Yamamoto, genius?

Don't know if this has been discussed much, but I wonder if Yamamoto's reputation for understanding naval aviation was as advanced as is believed. The key for me is his willingness to risk so much of his carrier force to eliminate the BB's at Pearl.

 

He was in a "damned if he did, damned if he didn't" situation. He didn't want a war with the U.S., but knew the only way to even remotely attain any of their goals was to knock the U.S. back on its heels for awhile, and try to consolidate Japan's hold on resources before American industrial strength worked up to full power.

They fully expected CV's to be at Pearl Harbor, and did come damned close to catching the Enterprise, who was due to be entering the harbor at the time of the attack. There's a "What If" for you. Think of the Enterprise being sunk on December 7th, and what that would have meant in the chain of events following the attack.

The Japanese by tradition and training always aimed for that knock out blow, so massing all their assets for the attack made sense. Yamamoto was directed to carry out the aims of his superiors with what was at hand, and let's be honest. In December 1941 the IJN was the most formidable fleet afloat. For Yamamoto, it like playing with a stacked deck in the beginning.

 

he used massed carrier aircraft to attack.......that was good strategy/use of the aviation...a lot of Americans never thought Japan would attack PH, so good strategy there......what's the adage ''he who risks nothing..."

 

Given the thoughts above from Gromit , something struck my mind but instead of searching on web I faster get answer here;

Many always believe the Japanese made a tactical/strategical mistake not to invade Hawaii, or at least to destroy all the oil/petrol tanks there. But I think I understand the thought behind it, as the Japanese wanted/hoped/believed that the US would give up their effectively colony Philippines as long as their culturally longer "occupied" Hawaiian islands are kept untouched (apart from pure military objects Naval harbour, military airfields).

But , in that light, I don't understand why his fleet that was looking for the US carriers didn't hang out around the Hawaiian islands as a form of blockade (to the carriers and in-flying aircraft/bombers from mainland, not for the civil cargo fleet) and searched the carriers around Hawaii for couple of weeks.
For sure that would have hampered the US build up even more, and more efficiently than the move (retreat further and return to) to the Midway islands

Why did Yamamoto's fleet had to go ? And why ALL of it ?
Philippines, Malaysia was already under attack from other japanese fleets.So no assistance required there. Also no need for defense of Japan itself. And there was enough ammunition & fuel in the fleet.

 

The Japanese could not linger around Hawaii for a large number of reasons.

1. The nearest Japanese bases were too far away.
2. The IJN was not very good at anti-submarine warfare, and the USN could still use Pearl Harbor as a sub base.
3. The Japanese lacked a substantial fleet train of supporting vessels which would have enabled the combat ships to remain at sea for a long time.
4. The Japanese did have sufficient land-based airpower (naval and army) to attack Malaya and the Phillippines but it was reasonable to expect that the British would send major naval forces to the East Indies, and so the carrier force was required for any campaign against the NEI.
5. Why all of the Combined Fleet? Because concentrating power is more effective than dispersing it. A weaker Japanese fleet might not have won such a quick and conclusive victory in the NEI. The Japanese got into trouble later when they dispersed the fleet excessively.

We seem to have several Yamamoto threads going. Shouldn't they be merged?

 

WRT, to Japanese shipping bottoms,
The problem would be greatly compounded by occupying Hawaii. By carrying troops and supplies to there new conquests, the merchantmen were pulling double duty ie. they were returning to Japan loaded with raw materials. Going all the way out to Hawaii, they merchantmen would be returning in ballast, carrying nothing.

WRT, the American submarines as an offensive force against the Japanese...This is very argumentative at best. The American submarine proved incapable of stopping the Philippine invasion, and the had plenty of chances to do so. Further, the successful American submarine campaign took quite some time to become effective. The Americans have not yet developed the tactics that made them effective, and their tactics of 41-42 tended to be on the very cautious side. Their torpedo problems had yet to be discovered, much less solved. And, if the Japanese had decided to invade Hawaii, the Americans may, or may not be able to use Pearl as a submarine base, that would depend on the Japanese and where they placed their bombs(Japanese bombers that hit Cavite on December 10th destroyed the submarine repair facilities, the torpedo overhaul shops, and some 233 Mark 14 torpedoes that were in storage or being overhauled).

 

Well, not all in ballast. Probably returning with sugar (lots of uses), and fruit. However, the distance just made it improbable.

