taken down and set up by each crew a minimum of three times one of which will be in a blackout. instructions will continue in SOP for reporting and familiarization with the SOP for preventative Maintenance. Whenever possible, radars will report into the I.C. by reduced power radio. Radio teams will work actual field nets instructions and will continue on SOP for preventative maintenance. Great stress will be put on set-up and take down All members of teams will practice setting up, tuning and take-down. Radio operators will perform simple 1st echelon maintenance on actual sets. Repairmen will do trouble shooting.
c. Filter teams will set up three filter and operations rooms in accordance with Annex A and B Warning Order 1. Stress will be put on setting up and taking down ICS equipment. Plotting and filtering will be carried on from information sent in by radars when operating and by cannery when they are not operating.
d. Ground observers will continue instruction in voice proce- dure, recognition and will stress set-up and take-down of radio equipment and laying field wire. Each member will practice set-up, tuning and breakdown of radios and will perform simple 1st echelon maintenance on radios.
e. Administrative personnel will continue to process records and complete all files and records. Unit files will be shaken down to the point where they are left with minimum essential equipment as authorized in POW 4k (4) and will prepare their excess records for storage as per POW 44w, WD cir 28/43 and AR 345-19.

By order of Lt. Col. McBride
Robert O. Schurke
1st Lt. Sig C
Adjutant

OFFICIAL:
Paul E. Rapp
1st Lt. Sig C
S-3

 

I'd copy everything you can. There is no telling how long it will be available.

 

192 pages (minus the photo's I couldn't get) saved to Microsoft word. Managed to copy 4 maps though Now I need to go back and see what I have.

 

I'll post the start of the 563rd History and if you have any specific questions I'll do by best. This has a nearly day by day accounting similar to the 348th Unit history thread. If the powers than be are willing or would like the entire History I'd be happy to break it up and post as a month by month or whatever.

CHRONOLOGY
Date Phase
June 6th to June 30th D Day Operations
June 31st to July 1st The Normandy Landing
July 2nd to July 31st Air Defense of Cherbourg
August 1st to August 13th The Breakout
August 14th to August 25th The Exploitation
August 26th to September 15th Pursuit to the West Wall
September 16th to December 15th Winter Operations
December 16th to February 7th Ardennes Campaign
February 8th to March 19th Rhineland Campaign
March 20th to March 28th Rhine River Crossing
March 29th to April 4th Reduction of the Rhur Pocket
April 5th to April 18th Advance to the Elbe River
April 19th to May 7th Final Operations

FOREWORD
By Maurice E. Byrne Col. Sig. Corps
Editor
This Version Three of the unit history of the 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion modifies the original version published in 1993. Additions were made from feedback from the men of the battalion. As time went on more sources of unit history become known. The unit history was written long after the facts and memory runs thin. There is a compensation for a late start because a lot of history has been published by the Army and others and a more detailed picture can be painted. It is fortunate that I still had some of the original maps used in operations by the 563rd that showed the old grid system used in combat. Since then the grid system was changed and the modern maps have a very different grid system. Without these old maps it would have been difficult to find a location since only the grid coordinate was invariably used in official records. In presenting the graphical data the original maps were used when at all possible. The names of towns on the original maps are sometimes different than they are now, particularly in Germany. It was decided to use the names on present maps in the text when known. In the initial phases of combat, Lt. Harold E. Waeckerle kept the Battalion Operations map posted. Later the Battalion S-2 group kept hour by hour track of the movement of the Third Army ground forces on the Battalion operations map. As S-2 WO Vernon O. Mills maintained the monthly historical report which he called "Following the 563rd". This historical report was consolidated monthly by him and forwarded to the XIX TAC. He plotted the ground situation extracted from the combat operation reports received from higher headquarters message centers and teletype messages from higher headquarters. The accurate and timely data WO Mills provided were the basis of the timely movement of the FDP's. Consistent and talented writers supplying the monthly historical report for the Companies were Lt. Wesley J. Howard for Company A, Lt. John C. DiLeo for Company B, Lt. Charles A Stewart for Company C, Lt. Jack F. Roberts for Company D and Lt. Norman H. Morse for the 738th Signal Air Warning Company.
[Editors Note 1---The historical record was a time consuming chore and it was required from all units monthly. Now we find out that these records is all we have left because the memory fades. Now, fifty years later I wish to belatedly thank the men who prepared these reports for their superior performance in preparation of the Unit Historical Reports and all others who participated in this activity whose names were not recorded. The company officers who were designated as Historical Officers were:
Lt. Wesley J. Howard A Company
Lt. John C DiLeo B Company
Lt. Charles A. Stewart C Company
Lt. Jack F. Roberts D Company
Lt. Norman H. Morse 738th SAW Company
When a person is referred to in the text it was attempted to give that rank the person had at the time of the action. It proved impractical to record all the promotions because many times the promotions were reported as a group with no names attached. During the operations in combat it was interesting to watch the progress of the Third Army and it did not take long to notice that when extremely fast progress was being made you could count on the 4th Armored Division as being in the spearhead. I always admired the men of that division and thought that the commanding general of that division was one of the more outstanding division commanders. His name was Maj. Gen. John S. Wood. He was the kind of leader that Gen. Patton's style of combat needed. He had the same attributes of boldness and skill that Patton had. Later on in the campaign Maj. Gen. Hugh Gaffey who was Patton's chief of staff was put in command of the 4th Armored.
We know the locations of most the units and the dates of movement because they were recorded for the S-3 operations report analysis. These locations were logged as grid coordinates along with the date. The 563rd was in combat from July 3, 1944 until May 7, 1945 or 331 days and in that time there was 645 movements of units. That includes the movement of all FDP's, LW's, BACU's, GO's and Headquarters. There were other movements which were temporary in nature and movement of groups to higher headquarters for confer- ences and to schools for training. In the history that follows the grid coordinates were mostly taken at face value and that position looked up on a map to find the town to identify with the location. There were several coordinates in the records which had obvious typographical errors which were corrected in the history. A few others were questionable and also had to be located by judgement.
In retrospect the 563rd had all the characteristics that were needed to fit into the Patton Army. For a small unit, the 563rd had responsibilities for an operations in a large area (the same size as the Third Army) which normally had three Corps. When in the Third Army one learned very quickly that we had to move practically before the smoke of battle had cleared. There were times when being one day late would put you a hundred miles behind. It was fortunate for the higher command that we were geared up to Armored operation. The Battalion was completely mobile and could therefore move rapidly. This mobility greatly aided the Airplane Groups to support the ground forces with the aid of fighter control Radar reporting into the Fighter Control Center.now and that he did self-confidence, speed and audacity. His army and air support modeled their behavior on that of their chief and they now found a situation perfectly suited to the expression of combat. The many staff officers who toiled in relative obscurity made it possible for the leaders to direct complex operations with appearant ease.
All the tactical capabilities of the 563rd would have been diminished if it were not for dynamic supply operations. This was superbly accomplished in the 563rd Signal Battalion under the direction of the S-4, Capt. Mac Ray and his staff. After the breakthrough, when the Battalion entered active combat supply became a harder and harder task. The supply installations could not move as rapidly as the combat units and soon supplies had to be transported for great distances. Later on the supply of gasoline became acute and when it was necessary to haul it in from the ports by trucks a significant part of the new gasoline was consumed by the trucks who were delivering it. The Supreme Headquarter also allocated priority to the British Armies operating in the northern sector to the extent that finally the Third Army was halted. The rapid advance of the Third Army always made the supply of material was a herculean task.

 

Jump on it, Biak!

 

Oct 29
In a letter from General (Hap) Arnold to the CG 3rd Air Force the 555th, 566th and 573rd Signal Air Warning Battalions were to be prepared for overseas shipment by 15 November 1943 and the 563rd and the 564th were to be prepared for overseas shipment by 1 January 1944.
NOVEMBER 1943
Nov 12
Following is Field Order 2 which set up the training situation for the operational training:
HEADQUARTERS
563rd SIGNAL AIRCRAFT WARNING BATTALION
DREW FIELD
Tampa, Florida 1200 12 November 1943

Field Order
No 2
Maps Operations Map (annex 2)
Sectional Aeronautical Charts M8 and C8
Hillsboro County FSR Dept 1936 1/63,000
Polk County FSR Dept 1936 1/63,000
USC and G Survey 14 January 1943 1,500,000
1. a. An enemy task force has assembled off the north coast of SOUTH AMERICA and is steaming towards the west coast of FLORIDA. It is believed the enemy will attempt a landing in the vicinity of TAMPA. The strength of the enemy force is unknown.
b. The 563rd Signal AW Battalion is attached to the 2nd Air Division for air Warning. The 2nd Air Division is in direct support of the II Corps and will operate within the boundaries of the II Corps. Boundaries of the II Corps are a line from BRADENTON to FROSTPROOF on the South and a line from TAMPA to HAINES CITY on the North. The I Corps is in the north sector and the III Corps is in the south sector. The I Corps is supported by the 1st Air Division and the III Corps is supported by the 3rd Air Division. The Command post of the 2nd Air Division is at LAKELAND, II Corps Command post is located at BARTOW.
2. The Battalion will move in four columns into pre reconnoitered operational positions in the vicinity of BARTOW (U7087). Provide aircraft warning for the sector. The head of the first column will pass the IP at 1500 27 November and the remaining columns will pass the IP at 10 minutes interval in the following order.
Column 2 1500
Column 3 1510
Column 1 1520
Column 4 1530
The IP will be the intersection of MEMORIAL HIGHWAY and HILLSBORO AVENUE. Column 1 will consist of the 4th Reporting Platoon Company A Column 2 will consist of Headquarters Company Column 3 will consist of the Headquarters platoon 2nd Reporting 3rd Reporting Platoon of Company A, and VHF team from 4th Training Battalion. Column 4 will consist of the 1st Reporting Platoon of Company A. (Annex 2 Route of March). Each echelon will set up operations immediately on arrival at their operational site.
3. a. Headquarters and Plotting Company will set up 3 combined rooms in the woods 3 miles north of BARTOW (UC6891) (Warning Order 1 Annex A and B Radio Nets and Filter Room arrangement), Ground observer system will be set up as follows:

Relay Station
Post Number Location Letter Location

1 UC4863 A UC4560
B UC4563
C UC4567
2 UC5273 A UC5072
B UC4571
C UC5076
3 UC5283
A UC5185
B UC5176
C UC5185
4 UC5287
A UC5085
B UC5187
C UC5184
5 UC5396
A UC5196
B UC5053
C UC5298
6 UC5696
A UC5399
B UC5257
C PX5401
b. Company A with a VHF team attached from the 4th Signal AW Training Battalion will set up their radars as follows:
Platoon Location Initial Sweep
1st Platoon EW UC7763 220 to 340 deg
2nd Platoon GCI UO9772 215 to 320 deg
3rd Platoon GCI UC0179 240 to 325 deg
4th Platoon CHL PY9421 215 to 310 deg
VHF equipment and Company headquarters will be superimposed on the 2nd Platoon. One pair of field wire will be laid from the 3rd Platoon to the VHF equipment for control channel.
c. Company B is attached to the 6th Training Battalion. The Commanding Officer Company B will make reconnaissances before 3 December so that double sections of SCR-602 may be set up during darkness 4 December in the vicinity of the following points
1st Platoon Section 1 and 2 PX6603
Section 3 and 4 PX4803
2nd Platoon Section 1 and 2 UC4857
Section 3 and 4 UC4897
3rd Platoon Section 1 and 2 UC3886
4th Platoon Section 1 and 2 UC4268
Section 3 and 4 UC5360
5th Platoon Section 1 and 2 UC5360
Section 3 and 4 UC5360
Company headquarters will be superimposed on the 1st Platoon. At 0900 on 3 December the Commanding Officer Headquarters and Plotting Company will dispatch a 1 1/2 ton truck to BRADENTON to pick up 12 radio operators from Company B. these radio operators will be attached to Headquarters and Plotting Company to operate the NCS for the SCR-602 nets. On 3 December 1943 the filter center will be converted into 1 Ground Observer Filter room, 1 Radar filter room, and 12 combined room (Annex 3, Arrangement of Rooms)
4. a. The gasoline dump will be located in the bivouac area of Headquarters and Plotting Company. Each day empty gasoline containers will be brought to the dump and exchanged for full ones. effort will be made to furnish enough containers to furnish each installation enough fuel to last for a period of 48 hours. The initial supply of gasoline will be taken from this station in the containers now provided. The individual installation commanders will be responsible thereafter to furnish information regarding the daily consumption of fuel to the company supply officer. Company supply officers will be responsible to see that each installation in the company is properly supplied.
b. Rations will be drawn from kitchen PDO, Drew Field. Company supply officers will be responsible for the hauling of rations from Drew Field and for the break down of rations to the various kitchens within their companies. Company Commanders will be responsible to see that an accurate ration return is submitted daily.
c. Requisitions for clothing,clothing exchanges, salvage, and shoe repair will be turned in to the battalion supply officer not later than 1200 each Tuesday. Requisitions for supplies and equipment other than those mentioned above will be submitted to the Battalion supply officer not later then 1200 Thursdays. Only emergency requisitions will be submitted at other times. The battalion supply will be located in the vicinity of Headquarters and Plotting Company.
d. MESSAGE CENTER SCHEDULE
0600 Leave Battalion Headquarters at Bartow for Drew Field
0830 Arrive Drew Field (Fourth Training AWUTC, AAB, Drop Mail
0930 Return to Battalion Headquarters (Bartow)
1200 Arrive Battalion Headquarters
1230 Distribution and Pick UP Hq and Plotting Company
1300 Leave for Drew Field
1530 Arrive Drew Field Pick Up and make necessary distribution
1630 Return to Battalion Headquarters (Bartow)
2030 Distribution and pick up Headquarters and Plotting Co
2100 Leave for Company A Headquarters for distribution and pickup
2230 Arrive Company A Headquarters
2400 Arrive Battalion Headquarters (Bartow)
e. MORNING REPORTS AND ALL REPORTS due the following day will be submitted on the following pickups
Headquarters and Plotting Company at 2030
Company A 2230
f. COMPANY MAIL CLERKS will pick up and deliver mail once daily at Message Center. This run will be coordinated with Paragraph c regarding fuel.
g. SPECIAL MESSENGER SERVICE will be operated as needed
h. THREE runners will be supplied daily from Headquarters and Plotting Company on the following schedule.

