MEDITERRANEAN WAR AT SEA Strategic Campaign Analysis

Hello and welcome................
My name is B5N2Kate, and I live in Darwin, Australia....
I have a burgeoning interest in WW2, and in the Maritime aspect of it in particular, and the Submarine campaigns of this war specifically....
Tonight, I'm going to post an article that originally appeared in an American Wargamers magazine, "Strategy and Tactics" issue No. 26 Mar-Aprl 1971. This article covered the Mediterranean War at Sea, and as we shall see, the conclusions arrived at, by not only the author but myself as well, are astounding...My notes are in brackets in the text itself or at the bottom of the page, and will be indicated with asterisks***.

So sit back with a cup of coffee, and join me as we take a look at the Southern Front!..............On with The Show!!!

THE MEDITERRANEAN WAR AT SEA.........by ALBERT A. NOFI with expansive notes in by B5N2Kate (as indicated by ***asterisks)

Introduction
Like many other campaigns in World War 2, the campaign in North Africa ultimately depended upon sea power.. For both sides every man, every bullet, every ounce of fuel, every vehicle came across the sea. If either side had been able to muster sufficient sea and air strength to gain control of the Mediterranean the fighting in the Western Desert would have been anti-climactic........a mere mopping up of isolated forces.......
That niether side was in fact able to achieve this made the desert fighting necessary. At sea, niether Britain nor Italy was able to totally deny the central Mediterranean to the other
For the British, this would have forced them to operate under severe handicaps.......
For the Italians, it would have spelt DOOM

LA REGIA MARINA
Italian naval thought had accepted the theory of 'command of the sea', but had also realistically assumed that Italy was not likely to ever achieve the material superiority which such a philosophy necessitated. Italy had planned for many years for war with FRANCE, and Italian strategists had recognized the inherent , and unlikely to change, quantative superiority of the French fleet over the Italian fleet. Though Italian ships were highly innovative in design, and by no means less efficient than those of France, there were simply not enough of them.....
Nor would there ever be........
Thus, Italy settled upon what may be termed a "Fabian" strategy. In effect, the Regia Marina saw it's role as that of a "fleet in being". A strong standing force, able to continuously dispute control of the Central Mediterranean, if unlikely to ever sieze that control. Major clashes were to be avoided, but every effort would be made to cut away at France's material edge. At all times the enemy's right of passage was to be disputed. Italy would be satisfied with being able to use the seas when she wanted to.
If unable to take on France in a hammer-blow naval war, then Italy was still less able to do so with Britain. So, the strategy evolved for use against the "old enemy", France, became that to be used against the new enemy..... Britain.
Italy entered WW2 on June 10th 1940, after delaying such entrance for a time at the specific request of Adolf Hitler. At the time, it appeared that the Anglo-French coalition would collapse within a few weeks or months. 'Officially' the war was to be a short one, something not questioned in a Facist state. This attitude prevented the Regia Marina from taking the long view of the impending struggle, not that it was consulted in the war decision, anyway. A major portion of the fleet was in 'reserve' status......only 2 of 8 battleships were off the stocks of constructor's or reconstructor's yards. Major new construction programs still had years to run, and the naval air-arm was virtually non-existent.
Since the war WAS to be a short one, the Regia Marina was given an essentially defensive role. Indeed, Italy is probably the only nation in history to wage an agressive war by immediately going over to the defensive. Not even the very large submarine forces were given free reign!

This assumption in mid-1940 of a 'short-war' would plague the Regia Marina's operations for the next three years.