 

Don't forget Pineapples...Hawaii has lots and lots and lots of Pineapples.(and I don't mean grenades)

 

very good...I spent 4 years there

 

Ah, makes sense, but I like bit more info:

1. That is only an issue when you want to sustain this distant blockade for indefinite times..but I would expect it not to be (objective = find the US carriers and/or make impossible for them to bunker in PH and/or for as long (4 weeks?) deny US bombers to reach PH).
2. I think you may be right of their fear for enemy subs is the major fear...however, is this "proven" ? Soon it turns out that allied subs were not effective (early 1942) and how could Japan sail out and venture these distances if they could not rely on their anti-sub defenses ? So I am mixed feelings about this point. It is a factor, but not decisive.
3. Like at 1. Fleets even in those days could stay at sea (patrolling) for probably few months , many weeks at least. As long as there is no island invasion/base support there is not such a logistics problem.
(though I read in wikipedia at PH : "and Nagumo's escorting destroyers lacked the fuel capacity for him to loiter long"...but that is the destroyer limited bunker capacity talking. With a fuelship in the fleet one could fill them up...but not in a battlezone so close to PH)

4. I suppose the Japanese were well capable to assess the weakness of the Dutch EI "fleet" and military and the disposition of the not so powerful british far east fleet. The jap fleet invading philippines were the ones to continue to the DEI east side when it was possible/time, and so did the Jap fleet harassing Malaysia/singapore move down to DEI west side on schedule.If anything, the worst to be expected is the fleet of the USA...the heart of which would be the two missing carriers.
5. on the wikipedia I find:
With the American Fleet largely neutralized at Pearl Harbor, Yamamoto's Combined Fleet turned to the task of executing the larger Japanese war plan devised by the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy General Staff. The First Air Fleet proceeded to make a circuit of the Pacific, striking American, Australian, Dutch and British installations from Wake Island to Australia to Ceylon in the Indian Ocean. The 11th Air Fleet caught the American 5th Air Force on the ground in the Philippines hours after Pearl Harbor, and then proceeded to sink the British Force "Z" (battleship HMS Prince of Wales and battlecruiser HMS Repulse) underway at sea.

This sounds as if Philippines and Malaysia peninsular east coast were not attacked before the arrival of his fleet from PH...which is not what I remembered.

See this map for instance...http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/MacArthur%20Reports/MacArthur%20V2%20P1/pic-76.jpg

and this http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/MacArthur%20Reports/MacArthur%20V2%20P1/pic-46.jpg

or this
http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/MacArthur%20Reports/MacArthur%20V2%20P1/pic-64.jpg


So what I understand to see is that the fleet attacking PH moved south to join the attacks on the Solomons (april 42) only to return (in major part ? to combine with other vessels?) to Midway in june 42.
If this is so, I think that loitering around hawaii for couple of weeks (and posing a major threat on PH, thus US reacting and moving resources to that area) would have been more efficient than this long haul to and from Solomons (where they meet other US carriers in a better prepared US fleet).

 

When you consider that the Midway operation used about 6 months worth of fuel alone and Japan only started the war with a 1 year reserve think what the fuel cost of an Hawaian invasion would amount to.

 

For the Japanese to sink the American carriers, they likely might have to stay for an indefinite period of time. To prevent the American carriers from fueling, they could destroy the harbor facilities and tank farms - shorter time frame, but requiring sustained operations drawing down ammunition and avgas supplies.

Still fuel would be a serious issue, and possibly aircraft ammunition supples.

It would be a factor, but as you say, not a decisive one. The Japanese were confident in their ASW, and the Americans were confident in their submarines, both would turn out to be wrong. Although one of the prime failures of Japanese ASW was that there were not enough escorts, but this would not be a problem for a major task force.

No, they could not...Where do you ever see the Japanese fleet operating independent of port resupply for months at a time during the entire Pacific War? Please, name them. Even the Americans lacked this capability until 1943-44.

Yes, Nagumo's destroyers were short of fuel, and this is one of the reasons given for Nagumo's retirement instead of a third strike. It also avoids the topic that the Japanese had to stuff barrels of fuel in all the spare spaces aboard the carriers Akagi, Hiryu, and Soryu, as well as the heavy cruisers Chikuma and Tone, to give them the "legs" to reach Pearl.

Also, in this regard, the Americans, at least, used their carriers and battleships to provide fuel for the destroyers, fueling them roughly every three to four days. This kept the destroyers with the fleet, but at the cost of decreasing the range of the carriers/battleships.

Further, I have seen no evidence as to a true Japanese UNREP capacity, not fuel, but ammunition and stores. I have never seen this mentioned. This would be a necessary key to keeping the Japanese fleet on station blockading Pearl Harbor.

What's the old saying...Expect the unexpected.

The British also had two fleet carriers in the Far East at the time, HMS Illustrious and HMS Indomitable. Yet, you ignore or unaware of them. Why would Japan focus on two US carriers some thousands of miles away, and ignore two fleet carriers in their own backyard? You don;t make any sense here.