0600 to 1200 (1 runner)
1200 to 1800 (1 runner)
1800 to 2400 (1 runner)
5. a. (1) See Index no 2 to SOI
(2) All nets will open 2400, 27 November. If contact is not made, each 1/4 hour on the 1/4 hour all stations will call for five minutes until contact is established. (Annex 4 Nets to be established 2400, 4 December)
b. (1) Command Posts: Battalion Headquarters Closes at present location 1500, 27 November and opens at the same time at the head of Column 2. Headquarters and Plotting Company 3 miles North of BARTOW (UC5488) after 1900 27 November
(2) Axes of signal communications rout of march
c. An advance information center will be established at woods 4 miles West of BARTOW (UC5488) and will open 2400, 4 December.
By Order of Lieutenant Colonel McBRIDE
MAURICE E. BYRNE
MAJ. SIGNAL CORPS
Executive
OFFICIAL:
PAUL E. RAPP
1st Lt. Sig C
S-3
Annex 1 Location of Sites
Annex 2 Routes of March
Annex 3 Arrangement of Rooms
Annex 4 Nets to be established 2400 4 December
DISTRIBUTION A
End of Document
All the men of the battalion had previously had technical training and experience in their specialty and after several weeks of Unit training the 563rd received an excellent rating from the Training Command headquarters inspectors.
Following is Field Order 5 which is the order to govern the boarding of the trains to the New York Port of Embarkation:
563rd SIGNAL AW BATTALION
DREW FIELD, TAMPA, FLORIDA
FIELD ORDER)
NO 5)
1. No tactical situation
2. The Battalion will entrain with all personnel, baggage and impedimenta at D time.
3. A. Train No 1
(1) Train Commander Capt. Glassow
(2) Train Transportation Officer Lt. Pohanish
(3) Train Mess Officer Lt. Drown
(4) Personnel of Headquarters and Plotting Company
Less (a) Executive Officer, S-3, Motor Officer to train #3
(b) Dental officer (to train #2)
(c) 8 officers and 30 men 3rd Filter Platoon train #2)
(d) 2 Medic enlisted men (to train #2)
(e) 2 Medic enlisted men (to train #3
(f) Battalion supply Sergeant (to train #3)
(5) Total officers 26 (1 car)
(6) Total enlisted men 351 (9 cars)
B. Train No 2
(1) Train Commander Lt. Slattery
(2) Train Transportation Officer Lt. Irwin
(3) Train Mess Officer Lt. Carr
(4) Personnel Reporting Company A 8 officers and 30 enlisted men 3rd
Filter Platoon, Dental Officer and 2 Medical enlisted men from Hq
and Plotting Company, 12 enlisted men from Reporting Company B
(5) Total officers 23 (1 car)
(6) Total enlisted men 276 (7 cars)
C. Train No 3
(1) Train Commander Capt. Root
(2) Train Transportation Officer Lt. Wilson
(3) Train Mess Officer Lt. Donton
(4) Personnel Reporting Company B less 12 enlisted men (to car #2) 1
Medical Officer (Attached) 2 Medical enlisted men, executive
officer, S-3, Motor Officer, Battalion Supply Sergeant from Hq
and Plotting Company
(5) Total Officers 20 (1 car)
(6) Total enlisted men 312 (8 cars)
X. Each Train Commander will line up the members of his train in a column of three files by platoons. The column for train 1 will be Column 1, the column for train 2 will be column 2 and the column for train 3 will be column 3. When marching to the train these three columns will march abreast and will be formed by the executive officer so that the columns will not cross when these columns separate to march alongside their respective trains. On the parade to the train, the columns will march in close order abreast the Battalion Commanding Officer and Battalion Executive Officer in front of the Column.
4. A. OFFICERS BAGGAGE. Twenty four hours before D time all officers will have brought their trunks and bed rolls to their company supply. Previous to bringing baggage to the company sully, it will have been marked according to instructions. This Baggage (bed roll and foot lockers) will not be sully again until the train is unloaded, therefore it will be necessary to put all your necessary clothing and equipment in your Hand Baggage and Field Bag. The field bag and hand baggage will be put in the coaches and the trunk and bed roll will be put in the baggage car. Two hours before D time, all officers will turn in their hand luggage to the company sully.
B. OFFICERS CLEARANCE. Forty-eight hours before D time one officer from each company will be assigned to obtain clearance for all the officers in the company. Of the officers who can not be cleared, a note will be made of the branch and the reason a clearance could not be obtained. Clearance will be obtained if at all possible twenty four hours before D time.
C. HAULING BAGGAGE. As soon as the baggage cars are spotted, the officers bed rolls and trunks will be hauled to the baggage cars along with the duffle bags of the enlisted men, as soon as the coaches are spotted. The officers hand luggage bags will be loaded in the officers car. When possible, the duffle bags of the enlisted men will be piled in sections of the car by platoon and by company.
D. UNIFORMS. Helmets, leggings, pistol or ammunition belt, harness, field bags, weapon, trench knife, gas masks will be worn. Carry overcoat on arm. Put necessary toilet articles, towels, 2 pairs clean wool socks, 2 handkerchiefs, 2 pairs clean underwear, mess kit, and gloves in field bag.
E. MINIMUM ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT. Will be earmarked immediately after receipt of movement order. Excess equipment will be turned in to property branches under supervision of the S-4. Excess company records will be turned in to the Base under the supervision of the Adjutant, see POM 4k,44w, WD Cir 26/43 and ARS 345-10.
F. DUTIES OF TRAIN OFFICERS
(1) TRAIN COMMANDERS (see AR 55-145 par 14)
(2) TRAIN TRANSPORTATION OFFICER (see AR 55-145 par 15)
(3) TRAIN MESS OFFICER (see AR 55-145 par 16)
(4) TRAIN COMMANDER will appoint a car commander for each car. He will reserve an officers car or part of a car. Reserve a train dispensary, Reserve a cooks section near the kitchen
G. Each train commanding officer will be responsible for installing his own kitchen, arranging for the kitchen police and cooks, drawing his mess funds, securing a stock of rations. Each Company Commander will be responsible for the loading of baggage of individuals in his company.
H. Previously to lining up for the parade to the train each train commander will obtain capacities to each car and divide his column up so that when the column marches abreast the train the correct number of men will peel off at each car starting at the rear of the column. When the head or the column reaches the end of the train all groups should be ready to mount and the first man just outside of the door for his car. Three groups will be arranged so there will be one officer with each car to supervise loading and repeat the commands. He will load last. The train Commander will load the train by blowing a whistle and each car will load simultaneously one file at a time, the inside file first. When the last man has loaded the Train Commander will have given the signal to the Conductor to move out the train.
I. Headquarters and Plotting Company will load its baggage in cars in Train 1, Company A on Train 2 and Company D on train 3.
J. Mail will be collected by the train commander and held until arrival at destination where it will be turned over to the Battalion Executive Officer for disposition.
K. Immediately after entraining, Platoon Officers will give one hour instruction on safeguarding military information.
L. No one will leave the train at any time without direct permission of the Train Commander.
5. A. Battalion Headquarters OP will close at present location at D time and open the same time at Train no 1.
B. There will be no communications whatsoever except official business by the Train Commanders.

BY ORDER OF LT. COL. McBRIDE

MAURICE E. BYRNE
MAJ. SIG CORPS
EXECUTIVE OFFICER
OFFICIAL:
PAUL E. RAPP
1ST LT. SIG C
S-3

 

JANUARY 1944
Jan 12
The Battalion was given movement orders to move by special train to Camp Shanks in New York which was the European Theater staging center for the New York Port of Debarka- tion. After some administrative, medical and supply checks the 563rd was assigned to board the Cunard Line Steamship the Queen Mary to England and sailed from New York harbor on January 22. Many thousand troops were to be carried on the trip including some Canadian troops, Antiaircraft Artillery and General Hospital units. There was also on board the 555th Signal Air Warning Battalion which would later be assigned to the U.S. First Army. Lt. Col. McBride was assigned to supervise the mess operations for the voyage which was the biggest job on board and set up serving lines in the swimming pool area. Maj. Byrne was appointed the B deck commander. The staterooms and salons of the Mary all had four to over six deck bunks installed depending on the ceiling height. The bunks were in rows and very little space was open.
The mess served two meals a day and each group was as-signed a time to eat. Once a day there was boat drill where each group proceeded by a scheduled route to the deck and lifeboat area where they were as- signed. Boat drill were the only time (other than going to meals) that the troops were allowed out of their living area. On deck was the only time smoking was permitted. The ship's plumbing used ocean water in order to conserve the fresh water for cooking and drinking. The fresh water was turned on for about an hour a day for brief showers and to fill the canteens of the passengers for drinking water.
The Queen Mary traveled solo through submarine infested waters because of its great speed. To increase safety it would zigzag its course. It was smooth sailing the first half of the voyage and especially when going through the gulf stream. When it approached the North Sea the going became very rough and the large waves coupled with the zigzagging made it quite unpleasant. At times the estimated height of the waves was a fifty feet. The Mary docked in the Firth of Clyde at Greenock in Northern Scotland.
The troops were shipped in two serials, by railway, to Remnham Haunts Station near Henley on Thames where they located in the Park. The station was also housed the 573rd Signal A. W. Battalion and Lt. Col. McBride assumed command of the station and Lt. Col. Oscar E. Everett who commanded the 573rd battalion was the station executive Officer. The area was enlarged by British erecting personnel and work and equipment tents were installed adjacent to the 573rd Battalion. Days were spent in draining and improving the muddy grounds and in building sidewalks and roads. During the month of February one half of the battalion personnel were transferred out, absorbed in general by the 555th, 564th and 573rd Signal A. W. Battalions. This personnel was replaced by 26 officers and 450 enlisted men. Most of the remaining personnel were sent to British RAF schools in their various specialties. Four LW teams, one GCI team and CHB team went to Number 21 school at Renscombe Downs for study in field operations.
Radio personnel attended radio school at Yatesbury, Wiltshire for technical and operational training. The filter platoons and filter officers studied the newest systems at the RAF Filter School at Bawdsey. Twenty three Enlisted men and five Officers from ground observer platoons were sent to Chigwell, to learn assault training. The remaining ground observer personnel was studying aircraft identifi- cation and procedure with British instructors at the Remenham Haunts station. The two GCI platoons and one CHB platoon went into operational training in the field near the advanced site. Soon after this the 563rd Advanced Headquarters was sent to camp in a location near an English Air Base near Andover. The 563rd was to operate British Radar and the teams were sent to training schools. The plan was to send the teams to schools for further deployment and to have these teams replaced with teams who had already been trained. The result of this plan is that most of the operating platoon's would be new
to he battalion and the new men would be the ones who would go into combat. There was some delays caused by supply of some radio equipment. Instead of moving the unit to Andover the high command ordered the 563rd assigned to the 100th Fighter Wing which was designated to be the Tactical Air operators for the Third U.S. Army. At this time Top-Secret Operations "Over- lord" was divulged to those who needed to know. The 563rd head- quarters moved to Lashenden a few miles south of Headcorn which is about ten miles south of Maidstone where the 100th Fighter Wing had their command center. Next the company's went out to practice sites along the Southern coast of England.
UNIT ORGANIZATION OF THE 563rd SAWB
The XIX Tactical Air Support Command was activated in England on 29 November 1943. It was redesignated the XIX Tactical Air Command on 24 April 1944. It was located at Aldermaston Court in England February 1944. It was commanded by Maj. Gen. Otto P. Weyland. The headquarters moved to France in July 1944.
The 100th Fighter Wing was activated in England on 24 November 1944. On 15 April they were located in Lashenden, England which is several miles south of Headcorn and about 45 miles south east of the center of London. The headquarters landed in France and located at Criqueville on 1st of July and it was commanded by Brig. Gen. Homer L. Sanders until V.E. day.
The 19th Tactical Control Group was a provisional unit set up at Rennes about 6 August and was part of the 100th Fighter Wing headquarters. In December 1944 Col. Harry French assumed command. See Appendix X for a more detailed structure of the Tactical Control Center and personnel operating it.
The 312th Fighter Control Squadron was commanded by Maj. Noble L. Hull and just prior to D-Day they were stationed at Headcorn, England.
The 316th Fighter Control Squadron was commanded by Maj. John Kersch.
The 563rd battalion organization was normal and consisted of a Headquarters and Headquarters company with three Operating Com- panies (A,B and C). Each Company operated a Forward Director Post (FDP) and had a platoon of Light Radar (LW) and a platoon of Ground Observers (GO). On the landing the strength of the battalion was 69 officers, 6 warrant officers and 948 enlisted men. The battalion was authorized on TO & E 11-400. The battalion had variations in strength due to transfers and attachments and on October 1944 the strength was 67 officers, 6 warrant officers and 943 enlisted men. Initially the operating units of the battalion were as follows:
Company A Company B Company C
Co Hq Co Hq Co Hq
IC 1 IC 2 IC 3
FDP1 FDP2 FDP3
LW1 LW2 LW3
GO1 Posts GO2 Posts GO3 Posts
Able George Mike
Baker How Oboe
Charlie Jig Peter
Dog King Queen
Fox Love Roger

Headquarters Co Company D

IC4 Co Hq IC = Information Center
FDP4 LW31 FDP= Forward Director Post
LW4 LW321 LW = Lightweight Radar
GO3 Posts LW332 GO = Ground Observer
Sugar LW343
Tare LW354
Uncle
Victor
William
FDP4 functioned like the other FDP's except that GO4 Ground Observer Platoon did not report into the FDP as in the other FDP's. GO4 went into combat attached to Company A and reported into FDP1. All of the Ground Observer Platoons were attached to the Company that best suited the then current operations Headquarters Company Communications Platoon was tactically under the Battalion Headquarters command. There was also a radar repair unit attached to provide parts and repair signal equipment and particularly for the British Radar units that the Battalion operated. This was a Depot Aviation Repair Crew from the 925th Signal Company.
All Companies had the normal company supply, mess, motor and communications sections, as well as a FDP radar platoon commanded by an electronics officer which included a plotting, filtering and communications operations center, a LW (light weight) platoon commanded by an electronics officer and a Ground Observer Platoon commanded by an Infantry trained officer.
A special note must be made for Company D. Before D-Day Co- mpany D consisted of 12 Light Warning platoons and were detached from the 563rd Battalion and assigned to the AAA command of the 9th Air Defense Command. During operations in central France the composition of the radars changed to five platoons of LW radar. They functioned superbly on that assignment until late in the winter of 1945 when they were returned to the 563rd in more a less a piecemeal fashion. The men were retrained for operation of the BACU units. Not many of their operational locations are known and details of their combat operations are abbreviated because most of the time Company D was under functioning in another command. There is an account of their operations in Appendix XIII. All other operations in conjunction with the 563rd Battalion are included in the history of the Company and unit the men were re-assigned to in 1945.
In September 1944 the 738th Signal Air Warning Company was attached and designated FDP5. It also had normal supply, mess, motor and communications sections and a MEW radar operating platoon and a plotting and filtering and communications section. FDP5 had no LW platoon or GO platoon.
Later in the campaign the battalion received state of the art microwave radar which were SCR-584 Anti Aircraft gun laying radar modified for close control of aircraft called BACU units (Battle area Control units). They were sometimes attached to the companies and in the final battles were employed directly by the Army Corps Air Liaison Officer at Corps headquarters. These units were manned by men from Company D who were retrained for that purpose.
The Battalion headquarters had the following staff.
Adjutant and headquarters administration
S1 Personnel and pay records
S2 Intelligence, mail and message center
S3 Operations and Plans
S4 Supplies, Ration and Headquarters transportation.
Surgeon with Dental Officer and Medical staffOrganization at Beginning of CombatOrganization at Ending of CombatChaplain
The Battalion Executive Officer also functioned as the S3 and when appropriate as the Commander of the Advanced Echelon and conducted advanced site reconnaissance.
As the campaign developed there were changes, for example the 738th Signal Air Warning Company was added on the 19th of September 1944 and then functioned as FDP5. Also Light Warning Radar Company D was detached from the 563rd and attached to an Army Antiaircraft Artillery unit.
The Command and Staff of the 563rd at the time of the channel crossing is listed below: (see Editors Note 2 below)
Commanding Lt. Col. William L. McBride
Exec Maj. Maurice E. Byrne
Adjutant Lt. Robert O. Schurke
S3 Lt. Harold E. Waeckerle
Operations Chief Tech/5th Alfred Madl
Battalion Sgt/Maj William A. Hunziker
Chief Clerk Sgt Robert Wesley
Operations Chief Sgt Robert Norton
S1 Lt. John J. Reynolds
Personnel Operations Tech Sgt. Chester R. Kasczynski
TCC Filter Officer Lt. Godfrey A. Welham
TCC Filter Officer Lt. Robert S. McSpadden
TCC Filter Officer Lt. Loyal W. Crosby
S2 & Message Center WO. Vernon Mills
Chaplain Capt. Arthur T. Engell
Hq Communications Officer Lt. Lewis F. Janek

BACU Platoons (added later)
BACU1
Commanding Lt. Emre T. Altman
Commanding Lt. Cobbs
BACU4
Commanding Lt. Jack F. Roberts
BACU2
Commanding Lt. Lloyd G. Martinsen
BACU3
S4 Capt. Mac Ray
Supply operation chief M/Sgt Charles E. Pollina
Motor Officer WO John J. Sappington

Surgeon Maj. Yashar A. Venar
[Editors Note 2--- The list cannot be guaranteed to be accurate because the records sometimes did not
have the proper rank designations. Some of the listing had to be supplied from memory which may not
be accurate. It was tried to give the rank that the person had at the time of the record]
Dental Surgeon Joseph D. Goldberg
Special Unit
HQ MW LW (joined in June)
Commanding Lt. Clarence A. Wetherill
Radar Officer Lt. Robert Homan