In material terms, the Regia Marina was the 5th largest navy in the world, after Britain, the U.S., Japan and France. Most importantly, Italy possessed the largest submarine force in the world. All the ships were efficient, well protected and speedy. Most were relatively new. Indeed, ships kept coming off the stocks through much of the war. The principal deficiencies were in naval air power.....and FUEL RESERVES.
The Regia Marina lacked anything more than a rudimentary naval air-arm, which comprised some 150 pilots, chiefly observers. Navy-Air Force co-operation was excreable, to say the least, and no immediate solution was to be had. Of the 5 major sea powers, Italy alone lacked aircraft carriers or plans to build any. The problem was NOT a lack of 'air-minedness', but rather, an excess of it!. The Regia Marina believed that Italy, with her many islands and colonies, was an unsinkable aircraft carrier from which aircraft could be sent to operate in virtually every corner of the Mediterranean. This was, technically true: Italian aircraft could reach most of the 'Med' from land bases. However, Italian aircraft could not always be where the action was on time, except in a few well planned instances. The few hours it took for messages to run between a beleagured squadron, then Supermarina (Naval GHQ), to SuperAerea (Air GHQ), then back to an operational squadron.......in order to get planes in the air.....all this was usually enough for the enemy to wreak his will and be away!
That the lack of aircraft carriers was severely felt is demonstrated by the fact that a pair of liners were taken in hand for conversion, and one (**The AQUILA), was virtually ready for sea on 8th September 1943, Italian Armistice Day.
Perhaps the most vital element militating against effective Italian participation in the naval struggle was the fuel situation. For full operational efficiency the Regia Marina estimated that it needed 200,000 tons of fuel per month, in fact, topping off the fuel tanks of all operational naval units required some 50,000 tons, so it appears the estimate was a fairly accurate one, particularly when it is noted that the average monthly fuel consumption for the entire 28 months of the war ran to over 80,000 tons, exclusive of convoy and minor unit consumption, and including the very curtailed operations of late 1942 and early 1943. When the war began there was sufficient fuel for about nine months of operations. At no time during the war was this reserve maintained and at one point, April 1942, only some 14,000 tons were available, which represented the residue in fuel storage tanks all over Italy. Throughout the war, operations had to be postponed or cancelled due to lack of fuel. In June 1942, only destroyers and smaller craft were available to take on a particularly important and heavily protected British convoy, there being insufficient fuel for the larger elements.
This fuel shortage was due partially to mismanagement on the part of the Italian government, but primarily to a blatant German refusal to supply fuel in the needed quantities. Admiral Weichold, Kreigsmarine Liason Officer with the Regia Marina, repeatedly asked for fuel to be shipped from Germany, and several agreements were worked out.....yet they were rarely kept by the Germans. Thus, during the second quarter of 1941, the Regia Marina revieved barely 38,000 tons of fuel at a time when the pre-war fuel reserve was virtually exhausted. German shipments of fuel to Italy never reached 50% of the agreed upon figures, which were themselves based upon absurd reductions in the minimum operational requirements. At one point, again in April 1941, the limit of 30,000 tons per month (or 15% of optimum) was set, which in effect meant that vessels had to operate with what they had in their tanks and not expect more than minimal resupply!
German non-cooperation in this matter is probably more than a little the fault of the obsession the High Command had with 'Ost-Front', and al so Rommel's continuous attacks upon the Regia Marina for it's "inefficiency" in escorting naval convoys to Africa!Though an ally protecting a common interest, the Regia Marina had to 'sweat' for every ounce of fuel oil recieved from Germany!......A truly remarkable situation...
One area where the Regia Marina held a significant advantage over everyone else was in the field of special naval attack forces; 'frogmen', 'human torpedoes', assault boats and so forth. Such methods had been pioneered by the Regia Marina in World War I, and they were unquestionably the leaders in this cheap but highly effective approach to the problems of naval warfare. These teams were to prove the Regia Marina's secret weapon during the war, though they were insufficient of themselves to win the war singlehandedly. They could, of course, influence events at critical junctures.

All in all the Regia Marina was not ideally equipped and prepared for war with Britain. Though some ships and crews were of excellent quality, the general numerical inferority, the lack of adequate naval air arm, the fuel situation, and the long held feeling that Britain was a friend and not an enemy at all......all of these factors militated against an effective showing. For all that, however, the performance of the Regia Marina was not unpraiseworthy, particularly in the case of the escort forces and the special naval assault forces.

