Operation Eagle Claw 24 April 1980 --too complex?

to me, one of the most ''interesting'' debacles ever was Operation Eagle Claw, that was set up to free the hostages in Iran .... in hindsight, it seems like it did not have much of a chance to succeed....the operators and choppers were to be in country for two nights, ground refueling schedule did not account for unforeseen problems, like the haboobs, intel on location of all hostages was spotty, a large bus with many civilians near the refueling area created more problems,....after rescue, choppers would transport all to a nearby base, that was supposed to be captured by Army Rangers,, for C130 pick up....etc etc
.was this not too complex of a rescue operation?
I think haboob should be the word of the month...it can be used for many different things and sounds like it's definition....''your thesis is like a haboob''.... ''your post left me feeling habooby''......

http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/05/the-desert-one-debacle/304803/ .

here is a somewhat lengthy 'human' story on the operation, but I found it easy and smooth to read....

 

Iran is to the Middle East what Russia is to Europe, Too bloody big to deal with.

Quite simply for the factor's surrounding the hostage situation they had nothing that could do the job, They had to put together an ad hoc force and paid for it. It's the reason the US know has the Osprey, A great bloody machine.

 

They could have pulled it off except the operations commander, Charlie Beckwith, due to overly strict operational security restrictions, never allowed the different component parts to practice together, and some had virtually no practice at all. There were also some maintenance issues with the helicopters because they had been at sea for an extended time on a deployment. It would have made more sense if they had used a different squadron whose aircraft had more recently had extended maintenance performed on them. The plan was also overly complicated. Just not very well planned or executed. This was not due to the men that actually deployed on the operation, it was a failure within the leadership.

 

The helicopters employed were navy minesweeping types, RH-53Ds embarked in Nimitz, not part of her normal air group, and for this mission flown by Marines.

 

That is correct, I knew they were Navy helicopters and had been selected over the Marine Corps CH-53's because they had extra fuel capacity in the landing gear sponsons that gave them extended range. The Airforce's MH-53 "Pavelow" had the best avionics, but there were too few of them and the range issue again. I remembered that there were corrosion and maintenance issues so I looked it up. HM-16's RH-53's had seen a high operational tempo leading up to their deployment to the Nimitz, first setting a high standard for operational tempo in Feb/Mar 1979, with 162 hours of minesweeping operations, then a deployment exercise on the USS Shreveport (Ex Solid Shield '79), and then went into a joint training exercise in Canada from October 1979 until four days prior to being ordered to deploy to the Nimitz. When they returned to Norfolk on 19 May they had an, at the time, unprecedented 193 days continuously at sea. Since the operation launched on 24 April, 1980 they had been at sea for 168 days when they flew off to Desert One. The helicopters were tired. Then the night before the mission was launched there was a false fire alarm and the fire suppression system coated the helos with highly corrosive AFFF, fire retardent foam. The crews stayed up all night and tried to repair damage and remover the highly corrosive foam from the helicopters
The Marines were chosen because they had the most experience with flying heliborne assaults. The Airforce pilots had more low level, long distance, overland flying experience. The Navy pilots had more time in and were more familiar with the airframe. None of the three groups had the complete correct skill set for flying the mission.
Then the pilots were never given the meteorlogical data that was available, the C-130's, helos and the Special Operations force never flew together due to over compatmentalization. It was a bad plan made even worse by poor choices by the leaders charged with implementing it.

 

we all know the more complex an operation is ,the more chance of it to fail...this is just a mathematical fact.....well, there was no full dress rehearsal, as there was with the Son Tay raid....the Son Tay and Entebbe transport to raid was simple, as it could be because of the 'ghost' prisoners and hostages locations....and some still landed at the wrong compound at Son Tay
the Eagle Claw choppers were not known for great reliability, as we see 2 out of 8 definitely down at the refueling point....and they still had a long way to go!.....another failure was they put the spare parts kits on one chopper--the one that aborted!!
as Price stated the pilots were a hodge podge ad hoc collection, that weren't even flying their own choppers! and there was the weather intel failure
even for an imperative military raid in a non-hostage situation, especially one that is complex, you have to give your men reliable equipment, intel, and training....since this was a hostage situation, with no threats to their lives yet, I consider authorizing this operation almost criminal.....complex plan + unreliable training + unreliable choppers + intel fail=total fail......the Spectator page below has some other thoughts...you might want to read the whole page......Entebbe and SonTay---- fast in fast out


