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Battle of Crete 1941


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#26 Lost Watchdog

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Posted 30 June 2010 - 11:30 AM

I remember being in Crete about 20 years ago with a copy of the British official history and another book (by a New Zealand doctor who's name I cant remember) and actually standing in the places described in the books. An Amazing and humbling experience.
Those who live by the sword will be shot by those of us who have progressed

#27 stevenz

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Posted 30 June 2010 - 09:19 PM

Steven;
Thanks again-fascinating story and it is interesting that General Student played a role in the Allied defeat at Arnhem some three years later; Military History Online - Momentum Lost: The Battle for the Arnhem Startline
JeffinMNUSA
PS. I lived on Crete for a while in 1973 and the place was still buzzing with stories of the battles and resistance. There were some gentlemen from all over I took to be veterans on tour, but I never managed to strike up conversations with any of these. I should have.


The Germans had the benefit of being able to learn from our mistakes there commanders were a lot quicker at reacting than ours and they were lucky they also found the whole allied battle plan i think in a glider.

#28 Gebirgsjaeger

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Posted 30 June 2010 - 09:23 PM

The Germans had the benefit of being able to learn from our mistakes there commanders were a lot quicker at reacting than ours and they were lucky they also found the whole allied battle plan i think in a glider.


Hi Steve,

it was a great present that the allies gave to the Wehrmacht. I suppose without it, it would have been much harder and maybe impossible to beat your troops.

Regards

Ulrich
Regards, Ulrich

Horrido!

"We're surrounded. That simplifies our problem!" LtGen. Chesty Puller.

#29 stevenz

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Posted 01 July 2010 - 03:39 AM

Hi Steve,

it was a great present that the allies gave to the Wehrmacht. I suppose without it, it would have been much harder and maybe impossible to beat your troops.

Regards

Ulrich


Hi geb you have to wonder what the hell they were thinking carrying the whole battle plan with maps into battle with them it,s hard to believe they did it it,s so dumb.

#30 Gebirgsjaeger

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Posted 01 July 2010 - 05:48 PM

We made the same mistake with the Netherlands but they won´t believe that´s true!
Bad luck for them.

Regards

Ulrich
Regards, Ulrich

Horrido!

"We're surrounded. That simplifies our problem!" LtGen. Chesty Puller.

#31 stevenz

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Posted 01 July 2010 - 11:54 PM

We made the same mistake with the Netherlands but they won´t believe that´s true!
Bad luck for them.

Regards

Ulrich


The Germans lost all there battle plans.?

#32 Gebirgsjaeger

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Posted 02 July 2010 - 11:27 AM

Yes, i have to look in my books. Somewhere it was descriped how this happened.

Regards

Ulrich
Regards, Ulrich

Horrido!

"We're surrounded. That simplifies our problem!" LtGen. Chesty Puller.

#33 JeffinMNUSA

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Posted 02 July 2010 - 03:03 PM

The Germans had the benefit of being able to learn from our mistakes there commanders were a lot quicker at reacting than ours and they were lucky they also found the whole allied battle plan i think in a glider.

Steven;
The Wehrmacht of 1941 was the first modern army; complete with effective comm, land/air coordination, automatic weapons and a leadership that was not burdened with WWI tactical doctrine. Our guys found the fighting easiest when they were still parachuting down from the sky-Beavor relates how they made quail hunting references to the numbers of enemy bagged. Once the Fallschrimjaegers were on the ground the game got much rougher.
JeffinMNUSA
PS. A link to books; http://www.hellenicb...orld_war_ii.htm

Edited by JeffinMNUSA, 03 July 2010 - 01:55 PM.

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#34 stevenz

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Posted 03 July 2010 - 09:45 AM

Steven;
The Wehrmacht of 1941 was the first modern army; complete with effective comm, land/air coordination, automatic weapons and a leadership that was not burdened with WWI tactical doctrine. Our guys found the fighting easiest when they were still parachuting down from the sky-Beavor relates how they made quail hunting references to the numbers of enemy bagged. Once the Fallschrimjaegers were on the ground the game got much rougher.
JeffinMNUSA


Thats true but it is also true that all the rifle companies in the 5th brigade area held there ground and none were defeated in the first 24 hrs.