THE ROYAL NAVY
If the Italians were ill-prepared for the coming conflict, then the status of the Royal Navy might best be termed "half-ready". In spirit and aggressiveness there can be no question that the Royal Navy was second to none. Centuries of dominance of the sea had helped to build a spirit in which aggressiveness was second nature. In material terms, however, the Royal Navy was less than fully prepared.......
Materially, of course, the ships and men were second to none in virtually every category. And, into the bargain, Britain had a new weapon which permitted their ships to detect the enemy long before they could do likewise:....RADAR. The fact that there existed the Fleet Air Arm was also of extreme importance, even if the Royal Air Force HAD managed to keep this vital service in subjugation for long years. Though tiny and relatively unsophisticated when compared to Japanese or American naval air arms, the Fleet Air Arm was an actual fact which could and did develop into an effective, agressive force during the war.
Britain did not seek, nor desire, a Mediterranean war, though British diplomacy did little to avoid it. When war did come, however, the Royal Navy saw but one strategy.......
To seek out the enemy and destroy him wherever and whenever possible.....
As a result, the Royal Navy would often sortie into the dangerous waters of the Central Mediterranean for no other reason than to keep the Regia Marina 'off balance' and to remind the world that Brittania still "ruled the waves". (curiously, this did not always work out as expected, and the expected reaction forces often did not materialize, much to the disappointment of His Majesty's seamen). This situation was, of course, partially due to the poor quality of Italian aerial recon, linked to their lack of radar. Also, the increasing efficiency of the British Fleet Air Arm made life difficult further still.
A number of major sorties went un-noticed........
This aggressive strategy, capitalizing as it did upon the known outlines of the basic Italian strategy, was very important to the conduct of the western desert fighting.. Control of the Mediterranean was the key element insofar as the Axis forces were concerned-although Mussolini, Weichold and others, wore themselves out trying to convince Hitler and OKW of this- .....and the Royal Navy aimed at nothing less than total mastery of the sea.......
The converse of this, that the Mediterranean was equally vital to the British forces operating in Africa was NOT true.....
Most British and Allied supplies went the long route, via the Cape of Good Hope, into the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and finally Egypt. Only on rare occasions was a convoy forced to run the gauntlet between Gibraltar and Alexandria, and this was usually to support the beleaguered Malta garrison, or in times of great desperation in the desert, such as the TIGER convoy of mid-1941 to carry vital supplies rapidly to the Eighth Army.
Why, then, in view of this aggressive spirit and sound strategy possessed by the Royal Navy......Why was it unable to deny the Regia Marina use of the Central Mediterranean....which it did, in fact, fail to do despite MASSIVE Allied propaganda campaigns to the contrary....until the Fall of Tunis in 1943?....Basically, for three reasons...
a/ For the Royal Navy, the Mediterranean was but one theater of many. For the Italians, it was the only theater.
b/ The Regia Marina successfully maintained a 'fleet-in-being' status, and deliberately avoided major actions, and
c/ Axis airpower, operating from bases in Italy, Greece, Tunisia and Libya were able to cover the entire region, if inefficiently.
Undoubtedly, the British strategy was the correct Allied solution to the problem, much as the Italian strategy was correct for them. However, the lack of sufficient resources to bring it off prevented fulfillment of this strategy. This, in turn, made the ground fighting in North Africa of vital importance.

THE CONVOY BATTLES
Lacking the covenience of a detour such as the Allies possessed in the Cape of Good Hope, the Axis forces in Africa depended almost entirely upon convoy routes between North Africa and Italy for their reinforcements and supplies.....

In addition to the differing importance the Central Mediterranean held for each side, there was a basic philosophical difference between the Allied (chiefly British) and Axis (chiefly Italian) approach to the problem. The Italians believed that a large number of very small convoys would be more efficient than a few very large ones. It was held that the smaller convoy would be less likely to be detected and would be easier to defend with one or two escorts. In addition, it was well known that the port facilities in Libya were limited, and that Tobruk, the port closest to the fighting, was frequently subject to air-raids. It would be impractical to have more than a minimum of shipping there at any one time.

