Paulus flanks at Stalingrad

Who had operational control over the Rumanian formations on Paulus flanks at Stalingrad? Was he ordered to place the Rumanians there or was it his own decision?

Cheers,
Daniel

 

I will have to confirm about operational control but I know he was forced to have them there. On a conference with Hitler, he submitted a request to have more reinforcements to support his flanks so he could to make faster progress towards Stalingrad. This was after Hitler made an inquiry as to 6th Armee's slow advance. After he received those, He showed minimal concern whilest his divisional commanders showed great concern.

[ 10. February 2004, 02:54 PM: Message edited by: PzJgr ]

 

At least in theory they were under command of Army Group 'B' headquarters of colonel general Maximilian von Weichs, and with that I am talking about the III and IV Romanian armies. But I think in the immediate operational way they might have been under the command, the IV Romanian Army, north of Stalingrad, under the VI German Army Headquarters and the III Romanian, south of the city under the IV Panzer Army headquarters respectively.

And of course, on November 23rd 1942, when the Soviet pincers finally closed, the broken pieces of Romanian III and IV armies, German IV Panzer and VI armies went all under command of general Paulus.

And talking about who decided to use the Romanian troops in the flanks, it was Hitler. He ordered all the forces of VI and IV Panzer armies to concentrate in the capture of the city and refused to use reserves to guard the flanks. That is why all the northern flank was composed of formations of "little offensive value" —Hungarian II, Italian VIII and Romanian III and IV armies— because German units were too busy attacking.

Generals Halder —before his dismissal—, Zeitzler, Von Weichs, Von Kleist, Paulus, etc. all warned the OKW of the dangerous position the VI Army would face at Stalingrad and adviced to defend the flank strongly but the problem was that at the time there were not enough units to capture the city and defend the flanks at the same time.

When the final assault on the city failed in early November 1942, Hitler finally authorised Paulus to withdraw some Panzer and motorised divisions to the rear to be used as mobile reserves. Infantry divisions were also re-deployed to rest and re-fit, but all these forces were so weak because of the brutal fighting in the city that they had little effect.

The perfect example is that the III Romanian Army's only mobile reserve was a German motorised division which was down to 50% of its equipment and personnel.

 

Not that it would have mattered in the long run for the battle of Stalingrad but interesting.

--------------

On 19 November 1942, the Soviet Southwestern Front attacked the Romanian 3rd Army and, despite pockets of determined resistance, smashed through and streamed deep into the Romanian rear areas. Heims’ corps counterattacked but, instead of attacking en masse, he received orders to divert the Romanian 1st Armored Division while it was already on the move. Heims’ counterattack was thus dislocated from the start...

http://www.specialcamp11.fsnet.co.uk/Generalleutnant%20Ferdinand%20Heim.htm

 

Keeping the Soviet armies totally behind Volga would have made the Stalingrad pocket impossible. However the Germans never managed that and Russian troops were able to send troops over Volga to make the surrounding of Stalingrad. Note the Volga leaving the Red Army able to have troops to attack Stalingrad.

 

Just for info notice the northern sector Soviet pincers which were on the western side of Volga. The Red Army was able to bring reinforcements on land and did not need to cross the Volga first.