The 22nd battalion withstood a huge air bombardment and they didn,t take this bombardment in bunkers or caves they were in slit trenches they hade dug for the most part with bayonets and helmets because they didn,t have shovels the dust hadn,t even cleared from the bombing and the german gliders were landing our guys didn,t collaspe from the bombing they were heads up and firing and they took on the equivilent of two full strength parachute battalions and fought them to stop and these battalions were not destroyed in the air they were landed safely out of range of our defences.

One of our platoons 23 men were asked to hold a front of 1400m directly in the face of the german attack and they fought till they had 100% casulties our machine gunners from 27th machine gun battalion had enough bullets for 7mins of rapid fire and that was all a lot of our people didn,t even have proper grenades they were throwing jam tins packed with concrete and gelignite yet our people still held on and at the end of that fight the germans were shot to pieces there own commanders have admitted they only got through the first night because of the failure of our senior leadership to carry out there orders to counter attack.

In prision Valley where large numbers of germans were able to form up on the ground and attack our petrol company as they tried to capture galatas and cut off the coast road they were again shot up badly.

Our petrol company was exactly that a company of drivers with no infantry training and listed as being 5 short of there allot men of rifles,and they had one bren gun,one lewis gun and one boys anti tank rifle and they had one pick and shovel for the whole company as well as no mortar or artillary support yet they were able to repulse repeated attacks and at the end of that days fight the para had failed to take any of there objectives.

Not bad going for a company of truck drivers and General Heydrich in Command of 3rd para said if we had counter attacked on the first night in his words they would have been in the cart but our two brigade commanders frim 4th brigade and 10th brigade asked to counter attack and we turned down by senior leadership.

#35 stevenz

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Posted 03 July 2010 - 09:57 AM

The failure to carry out the orders to counter attack after the enemy had been heavily engaged and smashed is what turned the battle and the germans para only played a secondry role from that point it was the germans mountain division that was brought in that provided the bulk of the numbers.

Once the germans got a foothold and were able to bring in big numbers of reinforcements with the shortages of equipment and ammo and with no air support the allied forces were never going to win a battle of attrition.

The germans had weight of fire in there favour machineguns,mortar,artillary airpower ammuntion supplies radios to communicate and they could just advance down the Island behind that firepower forcing our forces to engage then hitting them with dive bombers and starfing them them from the air.

The situation we faced on Crete was no different to what the germans faced on Normandy if we wanted to win with the shortages we faced we needed to hit them immediatly with full force and deny them a foothold and smash them in the first 24hrs the fight had to be short and sharp when our commanders failed to do this they threw away our chance of winning.

#36 Gebirgsjaeger

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Posted 03 July 2010 - 11:19 AM

Steven,

good points! I read a war diary from an german Para in that he wrote of the problems to take a small hill with a farm on it. They neede the whole day and lost completely their officers. There was no chance to move in the open ground and he said their opponents didn´t waste ammo. They only shot at clear visible targets which means Para´s that wanted to move.
The reason why your troops lost this battle is in my opinion are the old fashioned senior leaders which learned their work in the WWI era.
Ah, and here is the info about the unlucky german officer who lost the assault plans for the French war. It were Major Hellmuth Reinberger and a commander of the Luftflotte 2 Major Hönmanns who had to transport the plans from his place to Cologne. But after an party with lot of alcohol they flew with their Me 108 "Taifun" through bad weather in the wrong direction. And after an emergency landing they met an farmer, but he was an Belgian and immediately some belgian soldiers captured them and Reinberger tried to throw the plans in a fire but the Belgians got them and so they knew the plan. But they thought it was a trick and didn´t reacted right. And the starting assault of the Wehrmacht could go on. Hitler wasn´t amused and said the two Majors should be killed.

Regards

Ulrich
Regards, Ulrich

Horrido!

"We're surrounded. That simplifies our problem!" LtGen. Chesty Puller.

#37 JeffinMNUSA

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Posted 03 July 2010 - 04:27 PM

Steven,

good points! I read a war diary from an german Para in that he wrote of the problems to take a small hill with a farm on it. They neede the whole day and lost completely their officers. There was no chance to move in the open ground and he said their opponents didn´t waste ammo. They only shot at clear visible targets which means Para´s that wanted to move.
The reason why your troops lost this battle is in my opinion are the old fashioned senior leaders which learned their work in the WWI era.
Ah, and here is the info about the unlucky german officer who lost the assault plans for the French war. It were Major Hellmuth Reinberger and a commander of the Luftflotte 2 Major Hönmanns who had to transport the plans from his place to Cologne. But after an party with lot of alcohol they flew with their Me 108 "Taifun" through bad weather in the wrong direction. And after an emergency landing they met an farmer, but he was an Belgian and immediately some belgian soldiers captured them and Reinberger tried to throw the plans in a fire but the Belgians got them and so they knew the plan. But they thought it was a trick and didn´t reacted right. And the starting assault of the Wehrmacht could go on. Hitler wasn´t amused and said the two Majors should be killed.