As a result some 1,210 convoys were sent to Libya during the Western Desert fighting. These comprised 2,249 cargo ships of 500 tons or moreand 1,913 escorts. Thus, the average convoy contained 1.7 cargo ships carrying 170.5 men, and 1,855.7 tons of supplies, escorted by 1.5 warships, usually destroyers., destroyer escorts, or motor torpedo boats. Of course, in reality, a number of vital cargoes went through heavily escorted, while there were times when vessels could go in small groups without escort. Still, the basic point is clear: the Italians emphasized the 'small' convoy.
In the event, as experience in the Battle of the Atlantic proved, they were wrong.

The cost of this error was enormous. Roughly 44% of Italy's merchant tonnage was lost through December of 1942, including all vessels of 500 tons and above available to Italy during the war, roughly 173% of the tonnage available on June 10 1940. Most of the losses occurred on the Libyan route, although exact figures are unobtainable. The loss in the chief escort types (DDs, DEs, MTBs) comprise fully 67.8% of the total surface combat vessels lost to Allied military action. In addition, a large number of MTBs and auxiliary types were lost on this duty.
Fortunately for the Axis these staggering losses were relatively ineffective........
Some 2,345,381 tons of cargo were loaded in Italian ships for shipment to Libya during the war. Of this total, and in spite of often heavy losses in escorts, only 14% or 315,426 tons were actually lost. Some 206,402 men were embarked in Italian vessels, often warships, for transport to Africa, of whom 17,204or 8.5% failed to arrive at their destination. A large proportion of this 17,204 were in fact rescued, and eventually reached the front anyway. It is of course, important to note these figures do not include men and material transported in German controlled vessels, nor do they reflect the limited, but useful German airlift capability. (***It also makes Rommel's protests to Hitler and OKW about "Italian inefficiency" sound very hollow indeed!...)
The ratio of escort losses to cargo ship losses (1:4.5) is very enlightening and an important datum towards an understanding of why such a large proportion of material and men reached Africa unscathed, even though the Central Mediterranean was 'hot' for Axis vessels. The answer lies in the psychological make up of the Italain sailor and the British seamen and airmen. Usually, when a British warship or airplane encountered a convoy it invariably went for the escorts. This was probably the result of the RNs aggressive theories of naval warfare and of the Royal Air Force's desire to win the war singlehandedly. Killing escorts was an important contribution to the war effort.........
But impeding the flow of supplies to Rommel was more so.
As a result of this attitude, the usual outcome was this.......As soon as the attacking British aircraft or warships were sighted, the Italian convoy commanders would order up their escorts and scatter the cargo ships.....the escorts would put up a fight, and the British would invariably take the 'bait' and go after the escorts. .............. They were almost always sunk after a ferocious running fight, which usually permitted most of the cargo vessels, though not all, to make their escape. This tenacity often surprised British commanders, who had been nourished on a considerable amount of propaganda to the contrary about the fighting qualities of the Regia Marina.
The net result was that the bulk of material and manpower consigned to North Africa was in fact reaching it's destination.
Axis seamen, both Italian and German, could not be responsible for what happened to it after it reached the theater of war.
To look briefly at the other side, the Allied convoy problem was essentially one of getting material to MALTA whenever necessary. The so called "Life-Line of the British Empire", ran not through the Mediterranean....but around Africa. As already noted, only rarely was there a need to run a convoy from the 'Rock' to 'Alex'.
Malta, however, was a different story...................

MALTA: THE CRUCIBLE
Perhaps the single most important strategic position in the entire Hitlerian war was the tiny island of Malta. Certainly it was for the North African Campaign.