Headquarters Company

Commanding Lt. Paul E. Rapp
Mess Sgt S/Sgt Herman Messinger
Motor Sgt T/Sgt Joseph G. Bates
Co Supply Lt. Charles (NMI) Pohanish
Commanding FDP4 Radar Platoon Lt. Frank Van Camp
FDP4 Radar Platoon Tech WO. Stark
Radar Platoon Admin Officer Lt. Woodrow W. Cole
Commanding LW4 Platoon Lt. George B. Dorroh
Commanding GO4 Platoon Lt. Jimmie V. Duncan
FDP4 Filter Officer Lt. Delbert Cole
FDP4 Filter Officer Lt. Thomas J. Walker, Jr.
FDP4 Filter Officer Lt. Godfrey A. Welham

Company A

Commanding Capt. Thomas Slattery
Company Exec Lt. Richard T. Goncher
First/Sgt Matthew C. Bertrand
Mess Sgt S/Sgt Frank M. Rocco
Supply Sgt S/Sgt John F. Kiser
Company Supply Officer Lt. Hubert W. Scott
Commanding FDP1 Radar Platoon Lt. Will McAdam
FDP1 Radar Platoon Tech WO. Gantzhorn
Commanding LW1 Platoon
Commanding GO1 Platoon Lt. Lawrence A. Keefer
FDP1 Filter Officer Lt. John L. Nolan
FDP1 Filter Officer Lt. Wesley J. Howard
FDP1 Filter Officer Lt. Willfred T. Smith
Lt. Carl V. Lazarone
Lt. Joseph J. Faro
Company B

Commanding Capt. Claudius G. Farrow
Company Exec Lt. Wayne C. Hayward
Commanding FDP2 Radar Platoon Lt. David A. Pritchard
FDP2 Radar Platoon Tech WO. William F. Church
Commanding GO2 Platoon Lt. Charles W. Root
Surgeon Capt. John P. Michaels
FDP1 Filter Officer Lt. Loyal W. Crosby
FDP1 Filter Officer Lt. John C. DiLeo
FDP1 Filter Officer Lt. Neal Rabogliatti
Lt. Frederick H. Fahner
Lt. James H. Carr

Company C

Commanding Capt. Franklyn A. Glassow
First/Sgt Jack Goodman
Company Administrative Officer Lt. Benjamin F. Guttenberger
Company Supply Officer Lt. Thomas W. Kenyon
Commanding FDP3 Radar Platoon Lt. Robert K. Slaven
FDP3 Radar Platoon Tech WO. Theodore A. Malkin
Commanding LW3 Platoon Lt. James D. Tate
Commanding GO3 Platoon Lt. David R. Schultze
FDP3 Filter Officer Lt. Donald W. Hobbs
FDP3 Filter Officer Lt. Charles A. Stewart
FDP3 Filter Officer Lt. Clair B. Watson

Company D

Commanding Capt. Arthur G. Root, Jr.
Company Supply Officer Lt. Gordon R. Wilson
Commanding LW30 Lt. Jack F. Roberts
Commanding LW31 Lt. Oliver H. Smith
Commanding LW32 Lt.Edgar A. Franz
Commanding LW33 Lt. Lloyd G. Martinsen
Commanding LW34 Lt. Curtis E. Owen
Commanding LW35 Lt. Thomas J. Walker, Jr.
Lt. Donald P. Burns
Lt. Robert P. Feldman
Lt. Martin Dworshak

738th Signal Air Warnming Company (Joined Sep. 1944)

Commanding Capt. John A. Easton
Company Exec Officer Lt. Thomas L. McInturff
Company Adjutant and Personnel Officer Lt. Norman N. Morse
Senior Radar Tech Officer Lt. Allen B. Reppert
Senior Filter Officer Lt. Godfrey A. Welham (563rd SAWB)
FDP5 Chief Air Controller Capt. Clarence Long (316th FCS)
FDP5 Chief Filter Officer Lt. Temple Smith
Company Medical Officer Capt. Kaufman
SUBSEQUENT CHANGES
During Combat from June 28th 1944 through May 7th 1945 the following changes were made in command and staff of the 563rd Bat- talion. Here again most of these changes had to be from memory which can be inaccurate. The changes recalled were:
Maj. Julius L. Levy replaced Maj. Yashar A. Venar as Battalion Surgeon when Maj. Venar transferred to a Fi eld hospital to do surgery.
Maj. Grigsby was in and out as Battalion Surgeon
Capt. Claudius G. Farrow was put in command of Hq. Co. and later he was transferred out of the 448th Signal Construction Battalion as Commanding Officer
Lt. Wetherill's SCR-582 platoon was transferred to Company C
Maj. Walter N. Levin replaced Maj. Levy as Battalion Surgeon
Lt. William A. Wright was put in Command of Hq. Co.
Lt. John L. Nolan was promoted to Capt., transferred to Company B and placed in command of Co. B
Capt. Arthur G. Root, Jr. was put in command of Co C
Capt. Glassow was transferred to Battalion Headquarters as S3
Lt. Waeckerle was put on duty with the XIX TAC Signal section
Lt. Richard T. Viergever was appointed Hq. Communications Officer when Lt. Lewis P. Janek was in the Hospital
Lt. Paul E. Rapp was put in command of FDP4 (Provisional) and later was transferred to the 738th Signal Air Warning Company when FDP4 was deactivated.
Lt. Lewis F. Janek was reappointed Hq. Communications O.
Lt. Clair B. Watson was transferred to Hq. Co. TCC Filter O

 

HEADQUARTERS PLATOON
563rd SIGNAL AIR WARNING BATTALION
An inquiry was sent out to several Headquarters Platoon members in December 1994 and on 19 April 1995 Woodward C. Carlile (then Sgt) answered as follows;
"John E. Phillipo was Col. McBride's driver and I can verify that Spears L. Tipton and Clyde Grubb were drivers for the Message Center. I was a Buck Sergeant in the Platoon Headquarters and along with general clerical duties, I was also the Battalion File Clerk. However, the sergeants at Battalion Headquarters also served as Sergeant of the Guard, assisted in retreat ceremonies, made roster posting, etc. We did not have a First Sergeant. I be- lieve Sgt/Maj William Hunziker with the help of Sgt Chester Kasczynski and Sgt Robert Wesley took care of the duties normally performed by a company First Sergeant.
I was with the 563rd from the beginning and I was present on the 30 November 1943 roster. (see Editors Note 3 on the following page) I also worked in the processing line at Drew Field, processing other units for overseas (Service Records, Medical Shots, Training Records, etc), before Col. McBride was the 563rd Commander. I always assumed that I was working under him, while doing the processing duties.
Over the long haul, Sgt/Maj Hunziker, Sgt Kasczynski, Sgt Wesley and myself comprised the makeup of Battalion Headquarters. Of course, we were under the very capable leadership of Capt. Robert O. Schurke.
I think we were somewhat "family" and I look back on the Battalion Headquarters association with a great deal of warmth, and deep appreciation of Col. McBride, Capt. Schurke and the Sergeants and acknowledging the others handled the operations in a superb manner while was left to us."
RADAR EQUIPMENT
FDP1, FDP2,FDP3 and FDP4 were equipped with British made Type 15 and Type 11 Radar and LW1, LW2, LW3 and LW4 were equipped with British made LW units. FDP5 had American made MEW Radar and several British made Type 11 Range Finding Radars. The BACU units were equipped with American made SCR-584 radar which were rede signed from the mission of Anti Aircraft gun laying to accurate, automatic tracking radar. There was a Headquarters SCR-582 microwave unit for highly mobile situations.
In order to give several more slants on the technical operations of the Battalion, here follows the report of the XIX TAC sig- nal Section History and the 19th Tactical Control Group SOP. It is thought that our unit history along with the following documents would more completely explain the operations of the Battalion in combat.
The Signal Section of XIX TAC had a great fascination of the FDP operations and reported in "Signals", the XIX TAC Signal Sec- tion History and this is what they reported:
OUT AT THE RADAR
FDP and MEW control is both complex and fascinating. It is here at the small consoles, kept dark to show up the florescent figures, that the drama of air and ground unfolds. Here the con- troller's responsibility is to take the orders of the TCC and convert them into R/T instructions to the pilots above. Here on the PPI scope (Planned Position Indicator) is the actual moving
"blip" which indicates a flight of fighters on the way to intercept an enemy raid, or a flight being steered back to its field through an overcast. Or it may be a flight of Bombers out to
past a German oil target or a marshaling yard. Or it may be a
line pilot badly hit by flak or by a Jerry ME-109, trying to push his plane just that on mile more to get behind our lines before bailing out. Or, it may be a "Black Widow" P-61 of the 425th Night Fighter Squadron flying through pitch blackness searching
out enemy raiders, or on his way to do a little "intruding on Jerry, bent on raising all the possible hell he can before he
turns home.
[Editors Note 3--- The 30 November 1943 roster was made when the Headquarters Company was organized as a Headquarters and Plotting Battalion Headquarters company. It contained practically all the Officers and the Combat Headquarters and Headquarters Company but the men in the Plotting Platoon were transferred out to other units. Those in Battalion Supply and Motor Pool section, Mess Section, Personnel and Pay Section, S-2 Intelligence section, S-3 Operations section also remained in the Headquarters Company. I can verify the members of the S-3 Section and that was Tech/5th Alfred W. Madl and Lt. Waeckerle for several months until he was put on duty at XIX TAC Signal Section.]
At the FDP itself, there are two radars, British type 11 and type 15. While one set was being used by the controller, the other one sweeps its area of coverage, to provide early warning. Technical personnel of the 563rd SAW Battalion have ingeniously made the facilities of both sets to the controllers, thus allowing thee latter to switch from one set to the other, without moving out of the working van.
Regardless of the pilot's mission, the controller, in the darkened van has, and feels, an obligation to help the flight in every way possible. He will warn him of flak areas. He will warn him of approaching aircraft with his "Bogeys one o'clock, 8 miles", or, "Heads up. Bandits in the area". He will "sweat out" every single mile of the trip back with the pilot of a damaged ship. He will try to position fighters advantageously for an interception, try to get relative heights and distances. and take as much pride in a "kill" or other successful job as the pilot himself. And he is probably more reproachful to himself, for any error on his part, than is the leader of the flight. He is one of God's unhappiest creatures when, in the middle of an important mission, his scope as well as FM radio lines are suddenly "blanked out" by jamming devices such as "Carpet", "Window" or "Chaff", used by our bombers on their way into enemy territory. He will then try, by "D.R" (Dead Reckoning"), to help his
mission, using D/F and quickly switching to the less affected type 11 PPI scope for control. Often, however, valuable time has been lost before the controller can "see" his flight on the scope once again, and the anguished fellow is by then fit for admission to the "Home for Prematurely Gray Controllers".
Light Warning (LW) units of the SAW Battalion are positioned so as to cover areas that are blind to the radars at the FDP, and to give auxiliary coverage. Most important of these blind spots is the one created by the ground ray of the Type 11 and Type 15. To give continuous 24 hour operation, the LW's work in pairs and thus the LW's supplement the work of the FDP's. The FDP can then "track" many targets that otherwise would be lost.
Each FDP also has an Information Center (I.C). These are so- called because they get there the information from the radars, type 11 and 15, the LW set attached to each FDP and the visual observa- tions made by the Ground Observers. The information appears on a filter table, and is than passed on to the TCC, via land line or FM radio. The main plotting table at the TCC thus represents the latest plots from all the components of the Control System.
End of article
BATTLE AREA CONTROL UNITS OPERATIONS
The Battle area control units were SCR-584 radar units which were built for antiaircraft artillery gun laying duty. They were modified so that the radar antenna was electrically connected to an X-Y plotter. The electronics could be latched on to the radar echo from an aircraft to be guided (or tracked) and the plotter would automatically follow the target so its path could be plotted on the board. The controller could guide an aircraft to a predetermined location and the automatic bomb laying electronics would determine the flight elevation and signal when to release the bombs. When first put into commission the sites areas to cover were assigned by the XIX TAC and the 563rd battalion S3 would make a reconnaissance with the BACU commander then the BACU would contact the Corps Air Liaison and carry out the missions assigned. Soon the TAC altered this procedure and assigned the units directly to the Corps Air Officer. There is therefore few battalion records of who the units were employed but the
BACU's did report in their location so their location's are known but their accomplishments were sometimes kept by the Air Officers at The Corps that had operational control of them.
Having said this let us get several more slants on BACU op- eration. The Signal Section of XIX TAC had a admiration of the BACU operations and reported in "Signals", the XIX TAC Signal Sec- tion History and this is what they reported:
BACU--Fighters On a Foxhunt
Of all the Radar devices which have been pouring from our scientific laboratories since America rolled up its sleeves and went to war, few are as intriguing to both layman and technician alike, as the BACU--Battle Area Control Unit, better known as the modified SCR-584. Originally designed to work as gun-laying radar for Ack-Ack batteries, the SCR-584 was given some plastic surgery by BBRL (British Branch Radiation Laboratory), to perform an add- itional job. This was to display the location of any airplane in the area as a small moving spot of light on a map, using a gadget affectionately termed "the bug". This phenomenon is known as "automatic tracking", and is achieved as soon as the Radar "locks on" to the ship up above.
This highly mobile Radar is thus capable of determining with an amazing degree of accuracy the location of any given plane. For tactical purposes the possibility of a piece of equipment that will allow a controller to see the exact geographical spot over which a flight of P-47's is flying are enormous. To be able to control any number of aircraft and guide them to a pinpoints, regardless of weather, or the pitch-blackness of night, opens up a huge new horizon for Combat Operations. The advantage of being able to bomb an enemy target through a ten-tenths overcast, without having the pilot do more than fly level and release his two 500 ponders as soon as he hears the order over the radio, cannot be overrated. Night-photo missions which require coverage of specific hard to find areas are a "natural" for the BACU. And day-photo ships can be likewise vectored accurately along a particular line of flight. A flight of fighter bombers looking for an inconspicuous little village, which houses a vital
pickle factory or liverwurst dump, can be vectored to a point directly over the targets without the need for a "visual". Black Widows or A-20's of the 425th Night Fighter Squadron can bring their "intruder" work up to peak performance. These are but a few of the things the 584 can do.
Obtaining this excellent information on range and azimuth with the SCR-584 is like looking through a 10 foot pipe which is only 1 inch in diameter. This feature, which is the result of using a very narrow radar beam, often makes it difficult for the set to find the airplane. This weakness is overcome by having the controller at the FDP nearby call in the ship's "track" to the BACU controller, and also by taking D/F bearing at the BACU. Once the ship is picked up ate the SCR-584, the set is put on automatic control. The SCR-584 is thus "locked on" to the particular plane, and the controller has merely to watch the little light move along the lighted map spread out on the plexiglass covered Operations table. To have the flight correct its course to the target, all he needs to do is to call the leader over his VHF.
Then, using targets given by Corps, the BACU controller will vector the plane into their bomb-run, and call out the exact second for "bombs away".
The origins of BACU at XIX TAC began in October 1944, when the red tape difficulties of acquiring and transporting the sets from England to the Third Army front along the Moselle were finally overcome. Two complete SCR-584's, with a year's supply of spare parts arrived, and Lt. Edmund Austern set about to organize the first unit, BACU1. When the many problems of communications, supply, control and liaison were at length solved, Lt. Austern went on to do the same job for BACU2. These 2 BACU's covered the Third Army area from Luxembourg to the Seventh Army boundary and unsuccessfully controlled XIX TAC planes on blind bombing and nav- igational missions.
During the Battle of the Bulge, both sets moved north with Patton's Army, to add their close control facilities to the general effort. All this took place in very poor radar country, and in the middle of winter, which made living and operating conditions extremely hard. Still, communications were put in and maintained, in heavy snow and zero weather; and when the ships could not find targets to dive-bomb visually, the BACU's helped them drop their eggs blind, on suitable Jerry objectives. More than one enemy CP was violently disturbed by the unexpected arrival of bombs out of completely overcast skies.
The BACU operated in very close conjunction with the FDP's and Tactical Air Liaison Officers at Corps. When the FDP controlling a mission could not find satisfactory targets in bad weather, it would turn over control to one of the BACU's, and stand-by on both the VHF and radar, to give radar warning coverage which the BACU cannot provide. This system of "Foxhunts" was utilized with good results, and much of the credit for its success must go to Mr. Arnold McLean, of the Office of Operational Research, who was attached to XIX TAC Hq for many months.
In February 1945, a third BACU was organized, using the many lessons learned in the previous months. In the first three days of the week following its entry into operations, 16 BTO (bombing through overcast) missions were successfully controlled.
End of article
The 19th Tactical Control Group (prov) issued Standard Oper- ations Procedures on 2 March 1945 which contained the procedures for the BACU units. The procedures were as written up in the 19th Tactical Control Group Unit history as follows
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE
Battle Area Control Units
I GENERAL
1. This memorandum will supplement Memorandum 100-49, XIX Tactical Air Command, dated 16 February 1945, subject "Standing Operating Procedure for Battle Area Control units". All control personnel will be thoroughly familiar with the duties and procedure specified by both memoranda.
II TARGETS
1. Daily Field Order will include list of BACU targets sit- uated along Army front. TCC controllers will assist those targets to BACU's according to the coverage of the BACU, maximum range of which were consistent with coverage. He will then notify each BACU of the targets that have been assigned to them for day's opera- tions.
2. BACU will continue to pick up daily Field Orders from the Corps TALO (Air Liaison Officer). FDP's will receive their Field Orders by teletype, courier from Corps, or the most easily available method.
III RENDEZVOUS POINTS
1. Rendezvous (R/V) Points will ordinarily be the position of the BACU's at the time (Judicious use of D/F equipment may co- ordinate R/V points, only requiring flights to be brought into their general areas).
2. When either FDP's or BACU's move, the new locations will be given to all concerned by TCC.
IV COMMUNICATIONS
1. VHF:
a. At FDP's
"A" - Group concerned, as per Field Order assignment.
"B" or "D" - For Corps Cooperation. (This applies to those FDP's having only 2 channels VHF. Those FDP's having 4 channels, "C" to be set up in addition)
b. At BACU
"A" - All Groups within XIX Tactical Air Command, plus additions thereto.
"B", "C" & "D" - Those common channels will be kept available.
2. FM
a. Net common to all FDP,s, MEW, BACU's and TCC will be maintained and monitored at all times by all stations. In event any station cannot contact any other station at a given time, TCC will be asked to relay the message, one of the other stations, who can do, will relay it.
3. LAND LINES
To be provided when possible.
V COOPERATION AND LIAISON
1. Presently no more than two FDP's will work with each of the BACU's. The stations cooperating with each other will change from time to time, and notification of each change to all concerned is the responsibility of the TCC. Proximity and communication will ordinarily determine which FDP's work with which BACU.
2. The linking of 3 stations together (2 FDP's and BACU) requires close cooperation and timing and all concerned must become a team to guarantee efficiency.
3. In future, additional equipment will make possible a BACU with each FDP, providing greater simplification. Until then, teamwork, liaison and cooperation is imperative and watch station full cognizant of the other's problems.
VI PROCEDURE
1. Groups will be assigned to FDP's or MEW by TCC controller each day in record with Field Order, radar coverage, etc., as normal. Missions will be controlled by FDP's as normal until the situation as outlined in Par 3, below arises.
2. Weather Data
a. Barometric readings corrected for the target area are available at all times in the TCC for use of FDP controllers and BACU controllers in aiding control of the missions.
b. All Bomb Through Overcast (BTO) missions will be run, when possible, with aircraft at 10,000 feet above sea level (ASL) and maintaining on Indicated Airspeed of 210 mph.
3. If weather prevents any Group from completion of bombing missions by visual methods, the leader of the flight will notify the FDP controller of this fact on "A" channel. If the leader wishes to work with a BACU, he will so state to the controller by use of the code-word "FOXHUNT", the following perhaps being of typical request: "Hello RIPSAW THREE, YELLOWHAMMER LEADER here. Cannot see my target, request FOXHUNT. Upon receiving the code- word, FDP controllers will proceed to vector flight toward the BACU R/V point or area. At the same time the FDP controller, or his duty, will call the TCC, giving the duty chief controller there the information that a certain flight is going to perform a FOXHUNT mission,and requesting the corrected barometric pressure for the target area at the time. Upon receiving this reading, he will instruct the leader of the flight to set the reading upon his altimeter and go to 10,m,000 feet altitude, making an IAS of 210 mph. While the flight is approaching the R/V, the
FDP controller will contact the BACU controller over FM or land-line, telling him YELLOWHAMMER is being vectored to R/V for turnover. BACU control- ler will immediately set up correct "A" channel and begin sweeping R/V area to pick up flight, taking over control from the FDP when "lockon" is made. The FDP will stand by on "A" channel continuing to monitor and follow the flight and warn of bogeys approaching. The FDP will take over complete control of the flight once more when the flight has completed their bombing, or, if the BACU controller so requests, at any time during the mission.
4. In cases where a FOXHUNT request is received during the time the BACU is already working a mission, the duty controller will take the second flight to R/V point and orbit there until BACU can take them over in their turn. Or, with prior permission of the TCC duty controller, he will turn the flight over to another FDP for a FOXHUNT in its area.
End of document
The XIX TAC Signal History had this to say about the Tactical Control system.
METHOD OF OPERATION
When Battalion Headquarters was selected then the Headquarters and Headquarters Company would also locate in the same area and often the Battalion Headquarters would be located near the 19th TCG and the TCC. The Company Headquarters commanding the FDP's would also locate in the near vicinity of their FDP radar installation. The GO platoon and the LW radar platoon or platoons would be located by the FDP Commander and report in by radio to the FDP operations and communications center. The FDP operations center would filter and report everything back to the TCC Control. A detachment of Air controllers were stationed at each FDP who were attached from the 312th Fighter Control Squadron. The control of fighter missions was done by the controllers located at the FDP's. The missions were assigned by TCC. Deputy controllers at the TCC monitored the VHF radio channels on which the airplanes were controlled. The filter officers at the TCC were supplied from Headquarters of 563rd Battalion.
Usually FDP movements would result from Battalion Field Orders sometimes after the Executive Officer had made a reconnaissance to determine if the vicinity was free of enemy troops. Other movements were made by verbal orders from the Senior Controller of the TCC. Much of the routine procedures associated with technical and tactical operations were outlined in the battalion's book of Standing Operating Procedures. See Appendix XI for a discussion of siting radars.
The division of responsibility between the 563rd SAWB, the 312th FCS and the 316th FCS was as follows. The 563rd would op- erate the FDP's, operate Air Warning Radar, furnish the TCC Filter Officers and operate the H.F. Radio at the TCC. The 312th would operate the TCC, operate the TCC communications and furnish the FDP air controllers. The 316th would operate the D/F stations and assist the 312th operate the TCC communications.
The 19th Tactical Control Group commanded the 563rd, 312th and 316th. There was also technical channels for signal matters from the 563rd Headquarters directly back to the Signal Section of the XIX TAC and on occasion direct back to the SHAEF signal section.
TCC OPERATIONS
The TCC was operated by the 312th Fighter Control Squadron and Capt. Greenberg of the XIX TAC gave a graphic description of TCC operations and his action filled picture is as follows:
"At the TCC, there is available the Ground Liaison Officer (GLO), who has the latest information on ground force positions and activities. Here is the "Y" officer with data on enemy aircraft, which has been put together by listening in on the German radio transmissions. Through the radio loud-speakers at the center, also, come the "hot news" flashes from the tactical reconnaissance ships, observing enemy activities of all kinds.
"400 plus motor transports at L 2255"
would be a typical flash, which the TCC would forward via "hot" phone line to Combat Operations at XIX TAC Hq for very prompt "remedial" action. All information from the radar sites and ground observer posts funnels into the TCC, by telephone and teletype (when available), by FM radio (SCR-1498 and SCR-1505), and by courier. Data on enemy and hostile airplane formations pours in. Enemy ground movements are noted. Flight plans of all the Tactical Air Commands, IX Bomber Command, Eighth Air force, Fifteenth Air Force, RAF and First TACAF are constantly received. Maj. Norton, the AAA liaison Officer can, on a moments notice order "Fire" or "Cease Fire" to all the heavy antiaircraft artillery batteries in the Third Army area. Into the TCC is routed all the latest data on intelligence and operations, and on the main plotting board all these facts and figures are accurately noted. Other status boards give the controller up-to-the minute data on call signs, airfields, groups available, homer's,
VHF and FM communications, weather, radar coverage, enemy airdromes and anti-aircraft positions. In the corner is locate the very important D/F table, along with the Intercept and navigational tables, where the deputy controller and his capable assistants stand ready to take "fixes" on aircraft lost or in distress."