Regards

Ulrich


It did take our guys several sharp defeats before they figured out that their WWI field manuals were obsolete. A failure of doctrine on the German side was the new NAZI practice of taking mass reprisals on the civilian population. German Army Atrocities in Crete - Resistance in Crete It seems that everywhere the Wehrmacht went insurgency was bound to follow.
JEffinMNUSA
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#38 Gebirgsjaeger

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Posted 03 July 2010 - 04:41 PM

It did take our guys several sharp defeats before they figured out that their WWI field manuals were obsolete. A failure of doctrine on the German side was the new NAZI practice of taking mass reprisals on the civilian population. German Army Atrocities in Crete - Resistance in Crete It seems that everywhere the Wehrmacht went insurgency was bound to follow.
JEffinMNUSA


Jeff,

i agree that it was a giantic mistake to do such reprisals. But most times it wasn´t the Wehrmacht or better said it wasn´t started by the Wehrmacht. Such atrocities were started by SS and Gestapo. But you´re thats no the way to find new friends. But you have to admit that the Brit´s told the Crete people that the all the Germans were monsters and they have to kill them. So there happened some bad things made from the farmers and other civilians. And you now a reaction will follow an action.
Not correct solved by the Wehrmacht!

Regards

Ulrich
Regards, Ulrich

Horrido!

"We're surrounded. That simplifies our problem!" LtGen. Chesty Puller.

#39 JeffinMNUSA

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Posted 03 July 2010 - 04:52 PM

Jeff,

i agree that it was a giantic mistake to do such reprisals. But most times it wasn´t the Wehrmacht or better said it wasn´t started by the Wehrmacht. Such atrocities were started by SS and Gestapo. But you´re thats no the way to find new friends. But you have to admit that the Brit´s told the Crete people that the all the Germans were monsters and they have to kill them. So there happened some bad things made from the farmers and other civilians. And you now a reaction will follow an action.
Not correct solved by the Wehrmacht!

Regards

Ulrich


Ulrich;
Well Hitler being Hitler-a sort of"Charlie Manson with absolute power"-it really could have been no other way. The fact that these iron fisted occupation policies blew up in his face every time did not seem to phase the dictator. Fanatics are like that...
JeffinMNUSA
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#40 Gebirgsjaeger

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Posted 03 July 2010 - 05:00 PM

Jeff,

you´re so right!

Ulrich
Regards, Ulrich

Horrido!

"We're surrounded. That simplifies our problem!" LtGen. Chesty Puller.

#41 stevenz

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Posted 03 July 2010 - 08:14 PM

A lot of people can,t understand how our officers could have been so bad on Crete and i wondered the same thing and i learned over the years that if you want to find out the answer why you have to look off the battle field to the 1930,s in New Zealand.

After WW1 which was supposed to be the war to end all wars the army was disbanded and not one brigade sized exercise was carried out between WW1 and the beginning of WW2 even worse officers were not able to go over seas and train with other armies until 1934 so the end result was at the beginning of WW2 our officer corps was full of men whose knowledge of war was based on WW1 principles we did have some younger officers who had a clue but the senior officers who were going to have the final say in battle were old men from WW1.

Our army was one full battalion and about 1500 reserves with hardly any weapons we had guys marching with broom handles instead of rifles.

Even after the division was built up a lot of people in the division knew things were not where they needed to be i have a quote in one of my books i can,t remember who the individual was but he told Freyberg quote"the weakness is in the battalion commanders there is going to have to be a cleanout" and on Crete it was in the battalion commmanders that the disaster happened at malame with all three battalion commanders from the 21stn22nd,23rd plus the brigade commander hargest failing to carry out there orders.

One of the battalion commanders Howard Kippenburger who went on to command the division also said quote'' there are going to be disasters and we should expect heavy casulties" so people in the division knew we really weren,t prepared for what we were getting into but there was also nothing we could do about it at the time we just had to go with what we had.