The 11th Air Fleet was a land-based unit that was part of the Imperial Japanese Naval Air Force, not a carrier-based one. There also was no 5th Air Force at the time...It was the Far East Air Force(FEAF). The carriers from Kido Butai supported several Japanese inavsions during this time, as well as undertaking a raid on Darwin, and their raid into the Indian Ocean, as can be seen by their individual TROMs here: http://www.combinedfleet.com/cvlist.htm

Again, read their TROMS...

December - Attacked Pearl, Hiryu and Soryu also support 2nd invasion of Wake.
January - support invasion of Papua, New Guinea, and Rabaul, New Britain. Also support operations in the DEI.
February - chase after American carriers that raided the Marshall Islands. Also, raid Darwin, Australia. Also support operations in the DEI.
March - More operations in the DEI. Begin the Indian Ocean raid.
April - Indian Ocean raid. Also, chase after Halsey's carriers after the Doolittle raid.
May - Coral Sea.
June - Midway and Aleutians.

There may be other actions I have forgotten, and not all Kido Butai carriers participated in these actions.

 

Thanks.

a. (It was hard to find the specific info on the further route of the specific fleet from the PH attack...it is always "the " japanese fleet..attacked this on this date, or "the " combined fleet (with all vessels all over pacific joined)..joined operations there).
b. I didnot realise that there wasn't a supply/replenishment ship system introduced in the Japanese and US navy pacific fleets ! But you were right..(ggl search) it came with the pacific war logistics problems..and came into play in the 1943's..with the USnavy. how about that ..

Regarding the UK carriers..I only remembered 1 carrier, not 2..and that 1 carrier was already active on west side of malaysia and thus it was dealt with by the jap aircraft in the malaysia sphere...in dec 41...
However, must have been another carrier ? wiki is clear: HMS indomitable in Ceylon end of jan 42, HMS illustrious stayed in Mediterranean?

So if as naval commander you are between PH and Midway/Wake end of dec 41 and you learned that UK PoW and Rep are sunk (dec 41) and the carrier indomitable is still far from Ceylon...(Japan had spies and wld guess well where they were)
and the fight in Malaysia is under japanese control (at least Jap showed the initiative all the time).. why the "urgent" rush to get to Singapore/DEI (takes at least 3 weeks ?) ?


answer; to conquer DEI faster (tactical faster gain) ...yes, but at the expense of releasing free US carrier control on the east pacific much sooner.
Strategically I still find it a bad trade.
But was Yamamoto aware of this or not ?

 

Trying to answer the original question, the only basis I know of for calling Yamamoto a genius was the Pearl Harbor attack.... otherwise (and perhaps including that) he was going against outmatched and/or unprepared opposition. The first two times (Coral Sea and Midway) that the Kido Butai was called upon to defeat a force that could be called equal or close to it, they failed on both occasions, failed miserably in the second one, and you'd think that in an even match would be where "genius" would come through, but it wasn't demonstrated either time, or afterward. So taken in total, you'd have to say that to some degree they just got lucky at Pearl Harbor - a lot of things had to fall into place for that attack to "succeed" (if you can call it a success in the absence of the American carriers). Yamamoto scored points for audacity at Pearl Harbor though. Actually I'm unclear how much Yamamoto had to do with the Coral Sea operation, but I'll stick with my point here.

And a tangential point: the Pearl Harbor attack, while a tactical success for Japan when you tally up the forces present on that day, was a strategic disaster for them, as it brought an enraged industrial giant into the war which still had its aircraft carriers. If they'd bagged the carriers it would have been successful.

 

sounds very logical....

 

Coral Sea was a tactical victory for the IJN, the USN lost a very precious flight deck. However, losing the Hosho and putting the Sho out of order turned back their plans to capture Port Moresby. Midway was overconfidence, and planning based on what they expected the USN to do, and not what the USN COULD do. You're leaving out Savo, which the USN got it's butt kicked on equal footing, along with a couple of other actions around Guadalcanal. The US ultimately prevailed because they could absorb losses the Japanese couldn't, and the US was more flexible in its planning and thought. In other words, when the USN had to learn a lesson the hard way, they learned, and improved backed by superior industrial production. The IJN was almost too dogmatic in their tactics as the war continued, and we're forced to restrict its fleet actions based on fuel availability, reserves, and materials. Something the IJN had less and less of as months went by.

 

Coral Sea was a victory for the US in which the Japanese failed to reach their objective and USN successfully defended what they intended to defend. Costly victory though.

 

It was a strategic victory for the US, but a tactical loss. The Japanese were forced to abandon their plans, but inflicted more damage on the USN than they received.

 

damage the US could make up....