Control of Malta does not automatically imply control of the Central Mediterranean, but it helps. Malta's location is emminently suitable for hindering traffic by sea and air between Italy and Libya or between Eastern and Western basins of the Mediterranean. By the same token, of course, that location makes Malta a tempting and easily attainable target. Thus, the small island underwent heavy siege during 1940-1943, until Libya had fallen into Allied hands and the embattled garrison could be readily resupplied again. Throughout the North African Campaign, this siege exercised a significant and continuing influence.
The defence of the island proved an expensive proposition for Britain, but one that was inevitable and freely undertaken. A major portion of Britain's shipping losses in the Mediterranean were directly linked to the problem of supplying Malta. The Island suffered something of the order of 2,000 air raids during the siege (***Until Stalingrad, it was the most bombed place on earth!....). This works out to about 2 per day for three years. Some 30,000 British military personnel held the island and nearby Gozo. Of these, about half were organized into combat formations, totalling four brigades by mid-1942, the most critical period.
A basic problem in the defence of the island was air power and the limited air resources. Periodically, these were resupplied from Gibraltar. Standard method was to load fighters on a carrier and sortie towards Malta. When the pressure from Axis air and Italian naval units became too great, the carrier would launch the fighters and speed for safety. At one point, the situation was so desperate that the USS WASP was borrowed for this purpose, as another fast minelayer was loaded with vital supplies to make the trip alone to Valletta Harbor.
The potentially major problems in the defence of the island were the anticipated Axis invasion and the fact that many Maltese, though by no means the majority of them, were not overly enthusiastic about the British presence on the island. Indeed, a number of Maltese were engaged in espionage and sabotage for the Axis.(***see note below)

All this, of course, brings us to the basic question of WHY the Axis did not actually invade Malta. Certainly the capture of the place would have greatly eased the supply run to North Africa and, at the same time, would have been a telling blow to Allied morale.

Plans for the invason of Malta were well in hand during the early part of 1942. Two parachute divisions, one German, and one German trained Italian unit (**The FOLGORE Division...). These parachute units were to drop on the island in conjunction with an Italian amphibious assault in the southern portion of the island, aimed at capturing an airbase(***the same plan used by General Kurt Student at Crete, commanding officer of the German Division to be involved and planner of the operation, code named HERCULES....). Altogether, half a dozen divisions were to take part, though the initial assault was to be made by 32,000 men supported by about 1,300 Italo-German aircraft. Local air and naval superiority was assured and the island was expected to fall quickly.
In preparation for the attack, the Luftwaffe transferred Fleigerkorps X to Sicily (***ABLEY lead by Luftwaffe Field Marshal "Smiling" Albert Kesselring....).
They began systematic reduction of the island's defences from the air......
Then, as one Italian officer put it, the "fatal error"occurred......
Even as plans were moving foward, Rommel was preparing to break out of the 'Gazala Position'. He requested the use of the Fleigerkorps X for 15 days to support him until he reached his objective, the Libyan-Egyptian Frontier. Altogether, three weeks would be lost, an Fleigerkorps X was expected to return to it's task over Malta by mid-July 1942.Hitler agreed to Rommel's request over the protests of most naval advisors, though not of the Army.
Rommel, of course, did not stop upon reaching his objective but....... lured by the pyramids and the apparent rout of the Eighth Army, pressed onto the Alamein Line, where he was halted (***By British General Sir Claude Auckinleck....) in hard fighting in August (**this Battle of 1st Alamein was undoubtably the most decisve battle fought on land in the desert war thus far....). Fleigerkorps X were by then too heavily involved and too necessary to the support of the ground operations to be returned to Malta. The troops earmarked for the landing, both Italian and German, turned up as replacements and reinforcements at El Alamein......
Malta.......................remained BRITISH

Thus was the Axis only chance to gain Malta, and with it control of the Central Mediterranean THROWN TO THE WINDS.........***
...........To the unquestioned benefit of us all.