Another interesting point was the Brigade commander james Hargest who was in charge at malame and failed to carry out the battle plan he was not wanted by Freyberg and the army at the start of WW2 but Hargest was a member of parliment and pulled strings with the prime minister Peter Fraser to get himself into the division and so freyberg had no choice but to put him in charge of a brigade and boy did that come back to bite us.

It,s a lesson for all nations about what can happen when people are appointed to military positions because of who they know not what they know.

It is very sad for us the fact that of the three brgade commanders on the Island Lindsay Inglis who was in Charge of 4th brigade and Howard Kippenburger who was in charge of 10th brigade in Prison Valley both called for immediate counter attacks and were both turned down by the divisional commander Puttick.

The 4th brigade 18th,19th,20th battalions the 19th was in prision valley the 18th near prison valley and the 20th was in reserve.

In prison valley we had the 19th battalion,6th greek regiment and the composite battalion made up of the petrol company,artillary regiments with no artillery etc brave but with no infantry training and not much in the way of weapons except rifles.

Brgadiar Inglis wanted to take the whole 4th brigade on the frist day into prison valley link up with the composite battalion which was about 1000 strong wipe out the germans in the area then head for Malame and link up with 5th brigade but he was turned down by the divisional commander puttick and it was reported that when the word come through that the request for the attack had been turned down the brgade major starting screaming we,ve lost crete and Inglis reply was you don,t have to tell me that.

Kippenburger who was in charge of the soldiers in prison valley had a problem that it was hard for him to counter attack with the troops he had because they had no infantry training and the 19th had a place to hold in the area so he needed the 20th battalion a proper infantry battalion from the reserve to lead the attack and the other non infantry types could follow but he was also turned down.

Puttick said that Prision Valley was only a secondary front and was only a holding action and our commanders were cautious of using up there reserve because we had been told through the secret ultra communications that the sea borne landing was going to be 10,000 strong baring in mind that the new Zealand division on the island was 7700 strong with no vehicles so we had no ability to mass large numbers of troops in an area quickly and in day light hours we couldn,t move anyway because the planes would smash us so our commanders held the reserve back in the vital early days of the battle.

It should also be noted that the divisional commander puttick was sent home after crete and never served overseas again and the 22nd battalion commander at Malame Colonal Andrew was sent home early 1942 the offical line was to train soldiers at home from i understand the real reason was they had lost confidence in him and after the war officers were scathing of him and his performance on Crete.

Another intersting point i read in one of my books was i think Brigadar Inglis from 4th brigade commenting on the fact that there was no counter attack in the first vital 36 hours and there seemed to be an obbsesion with static defenses and barbed wire which again reverts back to that WW1 doctrine.

Edited by stevenz, 03 July 2010 - 08:19 PM.


#42 Erich

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Posted 03 July 2010 - 08:19 PM

not sure about accepting that all the German battle plans were lost, let us remember that many of the Para CO"s were either killed or wounded gravely in the jump and it was up to the NCO's down to lowly privates to make command decisions in an area they really knew nothing about. obvious too the LW paras did not know about the resiliancie of the Allied ground forces on the island. also the way the LW paras were incredibly spread out for miles their unification only came later in the battle when it was just small battle units trying to contain the Allied defenses early on and paid for it with their lives.
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#43 stevenz

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Posted 03 July 2010 - 08:21 PM

It did take our guys several sharp defeats before they figured out that their WWI field manuals were obsolete. A failure of doctrine on the German side was the new NAZI practice of taking mass reprisals on the civilian population. German Army Atrocities in Crete - Resistance in Crete It seems that everywhere the Wehrmacht went insurgency was bound to follow.
JEffinMNUSA


I agree about doctrine Jeff we were losing battle after battle till late 1942 because we weren,t doing things right like in the desert war splitting the divisions up into brigades and sending them into battle piecemeal and fighting the tanks seperate from the infantry.

#44 JeffinMNUSA

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Posted 03 July 2010 - 10:37 PM

I agree about doctrine Jeff we were losing battle after battle till late 1942 because we weren,t doing things right like in the desert war splitting the divisions up into brigades and sending them into battle piecemeal and fighting the tanks seperate from the infantry.