It is axiomatic that in war only the simple succeeds, but the mission plan for Eagle Claw was complex, maximizing the chances for confusion and mishaps. It called for the coordination of two foreign governments (Egypt and Oman), Green Beret advance teams, Iranian collaborators, Delta Force, and the Nimitz Task Force; for the seizure and maintenance of three landing zones, the staging of a major refueling operation, and an approach drive to the Embassy of some 60 miles in borrowed trucks; and it called for a force of six large transport planes, eight helicopters, and more than a hundred men to remain inside a hostile country for more than 72 hours. This last part of the plan obviously violates one of the cardinal rules of commando operations: fast in and fast out.
Read more at http://spectator.org/articles/34807/why-rescue-failed

 

this article deals with the decision making and statistical probabilities of these types of operations' success....also, it states what everyone does with their own ideas and plans, and that is ''hope'' and 'believe'' they will work, even if they don't have a chance..also a critical factor at that time, Delta Force was trained with the concept that they would be able to be transported to the hostage area that was in a ''friendly'' country

https://masterkan.wordpress.com/2014/06/15/operation-eagle-claw-1980-years-ago-col-beckwith-nd-i-exchanged-e-mails/

 

The author also insinuates that the pilot of number 5 aborted simply because of the sand storm. "Helo Number Five entered a blinding dust-storm and, at less than twenty-five minutes to clear conditions and less than an hour from Desert One, reversed course and returned to the mother ship."
In actuality he had either a malfuntioning altimeter or gyroscopic system and had been flying in "a bowl of milk" for an extended period of time. The helicopter pilot that aborted did so without knowing how much further he would have to fly in order to come out of the haboob (25 minutes in actuality) or if the rendezvous point was even clear (it was). After the fact he stated had he known, he would have gone on, but with his instruments on the blink and suffering with vertigo, he made the decision based upon an unknown, when the information was available but not provided to him.

As insinuated in the first article, Beckwith pretty much lost control of the situation and kind of panicked. After the fact he was the primary finger pointer, but from what I've read, and heard at the time, he was one of the problems.

 

yes, the news always ''leaves out'' critical information to make a story sound more exciting, etc....and let me add that Delta Force was a very young organization and this was its first mission....Beckwith did have extensive experience in SpecOps, but the force as a whole did not....so add that to the list....
let me ask you about the hide out plan in hostile country during the day...does this not sound super risky, unbelievable, etc for a hostage rescue? hiding 6 big choppers and the force?? sounds something like a Rambo movie

 

Actually, the SF guys that made up Delta had a lot of operational experience. While the unit itself was new, there was a ton of operational experience. Delta is still primarily made up of guys from the SF Teams, with a smaller proportion directly from the Ranger battalions, and even a few Marines. BTW, Delta also got their clocks cleaned in Grenada.

I wouldn't call it an optimal plan, but Iran is a very big country with a lot of very sparsely populated areas. It would be possible, but requires a lot of discipline, correct SOP's and training, not something the hodge podge of assets thrown together for this operation would have. This is particularly true of the severe restriction of information to and compartmentalization of the different elements. Many didn't get information they needed and didn't know who was responsible for what. The civilian leaderships desire not to produce any Iranian civilian casualties and the restrictions placed upon the operators led directly to the bus and tow truck/jeep incident that was part of the downward spiral in Eagle Claw that led to panic. Beckwith, just made the situation worse, he should have had more contact with, clearer instructions to, and more oversite of the operators providing security at Desert One. A highly kinetic, extremely violent response will normally cause civilians, and many trained soldiers to go all "deer in the headlights" allowing you to get control of the situation before they recover from the shock. This actually reduces the loss of life to the targets, because you're not forced to kill them to gain control.

 

I like the hide out idea...very bold......but I don't know about for this situation....I see your point on the how it would be feasible....I've been searching a lot and have read a few books on it, but never found out why they blew up the tanker....I guess they thought the driver had compromised Desert One...much thanks for your replies

 

Chairbound "warriors" have a tendency to assume that if you put together the appropriate numbers of men and equipment, it's the same as having a functioning unit, ready to carry out a mission. Unfortunately it's not that simple.