***From B5N2Kate.......Just to expand on this a little..The Italian 'Folgore' Division, earmarked for HERCULES, has been mentioned everywhere as the most motivated and highly trained unit in the Italian armed services. German units included Colonel Ramcke's Brigade of seasoned veterans, and Colonel von Der Heydte's unit, slated for the same type of rear area drop that this same unit had to cancel just before the Battle of the Bulge. There is no argument that Malta would have been a tough fight, but these veteran professionals would, most likely, have seen the operation through to completion, as they did at Crete, despite large losses. Erwin Rommel, indeed, had a lot to answer for.
Furthermore, Field Marshal Gerd von Runestedt is on record describing Rommel as,
"Nothing more than a good divisional general."
Operation HERCULES was cancelled for no better reason than to pull Rommel's rear end out of the fire. Rommel could neither break free from nor advance after the 'Gazala Position' WITHOUT the help of the Luftwaffe. This is something that Rommel had nobody to blame for but himself. The 'Desert Fox' was famous for outrunning supplies in a theater of war where supply was king. How many other times were Rommels wishes given precedence on Hitler's authority, and over the protests of senior advisors and office holders?...And this particular incident cost Rommel the campaign!
Analyze Rommels performance in Normandy with THAT in mind!.............
AND from Falschirmjaeger General Kurt Student, as described in B.H. Liddel Hart's "The Other Side of the Hill", page 243.......
"I hoped to carry out the plan (Hercules) not later than August- it depended on suitable weather- and I spent some months in Rome preparing it. In June I was summoned to Hitler's headquarters for the final conference on the operation. Unfortunately, the day before I got there, Hitler had seen General Cruwell , who was just back from North Africa, and had given a very unfavourable account of the state of the Italian forces and their morale. Hitler at once took alarm. He felt that if the British Fleet appeared on the scene all the Italian ships would bolt for their home ports- and leave the German airborne forces stranded. He decided to abandon the plan of attacking Malta"

*** Conflicting source on the state of the garrison and people of Malta...........
"Fortress Malta was tough but it faced many problems too. First, in consideration of the civilian population, Lord Gort, (in command from 7 May 1942), would have to consider capitulation when food and water supplies ran low as Percival did earlier at Singapore (15 feb 1942). The equivalent of four reinforced brigades defended the island, but during the spring and summer of 1942 they had become weary, were hungry and malnourished, lost their infantry training edge, and were even split up to provide labour details to remove bomb damage. In some photographs, even the uniforms were in tatters. Another problem was that at times, the AA guns fell silent as sufficient stocks of ammunition had to be available in event of invasion. Malta was also besieged psychologically. Every soldier and civilian watched the convoys and after 22 months of this behaviour a debilitating siege mentality had taken hold. Many were anxious for the Axis to invade just to get the agony over with. On the other hand, the siege united the Maltese people with the result that there were no saboteurs or collaborators........".....Vance Von Borries "The General" Magazine, (Vol 15 no. 3, page 14)

So we can see that the atmosphere in Malta was more than a little shady during the siege. No wonder that the sources conflict on this point!.......... If I was spying for the Axis at this particular stage of Malta's long history, I wouldn't tell anyone either!....***)




So.....that ends this submission for your reading pleasure.....Hope you enjoyed!!!!!

See you again real soon!

B5N2Kate

 

If any one reading this has a comment, wants to talk about the issues raised, or simply wishes to say hello, fell free to leave a post!

All comments, good, bad, or indifferent are most welcome!

B5N2Kate

 

Hmmm... Italian Navy is one of my specialties =)....

Grrrr.. 40 minutes writing that post and it got blipped =(. Im going to bed

Basic gist is that if the mediterranean was a puddle for the italian Airforce and they were the world leaders in torpedo design - why didnt they have any torpedo bombers till 8-40 ( Mickey rigged S79s ) or torpedo squadrons till 12-40 ? And in the same sense why were they so behind in dive bombers ? Seems like if the Air Force promised to cover the the puddle they woulda built a couple planes that could actually sink a ship rather than fly over them.

 

I think there is a factor or two to consider..........