Steven;
A counterattack at Maleme D2 could have turned the whole thing. Unfortunately the Allied command was not that fast on the draw, and the Axis was able to land the Mountain Div. So why could such relatively small numbers of troops make such a critical difference? Well they were Wehrmacht troops...
JEffinMNUSA
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#45 Gebirgsjaeger

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Posted 04 July 2010 - 01:44 PM

not sure about accepting that all the German battle plans were lost, let us remember that many of the Para CO"s were either killed or wounded gravely in the jump and it was up to the NCO's down to lowly privates to make command decisions in an area they really knew nothing about. obvious too the LW paras did not know about the resiliancie of the Allied ground forces on the island. also the way the LW paras were incredibly spread out for miles their unification only came later in the battle when it was just small battle units trying to contain the Allied defenses early on and paid for it with their lives.



Sorry if i worried you! The explanation was about loosing the "Sichelschnitt" plannings for the Battle of France. It should only show Steven that not only the allies lost their plans.

Regards

Ulrich
Regards, Ulrich

Horrido!

"We're surrounded. That simplifies our problem!" LtGen. Chesty Puller.

#46 JeffinMNUSA

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Posted 04 July 2010 - 03:12 PM

Sorry if i worried you! The explanation was about loosing the "Sichelschnitt" plannings for the Battle of France. It should only show Steven that not only the allies lost their plans.

Regards

Ulrich


Ulrich;
It didn't seem to matter that the Allied commanders knew of the German plans in France 1940; they did not seem to believe in the feasibility of mobile warfare in the first place. They were about to learn...
JeffinMNUSA
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#47 Gebirgsjaeger

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Posted 04 July 2010 - 03:27 PM

Jeff,

they learned it the hard way and to late for some countries. But than they were really good to beat us with our own tactics.

Regards

Ulrich
Regards, Ulrich

Horrido!

"We're surrounded. That simplifies our problem!" LtGen. Chesty Puller.

#48 stevenz

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Posted 04 July 2010 - 09:26 PM

Steven;
A counterattack at Maleme D2 could have turned the whole thing. Unfortunately the Allied command was not that fast on the draw, and the Axis was able to land the Mountain Div. So why could such relatively small numbers of troops make such a critical difference? Well they were Wehrmacht troops...
JEffinMNUSA


On the second day of the battle no counter attack could be attempted in day light because of the german airpower so all day the germans were able to bring in reinforcements 800 mountain troops and a battalion of para were also dropped approx 600 about 350 were dropped on the west side of hill 107 on german ground and were safe another 240 were dropped on the east side where our people were and 160 were killed the other 80 escaped up the beach so all up they were able to get around 1200 on the ground basically they were able to replace most of what they had lost on the first day and by the end of the 2nd day had 1800 on the ground fit for action and had resupplied with ammo and brought in more equipment.

Our commanders were afraid of the seaborne landing they had been told by the secret Ultra communications that it was 10,000 strong keep in mind the New Zealand division was 7700 strong short on ammo and equipment and totally immobile we had no vehicles so had no way to mass in an area quickly in big numbers and even if we had vehicles we couldn,t move in daylight because of the german airpower.

When it came time to attack our commanders insisted on the 20th battalion that was in reserve at canea carrying out the attack with the 28th maori with the 23rd battalion operating in a mopping up role but this was a mistake 5th brigade at malame was made up of

21st battalion approx 350 strong
23rd battalion aprox 540 strong
28th maori approx 600 strong
22nd battalion approx 250 strong
Engineers fighting as infantry approx 300

The 22nd were split into two companies headquarters company and D company went with the 21st and A,B,C companies went with the 23rd so each of those battalions would have had there numbers boosted by around 125.

The attack should have been carried out by the 23rd and 28th because they were close and could have moved as soon as it was dark and they were ready with the 20th coming up from canea to mop up but it didn,t happen and the conseqences were severe because they were so afraid of the seaborne landing they wouldn,t let the 20th move from there coastal postion until the Australians had arrived to replace them so instead of getting off the start line at 1.30am they didn,t get away until 3.30am and were only about 30mins off the start line and were already engaged so they had to fight there way to Malame which slowed them down.

One of the companies of the 20th reached the airfield but by the time they got there it was daylight and the german mortar and machine gun crews could see our people on the edge of the airfield and the Germans plane were back in the air machine gunning and our people couldn,t cross they got pinned down.