 

CONTROLLER OPERATION
As an example of SAW operations, a very graphic picture was painted of what happens at FDP5 operating the MEW radar in combat and was narrated by a XIX TAC Signal staff member and it follows:
"Four off-center PPI scopes set side by side in the FDP5 op-eration tent, with a trained controller following a mission on each one, where almost constantly in use. And on Armed Reconnaissance or escorts, where groups were going out by squadrons, each controller might have three separate missions on his scope.
For example, a squadron of Col. Laughlin's 362nd Fighter Group, on an armed reconnaissance in the St. Vith area, during January 1945, spotted several hundred s of Germans motor transport withdrawing from the "Bulge" area. They passed this information to TCC immediately. Very soon, the other two squadrons of the 362nd Fighter Group were being vectored into the area by Lt. Smith, MEW Controller. As soon as the P-47's had dropped their "babies" and strafed, they returned to base, reloaded-and took off again to continue the party. At noon, Lt. D.L Tedrick took over control of the group. Lt. Tedrick spent all afternoon vectoring the three squadrons to their targets, giving homing's to base-passing all information to the planes about movements of the German convoy and motor transports. Many of the ships were badly hit by anti- aircraft fire, and Lt. Tedrick would give first a snap vector to carry the plane across friendly lines, then a steer to an emergency field. The results of that day's activity, from the one scope, for one group, netted 800 enemy vehicles destroyed! The deputy controllers, working alongside each other, are often able to help each other, by passing information from flight to flight. One day last January Capt. W. H. Godbout was controlling "Elwood" squadron of the 365th Group when they encountered a flock of German ME-109's and FW-190's far out over Germany. As Elwood closed with the Germans, Capt. Godbout turned to Lt. John Clements.
"Hey, Clem, I've got some Jerries. Where are your boys, can they help?".
Lt. Clements was handling "Plastic" squadron of the same group., on an Armed Reconnaissance about 40 miles from the "Elwood" squadron. He spoke quietly into his microphone:
"Hello, Plastic, this is Rip 5, Elwood has some bandits, turn to 130 degrees and pour on the coal."
As "Plastic" took up his new course, Lt. Clements relayed all possible information about the bandits over the radio. When "Plas- tic" entered the area, they saw three German planes sneaking away. Results of this little job of cooperation: For Elwood 10-0-3; for "Plastic 3-0-0.
The MEW has often been called upon to direct fighters to a pin-point target. Such was the case when, before the fall of Metz, the Germans were using a 280 mm railway gun to shell Nancy and Pont-a-Musson. It was suspected that the gun was being concealed during the daylight hours in a certain railway tunnel. It was urgent, therefore, to close this tunnel. "Scooner" squadron of the 405th Fighter Group, lead by Col. Jackson, took off on the mission. Lt. A. K. Appleby, at MEW, vectored the squadron to the target area, but the planes could not find the right tunnel. Then Appleby went on the air:
"Okay Schooner, take a port 095 degrees, Ripsaw 5, over" And five seconds later,
Schooner leader, you're 6 miles from target, 12 o,clock"
Then
"Schooner leader, Ripsaw 5 here, look for target under your port wing".
"Roger. Rip 5, Scooner here. I see that tunnel under my left wing. Out"
"Okay Scooner squadron, arm your babies"
For some mysterious reason, the nights around Nancy became very peaceful and quiet after that.
Bomber escort missions are usually handled on two VHF chan- nels: a common one for use between fighters and bombers, and the fighter group's "A" channel,s to get the fighters to the rendezvous point, and to warn them of bogeys and bandits. Many of these missions are handled in this manner by Lt. K. M. Renz, and Lt. T. G. Butler. The 367th Fighter Group was once assigned to escort three groups of mediums, by squadrons. As the fighter squadrons were airborne, Lt. Renz on there "A" channel, would direct them to their rendezvous point. At the same time, Lt. Butler, on the bomber fighter channel would check with the mediums to make certain they would reach the rendezvous point at the correct time. The two controllers working on adjacent scopes can by checking with one another frequently, bring the flights together, give them warnings, vectors to target, and then give homing's.
The Reconnaissance of the 10th Photo Reconnaissance Group have rendered invaluable service in spotting targets and calling them in to fighter control. One day "Dumpling Purple" called in a large number of enemy motor transports west of Prum, Germany.
"Dumpling Purple, how about orbiting till I can get some fighters to you?"
queried the MEW controller. The latter then called the 354th Mustang squadron who were in the general vicinity, and vectored them to a rendezvous with the reconnaissance planes. The P-51's were led directly to the target by the reconnaissance planes. While Trolley was "working over" the motor transports, Dumpling Purple found another "fat" target some 25 miles east, so the con- troller soon vectored the fighters on to the new victim. This teamwork between the squadrons, reconnaissance and controller has paid off in many profitable targets with a minimum of time and effort.
About October 1944, FDP5 began night control operations, working with the 155th Night Photo Squadron (code King Kong) and the 425th Night Fighter Squadron.
Normally, the 155th pilot didn't require close control. Ex- pert navigation, coupled with the latest radar aids designed es- pecially for photographic work, took them straight to their tar- gets, in most cases. But the assistance given by FDP5 to them took many forms.
"You're approaching a "hot spot", K 72, shall I take you around it?"
"Roger, Rip 5, give me a vector, please".
Whereupon the controller would take over just long enough to clear the anti-aircraft zone and then restore the airplane to the pilot and navigator.
Lt. J. V. Mills was watching "King Kong" on his scope one night. Flight plans , clearances, and maps beside him, he watched the progress of each airplane as it took off and checked in. All seemed to be going well things were checking out, the pilots were going right for their targets. Lt. Mills would warn of bogeys or hot spots., but it looked as though that was all the help that would be needed. But then something didn't quite check. One of the pilots was orbiting Bastogne. There was not any pictures to be taken there. Lt. Mills watched for a moment and was sure that all was not right.
"Hello King Kong", he said, "Can I give you some help?"
"Roger, Rip 5, my weapon seems to be bent, can you take me to my target?"
Lt. Mills could and did. He not only took him to the target, but he took him right over it, and King Kong got the picture.
Handling of Black Widow night fighters sat FDP5 provided splendid opportunity for close control, to say nothing of a lot of thrills, and some tense moments. Designed as a night fighter, the P-61 Black Widow was the answer to a controllers prayer, for when he asked for a right turn, it was really right. When he asked the pilot to gain altitude quickly, the Empire pilots could take the airplane almost straight up.
It was during the "break through " period that the 425th Squadron had its greatest number of "kills".
The Germans were flying in a few JU-88's and JU-188's, and on occasion ME 110. They were flying out a few less. At 1740, on the afternoon of December 26th, Empire 22 was on patrol. Lt. Robert Moffatt vectored him out to the patrol line, keeping a sharp look out for "bogeys". There were a number of tracks on the screen, some C-47's in the "bulge", a squadron of fighters-bombers returning from a mission, everything was identified as friendly by the TCC said that there were no friends in that area, it must be hostile
"Bandit 15 miles, Empire 22", said Lt. Moffatt on the radio, "Starboard 185 degrees."
"Roger", came back 22 and the chase was on.
"Range now 12, angels 11.5."
"Roger"
"Range 8, bandits speed 200, on a heading of 275 degrees", continued Lt. Moffatt,
as 22 began to close in.
"Range 6, starboard 230, bandits now at angels 10", Moffatt announced.
"Range 4, starboard 250", Moffatt announced.
"Roger." then 15 seconds later,"starboard 270 degrees, bogeys course"
"Roger contact."
22 had picked up his quarry with his airborne radar and was taking over. And then followed seemingly interminable moments of silence. Empire 22 was on inter-com. Pilot and R/O were closing in for the kill, the job from the ground had been done, at least for the time being, and while two airplanes fought in the sky some 40 miles away, controllers, scope readers, plotters, tellers, radio men--the scores of personnel required to keep FDP5 functioning, were sweating it out. And then at 1925, actually only three minutes had elapsed.
"Hello Rip 5, Empire 22. Murder"
"Roger. Congratulations 22 what was it?'
"A JU-88, and now how about taking me home, my gravy's getting low."
The second kill that night came about four hours later, and provided a special thrill in the closing moments because there was not only a Radio "blackout", but sa visual blackout as well. Empire 43 came up for patrol at four minutes after 2300, and was assigned to Capt. M. J. Berlow for control. At 2315 contact on a bogey was made, but it turned out to be friendly. And then at seven minutes to 2400 a bogey appeared south and east of FDP5 moving west. As it moved in, Berlow started to vector 43 on to it. The range was about 30 miles, and it looked as though the intersec- tion could be made south and west of FDP5. 43 started to close in, range 25, range 20--bogey heading 280--angels 8--speed 200--and then for some reason which we'll never know, because the German didn't live to tell it to us, the bogey turned around, and starter back east--no, it was northeast, he was coming toward us.
"Bogey has changed direction 43, make your vector 150."
The 180 degree turn had cost the German distance, and the range was now only 10 miles.
"Make it 090 now, 43. Range 6, bogey's angels now 6"
"070 now, 43. Bogeys course--range 3"
"Roger--contact." and then again radio silence.
But this time the airplanes were getting so close to the station that within two minutes they were in the "ground ray". Not only was there no radio contact, but they could not be seen on the scope. All they knew at FDP5 was that target and fighter were approaching the station. At 5 minutes past 2400, two airplanes flew overhead , and then at 0006:
"Hello Rip 5, Empire 43 calling. Murder".
"Roger 43--you damn near put him in our lap". and he had, for at that very minute the guard at post no 3 was calling to say that about 2 miles away he had seen a plane go down in flames. Another JU-99 had felt the sting of the Black Widow.
With German night flying limited almost to the vanishing point, the Black Widows began to devote more and more of their flying time to what controllers and pilots referred to as "gang- ster" missions.
Fixed positions, known as "fiddle-points", were chosen for their recognizable terrain features. The controllers would take the fighters to these positions and from there they would fly over road junctions, railways, marshaling yards, blowing up trains, motor convoys, and generally harassing German night movements.
The night of February 24th furnished a good example of the type of air-ground teamwork that went into a "gangster mission". Lt. Gene Nelson had taken over control of Empire 22 at 2004, and had taken him to Fiddle Point 4. When Lt. Nelson took a plane to a fiddle point, he not only took him there, he set him down the right on it. As soon as he had 22 through the "hot spots", he starter letting him down.
"You can go to angels 8 now 22"
"You can take it down to 5 now."
When 22 got to Fiddle 4 he was at angels 2.
"You're right at Fiddle 4 now, 22."
"Roger Rip 5, I see the bend in the river, I'm going down"
At 0011 Empire 22 was up again, and reappeared on the scope.
"Hello Rip 5, this is Empire 22. I stopped a train. Shoot up the locomotive 2 miles on a 240 from Fiddle 4. It's a helluva long trains--about 70 cars. Can you send someone else up to help me?"
At that moment Lt. Edward Vojak was controlling Empire 49, Lt. T. G. Butler had Empire 38 on a patrol. While Lt. Nelson kept 22 orbiting the target, Lt. Vojak and Lt. Butler took 38 and 49 to him, and then with the three airplanes on the same radio channel, first 49 and then 38 getting instructions from FDP5 on the ground 50 miles away, and from 22 in the air, right over the target, all three went in and finished off the trains. No one knew exactly where that train was heading one thing, however, was a certainty, it didn't get there. Nor did six others. Lt. Vojak, Lt. Butler and Lt. Nelson kept knocking out trains until five in the morning, when weather conditions made it necessary for the Empire pilots to return to home, having completed a good night's works.
And so it goes day and night one shift of controllers rel- ieving another shift, night controllers sometimes having night fighters airborne before the days fighters have landed, and in the morning, day fighters airborne before the night fighter have all landed controller at number one scope handling all the missions of one group has "fat" targets and keeps airplanes there, until the controller at number two scope with the missions of another group and not-so-far targets can get airplanes to take up where the other group left off. And so on with the controllers at number three and four scopes and the groups they are controlling. All hoping that they are doing some little part to help in the big job.
To further amplify the TCC operations the following is the SOP for the MEW operations of the 738th Signal Air Warning Company which was published by the 19 TCG and is included in Appendix XVIII on page 687.
GROUND OBSERVATION POST OPERATION
The ground observer platoons were infantry trained signalmen. Their main mission was to report aircraft locations in areas which were not covered by the radars. They also often served this duty in addition to providing perimeter security for the FDP's or LW's. When the terrain was right they were located on high ground and served the same as artillery spotters, except they reported ground targets back to the TCC through the FDP control and communications center. Lt. Col. McBride took a great deal of pride in their operations, after all he was an infantry man himself. The ideal spot for a GO was on high ground just behind the Main Line of Resistance. This kind of a position would give them good observa- tion ground activity, a clear vision of incoming aircraft and a line of site location for radio communications to the rear.
In "Signals", the history of the XIX TAC Signal Section the recognition was given to the small units of the 563rd Sig Bn.
The radio men of Lt. Col. McBride's 563rd Signal Air Warning Bat- talion besides taking care of the all important radar sets, also had the job of running all the HF radio links in the control sys- tem, using SCR-188's and SCR-399's under the direction of Lt. Janek of the 563rd.
And then there are the Ground Observer Posts, up in the front areas, often more exposed and advanced than the forward Infantry units, constantly working under the most hazardous conditions and subject to attack by enemy patrols and artillery fire. The posts occupied the highest point of terrain, to get 360 degree coverage. Identification of aircraft and information on enemy ground moves are radioed to the RDP's, and relayed from there to the TCC. All this information is obtained using no technical equipment save for a pair of field glasses. Yet the data turned in by these observ- ers, both on hostile and friendly planes, and on enemy ground activity, has resulted in the destruction of many German troops and much equipment. In many cases the ground observers have acted as Infantry, and aided in repelling enemy counter-attacks. They have captured prisoners, inflicted casualties, and in turn have suffered losses themselves. To those who gave their lives so valiantly only the deepest homage and ptribute can be rendered, with the knowledge that they shared in the sacrifices that were made, to rid the world of the Nazi plague.
(End of Article)