German specialisation in Divebombing ships was more an accidental discovery than anything else.....The JU-87 was developed specifically in response to experiance in ground support for the ARMY, from their knowledge of operations in the Spanish civil War...The fact that it also made a great anti-shipping weapon was, in my opinion, a discovery made as a matter of circumstance. I don't think the Kreigsmarine thought to far ahead about it's likely role in a large war, but the Stuka was THERE, and it's adaptaion as an anti-shipping weapon came from a NEED for it, rather than as a result of any specific planning. The same may well be said of the Regia Marina, who had not put much thought into the subject at all, and, proud of their aerial achievements during the inter war period as they were, found themselves jury-rigging their own aircraft when the time came, rather than designing something from scratch. The fact that Italian Air policy was so outdated was, I'm sure, not well understood even by Italo Balbo. Balbo was an inter-war pioneer, and as vain as Mussolini in matters of Air force policy; the Italians attempted to solve their own problems with their own equipment, and reluctanly, were forced to re-equip with more modern German designs when it became obvious to a blind man that their so-called modernism was , in fact, much behind the time.....

The French Air-force, once a world leader in many aspects of aviation, suffered from this "nationalistic pride" to an even greater degree......

The Italians learnt different lessons from the spanish civil war, and applied them with an Italian logic that differed enormously from the more practical Germans, the innovative British, or a Russian Air Force affected by purging and the same nationalism that set them to solving problems in "their own manner". The Italian "style" of doing things was simply behind the state of the art when it came to new designs......loath to admit that their world beating and record breaking efforts in the 20s an 30s would not bear friut in a manner that assisted their operations.....In any case, Italian industry was not exactly equipped to deal with problems at a wartime pace of change, so large requests for more modern aircraft from Germany would seem to have been delayed for longer than might have been the case. Nor did Italy have the raw materials to prosecute a long war, so research, design and development would have taken a back seat to the needs of the moment.

NOBODY used DIVEBOMBERS in quite the same way as the Germans.....so Italian designers were straight-jacketed by their own foolish 'pride".

 

I like and admire Italian Military history, too!!........The Italians definately had their own "style".......much as they do today in matters more civilized......

Benito's attempts to restart the Roman Empire were looked at by ordinary Italians with more than a little rolling of their eyes.......

 

With a pure respect for Italian common people, I like them.
But even EU needs their own clown, like Adolf needed one too...

 

Ahhh Higge....

Never forget that it was BENITO MUSSOLINI that EVERY FASCIST was COPYING...

FASCIST comes from a LATIN word.....FASCI...it was the old Roman Rod of office that the Emperor held in his hand as a symbol of his power...if you look at the Italian Air Force symbol on the sircraft, you will see THREE FASCIs, side by side......

Mussolini was seen to be all things and by all people....both ADMIRED and despised....at one point in his career as a journalist, he was called "The Italian LENIN"!!!!! He was the editor of a mainly communist newpaper called "Il Popo d'Italia" (People of Italy).....When WWONE arrived, he initially wnated to side with GERMANY as a MARXIST, but reversed his tune overnight....

A lot of his ideas that became Fascism were from an Italian National hero called GABRIELLE D'ANNUNZIO, (campaigner for Italian soverignity over the Austrian city of TRIESTE).....

MUCH of Adolf Hitlers ideas about how to run a political party came from BENITO MUSSOLINI

 

You are right, tho Hitler made Mussolini look like a fool, he was his marionette.

And what did they get? Only bad reputation everywhere, and those steps are still present, look at Italia now, or Russia... People are smiling at them.

Sorry, this went a bit too political, better stop now

 