The attack was carried out by the 20th and 28th in the dark the 21st with the company of the 22nd that was attached to it started there attack moving along the southern flank of hill 107 towards the river bed around 7.00am already daylight.

The total number of riflemen and company officers depolyed in the attack would have been around 1000-1100 and they had nothing in the the way of tank,artillary or air support and even motar support was minimal so they needed the night once they lost the cover of darkness they were in trouble.The germans were well armed with Mg 34 belt feds and mortar and had air supremecy there planes were machine gunning and bombing anything that moved.

Trying to attack an enemy defender in daylight with nothing but rifle and bayonet no heavy weapon support of any kind and they are well armed with automatics and mortars and have control of the air is never going to work.

Our commanders sent to small a force and they got off the line to late because they were so afraid of the seaborne threat and it was a threat that played on our commanders minds the whole fight they were always trying to fight looking over there shoulders and it had a big effect on there conduct in the battle.

Edited by stevenz, 04 July 2010 - 09:37 PM.


#49 stevenz

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Posted 04 July 2010 - 09:55 PM

Steven;
A counterattack at Maleme D2 could have turned the whole thing. Unfortunately the Allied command was not that fast on the draw, and the Axis was able to land the Mountain Div. So why could such relatively small numbers of troops make such a critical difference? Well they were Wehrmacht troops...
JEffinMNUSA


It wasn,t just the fact that they were Wehrmacht troops it was also the fact that they had far superior weight of fire on the ground ie machineguns,mortar,artillery they also had total air supremecy and far better communications to direct there troops movements call in air strikes and direct there mortar and artillery fire and they had a resupply of ammunition the allies didn,t.

Once the airfield was lost the allies were stuffed because they didn,t have the logistcs to fight a long battle by the 22nd the 3rd day of the fight the Maori battalion was already suffering shortages by the 24th the 4th Brigade had 72 mortar rounds for the whole brigade and the front at galatas they had 6 vickers guns for a front of 2km.

Our artillary in the battle was 49 captured Italian 75mm with 350 rounds per gun a drop in a bucket in a fierce battle on top of that the guns were pathetic they had no sites our people had to make sights out of pieces of wood and chewing gum some used horse hairs and the guns had no elevation on them if you wanted to increase the range you put a bigger rock under the gun and if you wanted to decrease the range you put a smaller rock,on top of that there were no radios to call in and direct fire so the artillary had to shoot blind.

Not one of our rifle companies had a wireless set we had people running around with bits of paper and this is a modern high speed battle the equipment we were given to fight the german military at the peak of it,s power was pathetic.

#50 JeffinMNUSA

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Posted 05 July 2010 - 04:55 PM

It wasn,t just the fact that they were Wehrmacht troops it was also the fact that they had far superior weight of fire on the ground ie machineguns,mortar,artillery they also had total air supremecy and far better communications to direct there troops movements call in air strikes and direct there mortar and artillery fire and they had a resupply of ammunition the allies didn,t.

Once the airfield was lost the allies were stuffed because they didn,t have the logistcs to fight a long battle by the 22nd the 3rd day of the fight the Maori battalion was already suffering shortages by the 24th the 4th Brigade had 72 mortar rounds for the whole brigade and the front at galatas they had 6 vickers guns for a front of 2km.

Our artillary in the battle was 49 captured Italian 75mm with 350 rounds per gun a drop in a bucket in a fierce battle on top of that the guns were pathetic they had no sites our people had to make sights out of pieces of wood and chewing gum some used horse hairs and the guns had no elevation on them if you wanted to increase the range you put a bigger rock under the gun and if you wanted to decrease the range you put a smaller rock,on top of that there were no radios to call in and direct fire so the artillary had to shoot blind.

Not one of our rifle companies had a wireless set we had people running around with bits of paper and this is a modern high speed battle the equipment we were given to fight the german military at the peak of it,s power was pathetic.


Steven;
Amazing that our guys nearly won the battle for Crete-given the handicaps that they were working with. It does say something about the heroic performances of the New Zealand, Australian, British and Cretan troops that they were able to fight the mighty Wehrmacht to near defeat.
Unfortunately modern technology prevailed in this close fought battle.
JeffinMNUSA
PS. The insurgency that followed the conquest is the subject of a new documentary; http://agora-dialogue.com/?p=395

Edited by JeffinMNUSA, 22 July 2010 - 09:42 AM.

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