 

GRID COORDINATES IN THE U. K.
The unit history gave coordinates of the locations in the U.K. operational practice sites and locations could not be pinpointed at the time this history was started. The grid map used has not yet been identified. All the sites were shown in the history records as coordinate block "R" when actually the military maps showed the part of England we were located as in grid blocks "Q" and "U".
Only two references recorded the coordinate with the town where the site was located. The editor knew the location of these two sites with respect to the town and they were 563rd Battalion Headquarters at Lashenden and FDP3 site at Cousleywood. These two points were used in connection with mathematics to determine the location on present maps. A study of the two sites showed that the new grid was a rotation 8.53 degrees from the old grid and offset in the X direction by 4959.736 meters and in the Y direction by - 1613.576 meters.
The results of this transformation is used directly to locate the positions on the new UK Ordnance Survey Maps now in existence. The maps in the Map Location Annex are plotted on their translated basis. Also shown are some location reported that were known but no coordinates reported and have known historical connection, for example.
Site Map Remarks
A Location of 563rd Bn Hq on April 17,1944 in the woods just South of Lashenden. The 100th Fighter Wing headquarters was in the manor house at Lashenden.
C The first 563rd Bn Hq near Henley on Thames. The campment was located in the woods near Remenham.
D Location of the 563rd Advance Headquarters near Weyhill. The encampment was located in a woods near there.
E Location of the RAF Filter School at Bawdsey where the Filter Officers received advanced training.
F Location of the Port of Debarkation on the Firth of Clyde where the Queen Mary docked on completion of the crossing from New York Harbor. The dock was in the Port of Glasgow near Greenock. The troops were loaded on passenger trains which took us to Henley on Thames.
A key map showing the relation between the old grid and the new grid is shown on the page 57. Following that page a map of UK towns and cities is shown that has the old grid overlaid on it. This Town map is of a more recent date than the maps we were working with in 1944 but it will assist in locating points on the current UK Ordnance Survey maps. The UK Ordnance Survey Map grid is the basis of current tourist maps of the UK and also it conforms to the current International Grid System.
FEBRUARY 1944
Feb 8
Company C was formed for combat at Henly on Thames in Southern England on GO1 563rd SAW Bn. Capt. Franklyn A. Glassow assumed command and the following officers were appointed as follows
Lt. Joseph H. Eichbaum Company Supply O
Lt. Donald H. Hobbs Filter O
Lt. Clair B. Watson Filter O
Lt. Charles A. Stewart Filter O
Lt. David R. Schultze GO3 Platoon Commander
Feb 14
Company C reported their strength as 14 Officers, 2 Warrant Officers and 201 men. Most of the personnel were away at this time to various schools in different parts of England. >p>MARCH 1944
Mar 5
Company C reported that most of their personnel that had been away to Filter School at Bawdsey had returned to duty. Lt. Stewart noted that the days at Bawdsey would be remembered by the men and officers of Company C. as many a pleasant hour was spent at the RAF Filter School there and in the town of Folkstone. He said the officers learned a few customs of England the hard way.
Mar 16
Company reported that 2 officers and 28 men returned to the company from temporary duty at Renscombe Down. The CHB and half of a "U" team arrived at sites in preparation for Operational Training.
APRIL 1944
The 563rd Battalion Headquarters was located Lashenden which is about 5 miles south of Headcorn. As fast as the units had their equipment they were put into operations along the southeastern part of England. The units moved to their first location on the following dates:
FDP1 and LW1 13 April FDP3 and LW3 15 April
FDP2 and LW2 13 April FDP4 and LW4 15 April
In the UK operations of the battalion there was no tactical or strategic responsibility because the British had a network of Radar, Ground observers connected with Civil Defense and Royal Air Force operating centers. The sites desired were to be operated for pre battle training and were tentatively selected by the battalion staff. The permission to get the sites was through the British Ministry of Agriculture who coordinated the need of the armed forces with the ability to raise agricultural farm products and cattle for food. The British did a remarkable job coordinating the requirements of the troops. For Radar sites alone there were at least two or more units of our size also needing sites. To train properly we were allowed to make one move and that was sixteen sites for the four FDP's and four LW's. The second training positions were as follows.
FDP1 26 May
FDP2 8 May
FDP3 21 May Cousley Woods near Tunbridge Wells
LW1 15 May
LW2 8 May
LW3 30 Apr

A third position was occupied by the following units.

LW1 26 May
LW4 26 May
Battalion was represented by Maj. Byrne who checked out maps for the invasion and selected initial operational sites in France.
The Headquarters and Headquarters Company bivouac was located in a field near Lashenden. The manor house at Lashenden housed the 100th Fighter Wing headquarters. This camp was labeled Station 410. The 312th Fighter Control Squadron was located near Headcorn which is near by. During May and June plans were made at the SHAEF headquarters in London where Top Secret plans were given to the units. For signal preparations the 100th Fighter Wing and the 563rd
738th Signal Air Warning Company
Before being assigned to the 563rd, the 738th Signal Air Warning Company was activated at Drew Field Florida on March 15th 1943. On December 16th they were shipped to Camp Kilmer, New Jersey for shipment to England from the New York port of embarka- tion on the S.S. Brazil. They sailed on December 29th and arrived in England on January 7th 1944. They were then shipped to Start Point, in Devon, England in January 1944. They were the first field unit to be assigned a MEW radar. They were given the primary mission of acting as a Fighter Director Station. As such, it was the only radar which would cover the D Day invasion area, and an exposure was taken every minute of a PPI tube. (see Editors Note 4 on the following page) The next job that the MEW took on was to handle Ground Control Interception missions in the fight against the German V-1 "Buzz Bombs". As a result of these interceptions, 131 were shot down before reaching the British Shore.
MAY 1944
In 1994 the following report was sent in by Col. David Schultze on a phase of operation in England. GO3 In Coastal Operations in England
"I am sending a couple of pictures I have found. One is or Lt. Janek and myself working over one of our radios. The site was in England and you will notice the crumbling rock wall in the background. This was Pevensey Castle which was built during the Norman invasion. It took considerable persuasion to get an outpost in there but there were a couple of rooms in the castle what we occupied. There was an old caretaker there (his name was Mr. Bodel, I'll never forget him) and I guess he was afraid the Yanks would somehow deface the place. We had our radio up on the ram- parts and on D Day we could see wave after wave of aircraft and ships in the channel all heading for France. Pevensey Castle was, and probably still is, a tourist attraction and for a small fee you could get a tour of the place. In fact, I have one of the tour books they sold at the gate. Picked it up on occasion I had to visit there in the 50's. On the last page the book said;
"During WWII, the castle was occupied by a group of U. S. Signal- men" and that was of course us. A further comment on this. Lt. Col. McBride visited at Pevensey Castle a couple of times and would spend a little time with the platoon and the rest of the time across the street in the village of Pevensey as there was a lovely old English Antique Shop there with a lot of old china, silver, furniture, etc., and he really liked to browse through the shop. The other picture is a shot of several members of GO3 taken somewhere in Belgium during the Battle of the Bulge.
The site of Pevensey Castle is at the new grid coordinate of Q645048. This is one site that was not recorded in the unit his- tory, however GO3 Post Oboe was reported nearby on 26 May 1944 at Priesthowes at location Q610060.
To add historical interest to this site the editor furnished the following history.
"Pevensey Castle near Portchester (historians call Pevensey Bay therefore denoting it as a Roman port) in Hampshire. The Normans built a castle inside of a Roman Fort (Anderita). Both were for the protection of the Harbor (now silted up and built over by the town of Pevensey). It served as a beachhead for the invading armies. Here fought the savage battle in 961, when the Saxon's attacked and slew all that dwelt therein, nor was there a Briton left. William the Conqueror landed in Pevensey in 1066 before advancing to attack King Harold at Senlack 9 miles northeast and near the site of the present Abbey at Battle. Before the battle of Hastings, which occurred just southwest of the abbey gate, William of Normandy vowed he would build an Abbey should the day be his. here, now part of a school are the remains of the abbey he built and the high alter is exactly over the actual place where King Harold is buried."
See page 64 for the vicinity map of the southern coast of England which was part of the area assigned to GO3 for Air Warning which extended roughly from Eastbourne to Bexhill. During this time Gen. Eisenhower made an appearance to inspect the training setup where the Tactical Control Center were conducting an "canned" exercise and he also visited FDP3 radar site. Lt. Harold Salfen (FDP3 controller attached from the 312th FCS) was the controller and he had just showed Ike a radar scope and pointed what we did on an aircraft intercepted an enemy plane. He walked out of the van and said "That is very interest ing. I really don't understand radar, but there is something I do understand". He pointed at a manure spreader standing nearby.
[Editors Note 4--- Although I have not seen the media, I believe that there is a graphic presentation of the Normandy Landing as viewed from the PPI of the 738th Air Warning Signal Battalion. I would guess that this could be located at the Signal Corps School at Fort Monmouth. It is not known whether this was presented with motion pictures or pages in a book.]
JUNE 1944
During June a new mobile radar SCR-582 microwave unit was assigned to the Battalion with Lt. Clarence A. Wetherill and 2nd Lt. Robert A. Homan and their crew who assembled the unit in the U.S. at the radiation labs at M.I.T. Radiation labs.
Jun 1
Company C which now consisted of a FDP, a LW Platoon and a Ground Observer Platoon moved to Marden and went into operation. This move was a leap frog and was made during the night.
Jun 3
Company D was put on attached service direct to the Ninth Air Defense Command for administration and tactical operation per Par 6 of SO 154 Headquarters Ninth Air Force dated 3 June.