You ain't seen political yet - he calls Balbo a pioneer again I'm fixing to rock his world. Balbo made Sepp Dietrich look like Gustavus Adolphus. The Italian Fascist party was very unique - It was a gang of street thugs hired by the Italian Business interests to protect their property and profits from the communists. It was very clear in Italy who was in charge and he wasn't named Mussolini. Balbo in particular was a petty criminal with a sadistic bent who ran a gang named after a drink they chugged at their local bar. He performed very well in his repression of the local communists - some of whom were made to disappear and he even found enough leisure time to make other disappear - for a price. He was also a very clever man. The Italian Air Force under Balbo was a strictly for profit arrangement - Balbo wasn't a soldier nor an airman, was uneducated and corrupt. But Balbo's arm was very long and crossing him could be fatal. He was beyond the control of the military leaders as well as Mussolini. But then again thats a moot point due to his "Accident" almost immediately after the Italians joined the war. Industry was the leader of Italy - Not Mussolini. And arms and weapons purchases were controlled by the manufacturers not the military planners. There wasn't a military leader in sight emulating Mussolini. THe right wing was in existence long before him - Franco and the Falange made no attempt to Imitate him, Hitler absolutely had no reason to do so - The reason for Hitlers rise in power was due however to the support of Heavy Industry that felt they could control Hitler in the same way Italian business pulled Mussolinis leash. Fascism and National Socialism not even being remote cousins and Falangism being quasi religious in nature as it became mixed with Carlism. Hungarian Fascism was much closer to the the Spanish Role but it had a different developemental path. THe Catholic based Fascist movements conflicting with the fanatically anti-Fascist conservatism of Pious XI. Germany was an interesting case because of her Catholic/Protestant nature, compared to the outright Catholicism of Italy, Spain, Portugal, Hungary, Romania etc.. the Middle East dictatorships were Religious/Fascist in nature as well and m pretty sure Mussolini wasn't the Shah's role Model. Mussolini was a hired puppy and his hands were tied from day 1.

 

Divebombing theory began in WWI - By 1916 Junkers was workingon designs for the worlds first purpose built Divebomber - the Junkers K47. The Plane first flew in March, 1928 and was primarily used by China. Of 14 Planes 12 were used by China and 2 went to Lipetsk, Russia as part of Germany's secret training agreement. The decison to Build Divebombers was made in 1933 and the 2 Models: Junkers K47 and Heinkel Hs123 were chosen for further Developement. By 1935 the K47 had devolved into the Ju-87. PRODUCTION BEGINNING IN 1937. Contrary to the myth of the Stuka performing a large role in the Spanish civil war there was only 1 Plane present during 1937 - a single Ju-87A0 usd at Bilbao. From Janury to October 3 JU-87A1s arrived and were used in an anti-shipping role until October, 1938. These were replaced by 5 Ju-87B1's by November which fought till the end of the conflict in the ground attack role. Another Stuka Myth of the Sirens screaming in Poland is also false - the Sirens weren't installed until just prior to the Invasion of France in 1940. The Stuka played a limited naval role in the Polish and Norwegian campaigns and although eormously succesful in ground attack role during the French campaign culminating in their massive but ultimately futile success in the Anti-Shipping role at Dunkirk were devastated in the Battle of Britain, being withdrawn from the conflict by Mid-August, 1940.

 

http://www.luftarchiv.de/

has some excellent photos. this is the arado AR 81 which beat the JU87 in tests and the HS 123 as well as photos showing the stukas development.

 

Lufthansa was formed in 1926 - The Day of the Eagle was close at hand. By 1927 the Germans were perfecting their new tactics at Lipetsk - the first Divebombers being Fokker DXIIIs fitted with bomb racks. The K47's poor air to air qualities ( and a major scandal between Junkers and the Fledgeling Luftwaffe ) caused the germans to scrap the design despite its excellent flying qualities. Let's look now at how German Doctrine was formed. First and foremost it was formed by Wever. Secondly the Germans had, during the first World War turned a corner in military study that no other army ( or Air Force ) in the world had yet to attain. They focused their Attention on the Military grey area between fighting and winning.

 

Nice post Got......what made Germany switch to close support in the first place?....Was it simply Army co-operation?....Or was it Hitlers view that the more bombers produced, the better, something that Goering stressed more than once,

"The Fuehrer does not ask me what type of bombers we have, merely "How many?"

 

Germany switched to close air support because Wever died. Germany was aware that their army was too small for a prolonged conflict and needed to decide any military issue rapidly, Being hamstrung by a lack of artillery and years of design restrictions kept the focus on troop support, THe developement of mobile warfare expanded this with the need to provide fire support to spearheads, mobile artillery being theoretical at this time.

 

Yes.....I remember a cartoon drawn by Udet.....it shows Goering at a woodworking bench, making model aeroplanes from wood and sweating....caption reads,

"And as the new day dawns, our man has created the Luftwaffe!"