 

I believe there are 'chairbounders' ...such as McNamara, and those idiots that let the bomber kill 7 CIA agents in Afghanistan, etc etc....they are not/were not ''street''wise...because of Eagle Claw's failure, the Night Stalkers 160th Reg. was formed...and we've heard from some on this and other posts about the importance of the esprit de corps of a unit....

 

Then again no matter how good a unit is, if misused they are still vulnerable. Look at the Night Stalkers in Mogadishu. Command knew they were vulnerable to RPG fire because the Somali's had shot down a 101st Airborne UH-60 on 25 September. Nevertheless, when they decided upon the raid they went with a helicopter insertion. The raid now known as "Blackhawk Down" went off on 03 October. The first MH-60, Super 61, was shot down by an RPG at @1420 about 40 minutes into the raid, then Super 68 took an RPG hit and had to return to base. Why was Super 64 still orbiting the area 20 minutes later when it was shot down? Then they sent another helo in, Super 62 (with Gordon and Shughart) and it too was hit by an RPG and had to return to base. Wouldn't you think, knowing that the Somali's were using RPG's to shoot down helo's (based upon the 25 September shoot down) that you'd be more careful when employing your choppers? Then once Super 61 was shot down, wouldn't you keep your big vulnerable MH-60's out of the area?

 

Was the problem the helicopter insertion, or that they were still loitering over the battle zone for an hour after? I can't claim any great expertise, but my understanding of helicopter insertions is that you drop off the troops as quickly as possible and clear the area. Going in by helo may have been the only way to catch the targets, but the plan all along was to extract the team and prisoners by ground vehicles, so what were the MH-60s hanging around for? RPGs are not anti-aircraft weapons, but if you let the bad guys take enough shots, eventually they're going to get lucky.

Even if a helicopter evacuation was needed, it would probably have been better to do another quick in-and-out than have them circling over the hot zone waiting to see if they were needed.

I could see the MH-6s staying on station to provide fire support, but they were a lot less vulnerable; I don't recall any of them being lost, or damaged except when they went down to help the downed MH-60s.

 

I posted about this in my thread ''Choppers and RPGs'' I'll state again, it was my understanding from reading Black Hawk Down, that they weren't 'too' worried about RPGs much....but it seems like a built up area is a great place for an RPG ambush with a hit and hide type attack......now, I haven't read that book in a while though.......from what you say Price, I think that it close to the idea though
...,yes, why were they circling overhead? I've been trying to search that...some kind of support role....I guess I'll have to read the books again...

 

I read the book too and don't think it told why they were orbiting the city.

Poor man's AA, you fire them in salvo's. They knew it was a factor before they went in.

Yeah, I went back and read what I wrote and it wasn't correct. I didn't have a problem with the Delta/SEAL insertion, the MH-6 is stealthy, agile, a small target, well armed and with a 27.4' rotor diameter can set down or move through tight areas. The MH-60 is much more limited due to it's 53' 8" rotor diameter (almost double).

That's the million dollar question. Like I said the first aircraft downed was 40 minutes after the SpecOps guys hit the target at 15:42. The ground element arrived 10 minutes later. So the ground element was at the target 30 minutes prior to the first Blackhawk being shot down.

 

They were not too worried about RPGs, because they were not to worried about resistance. The previous six missions run had not encountered any serious enemy resistance. This, the seventh, turned out to be a completely different ballgame.

Airborne fire support.

http://inquirer.philly.com/packages/somalia/nov21/default21.asp

Mark Bowden's Philly Inquirer series can be found here - Lot's of good stuff on the battle: http://inquirer.philly.com/packages/somalia/sitemap.asp

 

we had Delta Force on our ship with the Little Birds and as Price says, they are small...almost like toys compared to the huge 53s....I think they had 2 in the hangar with some Blackhawks [ IIRC ]...they were on for a training op where our boys would 'close off' the area for DForce....... that's when we didn't get any port calls for a long time..I think it was over 30 days without one [ IIRC ].....had 'steel' beach parties......we were off Beirut when they had hostages around there in 1987....
do I sound like a jerk, when I bring up 'relevant' events, etc, to the topic....like this post?? I mean it's first hand knowledge....but I don't want to sound like a know-it-all, ''etc'', which I can tell you I don't...please, crack me with a frying pan or something, if I'm ''overboard''