 

D DAY OPERATIONS PHASE
The D-Day operation phase extended from June 6 to June 27
JUNE 1944
The description of the Normandy Landing Phase for the 563rd started June 28th and the Cherbourg Defense Phase started about July 1st. During this time the 563rd battalion was operating in a defensive role and marking time until the Third Army went into combat. The Third Army was not to be activated until August 1st.
From D-Day on 6 Jun until July 2 the 555th Signal Air Warning Battalion landed radar and troops. They went into operations on D- Day and operating in the First Army Area with the IX Tactical Air Command.(see Editors Note 5 below). In order to fill in what happened from 6 June to the 28th, Chart A and Chart B is the situation map on D-Day on Utah and Omaha beach respectively. The 555th made the landing on D-Day on Omaha beach and encountered some difficulties in landing the heavy radar in rough sea.
Following is the Invasion Phase situation shown on page 74 with a time frame of June 6th to 12th when the VII Corps commanded by Gen. Collins landed on Utah Beach, the V Corps commanded by Gen. Gerow landed on Omaha Beach. At the same time the British Second Army, commanded by Gen. Dempsey landed on Gold, Juno and Sword beaches with the XXX British Corps commanded by Gen. Buckhall on the left, the I British Corps commanded by Gen. Crocker on the right. By the 12th of June the V Corps had advanced to Caumont, near Cury-Marcourt about 10 miles south of Omaha beach. Page 85 shows the situation map for the Capture of Cherbourg with the time frame of the 13th to 30 June. The VII and VII Corps advanced west from Omaha beach and by the 30th of June had cleared the Cherbourg Peninsula. Page 76 shows the situation map for the map for the Phase to Expand the Beachhead
[Editors Note 5--- After the 563rd went into combat on 1 August Brig. Gen. Sanders, the 100th Fighter Wing Commander and superior headquarters to our operations expressed concern about our employment of Ground Observer Platoons. He said that the D-Day landing phase of Signal Air Warning troops at Omaha Beach that the Ground Observer platoons went into action and were deployed on or near the Line of Resistance. As I remember he said that there were enough Ground Observer casualties to disturb the high command of the Air Force units and their idea was to abandon the Ground Observer activities because of the inherent danger to the men. Col. McBride asked him to reconsider and reminded the General that our Ground Observers were Infantry Trained, that both the Battalion Commander and the Executive Officer of the Battalion were Original- ly trained and functioned as Infantry Officers. The General agreed to release the Ground Observers for combat and they soon became experts. From the first day of combat Col. McBride himself supervised their operation personally.]
where the entire front was straightening out and advances all along the front were on a line through St. Lo or about 20 miles deep from the Gulf of St. Malo to about 5 miles east of Caen. Gen. Montgom- ery was in command of the invasion force with the First Army Commanded by Gen. Bradley on the right and the British Second Army commanded by Gen. Dempsey on the left.
Jun 6
Company C was given orders to close down and cease operations and prepare for the Invasion of France.
Jun 12
Company C brought LW3 Platoon in to FDP3 and the Company was received orders to de-waterproof their vehicles after they had almost been completed. The order was a mistake, and the following day they had to waterproof again. At Lashenden, England 563rd SAW Battalion Headquarters, Capt. Claudius G. Farrow, Company B Commander was presented the Legion of Merit for previous service in the Pacific Theater. The presentation was made by Col. Homer L. Sanders, Commanding Officer of the 100th Fighter Wing, before a formal review of the troops of Headquarters and Headquarters Company.
Jun 17
Company C reported their first German Robot Bomb or "Buzz Bomb" came over their camp. They manned their .50 Cal machine guns and fired on all bombs that passed overhead or nearby. Lt. Stewart reported that their last days in England were hectic ones because of the Buzz Bombs. They had to stop firing after a few minutes when their daily allotment of ammunition ran out.
WO Vernon O Mills in the unit history reported the following in June.
"The primary mission of this battalion in England was opera- tional training. Many flights and raids on the continent were controlled during this training. Great anxiety was shown by the troops knowing that soon we would all be in France and using our operational training and our unit becoming a part of a real combat team.
Mid month from the enemy skies came a flood of the paper hanger's (Hitler) newest secret weapon, known to him and his malicious cohorts as the V-1, but to us it was just a nuisance known as the "doodle-bug". Even Hitler's V-1 weapon did not catch the Allied troops asleep. The first appearance of the new weapon over England received a continuous burst of gun fire from the smallest of firearms to large coastal guns. To my knowledge the first one was brought down within a mile and a quarter of our headquarters. As viewed by troops at one of our outposts con- trolling the valley it seemed that the entire valley was lit up by gunfire as if floodlights had been turned on. Number three was brought down in the valley and a loud roar was heard all over the entire valley from the troops knowing that Hitler's secret weapon could be destroyed.
At first, it caused a considerable disturbance, due mostly to the novelty of the situation and also to the fact that we had been working in a very quiet atmosphere for quite some time. Within a week's time this uneasiness wore off and operations continued in a norman vein. There was little cause for worry for the Ack-Ack batteries working hand in hand with the Air Force had the situation well in hand. Most of the bombs continued far past our positions and stuck farther north, presumably London. It is admitted that the projectiles have taken effect amongst the civilian populace but our heavy retaliatory blows made on the German home front can never by matched by any of Adolf's devices. There were several near misses, however, giving the men a temporary scare and on one occasion at 2320B, 25 June 44, one of our units was strafed by 20- mm's and machine gun fire from an Allied airplane which was endeavoring to deliver the knockout blow to a buzz bomb. No casualties were suffered however."
About the same time the German's also launched V-2 missions. These were high trajectory rockets fired with a preset range. There was no warning and no anti weapon to use against them. The British people took the rockets stoically. It was a different case with the V-1's as they were also a preset range and they could detected by early warning system and had a loud engine noise that could be heard miles away. When they got to the preset range the engine was automatically cut off. There was than silence for seconds before the missile crashed and exploded at an unpredictable distance from where they were heard. Even after the years of air raids the civilians dreaded them to the point where the morale of the civilians was definitely affected. This also affected the strategy of the allied forces because a lot of priority would go to the British Armies who were to attack in the sector where the launching was occurring.
During June preparations were being made for the crossing and the troops engaged in waterproofing the vehicles for the landing. The Battalion was divided into 13 echelons for the crossing. The makeup of the echelons was not reported in the unit history.


The Normandy Landing Phase for the 563rd extended from June 28th to July 1st
JUNE 1944
In the 21st Army Group, in the First Army's VIII Corps the 9th Infantry Division prepares to attack the Cap de la Hague. The 79th Infantry Division is assigned.
Jun 28
On June 28th the first echelon of the 563rd with Maj. Byrne in charge set out for the marshaling area at Southampton. On the following day other echelons of the Battalion also got the port call.
Maj. Byrne gave this account of the landing of the advanced echelon.
"The advanced echelon had the Battalion communications men and equipment and were needed to get on shore and set up communi- cations. When the ship arrived at Omaha Beach everything was quiet and the weather clear. The beach master asked us by blinker who we were and what was our mission. I answered that we were supporting the Third Army which was the wrong thing to have said. (It was not till later that I found out the Third Army was not to go into action for a month and thus had a low unloading priority). Right off the beach master informed us by blinker that we had a lower priority and others would be unloaded ahead of us. I was fit to be tied. We sat and fumed over being ignored and kept heckling him until he finally permitted us to unload several vehicles. I had Lt. Jenek and his communications men load up a truck and some jeeps and got them unloaded. Since I was the senior officer I had to sweat out unloading the remainder of the troops including several units that I was not familiar with. The Liberty ship which transported the advanced headquarters had accumulated a large amount of rations of various classes which it had accumulated on previous trips as emergency supplies. The ship's Captain informed that the beach master had refused to unload the rations and asked me to do what I could with them. I gave the beach master a chance to unload them and he refused. I then asked the various units and our own men to load as much of the rations on their trucks as they could and they did. Although we were packed for shipment with a weeks rations we thought the extra handout could be used for handout's to the French civilians.
We were kept on the ship for several days, there was no enemy action, but occasionally a German observation would fly over and do nothing. Also there was no guns being manned on any of the ships and if there was any guns ready on shore they did not bother firing. Finally the beach master unloaded us all and we drove our trucks through about four feet of water and up the hill to Criqueville. The waterproofing behaved superbly and there was no trouble. When we arrived at the Battalion headquarters we were disappointed that we, who were supposed to land first were practi- cally the last part of the Battalion Headquarters to arrive. But Lt. Janek, with his head start had communications up and going."
Jun 29
In the First Army the VII Corps the 9th Infantry Division attacks to clear Cap de la Hague and halts at Greville
In the First Army the VIII Corps the 101st Airborne Division starts to Cherbourg
In the First Army the XIX Corps the first elements of the 3rd Armored Division enter combat and reduce Villers-Fossard and the 29th Infntry Division renews the attack on St. Lo.
Jun 30
In the First Army's VII Corps the enemy defense at Cap de la Hague collapses and the 39th Infantry Division begins exploring the peninsula.
In the First Army's XIX Corps the 3rd Armored Division gains its objective and is relieved by the 29th Infantry Division.
On June 30th the remainder of the Battalion headquarters was scheduled to go and WO Vernon Mills gave this graphic account of the 563rd Headquarters rear echelon's crossing.
"At approximately eight o'clock on June 30th our serial number came blaring out over the public address system, and we knew that we would soon be on our way. Upon arrival at the docks in Southampton, we registered and then retired to a corner of the dock to await a call to board the ship. While waiting we ate and then sat around speculating as to what kind of a ship we were to make the crossing in.
Finally, the call came and we found ourselves filing up the gangplank onto a Liberty Ship named the "Empire Battleax". As each man stepped onto the gangplank, he received two doughnuts from an attractive Red Cross Girl. After dropping our equipment in the compartments assigned to us, we all managed to find our way up on deck. While we there all of us caught a glimpse of David Niven, the former Cinema Star, who was also on board. Some enterprising G.I.'s even approached him to get his autograph.
Early in the morning of July 1st the Empire Battleax nosed out into the channel in the direction of France with its barrage balloon hovering overhead. Most of us on seeing the balloon were reminded of a child at the fair parading down the midway with a silver balloon in tow.
The trip across the channel was quiet and uneventful. The day wore on, gray with the threat of rain. Occasionally a plane flew over or a corvette sped by us as though we were standing still.
In the middle of the afternoon the coast of Normandy loomed up ahead of us. As we drew closer the more visible effects of the greatest military operation in history became apparent to us. The hulks of many boats were barely seen jutting above the water. Off to our left was a long line of ships evenly spaced, listing, some to the port, others to the starboard. It seemed incredible that this could have been the result of enemy action. We were then informed by one of the ship's officers that this had been done deliberately to form a breakwater and permit smaller craft to operate inside it.
After what seemed we were finally loaded unto landing craft and speeding toward the beach. The beach was littered with landing craft of all descriptions. In the cliff facing the channel could be seen former German Gun emplacements. These, coupled with the blasted and wrecked landing craft gave us some idea of the Hell that raged up and down this beach on "D" day. Jerry had been attacked and defeated at this point, fantastic and impossible as it seemed.
We disembarked on floating docks, marched up these and onto the Omaha beach. Once on shore we marched parallel to the channel about 100 yards and then turned right to ascend a steep hill. By this time it was raining, and the path leading up was turned into a greased sliding board. After much slipping and sliding, and cursing our packs we finally negotiated the hill. When we finally caught our breaths every man was struck with the same thought, "we only had to climb it, but the infantry had to climb and fight up it."
That night we pitched our pup tents at the transit area and opened our "K" rations, and settled down. The next morning was July 2nd 1944 and we entrucked and were driven to Criqueville, which was also the Airdrome of the 70th Fighter Wing. Certain elements of the 100th Fighter Wing to whom we are assigned were already there. During the next week, the remaining echelons of the 563rd joined us at Criqueville."
Company A echelon consisting of Company A Headquarters, FDP1, LW1 and GO1 Platoons departed Tenterden, Kent, England.
On June 30, 1944 General Bradley commanded the First U.S. Army under Gen. Montgomery's 21st Army Group. It was the First Army that cleared out the Cherbourg Peninsula.
JULY 1944
The 563rd companies crossed the channel in "Victory Ships" in company sized units. Each company plus the advanced headquarters formed a convoy to take the vehicles and equipment to the port of debarkation. The 563rd was designated mobile and it meant exactly that because all in all there were almost as many vehicles as there was Men. The Supreme Headquarters directed the flow of vehicles to the port and each convoy had timed check points. When we arrived at the port the vehicles were loaded onto the "Victory Ships" which were manned by the U.S. Merchant Marine. Each such ship may take one or more convoys and transport them across the channel. At the time of unloading there were whatever extra rations of food that the unit could handle. The transports would cross the channel to the assigned beach and the beach master under the control of the U.S. Navy would control the unloading. The transports would provide the crane's but the beach master would control the unloading and the traffic on the beach. The 563rd was designated as a U.S. Third army unit and did not have high priority as they were not scheduled to participate in combat until about August. Before starting the convoy to the ships the vehicles had been waterproofed so the engines would work under water and the exhaust run through an elevated snorkel hose. The vehicles were unloaded in about four feet of water and went on their own power up to the beach. At that time the weather proofing was removed and discarded and the vehicles went on to their first rendezvous point. The 563rd units all landed at different times and the landing point was near St. Laurent.
Jul 1
In the First Army's V Corps the 2nd Infantry Division is committed.
In the First Army's VII Corps enemy resistance ceases on the Cherbourg Peninsula.
In the 563rd elements of the Battalion started landing on Omaha beach. Sometimes the men were waiting in their landing ships for unloading priority.
The Air Defense of Cherbourg Phase extended from July 2nd to 31st
JULY 1944
While waiting for the Third Army to begin attack operations the 563rd was designated to set up a radar warning system for the Cherbourg Peninsula which was more or less coordinated by the Hq staff of the British Royal Air Force (RAF). The men were disap- pointed at the defense assignment because they had expected to be controlling combat flights.
Jul 2
In the First Army the V Corps commanded the 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions, the 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions and the 101st Airborn Division. The VIII Corps had the 4th, 8th and 83rd Infan- try Divisions. The VIII Corps commanded the 72nd, the 82nd and the 90th Infantry Divisions. The XIX Corps retains the 29th and 30th Infantry Divisions.
On July 2nd Company B and Company C left Lashenden, Kent for France and FDP1 landed on July 2 and moved to a location near Criquevile about 6 miles inland from Omaha Beach.
Jul 3
In the First Army the VIII Corps, in a driving rain which prevents air support attacked toward La Haye-Du-Puits with the 79th and 90th Infantry Divisions and the 82nd Airborne Division.
In the 563rd Battalion Headquarters arrived and set up communications near Criqueville. FDP3 landed and set up near Mandeville-en-Bessin about 8 miles west of Bayeux and 7 miles inland from Omaha Beach. The radar operations was a reserve operation for the First Army. Sites occupied were preselected from three dimensional maps in England several months before D Day. FDP1 and FDP2 were planned to be in position to be a back up the First Army/IX TAC team.
Jul 4
In the First Army VII Corps the VII Corps the 83rd Infantry Division is in action for the first time. The VIII Corps the 82nd Airborne Division takes hill overlooking Haye-Du-Puit.
In the 563rd Headquarters Company left for France.
Jul 5
In the First Army the VII Corps closes in on Periers and the VIII Corps overruns the RR station at Haye-Du-Puit
In the 563rd Company C arrived on Omaha Beach on July 5th and made the trip over on a LST and reported they were well treated by the Navy.
Jul 6
The Third Army headquarters is set up in France at Nehou and the VIII Corps is assigned from the First Army. The XII, XV and XX Corps are assigned but they will be under the operational control of the First Army until the Third Army is operational..
In the 563rd Company C arrived at Mandeville-En-Bessen near Rubicy. While there they suffered their first casualties when two men were injured when a German Gernade they were examining exploded.
Jul 7
In the Third Army the XIX Corps opens an attack with the 30th Infantry Division.
In the 563rd Pfc Clyde Clark and Pfc Douglas Voll of Company C were handling a hand grenade when it exploded. Pfc Clark was injured seriously with burns on the hands and was evacuated. Pfc Voll was only slightly injured and was returned to duty after one week in the hospital.
Jul 8
In the Third Army XIX Corps the 3rd Armored Division and the 30th Infantry Division and they attack to Le Bernardrie.
Jul 9
In the Third Army the XIX Corps a strong German Counter Attack is checked near St. Lo
In the 563rd the remainder of Company C made the crossing to Omaha Beach.
Jul 10
In the Third Army XIX Corps the 30th Infantry Division reaches Belle-Lande.
In the 563rd Battalion Headquarters moved to near St. Pier Eglise where the 100th Fighter Wing was located. Company A and FDP1 was moved to Helleville about 11 miles southwest of Cherbourg and about 3 miles inland from the west coast of the Cherbourg Peninsula and LW1 was sited near Jobourg which is about 12 miles northeast of FDP1 and in the northwest corner of the Cherbourg Peninsula and deployed GO1 along the coastline. Company B and FDP2 moved to Ravenoville about 9 miles southeast of Valognes and about a mile inland from the east coast of the Cherbourg Peninsula also they moved LW2 to Morsalines which is about 1 mile inland from the east coast of Cherbourg and about 8 miles north of FDP2 and deployed GO2 along the coastline.Company C moved to Portbail and LW3 set up at Morville on the Cherbourg Peninsula. GO3 took occupied positions surrounding Portbail. Cherbourg was clear of enemy down to a line from La Haye-Dupits to Carantan. Maj. Yasha A. Venar had an accidental fall and broke one of his legs and was evacuated to the 12th Field Hospital. FDP4 was moved to Gouberv- ille. GO1 moved Post Able to Grunchy, Post Baker to Thet, Post Charley to Samson, Post Dog to Nicolle and Post Fox to Pte Jardeheu. GO2 moved Post George to Dedainville, Post How and Jig to St Martin, Post King to Jonville and Post Love to Montebourg. GO3 moved Post Mike to Beaubigny, Post Oboe to Girot, Post Peter to Cap de Flamanville, Post Queen to Pte De Rozei and Post Roger to Hameau.
Jul 12
In the XIX Corps the 29th, 30th and 35th Infantry Divisions are in the vicinity of St. Lo.
In the 563rd FDP4 occupied site near Gouberville near the north shore of the Cherbourg Peninsula about 16 miles east of Cherbourg. Maj. Julius L. Levy, Medical Corps was assigned to the battalion to replace Maj. Yasha A. Venar who was hospitalized and serve as Battalion Surgeon until Maj. Venar's release.
Jul 13
In the Third Army the 4th Armored Division lands in France amd the XIX Corps the costly battle for St. Lo continues.
In the Ninth Air Defense Command Company D (attached) moved using its own organic equipment for transportation to a port of embarkation in order to move to the continent. The trip across the Channel to Omaha Beach was made under adverse conditions. Because of the very rough water and storms the unloading at Omaha Beach had been broken up. After 36 hours of waiting for the weather conditions to improve unloading of equipment started. Two barges were being used and after being partially loaded with equipment and personnel, broke away from the ship in which the Channel crossing had been made. These barges with equipment and personnel were unable to make shore for 15 hours and considerable difficulty was experienced in the saving of men and equipment. The entire company personnel and equipment was unloaded and on shore within 96 hours after the channel crossing. From Omaha Beach, the Company moved to Levast, France in accordance with verbal orders of the Commanding General of the Ninth Air Force. Company D was to work in the Levast area with the 71st Fighter Wing and the 566th Signal Air Warning Battalion.
In the 563rd LW1 was relocated about 1/2 mile south east of their Jogbourg location. LW4 was moved to Valognes. GO1 moved Post Able to Greville, Post Charley to Sampson and Post Fox to Pte Jardeheu. GO4 moved Post Tare to Cap Levy, Post Uncle to Le bequt, Post Victor to Pte de Barfleur and Post William to Les Manes.
Jul 14
In the Third Army Area the XIX Corps the 30th Infantry Division captures Pont Herbert.
Jul 15
The XV Corp headquarters arrived in France on 15th July and was to be assigned to the Third Army.
Jul 18
In the 563rd Lt. Lewis F. Janek, Tech/Sgt Allen D. Kimmel, Tech/Sgt Elmer M. Mapp and Tech/4th Robert L Hinman, Jr. hit an anti-tank mine at near Langlois which is about 3 miles north of Barneville-sur-Mer near the west coast of the Cherbourg peninsula. T/Sgt Allen B. Kimmel and Tech/4th Robert L. Hinman were killed instantly and later buried at 2200 on July 18th at the La Farge Cemetery near St. Mere Eglise. Lt. Janek and Tech/Sgt Mapp were seriously injured and taken to the 101st Evacuation hospital. Lt. Janek had managed to make contact by walking five miles to Company C even though seriously injured at the time. With disregard to personal safety. GO4 Post Sugar was relocated to near Jubourg. Lt. Joseph H. Eichbaum of Company C went through the mined area and brought out Tech/Sgt Mapp. Later on Lt. Eichbaum would be awarded the Soldiers Medal (see citation on August 14th page 129). GO4 moved Post Sugar to Canteloup and Post Tare to Valognes.
Jul 19
In the 563rd Cpl John J. Kills-in-Water while returning from battalion headquarters to his ground observer site, hit a soft shoulder on the road at a curve and his three-quarter ton truck overturned. He was pinned under the truck for fifteen minutes before help arrived. He was diagnosed as having a serious injury and transferred to the 12th Field Hospital. GO4 Post Tare was moved to near Valognes.

 

Jul 20
In the 563rd Sgt Ernest R. Scott, Company A, on occupying a site previously used by enemy forces accidentally set off the fuse of a 20 mm detonator causing serious injury to his abdomen and he was transferred to the 12th Field Hospital.
Jul 21
In the 563rd Lt. Harold E. Waeckerle, Tech/5th Alfred W. Madl and Maj. Maurice E. Byrne were injured in a fire in the Battalion operations van caused by a defective gas fired heater and igniting the acetate covers of the situation maps on the wall. Lt. Waeckerle was seriously burned on the face and hands in his determination to put out the fire and save the map posting he tried to beat out the flames with his hands. Lt. Waeckerle was hospital- ized for ten days and returned to duty. (see Editors Note 6 below)
Jul 22
In the 12th Army Group, General Bradley issued a directive that the Third Army could become operational on July 24.
Jul 24
The XX Corps headquarters opened.
Jul 26
In the Third Army the 28th Infantry Division was assigned to the XIX Corps.
Jul 27
In the Third Army's XIX Corps the 28th Infantry Division was put on line.
Jul 28
General Patton was given verbal orders that he would assume operation control of the Third Army. The Forward Echelon of the Third Army Headquarters, named Lucky Forward by General Patton, made their first of many moves to a position five miles west of Coutances. Gemeral Patton's arrival in France was kept secret, since his supposed presence in England furthered the hoax that there would be another landing near Calais.
As yet the 563rd Battalion was not controlling any flights and the information reported into the 100th Fighter Wing Tactical Con- trol Center had no tactical use.
[Editors Note 6--- At one point one of the FDP's reported an enemy flight probably near Rennes which had such a high flying speed that it was not believed at the filter center. The radar operator said it went across the screen (120 miles) in minutes. I remember I had reports that the Germans had a rocket interceptor with about Mach 1 speed and I believe this was one of them. In any event a picture is shown below. The source of the picture is unknown. I also sent home an aviators helmet made very light which I picked up at the Rennes airport which I believe the rocket pilots used. It was my understanding that the rocket made one pass at a target (usually another aircraft) and the pilot and the rocket parachuted down to earth. On page 84 is a photo of one class of German Rocket interceptor.]
Jul 31
In the 563rd during the month incoming personnel included Tech/Sgt Eugene Kiimalehtro and T/Sgt William N. Miller.
After arriving by airplane Gen. Patton prepared to assume control of Bradley's western most divisions. Gen. Patton's go into action. A reconnaissance south discovered that armored divisions were gathering along the hedge rows, and nervously waiting for the attack. The prospect of going into action improved the morale of the men who were tired of our defensive position.
In the First U.S Army's VIII Corps the 6th Armored Division overran Granville and moved to Avranches. The 4th Armored Division secured a crossing of the Selune River near Pontaubault. In the VII Corps area the 3rd Armored Division secured a crossing of the See River. In the XIX Corps area the 35th Infantry Division advanced toward Vire.
The Third Army Staff at noon 1 Aug was

Commanding General Lt. Gen. George S. Patton Jr.
Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Gaffey
Asst Chief of Staff G-1 Col. Frederick S. Matthews
Asst Chief of Staff G-2 Col. Oscar W. Koch
Asst Chief of Staff G-3 Col. Halley G. Maddox
Asst Chief of Staff G-4 Col. Walter J. Muller
Asst Chief of Staff G-5 Col. Nicholas W. Companole
Adjutant General Col. Robert E. Cummings
Antiaircraft Artillery Col. Frederick R. Chamberlain
Artillery Col. Edward T. Williams
Build up Control Col. Redding F. Perry
Chaplain Col. James H. O'Neill
Chemical Warfare Col. Edward C. Wallington
Engineer Col. John F. Conklin
Finance Lt. Col. Charles B. Milliken
Headquarters Commandant Col. Rufus S. Bratton
Inspector General Col. Clarence C. Park
Judge Advocate Col. Charles E. Cheever
Medical Col. Thomas D. Hurley
Ordnance Col. Thomas H. Nixon
Provost Marshall Col. John C. Macdonald
Public Relations Col. Charles C. Blaklley
Quartermaster Col. Everett Busch
Signal Col. Elton H. Hammond
Special Service Lt. Col. Kenneth Van Buskirk
AUGUST 1944
The Breakout Phase extended from August 1st to 13th
Aug 1
Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley relinquished command of the US First Army in order to take command of the 12th Army Group. He had only to take his jeep from the First Army headquarters near St. Lo to his 21st Army Group headquarters at Coutances.
General Patton flew in on 1 August and at 12:00 noon the Third Army Headquarters became operational near Coutance, near the headquarters of General Bradley's 12th Army Group which also opened that day. General Weyland opened his XIX TAC command headquarters at noon the same day. Note that I said Patton flew in from England in an army observation plane. He was irritated that he had to fly in because he thought the a Field General should drive into camp in his jeep like a combat soldier.
Command and General Staff School and traditional U.S. Army - tactical doctrine indicated that an attack should start with a maneuver of Infantry Divisions to find a soft spot and develop a coordinated tank attack through the hole. At this point Patton was short on Infantry Divisions but had two Armored Divisions the 4th Armored and 6th Armored. For the first time in the history of warfare Patton used Tank Divisions as Infantry Divisions and used the forward points of the Armored Divisions as spearheads.
Under Patton's command were the VIII Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Troy H. Middleton the XII Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Gilbert R. Cook, the XV Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Wade H. Haislip and the XX Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Walton H. Walker.
Immediate plans were laid with the participation of IX TAC Commander Maj. Gen. Elwood Quesada. Quesada remembered the conver- sation with general Bradley this way. (see Editors Note 7 below)
Quesada said: "Look, Brad, if you will concentrate your armor, I'll tell you what I'll do. I will keep over every column that you establish a flight of bombers from daylight until dark."
Bradley answered: "You will?"
Quesada affirmed: "Yes, I will."
Bradley queried: "For every column that I establish?"
Quesada said: "Yes, and further than that, Brad, we'll do something else that I think will be of tremendous help. We will put in the lead tank of every column an aircraft radio and fix it so they can talk to the flight that is above them which will be there from dawn to dusk."
[Editors Note 7--- The books referred to above were;
August 1944 Campaign for France Robert A. Miller Presidio Press
Battle of the Generals Martin Blumensen Morrow Press
Patton's Third Army Charles M. Province Hippocrene Books
Bradley answered: "Terrific. You'll do that? Can you do it?"
Quesada explained: "Yes. Furthermore, in order for that talk to be meaningful to the pilot, I'll put an aviator in the tank."
When Bradley ordered a couple of tanks sent to the IX Tactical Air Force headquarters so that the radio installation could be worked out, the officer on the receiving end thought the general must have made a mistake, and he sent the tanks to the 9th Infantry Division instead. What would the air force want with tanks? When the 9th Infantry said the tanks were not for them, the officer called the General back. When the orders were repeated--IX Tactical Air Force--he could only comment, "well, I'll be damned."
In this time frame the XIX TAC was under the IX TAC and it is obvious that time on that Maj. Gen. Otto Weyland who commanded the XIX TAC agreed fully with Maj. Gen. Quesada.
In mid afternoon Bradley went from the First Army Hq to the Third Army Headquarters to settle the border between the First and Third Army. As soon as Bradley left, Patton took off to his VIII Corps headquarters. He directed that the 8th Infantry Division was to back up the 4th Armored moving south towards Rennes and the 79th Infantry to backup the 6th Armored moving towards Brest.
In the Third Army area it was quite common to have "scuttle- butt" filter down the command. This was quite easy to get in the 563rd because we were on the teletype net direct from TAC and had data passed through from Third Army. Several days after the 1 August operations I remember the "scuttlebutt" passed down for that day which stated that one of Patton's generals asked him for the attack orders and Patton answered him "Attack straight ahead". Historians state this more diplomatically by saying that Patton instructed his Generals to seek out the enemy and attack.
On 1 August Company A of the 563rd was located near Helleville which is about 10 miles southeast of Cherbourg and they were on alert for immediate deployment. 563rd Battalion Headquarters was located at St Pierre Eglise. (see Editors Note 8 below) At this timet in time the provisional 19th TCG was made up of the 563rd SAW Bn and the 100th Fighter Wing and 312th FCS personnel and commanded by Col. Don Mayhue. Maj. Nash was the TCC Senior Controller. The TCC and the 100th Fighter Wing were also located at St. Pierre Eglise. The plan was to have Company A function as the Tactical Control Center (TCC) when they moved to to their first site.
[Editors Note 8--- This period of combat in August the 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion really "earned their spurs". Before 1 August the 563rd were sitting on the Cherbourg Peninsula doing Air Defense and reporting in to the RAF radar center. There was a feeling among the men of the battalion that we were being left behind. In saying this I think that at this very time General George Patton was also feeling the sting of being left behind as he was the object of political complaints from Eisenhower.]
The 563rd was under the 100th Fighter Wing and staffed with Wing Headquarters officers plus the At this time the allied forces were pretty much slowed down by the hedge rows of France and the swamps in northern France about on line with Caen.
Maj. Gen. John S. Wood commanding the 4th Armored moved rapidly to Rennes and waited for the 8th Infantry to join the attack. He then swung the 4th Armored Division around to the west and south of the city.
At noon on August 1st the 12th Army Group, under General Brad- ley became operational and Gen. Patton's Third Army came to life. Patton took command the XV Corps headquarters, which had arrived in France on 15 July and XX Corps which was rapidly approaching Brittany. Behind the front headquarters, which had arrived on 24 July, were ready for action. The XII Corps headquarters was staging the movement of Third Army units from England to the Continent and processing them from the beach forward and part of the headquarters reached Normandy on July 29th and the remainder on August 7th.
To give close air support to the Third Army, Brig. Gen. Otto P. Weyland's XIX Tactical Air Command, which had been operating as part of the IX TAC, became operational. At their disposal they had the 365th, 368th and 371st Fighter Groups who were under the 84th Fighter Wing. They also had the one squadron of the 10th Photo Reconnaissance Group that was based in Normandy.
During the operations shown on the map close air support was superb. So effectively were bridges, roads and railroads destroyed that the Germans were reduced to moving troops by night and their supply deficiencies became acute.
The XIX TAC take-off, scheduled for August 1st was delayed until later afternoon because of bad weather. In the short time they operated that day they flew 147 sorties and dropped 22 tons of bombs. The 365th Fighter Group bombed 3 German 88-mm Guns. The 37th Fighter Group dropped four 500 lb bombs in a field with guns positions reported Other claims were 32 Motor vehicles, 9 Armored vehicles, 1 fuel dump, 9 motor transports, 1 marshaling yard and 6 other gun positions.
The Third Army had launched operations early and in the hours remaining before dusk, the airmen were able to knock out both German armor and trucks. After the ground forces broke through at Avranches the XIX TAC really had its work cut out for it. Groups were assigned to hang over the armored columns of the Third Army, to prevent attack by enemy planes and to knock out stuff holding up the columns. The armed reconnaissance squadrons had the long range jobs of isolating battlefields, and to spot and break up any concentrations and keep the enemy constantly off balance. There was also the job of protecting a bottleneck at Avranches through which the Third Army men and material were pouring and some work to be done on ships in the harbor of St. Malo. American pilots were going on three and sometimes five missions a day. Almost daily new groups were being added to the XIX TAC as its functions were broadened.
Patton drove the VIII Corps westward, spearheaded by the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions into Britanny. They moved through the Avranches gap straight south of Avranches and the primary effort of the Third Army was Britanny.
On August 1st the 6th Armored attacked South at Avranches and turned west and 4th Armored attacked south from Avranches and they were in Rennes the same day. The 8th Infantry Division occupied Rennes on August 1st.
Situation Map I shows the thrust of the 4th and the 6th Arm- ored Divisions westward to clean out the Brest Peninsula. The 563rd was prepared to follow west. The thrust of the Third Army was so powerful and quick that they cleaned it up in such a short time that following was not necessary. They did this but bypassed the German garrisons at St. Malo, Brest, and Lorient. As it turned out it would be months before these garrisons would surrender. This changed the plan of the 563rd Battalion because the thrust would now turn eastward. The battalion was deployed so it could go either way.
Situation Map II shows the detail of the eastward thrust which was being carried on by ground forces at the same time as the thrust in Situation Map I.
Following is a detailed account of the battles which sub- stantially started on 1 August 1944 when the Third Army became active.
THE ALLIED PLAN FOR THE BREAKTHROUGH
It was part of the Allied plan that when the US First Army broke out of the Corentin and pivoted to the east about Caumont, a corps would be sent into Brittany to secure the ports considered so vital for logistical support. The Third Army was to take command of this corps. Accordingly, when the U.S. VIII Corps broke into the open south of Avaranches on 1 August, the Third Army became operational and the 12th Army Group was formed.
While engineers labored on the restricted road network at the Avaranches bottleneck, the flamboyant General Patton drove the VIII Corps (spearheaded by the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions) westward into Brittany. His other corps, (XV,XX and XII) he moved through the gap straight south of Avaranches. Brittany was quickly overrun (most of the German field forces formerly stationed there had been destroyed in the defense of Normandy), except for its major ports.
During these operations Close Air Support was superb. Tank columns had direct communications with the aircraft flying column cover, thus ensuring immediate tactical support and reconnaissance. The lines of communications were interdicted by both tactical and Strategic air power to isolate the battlefield. So effectively were bridges, roads, and railroads destroyed that the Germans were reduce to moving troops by night and their deficiencies became acute.
Allied air power rallied to the support of the ground troops. On August 8th the attack was halted when the Germans realized that it was more important to try to contain Patton's threat from the south.
The 12th Army Group (General Bradley) became operational and took command of the U.S. Divisions engaged in France being divided between the U.S. First Army (FUSA) and the U.S. Third Army (TUSA). General Montgomery (British) was to retain command of all ground forces through the month of August. The XIX TAC of the U.S. Ninth Air Force became operational this date with the mission of supporting the Third Army. The IX TAC continued to assist the First Army.
The Third Army (General Patton) became operational with 4 corps under its command (VIII, XII, XV, XX) as well as FFI (French Forces of the Interior). Operating on the right of the First Army and on the extreme right of the Allied forces. The mission of the Third Army is to secure Brittany Peninsula and its valuable ports. VIII Corps, consisting of 4th and 6th Armored Division and the 8th and 79th Infantry Division, passes from First to Third Army command; with 4th and 6th Armored Division spearheading, pours through the narrow Avranches corridor and fans out to S, SW and W. Crossing Le Selune River at Pontubault, 6th Armored Division swings W into Brittany in 2 columns and reaches Pontorson-Antrain area. 4th Armored Division drives southward to cut off the peninsula and reaches positions near Rennes. XV Corps (Maj. Gen. Wade Haislip), consisting of 83rd and 90th Infantry Divisions and 5th Armored Division is concentrating between See and Selllune Rivers to block enemy movement toward Avaranches.
The First Army, command of which passes from General Bradley to Lt. Gen. Courtney Hodges, directs all but V Corps to drive southeast. The V Corps is to take heights N of Vire and remain there until pinched out. VII expands Brecey bridgehead on right flank with the Division reinforced by CCA of 3rd Armored Division. 4th Infantry Division, reinforced with CCB of 34rd Armored Division pushes forward toward St. Pois, 9th Infantry Division moves southward on left flank of corps. XIX Corps overruns Percy and Tessy, Percey falling to she 28th Infantry Division and Tessy to CCA, 2nd Armored Division. The V Corps continues southward toward Vire on a 2 Division front after 5th Infantry Division is pinched out on right flank by British and assembles in rear in Army reserve.
Aug 2
Third Army Forward Headquarters was located at Beauchamps which was 11 miles north of Avranches. The VIII Corps command post was at Sartilly, a few miles north of Avranches. Bradley went to the VIII Corps command post and after unsuccessfully trying to reach Patton he countermanded Patton's orders for the 79th Infantry Division and ordered the 79th to Fougeres to build up there. Bradley was concerned about his left flank. The traffic through Avranches became a nightmare. It was a small bottle neck with everything trying to get through. The "scuttlebutt" had it that Patton planted himself in the middle of the main highway and personally directed traffic through Avranches. Lt. Gen. Courtney Hodges arrived at his new First Army command post about three o'clock which was about 5 miles southwest of St. Lo. Hodges had taken over command of the First Army from Bradley the day before. (See Situation Map on p 12)
The XIX TAC took command of the 100th Fighter Wing. The 405th and 363rd Fighter Groups were under XIX TAC operational control. The 363rd was grounded all day on account of weather. The remaining Fighter Groups were able to operate after 1000 hours. Seven Tiger Tanks were destroyed with 500 Lb bombs delivered by the 405th Fighter Group. The 371st Fighter Group put 16 500 Lb bombs on 8 gun positions and silenced them. The 358th Fighter Group on armed Reconnaissance bombed railroad targets. In all 23 combat missions comprising 223 sorties were flown and 35 3/4 tons bombs dropped. Two planes were lost to flak. The claims were 1 locomo- tive destroyed and 3 damaged, 35 motor vehicles destroyed and 24 damaged. 7 Tiger tanks and one half track destroyed, a marshaling yard and 5 troop concentrations were attack.
Aug 3
12th Army Group in order to exploit success of VIII Corps, orders Third Army to secure line St. Hiliare du Haarcourt-Fougeres- Rennes and then clear Brittany Peninsula, bypassing St Malo if it cannot be taken easily. Bradley directed the Third Army to complete capture of Brittany Peninsula with minimum forces, clear region W of Mayenne R and N of Loire R, and secure crossings of the Mayenne. First Army is to extend its operations to Mayenne- Domfront area. Bradley changed the primary mission of the Third Army to driving eastward.
In First Army VII Corps area, 1st Infantry Division and attached elements of 3rd Armored Division speed southward and overruns Mortain. The 4th Infantry Division continues toward St. Pois. The 9th Infantry Division cuts road NE of Villedieu. The XI corps advances steadily SE from Percy-Tessy area against moderate opposition from retreating enemy. In V Corps area, continuing S toward Vire and 35th Infantry Division on W and 2nd on E., corps crosses the Vire and Soulevre Rivers.
In Third Army VIII Corps area, continuing W along Brittany Peninsula, 6th Armored Division bypasses Dinan to S when strong opposition develops there. The 83rd Infantry Division is attached to corps to follow 6th Armored Division, replacing the 79th Infantry Division. The 79th Infantry Division is transferred to XV Corps for drive on Fougeres. TF A (TD's,cavalry and engineers), under Brig. Gen. Herbert Earnest, is formed to clear bypassed resistance along N Coast of Brittany Peninsula. Task Force A (TFA) moves forward to clear bypassed resistance in St. Malo area. The 4th Armored Division gains additional ground near Rennes, 13th Infantry of 8th Infantry Division motorized moves forward to Rennes area. Forward elements of 6th Armored Division get to within a few miles of Loudeac, about 60 miles west of Rennes, when the attack is halted upon order to return and reduce Dinan and at the end of the day they were in contact with the Germans at St. Malo. The 13th Infantry reverts to 8th Infantry Division from attachment to 4th Armored Division and begins assault on Rennes, while 4th Armored Division continues S passing W of Rennes. In XV Corps area, the 79th Infantry Division reach Fougeres. The 9th Infantry Division reaches positions just NW of Foret de St Sever. XIX Corps, continuing steadily SE, reaches St Sever-Calvados on right and is about half way to Vire on left. The V Corps meets stiffening resistance as it approaches Vire.
In the Ninth Air Defense Company D LW team number 3 which included Lt. Cobbs section and Lt. Altman's section were relieved from attachment with the Ninth Air Defense Command and attached back to the 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion on Par 13 of GO 187, Headquarters Ninth Air Force dated 27 July 1944. This group was sent back to the U.K. for the purpose of studying a new type of Radar Set (SCR-584)
In the early morning of August 3rd the Advanced Headquarters of the 563rd under command of Maj. Byrne advanced from Ste Pierre Eglise to Bruz which is about 5 miles south of Rennes and secured the Chateau Blossac for the 100th Fighter Wing Headquarters. Mid morning Advance Headquarters sent a messenger back to 563rd Main Headquarters advising that the area of Pontorson was substantially clear for the planned movement of FDP1. Advanced Headquarters was set up in the park east of the Chateau in Bruz. Company A was on alert for the penetration and were equipped with Air/Ground radios borrowed from the 312th FCS and were ready to function as a Tactical Control Center manned by the FDP1 Information Center (IC).
The XIX TAC covered armored and infantry columns is spite of bad weather. Only 6 missions of eight aircraft each were able to take off, 4 missions were unsuccessful and aborted, the other 2 missions destroyed or damaged 40 motor and horse drawn vehicles including ammunition trucks. Total sorties were 48 and 3 1/4 tons of bombs dropped. One aircraft was lost. Twenty-four recon and 2 photo sorties were flown.
Aug 4
On August 4th a major change in the Overlord plan took place. Hodges' First Army was to continue the swing eastward, and Patton's Third Army, leaving Brittany to the VIII Corps advanced toward Le Mans. The Allies quickly implemented the new plan but late on August 6th a powerful German Counterattack at Mortain forced a reconsideration. The 20th Division (VIII Corps) caught the full force of the blow and reeled backward, but Bradley quickly stopped two of Patton's divisions in the area, and adding two more from the First Army, reinforced the 30th Infantry Division. (see Editors Note 9 below).
In Third Army VIII Corps area, planned attack on Dinan is canceled and 6th Armored Division continues toward Brest instead. Advancing though night 4-5, 6th Armored Division reaches vicinity of Carhaix, which supporting FFI forces report strongly held. TF A and elements of 83rd Infantry Division reach enemy stronghold of St Malo, where prolonged struggle ensues. Rennes falls to 13th Infantry, 8th Infantry Division, 4th Armored Division is driving toward Vannes.
In the 563rd Company A, FDP1,and GO1 and GO4 moved to a loca- tion near Ardevon about 4 miles north of Pontorson. LW1 stayed in position at Juborg for backup coverage. GO1 moved Post Able to St Germaine, Post Baker to Cumburg, Post Charley to Clayes, Post Dog to Becherel and Post Fox to Littre. GO4 moved Post Sugar to Romange, Post Tare to St. James, Post Uncle to Troyes, Post Uncle to Montangen, Post Victor to Montangen and Post William to Longsols. These location's were the sites where Company A earned a Presidential Citation for their part in the devastating fighter bomber action on the German Seventh Army and reduction of St. Malo port. This FDP1 location was a very good radar site because they could look east, west and south and fighter-bomber sorties were being run in all these directions and vectored in by the FDP! controllers.
[Editors Note 9--- At this time the provisional 19th TCG was set up under the 100th Fighter Wing with Col. Don Mayhue as commanding officer and Major Nash was named Senior Controller. Personnel came from the 53rd SAW Bn, the 312th and 316th FC Squadrons. The TCC was first set up near Rennes on 8 August. From Aug 1 to 8 The TCC responsibilities were handled by Company A by the FDP1 Informatin center, some radio and D/F borrowed from the 312 FCS and extra controllers. Security was provided by Company A GO1 Ground Observer platoon reinforced by Headquarters GO4 Ground Observer Platoon who were attached to Company for the operation.]
GO4 platoon had been recently assigned to the 563rd and was attached to Company A for this operation. Company A was commanded by Capt. Thomas J. Slattery. GO1 Ground Observer Platoon was commanded by Lt. Lawrence Keefer and GO4 Ground Observer Platoon was commanded by Lt. Jimmie Duncan. Platoon Ground observer Platoons are attached as a team to the Company where they will function for a given operation. Lt. Will McAdam commanded the FDP radar platoon and Lt. John Thomason commanded LW1 Light Radar. FDP1 information center (IC) functioned as the TCC (Tactical Control Center) in addition to their mission of FDP (Forward Director Post) and reported directly into the XIX TAC Command Center. It is normal for the attached Ground Observer nets, the LW radar and the FDP radar to report to the FDP information center where the information is filtered by the FDP filter Officer and used by the FDP controllers and also reported back to the TCC. At this time the 19th TCC had not as yet been formed. Ground observer posts supporting FDP1 moved in on 4 August and included Company A GO1 platoon with Headquarters Company GO4 Platoon attached. The ground observer posts were located as follows:
GO1 GO4
GO Post Location GO Post Location

Able Germaine Sugar Romange
Baker Cumburg Tare St. James
Charley Claynes Uncle Troyes
Dog Becherel Victor Montangen
Fox Lirttre William Longsols
Post Victor (GO4) reported they had a shootout with a group of Germans in a farmhouse. The Germans disabled their guns or threw away the parts. Later on the men of Post Victor men were going over the remains of a German payroll in a crashed airplane. The action of Company A can best be described by quoting the Battle Honors issued By Maj. Gen. Vandenberg, Commanding General of the Ninth Air Force and published on later on November 28th, 1944.
"General Orders Number 254>
Battle Honor
1. under the Provisions of Section IV, Circular Number 333, WD, 1943, the following named unit of the ninth Air Force are cited for outstanding performance of duty in action against the enemy from 3 to 8 August 1944. During this period the members of Company A, 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion distinguished themselves by extraordinary heroism in the face of the enemy when, after having been charged with the mission of establishing a forward Battalion FDP in the Mont St. Michael area, the company found itself in hotly contested territory, under fire from enemy artillery and constantly harassed by enemy scouting parties and snipers. Although the company was not equipped or prepared adequately to meet opposition of this nature, the members of the unit nevertheless so located its Light Warning and Ground Observation Posts that the company was immediately able to furnish radio control to aircraft in the area, directing them to targets of opportunity and furnishing early warning of enemy aerial and ground activity to Air Corps and Anti Aircraft Artilleryunits in the area, as well as serving as a relay point for many signal activities in the sector after existing land lines had been destroyed through enemy action. Throughout this period, the fortitude, spirit and improvision, and high Esprit de Corps evidenced by the members of Company resulted in the rendition of distinguished service to the Armed Forces during an important phase of the campaign in northern France."